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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 274
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
  • Civil Procedure Code
  • 1976 Amendment to CPC
  • Order 21, Rule 63 of old Code
  • Code (amended)
  • Section 22(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 274
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
  • Civil Procedure Code
  • 1976 Amendment to CPC
  • Order 21, Rule 63 of old Code
  • Code (amended)
  • Section 22(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Shyam Lal filed a suit for specific performance of a contract dated 1-9-1966, seeking execution of a sale deed and delivery of possession. The trial court dismissed the suit, but in Appeal No. 16 of 1973 the Civil Judge’s decision was reversed and a decree dated 18-10-1973 ordered the defendants to execute the sale deed within three months against payment of the balance consideration. Although the plaint also sought possession, the appellate decree granted only specific performance, omitting any direction on possession, and that decree has become final.

During execution, the decree-holder’s legal representatives attempted to dispossess the present appellant, who was not a party to the original suit. The appellant, claiming possessory title, instituted a separate injunction suit and on 2-7-1991 obtained an ad interim order restraining dispossession (still subsisting).

In the execution proceedings (filed under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC) the appellant lodged objections contending that he could not be dispossessed. The executing court overruled the objection, holding that an application under Order 21 Rule 97 was premature because the appellant had not yet been dispossessed. The Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) affirmed that view on 9-5-1995 in C.R.P. No. 656 of 1994. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who is not a party to the decree for specific performance may invoke Order 21 Rule 97 CPC to resist execution before actual dispossession.
  2. Whether the executing court is obliged to conduct a full adjudication under Order 21 Rules 98–103 CPC upon such an objection.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain, (1995) 1 SCC 6 An application resisting execution, even before dispossession, must be treated as one under Order 21 Rule 97; the executing court must adjudicate under Rules 98–103. The Court relied on this decision to hold that the appellant’s objection required adjudication and that dispossession is not a pre-condition for entertaining an application under Order 21 Rule 97.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the controversy had already been settled in Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain. That judgment established that:

  • Any resistance or obstruction to execution, whether styled under Order 21 Rule 35(3), Section 47, or otherwise, must be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97.
  • Actual dispossession is not a prerequisite for invoking Rule 97; the purpose of the rule is to prevent wrongful dispossession without inquiry.
  • Order 21 Rules 98, 101, 102 mandate a regular adjudication of the objector’s right, title, or interest, and the resulting order is deemed a decree under Rule 103, appealable like any other decree.
  • After the 1976 CPC amendments, the statutory scheme is a complete code, eliminating the earlier remedy of a separate suit (formerly Order 21 Rule 63).

Applying these principles, the Court held that the executing court erred in dismissing the appellant’s objection solely because no dispossession had yet occurred, and the High Court repeated the same error.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The executing court is directed to conduct an inquiry under Order 21 Rule 98, provide an opportunity to all parties, and record findings on the appellant’s objection. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision reinforces the procedural mandate that objections by non-parties resisting execution must be adjudicated under Order 21 Rules 97–103 without awaiting physical dispossession. It clarifies the exclusive statutory mechanism post-1976 amendments, but does not set a new precedent beyond affirming the rule already articulated in Bhanwar Lal.

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    Babulal v. Raj Kumar And Others

    Order

    1. Leave granted.

    2. Though the respondents have been served, the second respondent has filed a photocopy of the Power of Attorney on behalf of Respondents 1 and 3 to 6 but when the Registry directed him to produce the original he failed to do the same. He is also not present in the court. One Shyam Lal, son of Prabhu Lal Kayasth had laid the suit for specific performance; the Civil Judge dismissed the suit but on Appeal No. 16 of 1973 by judgment and decree dated 18-10-1973, the suit was decreed as under:

    “Appeal is accepted with cost. Judgment and decree under appeal is set aside and suit for specific performance of contract is decreed with costs that defendants as per contract Ex. 1 at 1-9-1966 shall execute sale deed within 3 months and plaintiff shall pay the balance sum to the defendant in the said period, otherwise plaintiff shall be entitled to get the sale deed executed of the disputed property as per the law depositing the balance amount in the court within two months.”

    3. In the suit there was prayer for specific performance with possession of the property in prayer 1 thus:

    “It be decreed that defendants should perform their part of the contract regarding the land and for this purpose get the sale deed registered after receiving a sum of Rs 1100 and hand over the possession of the disputed house to the plaintiff.”

    Under Section 22(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, notwithstanding anything contained in Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff suing for the specific performance of a contract for transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for possession or partition with specific possession of the property, in addition to such specific performance. Sub-section (2) puts fetters on the power of the court to grant such relief without there being the relief specifically claimed in the plaint. As seen in the decree, though prayer for possession was claimed, no decree for possession was granted which had become final.

    4. It would appear that in execution of the decree the legal representatives of the decree-holder sought to dispossess the appellant from the property said to be in his possession. Apprehending his dispossession, the appellant had filed another suit for injunction based on possessory title and obtained an ad interim injunction on 2-7-1991 as under:

    “Counsel for the applicant present. The Presiding Officer has been transferred. Notice be issued to non-applicant on filing the process fee. File be put up on…. After writing this, non-applicant 2 Subhash Saxena appeared and informed the court that he has not received copy of stay application. Copy of stay application is given to him today. Rest of the Applicants 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 be summoned through notices on filing the Registry fees and other expenses. Meanwhile non-applicant 2 would not be dispossessed by applicant Babu Lal from the disputed house (except the decree of the court). Put file on 17-8-1991.”

    We are informed that the injunction is still subsisting.

    5. In the execution application filed under Order 21 Rule 32 of the CPC the appellant filed an objection on the ground that he could not be dispossessed. It is not in dispute that the appellant was not a party to the decree for specific performance. His objection was overruled by the executing court holding that since he had not been dispossessed, application under Order 21 Rule 97 is not maintainable. That view was affirmed by the High Court in the impugned order dated 9-5-1995 in CRP No. 656 of 1994 by the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

    6. The controversy is no longer res integra. This Court in Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain (1995) 1 SCC 6 considered the controversy and had held that even an application filed under Order 21 Rule 35(3) or one filed under Section 47 would be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 and an adjudication is required to be conducted under Rule 98. Dispossession of the applicant from the property in execution is not a condition for declining to entertain the application. The reasons are obvious. The specific provisions contained in Order 21 Rules 98, 101, 102 enjoin conduct of a regular adjudication, finding recorded thereon would be a decree and bind the parties. In para 7 thereof it was held thus:

    “In the above view we have taken, the High Court has committed grievous error of jurisdiction and also patent illegality in treating the application filed by the appellant as barred by limitation and the third one on res judicata. Once the application, dated 25-5-1979 was made, the Court should have treated it to be one filed under Order 21, Rule 97(1) CPC. The question of res judicata for filing the second and third applications does not arise. Under these circumstances the appellate court, though for different reasons was justified in directing an enquiry to be conducted for removal of the obstruction or resistance caused by Satyanarain under Order 21 Rules 35(3) and 97(2) and Order 21, Rules 101 and 102 of CPC.”

    It would, therefore, be clear that an adjudication is required to be conducted under Order 21, Rule 98 before removal of the obstruction caused by the objector or the appellant and a finding is required to be recorded in that behalf. The order is treated as a decree under Order 21, Rule 103 and it shall be subject to an appeal. Prior to 1976, the order was subject to suit under 1976 Amendment to CPC that may be pending on the date the commencement of the amended provisions of CPC was secured. Thereafter, under the amended Code, right of suit under Order 21, Rule 63 of old Code has been taken away. The determination of the question of the right, title or interest of the objector in the immovable property under execution needs to be adjudicated under Order 21, Rule 98 which is an order and is a decree under Order 21, Rule 103 for the purpose of appeal subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Thus, the procedure prescribed is a complete code in itself. Therefore, the executing court is required to determine the question, when the appellants had objected to the execution of the decree as against the appellants who were not parties to the decree for specific performance.

    7. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The executing court is directed to enquire into the matter and record a finding after giving opportunity to the parties. No costs.

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    Comments

    Babulal v. Raj Kumar And Others
    (Feb 16, 1996)