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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 68 of the Act
  • Section 46 of the Act
  • Section 15(1), clause (b) of the Act; Section 16 of the Act
  • Section 15 of the Act
  • Articles 132 to 136
  • Section 132(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 15(1)(b) of the Act
  • Section 102 (sic) of the Customs Act
  • Section 50, Section 51 of the Act
  • The Customs Act, 1962
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Section 59 of the Customs Act, 1962
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 68 of the Act
  • Section 46 of the Act
  • Section 15(1), clause (b) of the Act; Section 16 of the Act
  • Section 15 of the Act
  • Articles 132 to 136
  • Section 132(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 15(1)(b) of the Act
  • Section 102 (sic) of the Customs Act
  • Section 50, Section 51 of the Act
  • The Customs Act, 1962
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Section 59 of the Customs Act, 1962
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 11 May 1983 an import licence for ₹20,12,729 was issued in favour of M/s Industrial Cable India Ltd., Rajpura and later transferred to M/s Metallic Metal Industries. The transferee authorised Northern Corporation (the petitioner) on 21 May 1984 to import “MSCR defective sheets/coils.” The petitioner placed an order with Sayani Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., Singapore on 30 May 1984 and the goods arrived at Bombay Port on 12 June 1984. Bills of entry for warehousing were filed on 30 July 1984 and the goods were bonded on 7 August 1984, when the applicable customs duty was 60 % + 40 % + ₹650 per MT and 10 % CVD (assessed at ₹26,20,109.55).

For ex-bond clearance, six bills of entry were filed on 21 August 1984 but were returned after the Income Tax Department imposed a prohibitory order under Section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The ban was lifted on 30 March 1988. When the petitioner sought clearance on 4 April 1988 the duty had risen sharply (₹5,000 per MT + 45 % additional duty and ₹825 per MT CVD). Contending that the enhanced demand was “arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional,” the petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on 16 April 1988.

On 22 April 1988 the Supreme Court granted an interim order permitting release of the goods on payment of duty as leviable on 21 August 1984, an additional cash deposit of ₹5 lakh, and surety for the balance. The present judgment disposes of that writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether customs duty on warehoused goods is payable at the rate prevailing on 21 August 1984 (the date the petitioner first sought clearance) or at the rate prevailing on the date the goods are “actually removed” from the warehouse under Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.
  2. Whether a writ petition under Article 32 lies to challenge assessment of customs duty in the circumstances of this case, i.e., does the dispute involve enforcement of a fundamental right.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents’ Arguments (Union of India & Customs Authorities)

  • Under Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act the applicable duty is the rate in force on the date the goods are “actually removed” from the warehouse, not the date they were first presented for clearance.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. B. Sen, which upheld assessment at the rate prevailing on the date of actual removal.

Petitioner’s Arguments (Northern Corporation)

  • The petitioner was ready and willing to pay duty when the goods first crossed the customs barrier on 21 August 1984, but clearance was prevented by the Income Tax Department’s prohibitory order—an event beyond the petitioner’s control.
  • Therefore the enhanced duty demanded in 1988 is arbitrary and should not be levied.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. B. Sen, (1979) 2 SCC 174; (1979) 2 SCR 1142 Under Section 15(1)(b) duty is assessed at the rate prevailing on the date goods are actually removed from the warehouse. Cited to support the respondents’ contention that enhanced duty is payable because the goods were removed only after duty rates had increased.
Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963) 1 SCR 778; AIR 1962 SC 1621 Article 32 is unavailable to challenge assessments made within jurisdiction; statutory remedies must be pursued. Relied on to hold that the writ petition under Article 32 is not maintainable for disputing customs duty liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first interpreted Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act, emphasising the statutory phrase “actually removed.” It held that the prohibitory order of the Income Tax Department necessarily postponed the date of removal and, therefore, postponed the date for determination of duty; the petitioner’s lack of fault was irrelevant under the statute.

More fundamentally, the Court examined the maintainability of the petition under Article 32. It reiterated that Article 32 is confined to enforcement of fundamental rights and does not confer an appellate jurisdiction over statutory assessments. Disputes concerning the correct rate of customs duty must be adjudicated within the machinery of the Customs Act. Relying on Ujjam Bai, the Court ruled that alleged misapplication of fiscal law does not by itself amount to a breach of fundamental rights. Consequently, the writ petition was held to be inappropriate and not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is DISPOSED OF.

The interim order dated 22 April 1988 permitted clearance of the goods; however, the revenue is at liberty to recover duty in accordance with law. The decision reaffirms that (i) customs duty on warehoused goods is determined by the rate prevailing on the date of actual removal, and (ii) Article 32 cannot be invoked to challenge ordinary fiscal assessments; affected parties must use statutory remedies. No new legal precedent was set, but existing principles were restated and applied.

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    Northern Corporation v. Union Of India And Others

    Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J— This is an application under Article 32 of the Constitution. Northern Corporation is the petitioner in the instant application and the Union of India, the Collector of Customs and the Assistant Collector of Customs (Bond Department) are the respondents.

    2. On May 11, 1983, the licensing authority issued import Licence No. 2959845 for Rs 20,12,729 in favour of M/s Industrial Cable India Ltd., Rajpura. The licence holder transferred the same in favour of M/s Metallic Metal Industries. The transferee-licence holder issued a letter of authority in favour of the petitioner for the import of MSCR defective sheets or coils. The letter of authority was issued on May 21, 1984.

    3. The petitioner herein placed order on M/s Sayani Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., Singapore for the supply of MSCR defective sheets or coils on May 30, 1984. The foreign supplier shipped the material in three consignments and the goods arrived at the Bombay Port on June 12, 1984. The clearing agent of the petitioner filed bills of entry on July 30, 1984 for warehousing under Section 59 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), and the same was allowed. The goods were bounded on August 7, 1984. It may be mentioned that the rate of duty on that day was 60 per cent + 40 per cent + Rs 650 per MT and 10 per cent CVD. The total duty on the consignment was assessed as Rs 26,20,109.55.

    4. On August 21, 1984 the petitioner's clearing agent filed six bills of entry for ex bond clearance. However, the bills of entry were returned with the remark that “please obtain no objection from the income tax”. This was endorsed on August 24, 1984. The petitioner states that thereafter he came to know that the income tax authorities had imposed ban under Section 132(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petitioner asserted that he was ever ready and willing, rather was anxious, to get the material on payment of the then prevailing customs duty. However, due to circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner, that is to say, by the order of the income tax authorities the goods could not be released. This factor was not of the petitioner's making, according to the petitioner.

    5. On March 30, 1988 the Income Tax Department issued the necessary no objection certificate, thus lifting the ban. On April 4, 1988 the petitioner's agent contacted the customs authority for clearance of the goods. The duty as is prevalent now is Rs 5000 per MT + addl. duty 45 per cent and CVD at Rs 825 per MT. The total duty came to a very large sum of money. The demand, according to the petitioner, was arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional.

    6. The instant writ was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on April 16, 1988 and on April 22, 1988 this Court passed the following order:

    “Pending notice, there will be limited stay to the extent that the goods named, “MSCR defective sheets/coils” which have arrived at Bombay Port per S.S “SEA PRIMROSE” will be released forthwith on petitioner's paying customs and other duties as leviable on August 21, 1984. In addition to the above payment the petitioner will deposit Rs 5 lakhs and for the balance amount petitioner will furnish surety (which may consist of ITC bond but excluding cash/bank guarantee/NSC/FDR) to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs.”

    7. We directed that the notice should be given to the revenue authority to appear before us. Learned Attorney General had appeared pursuant to the notice on behalf of the respondents. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that for the payment of duty, the liability of the petitioner to pay the duty is the duty at the time of clearance of the goods. Our attention was drawn to Section 15(1)(b) of the Act which postulates that the rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any imported goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force, in case the goods are cleared from a warehouse under Section 68, on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse. Section 15 of the Act reads as under:

    “15. Date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of imported goods.—(1) The rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any imported goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force—

    (a) in the case of goods entered for home consumption under Section 46, on the date on which a bill of entry in respect of such goods is presented under that section;

    (b) in the case of goods cleared from a warehouse under Section 68, on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse;

    (c) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty:

    Provided that if a bill of entry has been presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods are imported, the bill of entry shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards.
    (2) The provisions of this section shall not apply to baggage and goods imported by post.”

    8. Learned Attorney General laid emphasis on the expression “actually removed” in clause (b) of Section 15(1) of the Act. Our attention was also drawn to Section 16 of the Act which reads as under:

    “16. Date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of export goods.—(1) The rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any export goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force—

    (a) in the case of goods entered for export under Section 50, on the date on which the proper officer makes an order permitting clearance and loading of the goods for exportation under Section 51;

    (b) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty.

    (2) The provisions of this section shall not apply to baggage and goods exported by post.”

    9. It was contended on behalf of the revenue that in view of the aforesaid, it would not be possible for the petitioner to clear the goods on payment of duty on the date when the petitioner was actually ∼expressing willingness to remove the goods. Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. B. Sen (1979) 2 SCC 174, (1979) 2 SCR 1142. In that case, the appellant stored on December 22, 1965 in the customs warehouse, goods imported by him under a licence, and cleared them on various dates between September 1, 1966 and February 20, 1967. Under protest, they paid customs duty at the enhanced rates in accordance with the amended provisions. Later, they claimed rebate alleging that since the consignments had been received, stored and assessed to duty much before the promulgation of the Ordinance, they were liable to pay duty at the rate prevailing on the date of warehousing. Their appeals and revision were unsuccessful. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the material change in Section 15 being only the substitution of the words “the rate of duty” the customs authorities were not entitled to take into account the new rate of exchange at the appreciated value of currency in respect of the consignments stored in the warehouse prior to the coming into force of the Ordinance. Dismissing the appeal, this Court held that the customs authorities were right in taking the view that the rate of duty applicable to the imported goods should be determined according to the law prevalent on the date they were actually removed from the warehouse. Section 15(1)(b) clearly requires that the rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff applicable to any imported goods shall be the rate and valuation in force on the date on which goods are actually removed from the warehouse. Under Section 49 an importer may apply to the Assistant Collector of Customs for permission to store the imported goods in a warehouse pending their clearance and he may be permitted to do so; and Section 68 provides that an importer of any warehoused goods may clear them if the import duty leviable on them has been paid. In that case, it was found that as the goods were removed from the warehouse after the amending Ordinance had come into force, the customs authorities and the Central Government were right in taking the view that the rate of duty applicable to the imported goods should be determined according the law prevalent on the date these were actually removed from the warehouse.

    10. Mr Garg, appearing for the petitioner, on the other hand contended before us that his client was willing indeed to pay the duty when the goods crossed the customs barrier and were in the process of being cleared, but could not be cleared because of the prohibitory orders of the Income Tax Department under Section 102 (sic) of the Customs Act. In that light, it was not possible, Mr Garg contended, for the Income Tax Department to claim enhanced duty due to facts which were not for the fault of the petitioner. In view of the language used in Section 15(1)(b) of the Act, it is difficult to accept this contention specially in the light of the expression used ‘actually removed’. It must be accepted that the prohibitory orders, arbitrary or not, would postpone the date of clearance and as such would postpone the determination of the duty. Therefore, it is difficult to accept Mr Garg's contention.

    11. However, there is a far more serious objection in entertaining this application under Article 32 of the Constitution, Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. If there is breach of the fundamental rights, the petitioner can certainly have recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution provided other conditions are satisfied. But we must, in all such cases, be circumventive of what is the right claimed. In this case, the petitioner as such has no fundamental right to clear the goods imported except in due process of law. Now in the facts of this case, such clearance can only be made on payment of duty as enjoined by the Customs Act. In a particular situation whether customs duty is payable at the rate prevalent on a particular date or not has to be determined within the four corners of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner has no fundamental right as such to clear any goods imported without payment of duties in accordance with the law. There is procedure provided by law for determination of the payment of customs duty. The revenue has proceeded on that basis. The petitioner contends that duty at a particular rate prevalent at a particular date was not payable. The petitioner cannot seek to remove the goods without payment at that rate or without having the matter determined by the procedure envisaged and enjoined by the law for that determination. The petitioner without seeking to take any relief within the procedure envisaged under the Act had moved this Court for breach of fundamental right. This is not permissible and should never be entertained. In a matter of this nature where liability of a citizen to pay a particular duty depends on interpretation of law and determination of facts and the provision of a particular statute for which elaborate procedure is prescribed, it cannot conceivably be contended that enforcing of those provisions of the Act would breach fundamental right which entitle a citizen to seek recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that relief under Article 32 of the Constitution is wholly inappropriate in the facts and the circumstances of this case. It has further to be reiterated that for enforcement of fundamental right which is dependent upon adjudication or determination of questions of law as well as question of fact without taking any resort to the provisions of the Act, it is not permissible to move this Court on the theoretical basis that there is breach of the fundamental right. Whenever a person complains and claims that there is a violation of law, it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted. It appears that the facts of this nature require elaborate procedural investigation and this Court should not be moved and should not entertain on these averments (sic) of the Article 32 of the Constitution. This position is clearly well settled, but sometimes we are persuaded to accept that an allegation of breach of law is an action in breach of fundamental right. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) 1 SCR 778, AIR 1962 SC 1621, where this Court observed at p. 842 of the report as under: (SCR pp. 842-43)

    “In my opinion, the correct answer to the two questions which have been referred to this larger bench must be in the negative. An order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. Nor can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The proper remedy for correcting an error in such an order is to proceed by way of appeal, or if the error is an error apparent on the face of the record, then by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is necessary to observe here that Article 32 of the Constitution does not give this Court an appellate jurisdiction such as is given by Articles 132 to 136. Article 32 guarantees the right to a constitutional remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Unless a question of the enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply. There can be no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right if the order challenged is a valid and legal order, in spite of the allegation that it is erroneous. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right arises in this case and the writ petition is not maintainable.”

    12. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that Article 32 of the Constitution should not have been resorted to and this application does not lie under Article 32 of the Constitution.

    13. However, it appears that this Court has passed an order on April 22, 1988 as indicated2 hereinbefore. It is stated that the goods have been cleared pursuant to that order. The revenue would be at liberty to take appropriate action in accordance with law for the recovery of the dues.

    14. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

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    Northern Corporation v. Union Of India And Others
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