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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 322
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10 of the Code
  • Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962
  • Section 10(1) of the Code
  • Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution
  • Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962
  • Madhya Pradesh Local Authorities School Teachers' (Absorption in Government Service) Act, 1963 (25 of 1963)
  • Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970
  • Section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 29 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 322
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10 of the Code
  • Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962
  • Section 10(1) of the Code
  • Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution
  • Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962
  • Madhya Pradesh Local Authorities School Teachers' (Absorption in Government Service) Act, 1963 (25 of 1963)
  • Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970
  • Section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 29 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, an officer of Allahabad Bank, was subjected to a departmental enquiry for misconduct. On 30 June 1987 the disciplinary authority imposed a penalty reducing him by one stage in his time-scale of pay. Shri R.L. Wadhwa, the Executive Director who had been entrusted with the “current charge” of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) after the transfer of the incumbent CMD, reviewed the matter under Regulation 18 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976.

Finding the punishment inadequate, Shri Wadhwa issued a show-cause notice on 30 December 1987 proposing a major penalty of reduction in rank from MMG Scale II to JMG Scale I. After considering the appellant’s representation, he imposed the enhanced penalty on 5 February 1988. The appellant’s writ petition before the Allahabad High Court was dismissed. The present appeal challenges the legality of Shri Wadhwa’s review order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the power of review under Regulation 18 could be exercised by the Executive Director who was only holding the current charge of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director.
  2. Whether the review order was void because it was signed by Shri Wadhwa in the capacity of “Executive Director,” an authority not expressly named as a reviewing authority in the Regulations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The impugned orders are null and void because they were signed by Shri Wadhwa as “Executive Director,” an authority not listed in Regulation 18 as a reviewing authority.
  • Even if he was holding current charge of CMD, the statutory power of review is vested only in the CMD and cannot be exercised by anyone else, as such power is incapable of delegation.
  • An officer merely placed in current charge can exercise only administrative powers available under executive orders, not statutory powers conferred by regulations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board (1953) 1 All ER 1113 Statutory power must be exercised by the authority specifically named; cannot be delegated further. Court held the case inapplicable because Shri Wadhwa was not exercising delegated power but discharging functions of the CMD while in charge.
Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Asstt. Electrical Engineer (1979) 4 SCC 289 Differentiates substantive promotion from temporary entrustment of higher duties. Distinguished; relied on only to show that holding charge does not amount to promotion, not to restrict functional powers.
Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan (1989) 3 SCC 132 Same principle as above regarding acting appointments and delegation. Court found it irrelevant because issue here concerned discharge of functions, not promotion.
Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India 1991 Supp (2) SCC 733 Effect of acting appointments on powers of the officer. Held not germane for identical reasons.
State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma 1993 Supp (3) SCC 252 Temporary charge does not constitute promotion. Noted but found irrelevant to the present question of functional authority.
Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab (1965) 2 SCR 845 Additional District Magistrate exercising statutory detention powers without formal appointment. Distinguished; Court emphasised difference between drastic detention powers and employer’s disciplinary review.
Hari Chand Aggarwal v. Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR 1969 SC 483 Requirement that drastic statutory powers be exercised only by the expressly empowered officer. Held not supportive; concerned requisition of property, not internal disciplinary matters.
State of M.P. v. Laxmishankar Mishra (1979) 2 SCC 270 Credit for service while in charge/officiating towards eligibility criteria. Cited to illustrate that an officer in charge performs all duties of the post; supports respondent’s stance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Although the impugned orders were signed by Shri Wadhwa as “Executive Director,” the text of each order expressly stated that it was made under Regulation 18, demonstrating that he was acting in his capacity as the officer discharging the functions of CMD. The appellant’s own representation acknowledged him as the reviewing authority.

2. Regulation 18 is part of bank-made service regulations, not a statute. Entrusting an officer with the charge of CMD is an administrative arrangement that authorises him to perform all duties and exercise all powers of that office. No question of delegation to a subordinate arose.

3. Precedents relied on by the appellant were distinguished. They dealt either with (a) non-delegable drastic statutory powers such as detention/requisition of property, or (b) the distinction between substantive promotion and temporary charge. Neither line of authority limited an officer in charge from exercising the routine employer’s disciplinary review power.

4. Regulations 2(n) and 18, read together, contemplate that the CMD (or any person lawfully performing the duties of that office) may exercise review powers. Once placed in charge, Shri Wadhwa was entitled to all attendant powers, including enhancement of penalty.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the enhanced penalty imposed by Shri Wadhwa. The ruling confirms that an officer entrusted with the current charge of a higher post in a public sector bank may exercise all statutory and regulatory powers attached to that post, including disciplinary review. The decision affects only the parties involved and does not alter existing legal doctrine beyond clarifying this administrative principle.

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    Gopalji Khanna v. Allahabad Bank And Others

    G.T Nanavati, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the power of review available to the Chairman and Managing Director of the Allahabad Bank under Regulation 18 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 could have been exercised by the Executive Director who, in the absence of the Chairman and Managing Director, was entrusted with current charge of the duties of offices of the Chairman and Managing Director.

    3. The appellant is an employee of the Allahabad Bank. A departmental enquiry was instituted against him for certain acts of misconduct. By an order dated 30-6-1987, the disciplinary authority, by way of penalty, reduced him to a lower stage in the time-scale of his pay. As the penalty imposed upon the appellant was found to be inadequate by the Executive Director who was then holding charge of the posts of Chairman and Managing Director, he passed an order dated 30-12-1987, setting aside the said order of penalty and proposing to impose major penalty of reduction from MMG Scale II to JMG Scale I and to fix his pay in the JMG Scale I at the minimum of that scale. By that order the appellant was called upon to submit his representation as to why the proposed enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him. After considering the representation made by the appellant the Executive Director by order dated 5-2-1988 imposed penalty of reduction from MMG Scale II to JMG Scale I and fixed the pay of the appellant at the minimum of that scale. The appellant challenged that order by filing a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. It was dismissed as the High Court did not find any substance in any of the contentions raised before it.

    4. Two contentions have been raised before us. Firstly, it was contended that the order enhancing the penalty was passed by Shri Wadhwa in his capacity as the Executive Director and as the Executive Director is not specified in the Regulations as the reviewing authority, the order passed by him should be regarded as null and void. Secondly, and in the alternative, it was contended that under the Regulations, only the Chairman and Managing Director are specified as reviewing authorities and, therefore, Shri Wadhwa who was the Executive Director and was merely holding current charge of duties of the posts of Chairman and Managing Director could not have reviewed the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority.

    5. Before we consider these contentions it may be stated that till 23-6-1987 Shri R. Srinivasan was the Chairman and Managing Director of the Allahabad Bank. As he was appointed Chairman and Managing Director of Bank of India by notification dated 23-6-1987, he was directed to hand over current charge of duties of the post which he was holding to the Executive Director Shri R.L Wadhwa. Pursuant to the said notification Shri Srinivasan handed over and Shri Wadhwa took over the charge of the posts of Chairman and Managing Director on 24-6-1987. The resultant position was that thereafter Shri Wadhwa continued to hold substantively the post of Executive Director and at the same time was also holding charge of the offices of the Chairman and Managing Director. Subsequently, on 29-4-1988 Shri Wadhwa was appointed as Managing Director and also as Chairman of the Bank.

    6. In support of his first contention the learned counsel drew our attention to the order-cum-show-cause notice dated 30-12-1987 and the impugned order dated 5-2-1988. Both are signed by Shri Wadhwa as Executive Director. However, we find that, in both these orders it is stated that they were being passed by him in terms of Regulation 18. That would mean that while passing those orders, Shri Wadhwa was discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director. Shri Wadhwa was only holding charge of the offices of the Chairman and Managing Director and, therefore, he could not have signed those orders as Chairman and Managing Director. Since he was then holding substantively the post of Executive Director he rightly described himself, while signing those orders, as Executive Director. The appellant also understood the show-cause notice as one issued by a person discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director as can be seen from his representation made pursuant thereto. In it he has referred to Shri Wadhwa as Executive Director and reviewing authority. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned counsel has to be rejected.

    7. With respect to the second contention, it was submitted by the learned counsel that the power of review is conferred by Regulation 18. Only the Chairman and Managing Director are specified as reviewing authorities. This statutory power, therefore, can be exercised by the Chairman and Managing Director only as they are the named authorities under the statutory provision and cannot be validly delegated to any subordinate authority. Shri Wadhwa, therefore, could not have validly exercised that power. There is no substance in this submission. It is really misconceived. Though the Regulations have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, by the Board of Directors, they cannot be equated with a statute. What the Board of Directors have done by making those Regulations is to regulate the power of taking disciplinary action against the employees of the Bank. Moreover, this is not a case where the power of Chairman or the Managing Director came to be exercised by a subordinate official as a result of delegation of that power. Shri Wadhwa while exercising the power of review was really discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director as he was then placed in charge of those offices and was therefore entitled to perform all the duties and functions of those offices. He did not exercise that power on the basis that it was delegated to him. Therefore, the decisions in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board (1953) 1 All ER 1113, (1953) 2 WLR 995, Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Asstt. Electrical Engineer (1979) 4 SCC 289 and Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan (1989) 3 SCC 132, relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention that statutory power can be exercised by the named authority only and cannot be further delegated, require no further consideration. So also, Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India 1991 Supp (2) SCC 733, (1992) 19 ATC 85 and State of Haryana v. S.M Sharma 1993 Supp (3) SCC 252, (1993) 25 ATC 594 cited by the learned counsel have no relevance. The question which arose for consideration in those cases was whether an officer who substantively holds a lower post and is asked to discharge the duties of a higher post can be considered as promoted to that higher post. This Court held that entrustment of current duties charge of a higher post does not amount to promotion and in such cases the person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of higher post essentially as a stopgap arrangement.

    8. It was next submitted that when a person is entrusted with charge of current duties of a higher post, he can exercise only those powers and perform those functions which are available to the person holding the higher post under executive orders and not those which are conferred by statutory provisions. In support of this submission the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab (1965) 2 SCR 845, AIR 1965 SC 1619, (1965) 2 Cri LJ 553. In that case what had happened was that the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar was invested with powers of a District Magistrate under Section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was also put in charge of the office of the District Magistrate Amritsar, who was transferred. No order appointing him as a District Magistrate under Section 10(1) was passed. While in charge of the office of the District Magistrate, he passed an order of detention under the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962. That order was challenged on the ground that as the Additional District Magistrate was not appointed as District Magistrate under Section 10(1) he did not have the power to pass a detention order and, therefore, the order passed by him was without any authority of law and liable to be set aside. This Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962 and the drastic nature of the power and the consequences following from it, observed that the power of detention could only be exercised by the State Government or an officer or authority to whom it was delegated and that the said power could be delegated to an officer or authority who was not lower in rank than the District Magistrate. It was then held that even though the Additional District Magistrate was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate on there being a vacancy in the office of the District Magistrate, he was still not the District Magistrate as he was not appointed as such under Section 10(1) of the Code and therefore, he had no power to pass the order of detention. Even though invested with the powers of a District Magistrate he did not become an officer of the rank of a District Magistrate. In this case we are not concerned with such a provision and therefore are not required to consider whether Executive Director of the Bank when entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director became an officer of the rank of Chairman and Managing Director. Moreover the power of the employer to take disciplinary action against his employee including the power to review an order of penalty, has to be distinguished from the statutory power to detain a person. Therefore, on the basis of this decision it cannot be held that the Executive Director who was merely entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director could not have exercised the power of reviewing the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority.

    9. In Hari Chand Aggarwal v. Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR 1969 SC 483, (1969) 2 SCR 201, 1969 Cri LJ 803 also a question had arisen whether the Additional District Magistrate who was entrusted with all the powers of the District Magistrate under Section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could have exercised the power delegated by the Central Government to the District Magistrate to requisition the property under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962. This Court held as under:

    “… the powers of requisitioning are of a very drastic nature and involve the fundamental rights in respect of property guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Central Government while making the delegation of its power under Section 29 of the Act must ordinarily be presumed to be fully conscious of this aspect of the matter and it is for that reason that an officer or authority of the high status of a District Magistrate in the district was empowered to exercise that power.
    The scheme of Section 10 of the Code leaves no room for doubt that the District Magistrate and the Additional District Magistrate are two and distinct authorities and even though the latter may be empowered under sub-section (2) to exercise all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate but by no stretch of reasoning can an Additional District Magistrate be called the District Magistrate which are the words employed in sub-section (1) of Section 10.”

    This decision, therefore, does not support the contention raised on behalf of the appellant.

    10. In State of M.P v. Laxmishankar Mishra (1979) 2 SCC 270, this Court was required to interpret Rule 3(b) framed under the Madhya Pradesh Local Authorities School Teachers' (Absorption in Government Service) Act, 1963 (25 of 1963) which read as follows:

    “3. (b) For absorption on the post of Headmaster/Principal of a High/Higher Secondary School, the person concerned should posses the postgraduate degree and should have worked on the post for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution and should have 10 years' teaching experience in any recognised institution of Madhya Pradesh.”

    11. It was contended by the respondent that working on the post for a minimum period of 7 years would for the purpose of computation of 7 years include service even as incharge Headmaster/Principal or officiating service in the post. On the other hand it was contended by the State that the teacher claiming to be absorbed as Headmaster/Principal should have worked as a confirmed Headmaster/Principal in a substantive post for the full period of 7 years. This Court held that the period during which the teacher had worked as incharge Headmaster/Principal ought to have been taken into account by the State Government for computing the period of 7 years. It is difficult to appreciate how this decision can lend any support to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. On the contrary this Court has observed therein that the confirmed holder of a substantive post would be discharging the functions attached to the post and when someone is placed in that very post in an officiating capacity or directed to hold charge of the post, he would be required to perform the duties and discharge the functions of the post rendering identical service. In paragraph 10 of the judgment it is further observed as under:

    “… it may be that the confirmed holder of the post may be away and not in a position to discharge the duties and someone may be appointed in an officiating capacity or may be directed to hold charge but nonetheless such holder of the post will have to perform duties and discharge functions attached to the post.”

    12. After considering the above decisions and Regulations 2(n) and 18, we are of the opinion that as the Executive Director Shri Wadhwa was entrusted with the charge of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director he became entitled to exercise all the executive powers, perform duties and discharge functions attached to those offices and, therefore, the order of penalty passed by him was legal and valid.

    13. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Gopalji Khanna v. Allahabad Bank And Others
    (Feb 27, 1996)