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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act
  • Section 3(a) of the Act
  • Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 3 and 8 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act
  • Section 3(a) of the Act
  • Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 3 and 8 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Kundan and Mohar Singh were co-sharers of Plot No. 645 (4 bighas 8 biswas) in Village Amarpur, District Bulandshahr. On 8 April 1969 they executed an agreement to sell the land to the appellant. When no sale deed was executed, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it in the appellant’s favour.

During the defendants’ second appeal before the High Court, Mohar Singh executed a sale deed for his half share in favour of the appellant. The High Court ultimately dismissed the second appeal. As Kundan still refused to execute the sale deed, the appellant initiated execution proceedings. Kundan objected, contending that only land—not the standing trees—had been contracted for, so possession could not be delivered with the trees. The executing court upheld Kundan’s objection.

The appellant’s revision before the Additional District Judge succeeded on the ground that any trees standing on the land vested in the purchaser under Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA). Kundan then filed a writ petition; the Allahabad High Court set aside the revisional order and held that, failing compromise, the appellant would get the land while Kundan could “reap the fruits” of the trees. The present appeal challenges that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of an express reservation, trees that were saplings at the time of the agreement but matured during protracted litigation pass to the transferee under Sections 3 and 8 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in holding that the vendor could retain the benefit of the trees while the purchaser received only the land.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Invoked Sections 3 and 8 TPA and Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act to assert that land includes “things attached to the earth”, hence trees are part of the immovable property transferred.
  • At the time of the 1969 agreement only plants/saplings existed; their later growth into full-grown trees constitutes a “benefit arising out of land” that now vests in the appellant under Section 8 TPA.
  • Relied on judicial interpretation that, unless expressly excluded, transfer of land carries with it all interests embedded in or attached to that land.

No arguments from the respondents are recorded; their counsel did not appear.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532; 1959 SCR 265 “Immovable property” under the General Clauses Act includes land and things attached to the earth, therefore trees are part of land. Used to establish that trees, being rooted in the earth, form an integral part of the land sold unless expressly severed.
Divisional Forest Officer, H.P. v. Daut, AIR 1968 SC 612; (1968) 2 SCR 112 Transfer of “right, title and interest” in land normally embraces trees standing on it, unless a different intention appears. Cited to reinforce that a sale of land, without an express reservation, conveys the trees to the purchaser.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the statutory framework. Section 3 TPA defines “immovable property” by reference to what is “attached to the earth”; Section 8 TPA provides that a transfer passes “all the interest” the transferor can convey, including “rents and profits” accruing after transfer. Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act expressly includes “benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth” within “immovable property”.

Applying these provisions, the Court reasoned that standing trees—whether saplings at the contract date or fully grown at execution—are embedded in the earth and therefore part of the land. Unless the parties express a contrary intention, transfer of the land necessarily includes the trees.

The Court distinguished situations in which trees are sold separately for felling; in such cases only the timber, not the land, is conveyed. Here, however, the agreement contained no clause reserving the trees to the vendors. Consequently, both the land and whatever vegetation existed or subsequently grew formed a single subject-matter of conveyance.

Relying on Shantabai and Divisional Forest Officer cases, the Court rejected the High Court’s approach that land and trees should be severed for the vendor’s benefit. It concluded that the High Court had misdirected itself in law by allowing the vendor to “reap the fruits” of trees while divesting the land.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside.

The decree for specific performance entitles the appellant to possession of the land together with all trees standing thereon. The respondents obtain no separate right to the trees. No costs were awarded because the legal representatives of the respondents did not appear. The decision reinforces the principle that, absent explicit reservation, trees are inseparable from the land in a transfer of immovable property; however, it does not announce a new legal precedent beyond applying settled statutory interpretation.

    Suresh Chand v. Kundan (Dead) By Lrs. And Others

    Order

    1. Kundan and Mohar Singh were the co-sharers of Plot No. 645 measuring 4 bighas 8 biswas situated at Village Amarpur in the district of Bulandshahr. Kundan and Mohar Singh executed an agreement for sale of the said land in favour of the appellant on 8-4-1969. Since the vendors did not execute the sale deed, the appellant brought a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale of the land. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court. However, the first appellate court allowed the appeal of the appellant and the suit for specific performance was decreed. Thereafter, defendant Kundan and Mohar Singh, preferred a second appeal before the High Court. During pendency of the appeal before the High Court, Mohar Singh executed a sale deed with respect to his half share in the land in dispute, in favour of the appellant. Subsequently, second appeal filed by Kundan and Mohar Singh was dismissed by the High Court. Since Kundan did not execute the sale deed despite the decree, the appellant put the decree for execution. In the said execution case, Kundan filed an objection, inter alia, on the ground that what was agreed to be transferred was land and not the trees standing thereon, and that since the trees had not been agreed to be sold, the possession of the land cannot be delivered to the decree-holder. The executing court upheld the objection of Kundan.

    2. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a revision petition before the District Judge, Bulandshahr. The Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr who heard the matter was of the view that there was no existence of full-grown trees on the land at the time of agreement for sale and thus by virtue of Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the trees standing on the land shall be deemed to be vested in the plaintiff. Consequently, the order of the executing court was set aside and the revision petition filed by the appellant was allowed. However, on the writ petition filed by Kundan before the High Court at Allahabad, the order passed by the revisional court was set aside and the case was sent back to the revisional court to enable the parties to arrive at some compromise between themselves. The High Court, however, held that if no compromise was arrived at between the parties, the appellant would be entitled to hold the land purchased by him and defendant Kundan shall be entitled to reap the fruits of the trees standing on the land. In these terms the writ petition was disposed of. It is against the said judgment of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal before us.

    3. Mr E.C Agrawala, learned counsel appearing for the appellant referred to Sections 3 and 8 of the Act and Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act. On the strength of these provisions, learned counsel argued that when the land was agreed to be sold there were only some plants and saplings on the land and there was no existence of the trees on the land and during the long period of litigation of 25 years if some plants and saplings have grown into full-fledged trees, the same would be treated as benefit arising out of the land, and in view of Sections 3 and 8 of the Act, the trees are now vested in the appellant. We find substance in the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant. Section 3 of the Act defines the expressions “immovable property” and “attached to the earth”. They read as under:

    “3. ***
    ‘immovable property’ does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass;
    ‘attached to the earth’ means—
    (a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs;
    (b) embedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or
    (c) attached to what is so embedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached;”

    4. Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that:

    “8. Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof.
    Such incidents include, where the property is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer….”

    5. Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act defines “immovable property” as under:

    “3. (26) ‘immovable property’ shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;”

    6. A perusal of Section 3(a) of the Act shows that all things attached with the earth are included in the land. Thus the standing trees being embedded in the earth are part of the land. Section 8 of the Act provides that if there is any transfer of a property and unless there is any expressed or implied different intention appearing in the agreement, the interest in the property would also include anything attached with the land which is agreed to be sold. Thus when a vendor sells a property, he sells all his rights embedded in the property unless it is specifically or impliedly excluded. This Court in Shantabai v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 532, 1959 SCR 265 held that although the Transfer of Property Act does not define immovable property excepting saying that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass but Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act defines “immovable property”. According to the said provision immovable property shall include land, benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. As there is no special definition of immovable property, the general definition contained in the General Clauses Act would prevail and, therefore, trees are regarded as part of land because they are attached and rooted in the earth. In view of the said legal position, the trees, which at the time of agreement for sale were mere saplings on the land would vest in the transferee.

    7. This matter can be examined from another angle. As noticed earlier that when the agreement for sale was entered into between the appellant and the defendant, no full-fledged trees were in existence on the land and there were only plants and saplings which, during the long period of litigation of 25 years have grown into full-grown trees. The question, therefore, arises whether the land, which was agreed to be transferred, would also include subsequent full-grown trees on the land. In Divisional Forest Officer, H.P v. Daut AIR 1968 SC 612, (1968) 2 SCR 112 this Court held as under: (SCR p. 115 D-E)

    “There can be no doubt that trees are capable of being transferred apart from land, and if a person transfers trees or gives a right to a person to cut trees and remove them it cannot be said that he has transferred land. But we are concerned with a different question and the question is whether under Section 11 of the Act trees are included within the expression ‘right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy’. It seems to us that this expression ‘right, title and interest of the landowner in the land’ is wide enough to include trees standing on the land. It is clear that under Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, unless a different intention is expressed or implied, transfer of land would include trees standing on it. It seems to us that we should construe Section 11 in the same manner.”

    8. The aforesaid decision makes it clear that interest in the property also includes anything attached to the land including trees standing on the land. Where a vendor sells his right, title and interest in the land unless expressly or impliedly provided in the agreement, sale of the land would also include trees standing thereon. But where trees are sold for being cut and removed it does not mean that the land is also transferred along with the trees. It is open to the vendor while transferring the land to exclude the trees from sale if he wants to appropriate it by cutting and removing them. In the present case, there was no mention in the agreement that the saplings were not being sold along with the land. In the absence of any expressed or implied intention in the agreement, it would be taken that the land along with the saplings standing on the land, which subsequently had grown into trees, were sold. The view taken by the High Court that unless the trees are sold separately, trees would not go with the land, is erroneous.

    9. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the judgment under appeal is set aside and appeal is allowed. Since none has appeared on behalf of the legal representatives of the respondents, there shall be no order as to costs.

    Contempt Petition (C) No. 146 of 1991

    10. Learned counsel seeks leave of this Court to withdraw the petition. The contempt petition is dismissed as withdrawn.

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    Comments

    Suresh Chand v. Kundan (Dead) By Lrs. And Others
    (Sep 7, 2000)