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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 4(1)(f) of the Code
  • Section 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act
  • Section 6 or any other provision of the Act
  • Section 4 and 5 of the Act
  • Section 496 of the Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 4(1)(f) of the Code
  • Section 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act
  • Section 6 or any other provision of the Act
  • Section 4 and 5 of the Act
  • Section 496 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the validity of a circular issued by the District Superintendent of Police, Rajkot, which directed all Police Sub-Inspectors not to release on bail persons arrested for offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. The circular was challenged on the ground that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure (referred to in the opinion simply as “the Code”), offences under those sections are bailable and the arresting police officer is legally bound to grant bail. The matter reached the appellate court, which was required to decide whether the circular could stand in the face of the statutory provisions governing cognizable and bailable offences. The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act are “cognizable offences” even though the power of arrest without warrant is restricted to police officers of a particular rank under Section 6 of that Act.
  2. Whether a Commissioner of Police, empowered to issue a special warrant or general order under Section 6(1)(i) of the Act, may himself arrest offenders and is obliged to release them on bail under Section 496 of the Code.
  3. Whether an administrative circular that prohibits release on bail can validly override the statutory authority and duty of the arresting officer to grant bail for bailable offences.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Maj. I. C. Lala, (1973) 2 SCC 72 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 738 Interpretation of “police officer” and the scope of cognizable offences when arrest powers are limited to certain ranks. Applied to hold that offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are cognizable even though only designated officers may arrest.
Queen Empress v. Deodhar Singh, 1899 ILR 27 Cal 144 Early authority on police powers and cognizability. Approved as consistent with the present interpretation.
Emperor v. Ismail Hirji, (1929) 31 Bom LR 1349 : AIR 1930 Bom 49 Principle concerning arrest powers of specified police officers. Approved.
Emperor v. Abasbhai Abdulhussein, ILR 50 Bom 344 : AIR 1926 Bom 195 Scope of statutory arrest and bail powers. Approved.
In re Nagarmal Jankiran, AIR 1943 Nag 338 Interpretation of bail provisions for bailable offences. Approved.
Delhi Administration v. Parkash Chand, AIR 1967 Del 151 Police officer’s statutory duty to grant bail. Approved.
Raghunath Lahanusa Walvekar v. Emperor, 34 Bom LR 901 : AIR 1932 Bom 610 Earlier contrary view on arrest and bail powers. Overruled.
G. K. Apte v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Ass 43 Earlier contrary view on cognizability and bail. Overruled.
State of U.P. v. Lal Bahadur, AIR 1968 All 55 Earlier contrary view on police power to grant bail. Overruled.
Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra, AIR 1957 MB 43 Earlier contrary view on statutory bail powers. Overruled.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by interpreting the expression “police officer” in Section 4(1)(f) of the Code, holding that it does not mean “any and every” police officer; an offence remains cognizable even if only a specific rank of police officers is authorised to arrest without warrant. Section 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act confers the power of arrest on a limited class of officers, but this limitation does not alter the character of the offence as cognizable. The Court relied on the principle laid down in Union of India v. Maj. I. C. Lala to reinforce this view.

The Court next observed that a Commissioner of Police who can issue a special warrant under Section 6(1)(i) also possesses the personal authority to effect the arrest. Because offences under Sections 4 and 5 are expressly bailable, Section 496 of the Code imposes a statutory duty on the arresting officer—whether the Commissioner himself or an authorised subordinate—to release the accused on bail.

Any administrative or executive instructions that purport to curtail this statutory power and duty are invalid. Consequently, the Rajkot Superintendent’s circular, which forbade release on bail, was found to be inconsistent with the Code. The Court further noted that neither Section 6 nor any other provision of the Gambling Act removes the bail power provided by the Code. Having reached these conclusions, the Court declared the impugned circular ultra vires.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

The dismissal nullifies the Rajkot Superintendent’s circular, reaffirming that:

  • Offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act are cognizable yet bailable.
  • The arresting police officer has a statutory obligation to grant bail under Section 496 of the Code.
  • Administrative directives cannot override statutory bail rights.

The decision reinforces existing principles without setting out a new legal test, but it underscores that executive instructions must yield to statutory provisions, thereby guiding police administration in similar contexts.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    State Of Gujarat And Another v. Lalsingh Kishansingh .

    The expression “police officer” in Section 4(1)(f) of the Code does not necessarily mean “any and every” police officer, and an offence will still be a “cognizable offence” within this definition even if the power to arrest without warrant, for that offence is given by the statute to police officers of a particular rank or class only. Section 6 confers the power of arrest thereunder only on a specific class of police officers and not on any or every police officer. A Commissioner of Police who is competent to direct, by issuing special warrant of general order, under Section 6(1)(i) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, another police officer of the requisite rank to arrest persons found gambling or present in a gaming house, can also arrest personally the offender concerned. Therefore, by applying the principle laid in I.C Lala case offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are cognizable. Such offences are admittedly bailable. Hence the Commissioner of Police or the police officer who is authorised by him to search, arrest and investigate such offence, is under a legal obligation to release the accused on bail under the provisions of Section 496 of the Code. The authority to grant bail to the person arrested in execution of such a warrant is derived by the officer arresting, from the statute and consequently, no executive instructions or administrative rules can abridge, or run counter to the statutory provisions of the Code. Therefore, the circular order issued by the District Superintendent of Police, Rajkot, directing all the Police sub-Inspectors not to release persons arrested in respect of offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act on bail is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of the Code and on a true construction, there is nothing in Section 6 or any other provision of the Act, which takes away the right and power conferred by the Code on the police officer to grant bail to the person arrested by him for offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Hence the impugned order was ultra vires and bad in law.

    (Paras 11, 15 and 24)
    Union of India v. I.C Lala, (1973) 2 SCC 72 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 738, applied
    Queen Empress v. Deodhar Singh, 1899 ILR 27 Cal 144, 150; Emperor v. Ismail, (1929) 31 Bom LR 1349 : AIR 1930 Bom 49 : 31 Cri LJ 633; Emperor v. Abasbhai Abdulhussein, ILR 50 Bom 344 : AIR 1926 Bom 195 : 27 Cri LJ 503 : 93 IC 967; In re Nagarmal Jankiran, AIR 1943 Nag 338 : 1943 Cri LJ 89 : 196 IC 869 and Delhi Admn. v. Parkash Chand, AIR 1967 Del 151 : 1967 Cri LJ 1630 : 69 Pun LR (D) 207, approved
    Raghunath Lahanusa Walvekar v. Emperor, 34 Bom LR 901 : AIR 1932 Bom 610 : 33 Cri LJ 733; G.K Apte v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Ass 43 : 1970 Cri LJ 448; State of U.P v. Lal Bahadur, AIR 1968 All 55, 57 : 1968 Cri LJ 223 : 1968 All WR (HC) 189 and Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra, AIR 1957 MB 43 : 1957 Cri LJ 184, overruled
    Appeal dismissedR-M/4979.CR

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    Comments

    State Of Gujarat And Another v. Lalsingh Kishansingh .
    (Aug 12, 1980)