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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 134
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 134
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent obtained a decree in Civil Suit No. 2-B of 1970 before the District Court, Mandsaur, for recovery of Rs 20,644 with costs. The appellant State challenged that decree in First Appeal No. 57 of 1976 before the High Court. While the appeal was pending, the respondent died on 31-12-1980. On 16-03-1983 the respondent’s counsel informed the High Court of the death and supplied the names of the legal representatives. The State filed an application on 08-04-1983 under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to substitute the legal representatives, accompanied by applications to condone a 15-day delay and to set aside the abatement that had occurred meanwhile. The High Court dismissed those applications and, consequently, dismissed the appeal itself. The State thereafter approached the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to condone the 15-day delay in filing the substitution application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC.
  2. Whether the High Court was justified in declining to set aside the abatement of the appeal caused by the respondent’s death.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant State’s Arguments

  • The delay was properly explained: the State acted promptly after learning of the respondent’s death, but gathering official information and approvals inevitably consumed time.
  • Under Order 22 Rule 10-A CPC, limitation for substitution starts from the date of knowledge of death; therefore the short delay should have been condoned.
  • The High Court adopted an unduly rigid approach inconsistent with settled principles governing abatement and delay in government litigation.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The respondent’s counsel had already informed the State’s counsel of the death and provided details of the legal representatives on 16-03-1983, yet no timely steps were taken.
  • Lack of diligence and absence of a satisfactory explanation justified the High Court’s refusal to condone the delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s approach “wholly untenable and unsustainable.” Emphasising Order 22 Rule 10-A CPC, the Court noted that:

  • Upon a party’s death, counsel must inform the court, which must then notify the opposite party; limitation for substitution therefore commences from the date the surviving party gains knowledge of the death.
  • In governmental litigation, procedural delays are commonplace because responsibility is diffused among multiple officers; courts must assess such delay from the standpoint of public justice.
  • Distinguishing between Section 5 of the Limitation Act (general condonation) and Order 22 CPC (setting aside abatement), the Court reiterated that courts should adopt a liberal approach to applications for substitution once an appeal is already pending.
  • Given that the State filed the applications within a short span (signed on 07-04-1983 and filed on 08-04-1983) after learning of the death on 16-03-1983, diligence was demonstrated and the explanation was adequate.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and set aside the abatement.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The delay is condoned, the abatement is set aside, and the legal representatives of the deceased respondent are brought on record. The appeal is allowed.

Implications: The matter is remitted to the High Court, which is requested to dispose of the pending first appeal within two months of receiving the Supreme Court’s order. The ruling affects only the parties to this litigation and does not establish a new substantive precedent.

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    State Of M.P v. S.S Akolkar .

    Order

    1. Delay condoned.

    2. Leave granted.

    3. Heard learned counsel for both sides.

    4. The respondent's Civil Suit No. 2-B of 1970 to recover Rs 20,644 with proportionate costs was decreed by the District Court, Mandsaur. First Appeal No. 57 of 1976 filed by the appellant was pending in the High Court. When the matter had come up on 16-3-1983 for hearing, the counsel for the respondent had informed that the respondent had died on 31-12-1980 and he gave the names of his legal representatives. The application for substitution of the legal representatives under Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC was filed on 8-4-1983, with a delay of 15 days. The applications for setting aside abatement and delay were dismissed by the High Court; consequently it dismissed the appeal. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

    5. It is contended by Shri Bachawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State, that the delay was properly explained. In the circumstances, the High Court was not justified in refusing to condone the delay on bringing the legal representatives on record and setting aside the abatement. Shri Gambhir, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that in spite of the respondent's counsel having informed the counsel for the State of the death and having given the names of the legal representatives, no steps were taken and no diligence was shown. The delay, therefore, was not properly explained. The High Court was right in refusing to condone the delay. The High Court proceeded on the premise that no explanation was given for not taking steps to bring legal representatives on record and even accepting that the respondent had come to know about the death of the plaintiff on 16-3-1983, and though the application was signed on 7-4-1983, the application had come to be filed on 8-4-1983. This would show that there was no diligence on the part of the respondent and no proper explanation was given.

    6. We find that the approach of the High Court is wholly untenable and unsustainable. Under Order 22, Rule 10-A, it is the duty of the counsel, on coming to know of the death of a party, to inform it to the court and the court shall give notice to the other party of the death. By necessary implication delay for substitution of legal representatives begins to run from the date of knowledge. It is notorious that in government proceedings, no one takes personal responsibility and each would pass over the responsibility to the other officer. It is common knowledge that almost 50% of the cases filed in the Supreme Court are barred by limitation. Delay is equally usual in private cases. The court examines each case on merits. The counsel for the respondent had informed the death of the principal respondent Akolkar on 16-3-1983. It would be obvious that counsel for the State has to intimate the officer concerned who in turn is required to have the details ascertained through his subordinates by deputing the officer concerned to ascertain the further details of the legal representatives and feed the officer with all factual details. In the process, delay would occur. Accordingly, the applications came to be prepared on 7-4-1983 and were filed next day. It would be obvious that they had acted with diligence in collecting the information and filing the petition. In the process, a short delay had occurred.

    7. It is settled law that the consideration for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and setting aside of the abatement under Order 22 are entirely distinct and different. The court always liberally considers the latter, though in some case, the court may refuse to condone the delay under Section 5 in filing the appeals. After the appeal has been filed and is pending, Government is not expected to keep watch whether the contesting respondent is alive or has passed away. After the matter was brought to the notice of the counsel for the State, steps were taken even thereafter; after due verification belated application came to be filed. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and delay is required to be explained. The delay in official business requires its broach and approach from public justice perspective.

    8. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not right in refusing to set aside the abatement and to condone the delay in filing of the petition to bring the legal representatives on record.

    9. The delay is condoned. The abatement is set aside and the legal representatives are brought on record. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible within two months from the date of the receipt of the order as this is a very old appeal.

    10. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

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    Comments

    State Of M.P v. S.S Akolkar .
    (Jan 25, 1996)