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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 313
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 313
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants—Subash Chandra Panda (A-1), Kunja Ramana (A-2), Narayan Mazumdar (A-3) and Kalpana Mazumdar (A-4)—were tried for kidnapping and murdering a four-year-old child, Ranjeet Mohanty, allegedly as a human sacrifice. They were charged under Sections 364, 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The prosecution story rested largely on two witnesses: PW 7 (the informant and uncle of the deceased) and PW 14 (an employee of A-1 who claimed to be an eye-witness). PW 7 lodged the First Information Report after allegedly catching A-3 while disposing of the child’s body. PW 14 narrated in detail the events leading up to and including the killing, implicating all four appellants.

The trial court convicted all appellants, characterised the offence as the “rarest of the rare,” and imposed the death penalty. The High Court upheld both conviction and sentence. The present Supreme Court judgment reviews those findings in criminal appeals and a death reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction of all four appellants could be sustained on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of PW 14, allegedly an accomplice.
  2. Whether the evidentiary circumstances against A-3, apart from PW 14’s testimony, were sufficient to uphold his conviction under Section 302 IPC rather than only Section 201 IPC.
  3. Whether the death penalty awarded to the appellants, particularly A-3, was justified.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The prosecution case relies exclusively on PW 14, whose status as an accomplice renders his uncorroborated testimony unsafe for conviction.
  • No material corroborates PW 14 on crucial aspects; if his evidence is discarded, nothing links A-1, A-2 or A-4 to the crime.
  • For A-3, being caught disposing of the body at most establishes an offence under Section 201 IPC, not murder under Section 302 IPC.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's counter-arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh, (1978) 3 SCC 279; AIR 1978 SC 1183 Factors relevant to drawing a presumption of guilt from possession or disposal of incriminating articles. Used to justify drawing a presumption of murder against A-3, who was caught red-handed disposing of the child’s body and failed to explain its possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court scrutinised PW 14’s credibility and found multiple weaknesses:

  • His police statement was recorded 19 days after the incident; he remained silent during that period despite being away in his village.
  • He admitted acting as a lookout during the killing, raising the possibility of complicity.
  • No physical corroboration existed for key details he supplied (e.g., allegedly severed tongue, hair, and nails were neither seized nor medically confirmed).
  • Investigative lapses left major gaps: unexplained relationships among accused, unclear motives, and involvement of the 17-year-old A-4.

Consequently, the Court held it unsafe to convict any accused solely on PW 14’s testimony. Removing that testimony left no evidence implicating A-1, A-2, or A-4.

For A-3, however, independent evidence existed:

  • PW 7 and four other witnesses caught him disposing of the body and heard his extra-judicial confession that others were involved.
  • Medical evidence confirmed homicidal death by strangulation.
  • A-3 offered no explanation for possession of the body, either in cross-examination or in his Section 313 statement.

Combining the incriminating circumstance of being apprehended “red-handed” with his confession, and guided by Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh, the Court drew a presumption of guilt sufficient to sustain A-3’s conviction for murder.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Convictions of A-1, A-2 and A-4 were set aside and they were ordered released if not required in other cases. A-3’s conviction under Section 302 IPC was upheld, but his death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life.

Implications: The judgment reaffirms the principle that uncorroborated testimony of a potentially complicit witness is insufficient for conviction, especially in capital cases. It also illustrates that strong circumstantial evidence—such as being found disposing of a victim’s body—can, coupled with an unexplained possession and extra-judicial confession, support a murder conviction. No new legal doctrine was created, but the decision underscores rigorous standards for evidence before imposing the death penalty.

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    Kalpana Mazumdar v. State Of Orissa .

    Y.K Sabharwal, J.— Subash Chandra Panda (A-1), Kunja Ramana (A-2), Narayan Mazumdar (A-3) and Kalpana Mazumdar (A-4), the appellants before us, are facing death penalty. The charge against them is of kidnapping and murder of a child Ranjeet Mohanty @ Rana, aged four years. They were charged for offences under Sections 364, 302 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC.

    2. The first information report was registered at the instance of Chitranjan Mohanty, PW 7. He reported that the four appellants and Simanchal Padhi had kidnapped his nephew on 30-4-1997 and subsequently killed him. According to the FIR on 1-5-1997 in the early morning while he had gone out to attend the call of nature he observed that a person was bringing something on his shoulders and he came towards the pond. The person was A-3. PW 7 caught him and an alarm was raised. People gathered there. Some are named in the FIR. They found that A-3 was carrying the dead body of the deceased and on being asked he said that he has not murdered the child alone but some other persons were also involved in the murder and he can identify them. He took all the persons to the house of A-2 who finding A-3 and others threatened to assault everyone and his field servants also came with lathi and tangi. At that time they came back but with the help of villagers they again went to the house of A-2 and then found that there is no one in the house. In the prayer room of the house they found the nails of the dead child lying with the blood as also the hair of the child. A-3 told them that in the room the nail, hair and the tongue of the child were cut and Simanchal Padhi offered prayers whereafter they took the child alive in the jeep of A-2 to the house of A-1 where the child was murdered by holding his leg and hand and throttling his neck. Simanchal Padhi, A-1 and A-2 told A-3 that they will pay Rs 25,000 to throw the boy. When he was throwing the boy in the pond PW 7 caught him red-handed. After hearing this they all went to the house of A-1. There Simanchal Padhi “the tantrik” said that he had killed the boy and he can give life to him. He offered prayers near the body for three hours and told everybody to wait but he failed to give life to the boy and ran from the house. But he was caught with his associates and handed over to the police.

    3. The four appellants were charged for the offences as aforesaid, the tantrik Simanchal Padhi having already died. It is on record that PW 7 was an accused in the case of murder of Simanchal Padhi though we do not know as to what was the result of that case.

    4. The prosecution in order to bring home the charges examined 15 witnesses. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence. PW 14, Hari Chand Sahu, was examined by the prosecution as an eyewitness to the occurrence.

    5. According to the prosecution, the deceased was kidnapped and murdered as the accused wanted to offer a human sacrifice to appease the deities on the asking of the tantrik who told them that as a result of the sacrifice A-1 will get a gold pot and A-2 will be blessed with a son. A-3 was to get Rs 25,000, A-4 is the daughter of A-3.

    6. PW 14 was an employee of A-1. He deposed to have seen everything but did not speak out on the threat that on so doing he would be killed. PW 7 claims to be an eyewitness having seen A-3 throwing the body of his deceased nephew and caught A-3 red-handed, A-3 is stated to have made extra-judicial confession before PW 7 and PWs 1, 2, 3 and 6.

    7. On appreciation of evidence, in particular the testimony of PWs 7 and 14, the learned Additional Sessions Judge held the appellants guilty of the offences earlier noticed and considering the case to be rarest of the rare imposed on the appellants death penalty. The death penalty has been confirmed by the High Court while disposing of the death reference and the criminal appeal filed by the appellants challenging their conviction and sentence.

    8. The main evidence that has been relied upon by the High Court as well as by the Sessions Court for holding the appellants guilty is the testimony of PW 14 as an eyewitness. PW 7 has also been relied upon in respect of matters noticed hereinbefore as an informant leading to FIR being registered. PW 14 has given a detailed account of the role of each of the accused. The submission urged before the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court that PW 14 was an accomplice and was not a witness to the offence was not accepted. PW 14 was held to be a mere mute spectator. The same submission has been urged before us.

    9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that although they do not dispute the factum of kidnapping and brutal murder of a young child ostensibly with a view to offer a human sacrifice to appease the deities yet their conviction is unsustainable as it is based on the sole testimony of an accomplice alone without any corroboration. It is contended that it would be highly unsafe to rely upon the testimony of PW 14 and convict the appellants. The contention is that if the testimony of PW 14 is discarded there would be no evidence to connect the appellants with the offences. It has also been contended that in none of the material aspects on which PW 14 deposed is there any corroboration.

    10. Let us first see as to what PW 14 has deposed.

    11. For appreciating the testimony of PW 14, it has also to be kept in view that his statement was recorded by the police after 19 days of the occurrence. He left the place of occurrence and went to his own village. Admittedly he did not narrate the incident to anyone even when he was in his village. He was working in the hotel of A-1 for the last five years. PW 14 was examined in court on 13-12-1999. PW 14 stated that about three years back the tantrik abovenamed came to him and asked him about the house of A-1 which he told him. A-1 called him and one rickshaw-puller at 10 p.m and gave a torchlight to him and one crowbar to the rickshaw-puller. A-1, A-3 along with the witness and rickshaw-puller went to the riverside along with puja articles. The river was crossed at 12 midnight. A-1 performed puja on his land. Next day at 10 p.m A-1 and the tantrik along with the witness again went to the land of A-1 to perform puja and they returned after performing the said puja. Next day morning one Dhanu Mistri was sent to the place of puja to dig a ditch. On the third day the rickshaw-puller was sent to dig that place. On Sunday morning the tantrik told A-1 to collect a black cock. On the same day at night they all went to the ditch with the cock. A-1 asked PW 14 to cut the cock in the ditch. PW 14 did accordingly. The tantrik placed a crossbar inside the ditch and became unconscious. PW 14 entered the ditch on the directions of A-1 and stood there out of fear and thereafter he was asked by A-1 to come out. Accused A-3 also went into the ditch. The tantrik told A-3 that the golden pot will not be available that day. After about 2 days on 30-4-1997 he (PW 14) heard that one boy was missing. At about 7 p.m PW 14 was called by A-1 to his house. There A-1 also came in a jeep and A-3 brought one child covered with a cloth. A-4 caught the boy and directed PW 14 to go to the jeep. PW 14 along with the tantrik and A-1 sat in the jeep of A-2. They all went and stayed in the house of A-2. All of them stayed in one room and PW 14 in another room. They told PW 14 not to tell about the matter to anybody otherwise he will be killed. At about 10 p.m, PW 7 came in search of the boy. He enquired about the witchcraft from A-2 who told him that witchcraft was not there. Thereafter PW 7 returned. Simanchal Padhi thereafter started puja path at about 12 midnight. All sat in the jeep, went to a place where the ditch was prepared. They all went to the ditch giving a torch to PW 14 to watch if anybody may come.

    12. PW 14 has deposed that A-4 caught the leg of the boy, A-1 pressed his belly, A-2 caught the chest of the boy and the tantrik was doing mantra path and A-3 caught the neck of the child and the child died there. They all returned in the jeep. He further deposed that hearing that the boy was caught, out of fear he went to his village.

    13. PW 14 deposed to have witnessed all the details of the occurrence. He has given roles played by all the accused and also detailed accounts of the events of four days earlier than the date of kidnapping and killing of the boy. PW 14 has further deposed that the tongue of the boy was cut, who was alive when taken in the jeep to the ditch but he was not crying.

    14. The deposition of PW 14 makes it abundantly clear that he was a witness to all the events up to the killing of the boy. PW 14 stated that he was given a torch to watch if anybody came at the place of occurrence. This shows that PW 14 was deputed to watch that when the four accused were killing the boy in the manner deposed by him, no one comes there. In other words, it means that in case he finds someone coming while the accused were killing the boy either he should inform them or ensure that nobody comes. He is said to be doing all this on account of fear and also on account of his being an employee of A-1. He did not narrate the incident to anyone for 19 days even when he was away to his village. Without going into the question whether PW 14 was an accomplice or not, it is evident, on the facts and circumstances noticed above, it is not safe to convict the appellants on the sole testimony of PW 14. Further, it is also to be borne in mind that the investigation of the case has been most tardy and unsatisfactory. Despite the fact that PW 14 deposed about the tongue of the boy being cut and PW 7 deposed that the tongue, hair and nails of the boy were found in the house of A-2, neither were those articles seized nor was it explained as to what had happened to the said articles. Moreover, the medical evidence does not support the cutting of the tongue. The age of A-2 was more than 70. It was not explained whether A-2 had a child or not and besides the testimony of PW 14 what was the material to substantiate the motive attributed to him that he wanted a child for which he became party to the sacrifice of the boy on the asking of the tantrik. It is also not explained as to what was the interconnection between A-1 and A-2. There is nothing on record to show that either they were friends or relatives. How they became common parties to the sacrifice of one human being, one in lurement of a golden pot and the other a son. None of these aspects were enquired into. Further the age of A-4 was about 17 years at the time of occurrence. If A-3 was to get Rs 25,000 as stated in the FIR of PW 7 why was the young girl of that age involved? All these aspects remained in the realm of mystery thus raising bona fide and reasonable doubt about the story of the prosecution. None bothered to investigate these aspects. The prosecution rested its case entirely on PW 14 without any corroboration of his testimony on any of the material aspects.

    15. We have minutely examined the testimony of PW 14 and for the reasons abovenoted find it difficult to affirm the conviction of the appellants on that basis alone.

    16. It is clear that if the sole testimony of PW 14 is not relied upon there would be no evidence to connect the appellants except A-3 with the commission of the offence. Under these circumstances, A-1, A-2 and A-4 are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

    17. Regarding the third accused Narayan Mazumdar, his position is different. We have given our sincere and anxious consideration to the case against the third accused. In our view even after discarding the testimony of PW 14 there is ample evidence against him. It is neither disputed nor could be disputed, having regard to the evidence on record, that this accused was caught red-handed while throwing the dead body of the deceased by the side of the tank. To that effect there is clinching evidence of PW 7 who saw A-3 disposing of the body. The FIR was registered on the report of PW 7. However the contention of learned counsel for the third accused was that the circumstance of throwing of dead body of the deceased by A-3 can only lead to his conviction for offence under Section 201 IPC and not under Section 302.

    18. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid contention of learned counsel. It stands established from the medical evidence that the deceased died a homicidal death. It was due to asphyxia on account of strangulation. None has questioned this finding. It is unquestionable on the evidence produced on record. It is also unquestionable and has also not been questioned that the prosecution has proved, as stated earlier, throwing by A-3 the body of the deceased by the side of the tank in the early hours of 1-5-1997 and at that time he was caught red-handed by PW 7. The testimony of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 6 is also to the same effect. The accused also made an extra-judicial confession before them that he alone had not killed the boy but other appellants were also with him. We have already given the reasons why the conviction of other accused cannot be maintained. Insofar as this appellant is concerned, there are the following circumstances:

    (1) Extra-judicial confession made to the prosecution witnesses.
    (2) Recording of the said confession also in the first information report.
    (3) Caught red-handed while disposing of the dead body.
    (4) Absence of explanation how the dead body came in his possession either by way of suggestion in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    19. We are conscious of the fact that extra-judicial confession for making it a basis for conviction by itself is a weak piece of evidence, such evidence deserves strict scrutiny. At the same time, however, strong circumstantial evidence can get strength from extra-judicial confession. That circumstance, in the present case, is the fact of the third accused being apprehended red-handed when he threw the dead body. It is an important piece of circumstantial evidence against him. Having regard to the facts of the case we see no reason for not drawing a presumption against the third accused for having committed the murder of the child. Our view gets sustenance from Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh (1978) 3 SCC 279, AIR 1978 SC 1183 wherein this Court held that the question whether a presumption to be drawn is a matter which depends on the evidence and circumstances of each case. The nature of the recovered articles, the manner of their acquisition by the owner, the nature of the evidence about their identification, the manner in which the articles were dealt with by the accused, the place and the circumstances of their recovery and the length of the intervening period and the ability or otherwise of the accused to explain the recovery are some of those circumstances. Despite the aforenoted circumstances duly established against the third accused, it cannot be said that conviction in respect of the third accused under Section 302 is not liable to be maintained. These circumstances are presumptive evidence of the charge of murder against the appellant.

    20. In view of the aforesaid insofar as the third accused is concerned, his conviction under Section 302 is maintained.

    21. As earlier noticed, death penalty on the third accused has been confirmed by the High Court. We have given to the other appellants benefit of doubt having discarded the sole testimony of PW 14. The conviction of this appellant has been upheld in view of evidence other than that of PW 14. Under the circumstances, in our view, the death penalty imposed on the third accused deserves to be converted into imprisonment for life.

    22. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court confirming that of the Sessions Court and give benefit of doubt to Accused 1 Subash Chandra Panda, Accused 2 Kunja Ramana and Accused 4 Kalpana Mazumdar and allow their appeals. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.

    23. While maintaining conviction of Accused 3, we set aside the death penalty imposed on him and instead impose on him imprisonment for life and to this extent his appeal also stands allowed. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.

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    Comments

    Kalpana Mazumdar v. State Of Orissa .
    (Jul 30, 2002)