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1992 INSC 295
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1992 INSC 295
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal was filed against a judgment of the High Court that had quashed an order terminating the services of Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar (“the respondent”), a Lecturer in Surgical Oncology at the Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore. The respondent had been appointed on 3 July 1981 on a one-year probation, subject to confirmation only if his performance satisfied the competent authority. Before the probation period lapsed, the Governing Council of the Institute resolved on 28 January 1982 to terminate his services with effect from the afternoon of 30 January 1982 under Rule 4 of the Institute’s Conditions of Service Rules, paying one month’s salary in lieu of notice.

Contending that the order was in reality a dismissal for alleged misconduct, the respondent successfully challenged it in a writ petition before the High Court. The Institute (appellant) thereafter brought the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order was a bona fide “termination simpliciter” permissible during probation, or a punitive dismissal masquerading as such and therefore void for failure to conduct a departmental enquiry.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The termination was founded on specific allegations—such as being unsympathetic to patients and inappropriate conduct with an attendant—which amounted to misconduct; hence the employer was obliged to hold a disciplinary enquiry.
  • Reliance was placed on Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India (1984) 2 SCC 369, where termination during probation was held to be punitive because it was based on a definite act of misconduct that had not been inquired into.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali (1980) 3 SCC 428 Termination of a probationer is not punitive merely because misconduct, negligence or inefficiency was the motive for the employer’s decision. Cited to reaffirm that an employer may end probationary employment without enquiry when overall suitability is in doubt, even if complaints influenced the decision.
Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corp. Ltd., 1987 Supp SCC 739 Similar principle applied to temporary or ad hoc appointments: termination simpliciter is not a penalty absent stigma. Relied upon to support the view that the respondent’s probation could be ended without disciplinary proceedings.
State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (1991) 1 SCC 691 Reiteration that dismissal rules differ for probationers/temporary employees; absence of stigma keeps the action non-punitive. Used as further authority sustaining the Institute’s power to terminate.
Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524 Continuation of the above line of cases on non-punitive termination during probation or temporary service. Invoked to bolster the conclusion that no enquiry was required.
Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India (1984) 2 SCC 369 Where termination is founded on a specific act of misconduct, it is punitive and void without enquiry. Distinguished: unlike in Anoop Jaiswal, the present termination was based on an overall assessment, not a singular proved misconduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting the express probation clause and Rule 4, which allow termination on one month’s notice without assigning reasons. It observed that probation inherently requires evaluation of the employee’s conduct, performance and suitability. The “veil” of a termination order may be pierced only when a direct nexus between a specific charge and the action taken is established, thereby revealing a punitive dismissal.

Although complaints about the respondent’s behaviour were placed before the Governing Council, the Court found that the Council’s decision was taken on an “overall assessment” of his performance during probation, rather than on a concluded finding of misconduct. The preliminary nature of the inquiries did not convert the decision into a punitive act. Relying on ONGC v. Iskender Ali and subsequent authorities, the Court held that even if misconduct was a motivating factor, termination simpliciter during probation remains non-punitive when no stigma is attached.

The judgment distinguished Anoop Jaiswal on the ground that there, the foundation of the action was a specific incident of misconduct; whereas here, no such singular charge formed the basis of the order. Accordingly, the High Court erred in treating the termination as punitive and in requiring a departmental enquiry.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed – High Court judgment set aside.

Consequently, the respondent’s writ petition fails and the order terminating his services stands revived. No costs were awarded. The decision reinforces the settled principle that employers may lawfully terminate probationary or temporary employees without initiating disciplinary proceedings, provided the order is free from stigma and based on an overall assessment rather than a definitive charge of misconduct.

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    Governing Council Of Kidwai Memorial Institute Of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar And Another

    N.P Singh, J.— This appeal has been filed against an order passed by the High Court, on a writ application filed by the petitioner-respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the respondent”) quashing the order of termination of the service of the respondent.

    2. The respondent was appointed as a Lecturer in Surgical Oncology on July 3, 1981. He was to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of his appointment which period could have been extended at the discretion of the competent authority. One of the conditions provided is as follows:

    “Failure to complete the period of probation to the satisfaction of the competent authority will render you liable to be discharged from service.”

    Before the expiry of one year, the impugned order of termination was issued on January 30, 1982 saying:

    “In accordance with the decision of the Governing Council at its meeting held on January 28, 1982 the services of Dr Pandurang Godwalkar, Lecturer in Surgical Oncology (on probation), Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore are terminated with effect from the afternoon of January 30, 1982, as per Rule 4 of the Conditions of Service Rules (Annexure-2, Chapter I) of the Institute.
    He is paid one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice required as per rules.”

    3. Although the order under challenge was order of termination simpliciter, the validity thereof was questioned by the respondent on the ground that an order of dismissal had been passed in the garb of an order of termination. According to the respondent, some complaints had been made against him to the Director of the Institute who instead of initiating a departmental proceeding on the basis of charges levelled against the respondent, put up the matter before the Governing Council of the Institute for termination of the service of the respondent during the period of probation.

    4. The learned Judge in view of the assertions made on behalf of the respondent directed the Institute to produce the original records including certain documents and papers which had been marked as confidential. From the note of the Director it appeared that complaints had been made in respect of performance of the duties by the respondent. In that note it was also mentioned that the respondent was unsympathetic towards the patients. It had also been brought to the notice of the Governing Council that the respondent had attempted to obtain the signatures of some of the patients on the petitions stating that he was a good doctor. On one occasion it was reported that the respondent had taken away a girl on his scooter and brought her back late in the night. The said girl was an attendant to a patient in the hospital. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that as the service of the petitioner had been terminated because of the complaints made against him, it really amounted to his removal, for the misconduct alleged in the note of the Director. According to the learned Judge, the Institute should have initiated a departmental proceeding in respect of the alleged charges and only after due enquiry any action should have been taken.

    5. There is no dispute that the service of the respondent had been terminated during the period of probation. The appointment of the respondent was with a clear condition that failure to complete the period of probation to the satisfaction of the competent authority shall render him liable to be discharged from the service. Relevant part of Rule 4 of the Conditions of Service Rules is as follows:

    “4. Termination:
    1. All appointments shall be terminable on a notice in writing either by the appointing authority or the employee without assigning any reason as set below:

    (a) During the period of probation … one month. (b) After completion of the period of probation 3 months. (c) The notice referred to in Rule (1) above shall not be necessary if in lieu thereof an amount equal to the pay and allowance for the period of notice is paid.

    6. Generally in connection with an order of termination, a question is raised before the court as to what is the motive behind the termination of the service of the employee concerned — whether the reason mentioned in the order of termination has to be accepted on its face value or the background in which such order of termination simpliciter has been passed should be examined to find out as to whether an officer on probation or holding a temporary appointment has been, in fact, dismissed from the service without initiating any departmental enquiry. If an employee who is on probation or holding an appointment on temporary basis is removed from the service with stigma because of some specific charge, then a plea cannot be taken that as his service was temporary or his appointment was on probation, there was no requirement of holding any enquiry, affording such an employee an opportunity to show that the charge levelled against him is either not true or it is without any basis. But whenever the service of an employee is terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment is on temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter after some preliminary enquiry it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before the issuance of order of termination it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge as such penal in nature.

    7. When an appointment is made on probation, it presupposes that the conduct, performance, ability and the capacity of the employee concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. The principle of tearing off the veil for finding out the real nature of the order shall be applicable only in a case where the Court is satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken, to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation, after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. It need not be said that the appointing authority at the stage of confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the service of such employee be terminated during the continuance of the period of probation, is entitled to look into any complaint made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties for purpose of making assessment of the performance of such employee.

    8. Even if such employee while questioning the validity of an order of termination simpliciter brings on the record that some preliminary enquiry or examination of some allegations had been made, that will not vitiate the order of termination. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr Mohd. S. Iskender Ali (1980) 3 SCC 428, (1980) 3 SCR 603 where it was pointed out that a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period “only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained”. It was also said that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the influencing factor which induced the employer to terminate the service of the employee which such employer admittedly had under the terms of the appointment, such termination cannot be held to be penalty or punishment. Same view has been reiterated in connection with appointment on temporary or ad hoc basis in the cases of Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P State Handloom Corpn. Ltd. 1987 Supp SCC 739, (1988) 6 ATC 617; State of U.P v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (1991) 1 SCC 691, (1991) 16 ATC 498 and Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524, JT (1992) 1 SC 37, (1992) 19 ATC 931

    9. On behalf of the respondent reliance was placed on the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India (1984) 2 SCC 369, (1984) 2 SCR 453. In that case the service of the appellant had been terminated during the period of probation. On the materials on record it was held by this Court that the order of termination really amounted to punishment because the real foundation of the action against the appellant was the act of misconduct on June 22, 1981. The aforesaid judgment is of no help to the respondent because in that case a clear finding was recorded by this Court that the service of the appellant had been terminated because of a particular misconduct alleged against him which had never been enquired into. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the Governing Council examined the different reports in respect of the respondent during the period of probation and considered the question as to whether he should be allowed to continue in the service of the Institute. The decision appears to have been taken by the Governing Council on the total and overall assessment of the performance of the respondent, in terms of the condition of the appointment and Rule 4 aforesaid.

    10. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

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