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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1977 INSC 104
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 14-A of the Act
  • Section 2(e) of the Act
  • Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act 59 of 1958)
  • Section 14-A and Section 25-B of the Act
  • Section 14-A and Section 25-B of the statute
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1977 INSC 104
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 14-A of the Act
  • Section 2(e) of the Act
  • Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act 59 of 1958)
  • Section 14-A and Section 25-B of the Act
  • Section 14-A and Section 25-B of the statute
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation stems from an ejectment proceeding initiated under Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The respondent, an Under-Secretary in the Housing Ministry, owns House No. 23/6, Shakti Nagar, Delhi. In August 1968 the predecessor-in-interest, Pandit Saraswati Dass, let out a four-room portion on the first floor to the appellant. After Dass’s death in 1972, his heirs (Respondents 1–4) succeeded to the property.

When the Government ordered Respondent 1 to vacate his official accommodation, he invoked Section 14-A and successfully evicted another tenant from an adjacent three-room unit in the same building, which remains vacant. He then filed the present eviction application against the appellant for the four-room unit. The Rent Controller refused the tenant leave to contest and ordered eviction. On revision, the Delhi High Court affirmed eviction—adding the other heirs as parties—but overlooked a statutory plea crucial to the tenant’s defence.

The appellant obtained special leave from the Supreme Court. Owing to the landlord’s appearance by caveat, the Court granted leave and heard the appeal immediately. During the hearing, judicial initiative and counsel’s cooperation led to a negotiated settlement between the parties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a government servant-landlord who has already recovered possession of one dwelling house under Section 14-A can invoke the same provision again to evict another tenant from a different dwelling house, in light of the proviso to Section 14-A(1).
  2. Whether Respondent 1, being a co-heir and alleged beneficiary under an unproved will, qualifies as “landlord” entitled to sue for eviction under the Act.
  3. Whether non-joinder of all co-heirs before the Rent Controller vitiated the eviction order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The proviso to Section 14-A(1) bars a landlord owning multiple dwelling houses from recovering possession of more than one; having already used the provision to evict another tenant, Respondent 1 cannot invoke it again.
  • Respondent 1 is not the appellant’s landlord: the premises were neither in his name nor let out by him, and the will relied on is unproved.
  • All co-heirs were necessary parties; their absence before the Controller renders the proceedings void.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Section 14-A applies because, as an heir of the original landlord, Respondent 1 owns the premises and stands in the shoes of the deceased lessor.
  • Under Section 2(e) of the Act, collection of rent makes him a “landlord”; a single co-owner may maintain eviction proceedings on behalf of all.
  • The earlier eviction concerned a separate “premises” within the meaning of the Act; therefore the present application is permissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (1976 4 SCC 184) A co-owner is, in law, owner of every part of the property and may sue for eviction without joining other co-owners. Used to reject the appellant’s objection that Respondent 1, as co-owner, could not alone maintain the eviction petition.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first interpreted Section 14-A(1) purposively: the provision affords an emergency remedy enabling a government servant to regain one dwelling house for immediate occupation after vacating government quarters. The proviso expressly withholds any right to recover “more than one dwelling house” where the landlord owns several.

Because Respondent 1 had already invoked Section 14-A to evict a different tenant from the adjacent three-room unit—which remains vacant—the statutory right was “exhausted.” Attempting to evict the appellant from another unit under the same provision contravened both the text and purpose of the proviso. This “lethal” objection, ignored by the High Court, was decisive.

The Court dismissed the appellant’s other defences:

  • “In his name” and “let out by him” in Section 14-A encompass property inherited from the original lessor; corporate legal formalism should yield to “rugged realism.”
  • Section 2(e) defines “landlord” broadly; Respondent 1 collected rent and was therefore a landlord despite being a co-heir and notwithstanding disputes over the will.
  • Following Sri Ram Pasricha, a single co-owner may sue for eviction; the absence of other co-heirs at the Controller stage did not invalidate proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED; eviction order set aside.

By consent of parties, the appellant will surrender the contested four-room unit within one month in exchange for possession of the vacant three-room unit; rent is fixed at ₹250 per month, with provision for additional space at ₹75 per month if mutually agreed. Each party will bear its own costs.

Implications: The judgment clarifies that a landlord’s right under Section 14-A is single-use; once he recovers one dwelling house, the statute bars further reliance on that provision against other tenants. The ruling also reaffirms that a co-owner collecting rent qualifies as “landlord” for rent-control purposes. No new precedent is set beyond statutory interpretation; the primary effect is the immediate re-allocation of premises between the parties.

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    Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak And Others

    V.R Krishna Iyer, J.— So heartening to the Judges' bosom is the happy ending of a bitterly fought litigation where the law is declared by the Court and justice is accomplished by the parties settling the differences, assisted by activist judicial suggestions and promoted by constructive counselling by advocates. Such is the pleasing culmination of this case which relates to an ejectment proceeding under Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act 59 of 1958). The Controller directed eviction, refusing leave to the tenant to contest the application for eviction. The High Court, in the revision filed by the tenant, went into an elaborate discussion on many matters but somehow missed a plea fatal to the landlord's claim and affirmed the relief of eviction although on different grounds. The aggrieved tenant sought special leave to appeal which was granted and, thanks to the landlord appearing by caveat even at the preliminary hearing, leave was granted and the appeal itself was heard the very next day. Thus at the Supreme Court level quick justice has been meted out and fortunately our judgment has resulted in a re-adjustment between the parties and, hopefully the healing of the wounds of litigation. A protracted forensic proceeding makes foes of friends, but a settlement of the dispute in accordance with law and justice makes friends of foes.

    2. Some facts need to be narrated for getting the hang of the case and the issues of law raised. The respondent is an Under-Secretary to Government in the Housing Ministry. He was in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government and was required by Government Order to vacate such residential accommodation on the ground that he owned in Delhi a residential accommodation in his own name. The building we are concerned with is 23/6, Shakti Nagar. It is a two-storeyed house but the litigation centres round part of the first-floor. The whole building belonged to one Pandit Saraswati Dass who let out a portion of the first floor consisting of 4 rooms and a small enclosure somewhere in August 1968 to the appellant. Shri Dass died in 1972 leaving behind the 1st respondent, two other sons (Respondents 2 and 3) and a daughter (Respondent 4). It may be stated even here that the proceeding before the Controller was started by the 1st respondent and an objection was raised by the appellant that the other heirs of the late Dass were necessary parties they were not impleaded at this stage although the Controller ordered eviction overruling the objection. The High Court however, impleaded the other two sons and the only daughter (Respondents 2 to 4) and taking the view that their presence was necessary for the maintainability of the action, the learned Judge decreed eviction.

    3. A crucial objection, lethal to the case of the landord, considered by the Controller but negatived by him was raised in the revision petition but was not adverted to or adjudicated upon by the High Court. Before us Shri Nariman has pressed it again and the fate of this case, so far as we are concerned, rests on the validity of that point. The landlord 1st respondent, after receiving the order from Government to vacate, as contemplated in Section 14-A of the Act, applied for eviction of another tenant who was occupying a three-room tenement on the first floor of the same building. In fact, the first floor of the house consists of two dwelling apartments as it were, one consisting of three rooms and the other of 4 rooms. By definition, ‘premises’ means any part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence .... In the present case the three room tenement being part of a building and let separately to a tenant, fell within the definition of “premises”. Admittedly, the landlord exercised his right under Section 14-A to recover immediately possession of those premises. He succeeded, secured possession and kept it vacant. Even at the present time those premises which are adjacent to the suit premises are in his vacant possession. Shri Nariman's argument is that while it is open to a landlord who is a government servant directed to vacate allotted premises, and clothed with a new right to recover possession of any premises let out by him, to exercise it once, he cannot repeat the exercise ad libitem and go on evicting every tenant of his by using the weapon of Section 14-A. He relies on the proviso to Section 14-A(1) to reinforce his submission and we will deal with it presently.

    4. Two other contentions urged by the appellant are that the first respondent is not his landlord and therefore is disentitled to evict him, under the Act, and secondly, the premises are not in his name and have not been let out by him. In any case, the claim of the first respondent that the building in its entirety had been allotted by the late Shri Dass by his will to the first respondent and his brother the 3rd respondent and that, subsequently, there had been an oral partition between the two whereunder the first floor was allotted in toto to the 1st respondent making him the sole owner and therefore the exclusive landlord, was contested by the appellant tenant and this plea should have been allowed to be raised by grant of leave under Section 25-B by the Controller. The presence of the co-heirs at the High Court level was inconsequential, according to the appellant, and their absence at the trial stage vitiated the order of the Controller. We will examine these contentions briefly.

    5. The scheme of the statute is plain and has been earlier explained by this Court with special reference to Sections 14-A and 25-B. The government servant who owns his house, lets it out profitably and occupies at lesser rent official quarters has to quit but, for that very purpose to be fulfilled, must be put in quick possession of his premises. The legislative project and purpose turn not on niceties of little verbalism but on the actualities of rugged realism, and so, the construction of Section 14-A(1) must be illumined by the goal, though guided by the word. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that Section 14-A(1) is available as a ground, if the premises are owned by him as inherited from his porpositus in whose name the property stood. “In his name” and “let out by him”, read in the spirit of the provision and without violence to the words of the section, clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, which is the case where he as heir, steps into his father's shoes who owned the building in his own name and let it out himself. He represents the former owner and lessor and squarely falls within Section 14A. The accent on ‘name’ is to pre-empt the common class of benami evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominalism. Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality of the ownership and landlordism as the touchstone.

    6. Nor do we set much store by the submission that the 1st respondent is not a landlord, being only a co-heir and the will in his favour having been disputed. Equally without force in our view is the plea that one co-lessor cannot sue for eviction even if the other co-lessors have no objection. Section 2(e) of the Act defines ‘landlord’ thus:

    “2. (e) ‘Landlord’ means a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant.”
    “Tenant”, by definition [Section 2(1)] means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable. Read in the context of the Rent Control law, the simple sense of the situation is that there should be a building which is let. There must be a landlord who collects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he recognises as landlord. The complications of estoppel or even the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not necessarily or inflexibly be imported into the proceedings under the Rent Control law, tried by special Tribunals under a special statute. In this case, rent was being paid to the late Dass who had let out to the appellant; on the death of the former, the rent was being paid by the 1st respondent who signed his name and added that it was on behalf of the estate of the deceased Dass. At a later stage the rent was being paid to and the receipts issued by the first respondent in his own name. Not that the little change made in the later receipts makes much of a difference, but the fact remains that the tenant in this case had been paying the rent to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the latter fell within the definition of “landlord” for the purposes of the Act. We are not impressed with the investigation into the law of real property and estoppel between landlord and tenant, Shri Nariman invited us to make. A fair understanding of the relationship between the parties leaves little room for doubt that the appellant was the tenant of the premises. The 1st respondent, together with the other respondents, constituted the body of landlords and, by consent, implicit or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them representing them all, was collecting rent. In short, he functioned, for all practical purposes as the landlord, and was therefore entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord.

    7. This Court, in Sri Ram Pasricha (1976 4 SCC 184) clarified that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property is: Jurisprudentially. it is not correct to say that a co-owner of property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property.... It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff, who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises, is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of Section 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property, being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendants. That case also was one for eviction under the rent control law of Bengal. The law having been thus put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the other co-owners on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction, fails. We are not called upon to consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the evicting co-owner.

    8. Shri Nariman urged that the will had not been proved and that he had not been given an opportunity to establish his challenge of the will of Shri Dass. In the High Court the other co-heirs were parties and there is nothing on record to show that they objected to the claim of the 1st respondent to the first floor on the strength of the will from his father. An objection for the sake of an objection which has no realistic foundation, cannot be entertained seriously for the sake of processual punctiliousness. We do not agree with the contention.

    9. The last, and yet the lethal objection which had been lost sight of in the High Court, although raised there, loomed large before this Court, in Sri Nariman's arguments. The admitted fact is that on the same ground of the government's Order to vacate, the first respondent had evicted a dwelling house on the first floor and is keeping it vacant. He is again using the same order to vacate passed by the Government to evict the appellant's dwelling house. This is obviously contrary to the intendment of Section 14-A and is interdicted by the proviso to Section 14-A(1). It is true that when an officer is sought to be evicted by the Government from its premises he has to be rehabilitated in his own house by an accelerated remedial procedure provided by Section 14-A read with Section 25-B of the Act. But this emergency provision available merely to put the government servant back into his own residential accommodation cannot be used as a weapon for evicting several tenants if he has many houses let out to various persons. The object of Section 14-A is fulfilled once the landlord recovers immediate possession of his premises from one of his tenants. The right is exhausted thereby and is not available for continual applications for eviction against all other tenants holding under him. This is made clear by the proviso which makes plain that the section shall not be construed as conferring a right on a landlord owning two or more dwelling houses to recover possession of more than one dwelling house. Of course it gives him the choice since the proviso states that it shall be lawful for such landlord to indicate the particular dwelling house among a plurality owned by him, possession of which he intends to recover. He can ordinarily recover one dwelling house but no more. In the present case, admittedly he has recovered one dwelling house consisting of a three-room apartment on the first floor by using the precise ground under Section 14A(1). It necessarily follows that he cannot use Section 14-A for evicting the tenant-appellant from another dwelling house. On the last ground, therefore, the appeal must be allowed, although in the circumstances we direct the parties to bear their cost throughout.

    10. Counsel on both sides, on the suggestion by the court, calculated to produce a salutary relationship between the parties, agreed that the three-room dwelling house which lies vacant (having been evicted under Section 14-A) will be given possession of to the appellant in exchange for the appellant making over possession of the 4-room apartment — the premises involved in the present case — together with the appurtenant space. The appellant has agreed to pay a sum of Rs 250 per month by way of rent for the adjacent three-room apartment into which he will move, within one month from today and surrender possession of the 4-room apartment simultaneously. In case the parties are able to adjust their differences and the 1st respondent makes over the additional space attached to the 4-room tenement for the use of the appellant, he will pay an extra sum of Rs 75 per menses or other negotiated figure. On these terms agreed to before us by counsel on both sides, after taking instructions from their parties, we direct that the first respondent do make over possession of the three-room dwelling house on the first floor and take in exchange the 4-room dwelling house which is the subject-matter of the present eviction proceedings. We record this undertaking as indicated above and with this modification, allow the appeal.

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    Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak And Others
    (Apr 1, 1977)