N.L Untwalia, J.— This is a plaintiffs' appeal by Special Leave. The trial court dismissed the suit and the Bombay High Court maintained the dismissal in appeal by the plaintiffs.
2. The facts are a bit complicated. For the disposal of the present appeal, only a few of them need be stated in a narrow compass. One Ambabai, wife of Chintamanrao Ghatge purchased lands mentioned at Items 1-A to I-E in the plaint on December 3,1896 in the name of the deity Shri Vitthal Rakhumai Dev. Lands at 1-F, 1-G and 1-H were endowed by Ambabai to the deity by a deed of endowment executed in January or February, 1905. Under this deed of endowment, one Pandurang Babaji Pawar was appointed the Vahivatdar (Manager) and one Bala Appa Yadava was appointed as a servant of the deity. On June 1, 1905, however, Ambabai executed a sale deed in respect of all the suit properties except property 1-E in favour of Pandurang and Bala. On June 23, 1907 Ambabai executed a second Will and in that also she reiterated that Pandurang was being appointed as Vahivatdar and Bala a servant of the deity. Ambabai died on March 12, 1910. After her death Pandurang and Bala partitioned the properties purchased by them by the sale deed dated June 1,1905. Pandurang got property at 1-C and the rest went to Bala. Pandurang died on February 13, 1911. Thereafter his widow Radhabai sold the property at 1-C to one Chinto Deshpande. Chinto sold it to original Defendant 2. Property at 1-E came in possession of the original plaintiffs — Plaintiff 1 being Yashwantrao Laxmanrao. He claimed to be a Manager and hereditary trustee of the deity. Original Plaintiff 2 who died during the pendency of the suit and on whose death his legal representative was substituted claimed to be the hereditary Pujari of the deity. Property at 1-E had come in possession of the plaintiffs long time back and Plaintiff 1 treated the said property as his own. There were several other transfers inter se between the defendants and ultimately in one form or the other Defendants 1 to 6 came to hold one kind of interest to the other in the various suit properties. The plaintiffs instituted the suit in the year 1961 with the permission of the Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra, Defendant 7. The suit was instituted under Sections 50 and 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 — hereinafter called “the Act”, to recover possession of the suit properties from Defendants 1 to 6. Property at 1-E had been sold by Plaintiff 1 on September 17, 1947 to original Defendants 2 and 3. The sales made in the year 1905 as also in the year 1947 were attacked as being void and not binding on the deity. Although specifically the deity was not impleaded as a plaintiff in the suit, as observed by the District Judge, Sitara who tried the suit in the first instance, to all intents and purposes the suit was by the deity and the two plaintiffs. Defendants contested the suit on several grounds. Several issues were framed and tried by the learned District Judge. He held that the properties in suit were bequeathed by Ambabai to the deity. The sale deed dated June 1, 1905 was obtained by undue influence. It was without legal necessity and was not for the benefit of the Devasthan. It was, therefore, held to be not binding on the Devasthan. The purchaser's possession over the land sold was, therefore, held to be void and adverse. Same were the findings of the trial court in respect of the property at 1-E. The suit was, however, dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
3. On appeal by the plaintiffs, only limited submissions were made by them in the High Court. The finding of the trial court that the respective purchasers were in adverse possession of the properties at 1-A to 1-D and 1-F to 1-H was not attacked. The finding of the trial court, however, in respect of property at 1-E was assailed but without success. The High Court dismissed the appeal.
4. Mr R.B Datar, learned Counsel for the appellants put in great industry in arguing this appeal and took us to the various facts and facets of the case. Having appreciated them all, the points which ultimately crystallized in argument are the following :
“(1) Section 52-A was introduced in the Act by Bombay Act 23 of 1955 and in view of the said provision of law, there was no limitation for recovery of the properties of a Public Trust in accordance with the Act.
(2) A suit for the recovery of the properties was not barred in the year 1955 when Section 52-A came into force.
(3) That in any view of the matter, claim regarding 1-E of the property was obviously not barred in the year 1955 and could not be held to be so in the suit instituted in the year 1961 after coming into force of Section 52-A.”
Learned Counsel for the respondents combated all the submissions made on behalf of the appellants.
5. In our judgment, there is no substance in any of the points urged on behalf of the appellants. The possession of the purchasers was adverse in respect of all the properties at 1-A to 1-D and 1-F to 1-H from the very beginning. By such adverse possession those who had come in possession of these properties had acquired an indefeasible title under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. It is not necessary to decide in this case as to which of the articles in the first Schedule of the said Limitation Act applied to this case. Whether it was Articles 134, 134-A, 134-B, 142 or 144 the claim had become barred long, long before the year 1955. The effect of Section 28 of the Limitation Act was that right to the property was extinguished resulting in conferment of a title by adverse possession on the persons in possession of the concerned properties. It is well-known that the effect of Section 28 of the Limitation Act is not only to bar the remedy but also extinguish the right. The right to the property itself was dead and gone. It could not be revived by a provision like the one contained in Section 52-A of the Act.
6. Section 52-A reads as follows :
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, no suit against an assignee for valuable consideration of any immovable property of the Public Trust which has been registered or is deemed to have been registered under this Act for the purpose of following in his hands, such property or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.”
It is a well-established proposition of law that the law of limitation fixing a period of limitation for the initiation of any suit or proceeding is a procedural law and not a substantive one. Section 52-A had, by no stretch of imagination, the effect of reviving an extinguished and lost claim and giving life to a dead horse. If the claim was not barred and the light to the property was not extinguished when Section 52-A came into force, then a suit instituted thereafter could not be defeated under any of the articles of the Limitation Act of 1908 or even of the new Limitation Act of 1963. In express terms it overrides the provisions of the Limitation Act including the provision in Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. But then the overriding effect of Section 52-A will have its play and operation, only if, by the time it came into force. Section 28 had not extinguished the right to the property in question. Otherwise not. In Mahanti Biseshwar Dass v. Sashinath Jha AIR 1943 Pat 289 a Bench of the Patna High Court pointed out that where the right of the plaintiff had become barred by limitation before the amending Act of 1929 was passed the mere institution of the suit after 1929 cannot have the effect of reviving that right. By the Amending Act of 1929 in Section 10 of the Limitation Act it was provided that no suit instituted against a person in whom property had become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns for the purposes mentioned in the section would be barred by any length of time. From the category of assigns, assigns for valuable consideration were left out. The question before the Patna High Court in the case referred to above was whether the amendment brought about in the year 1929 could revive a right which was extinguished, dead and gone prior to 1929. In that connection the answer given was in the negative. The view so expressed in the Patna decision is perfectly sound and correct, and no decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. Under Section 52-A of the Bombay Act even assignees for valuable consideration have been roped in to save the suit from the bar of any period of limitation. But then on an application of the principle referred to above it is plain that Section 52-A could not have the effect of reviving an extinguished right.
7. In Mst Allah Rakhi v. Shah Mohammad Abdur Rahim AIR 1934 PC 77 Sir Lord Lancelot Sanderson delivering the judgment on behalf of the Board ruled that in regard to a suit brought on January 29, 1926 “the question whether it was then barred by limitation must depend upon the law of limitation which was applicable to the suit at that time”. The provisions of the Amendment Act of 1929 which had come into force on January 1, 1929 were held to be inapplicable. Of course, even in the light of the old section it was held that the suit was not barred by limitation and the decree of the High Court was affirmed. Krishnan, J. in the case of Balram Chunnilal v. Durgalal Shivnarain AIR 1968 MP 81, 1967 MP LJ 384 expressed a view identical to the one expressed by the Patna High Court (vide end of para 36, p. 86, Column 1).
8. Mr Datar placed reliance upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dev Chavata v. Ganesh Mahadeo Deshpande AIR 1970 Bom 412 in order to take advantage of Section 52-A of the Act. The ratio of the case has to be appreciated in the background of the facts found therein. The principles of law as enunciated cannot be fully and squarely applied. But yet the decision, if we may say so with respect, is correct. This would be on the footing that the decision given by the Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Act was conclusive and final. He had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the suit land belonged to the trust. He had so decided it on November 5, 1954. The suit was filed on July 21, 1955. In that view, the High Court was right in holding that a suit filed under Section 50 of the Act was not barred under Section 52-A because the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner given in 1954 had declared the property to be a trust property and which decision was final.
9. For the reasons stated above, it is clear that the appellants could not take advantage of Section 52-A of the Act in respect of the properties at 1-A to 1-D and 1-F to 1-G. Argument put forward by Mr Datar to show that the claim was not barred in the year 1955 when Section 52-A came into force was absolutely devoid of any substance. It was against the stand taken in the High Court and does not merit any detailed discussion in our judgment.
10. Coming to property at 1-E now, we must confess at the outset that during the course of argument at one time, we thought that this property having been sold in the year 1947 by Plaintiff 1, the right to the property was not extinguished under Section 28 of the Limitation Act in the year 1955. Therefore, although the suit was instituted in the year 1961, beyond 12 years of 1947, it would perhaps be saved under Section 52-A from the bar of limitation. But on a closer scrutiny and on appreciation of the argument of the other side in the light of the finding recorded by the High Court, we did not feel persuaded to give relief to the appellants even in regard to property at 1-E. The High Court has found that Plaintiff 1 had acquired title to property 1-E by adverse possession long before 1947. He dealt with this properly as his own. Even when the trust was declared as a Public Trust by the Charity Commissioner in or about the year 1954, the property at 1-E was not shown as a trust property. The sale, therefore, in the year 1947 by Plaintiff 1 conveyed a good title to the purchaser. The lost right to this property long before 1947 could not be saved and revived in the year 1955 or 1961 by Section 52-A of the Act. We, therefore, hold in agreement with the High Court that the suit was barred by limitation in regard to this property also.
11. In the result, we dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances make no order as to costs.