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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Draft Bill before Parliament revising the Penal Code
  • Section(s) not specified of the Criminal Code
  • Penal Code, and other countries' penal codes
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Draft Bill before Parliament revising the Penal Code
  • Section(s) not specified of the Criminal Code
  • Penal Code, and other countries' penal codes
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a neighbouring cultivator of Mohinder Pal (PW 7), harboured animosity towards PW 7 over a field boundary dispute and unpaid grocery debts. On the night of 21 August 1971, while PW 7, his wife Satya Devi, their children and PW 8 were conversing in the courtyard, the appellant allegedly threw a hand-grenade from a distance of roughly 35–45 feet. The explosion killed Satya Devi and her child Surjit Kumar and injured several others, including PW 7.

The village Sarpanch (PW 6) attempted to lodge a First Information Report (FIR) the same night, but flood conditions delayed filing until 2 p.m. the next day (Ex. PK), which referred to an “unknown man”. After investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for murder (s. 302 IPC) and lesser offences (ss. 325, 323 IPC). The Sessions Judge convicted him and imposed the death penalty. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. This opinion is the Supreme Court’s judgment on the appellant’s further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant threw the hand-grenade that caused the deaths and injuries.
  2. Whether the death sentence imposed by the courts below should be upheld or commuted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (through amicus curiae Shri O.P. Rana)

  • The FIR’s omission of the appellant’s name is a fatal flaw; had PW 7 recognised the assailant, the FIR would have identified him.
  • PW 7’s claim of unconsciousness until the next morning is a convenient fabrication enabling the prosecution to explain away the FIR defect.
  • The prosecution evidence is “built upon surmises and flimsy evidence”, particularly lacking in decisive ballistic proof.

State/Prosecution

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate exposition of the prosecution’s submissions; its stance is reflected in the evidence adopted by the courts below.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ediga Anamma v. State of A.P., (1974) 4 SCC 443 Judicial trend and legislative proposals favouring abolition or restriction of capital punishment. Referenced to acknowledge abolitionist trends but distinguished; the Court declined to interfere with the death sentence, leaving commutation to executive clemency.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, writing for the Court, analysed the evidentiary record and addressed the defence critique:

  • Explanation for FIR omission: The Court accepted that PW 7 became unconscious after the blast, supported by medical testimony (PW 2) and corroboration from PW 6 and PW 8, making it plausible that PW 6 could not learn the assailant’s identity before lodging Ex. PK.
  • Eyewitness credibility: PW 7 saw the appellant in lantern light moments before the throw; PW 8 corroborated the circumstances despite not seeing the throw herself. The short distance and lighting rendered identification believable.
  • Corroborative evidence:
    • PW 15 met the appellant running away seconds after the explosion, lending immediate post-occurrence corroboration.
    • PW 16, a Panchayat member, received the appellant’s extra-judicial confession, which the Court deemed reliable.
  • Ballistic evidence: Although better ballistic proof was possible, the cumulative oral evidence sufficed to meet the “proof beyond reasonable doubt” threshold.
  • Sentence: The Court acknowledged contemporary abolitionist tendencies (citing Ediga Anamma) but characterised the crime as “cruel and inhuman”. Finding no “special reasons” to alter the discretion exercised by the lower courts, it declined to reduce the sentence, noting that clemency petitions remain open to the appellant.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction under Section 302 IPC and allied offences, and the sentence of death.

Immediate consequence: the appellant remains under a judicial death sentence, subject only to possible executive clemency. The decision reinforces the principle that corroborated eyewitness and circumstantial evidence can sustain a conviction even where initial investigative documents omit the accused’s name. No new doctrinal precedent was established; the Court primarily applied existing evidentiary standards and sentencing discretion.

    Bishan Dass v. State Of Punjab .

    V.R Krishna Iyer, J.— The appellant, convicted of murder of Satya Devi, a young woman, and her child, Surjit Kumar, by throwing a hand-grenade into the house of Mohinder Pal, PW 7, husband of the deceased lady, was sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge. On appeal, the conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court. Of course, he has also been con+++victed for offences under Sections 325 and 323 for causing injuries to Mohinder Pal aforesaid and a few others.

    2. The substance of the prosecution case is that PW 7 was a grocer and cultivator. The accused was a neighbouring cultivator and had a dispute over the boundary between the two fields with PW 7. A quarrel had arisen on this score between the two and this led to grudge borne by the accused against PW 7. It is further alleged, as motive for the offence, that the accused used to buy grocery from PW 7's shop on credit but that the former defaulted to pay and when pressed, picked up a quarrel. These dual motives by themselves are not serious enough for the commission of a grave crime but who knows the psychic sensitiveness of individuals? Both the courts below have held the motives true and we see no reason to disagree with them. Of course, merely because there is some grudge or pique proved, we cannot hold the accused guilty. That question has to be decided by the pressure of probabilities and direct evidence to the extent of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

    3. Now to the actual incident. It is alleged that on August 21, 1971, PW 7, his wife and children and his aunt, PW 8, were talking to each other from the courtyard of their house, seated on cots. There was a lamp burning, hung from a wall of the courtyard. As they were chatting, PW 7 turned towards the lantern to light a cigarette and his eyes landed on the accused standing in the lane nearby. Immediately the latter threw a handgrenade into the courtyard and ran away. The explosion which followed sprayed splinters which struck the persons present there. In consequence, two persons, the wife and child of PW 7, died on the spot and others, including PW 7 received injuries. The Sarpanch of the village PW 6, who was living closeby, came to the scene, found two persons dead and a number of others with injuries. He proceeded to the police station for lodging a first information report but could not cross the river at night as it was in floods. The next day he lodged the first information report before the police at 2 p.m, Ext. PK. Investigation commenced and the accused was charge-sheeted for various offences, the gravest of which was under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused denied his guilt totally but produced no evidence in defence. Even so the prosecution has to prove its case satisfactorily, the silence of the accused being of no consequence in this context.

    4. It has been held by the courts below that the death of the two persons and the injuries to a number of others were caused by the hand grenade thrown by the accused. Shri O.P Rana appearing as amicus curiae has challenged the findings as totally untenable and built upon surmises and flimsy evidence. Indeed, his persuasive presentation initially induced some hesitancy in our minds but on a closer consideration of the evidence we are not inclined to disturb the holding by the High Court and the Sessions Court that the accused was responsible for the murder and the other lesser offences.

    5. The trumpcard used by Shri Rana was that there was a fatal omission in the first information, laid a day after the occurrence, to mention the name of the accused. On the other hand Ext. PK, the first information report, mentions as the miscreant “some unknown man”. Had there been no satisfactory explanation for this serious omission we might have been inclined to doubt the veracity of the prosecution. The point made by Shri Rana is that PW 7 claims to have seen the assailant and shouted that the bomb was thrown by Bishan “Bishan, Tera Bera Gark Mainu Taba Kar Ditta Hai”. It is plausibly submitted that if PW 7 had known the name of the assailant and PW 6 had visited his house after that he should have been told about the accused and the name of the accused should have found a place in the Ext. PK. But we have the evidence that PW 7 became unconscious after a time and regained consciousness only the next morning. This is stated to be a convenient device of evasion, according to Shri Rana. We do not think so. It is conceivable that the person seeing a horrible crime might instantly shout the name of the criminal but viewing the horror of his dear wife and child being struck dead, be shocked into unconsciousness, particularly when he too, was injured by the blast. According to the Medical Officer (PW 2), one of the injuries of PW 7 was located on the right side of the chest and had to be kept under observation. PW 6 testified that on reaching the scene after the explosion, he found PW 7 and the other injured persons lying unconscious. PW 6 therefore, could not elicit any information from PWs 7 and 8, during his 10 minutes' stay at the scene. PWs 7 and 8 swore how they had been rendered unconscious. The courts below have believed them on this point and we see no reason to disagree.

    6. PW 8 candidly admitted that although the name of the assailant was shouted by PW 7, she herself did not see the accused throwing the bomb. May be she did not but that does not contradict PW 7 having seen the accused in the light of the lantern. We have substantial corroboration from PW 8's evidence of the version given by PW 7. The night was dark, true, but there was a light burning and the distance from where the handgrenade was thrown was a few yards only (between 35 and 45 feet). There is no inherent improbability in the versions of PWs 7 and 8.

    7. We have the evidence of PW 15 who identified the accused shortly after the occurrence running from near the scene:

    “When I was in the street the accused came running from the side of the house of Mohinder Pal. He struck against me. I enquired from him as to what had happened but the accused did not respond and ran away towards the field. I went to the house of Mohinder Pal. There I saw his wife and one son lying dead. Mohinder Pal and his two sons and Daya Wanti were lying injured. When the accused struck against me there was a report of explosion just before that.”
    This testimony is corroborative of the prosecution case. We have also the extra-judicial confession spoken to by PW 16, a member of the Panchayat whom the accused approached, confessed to having thrown a handgrenade into the house of PW 7 killing two and pleading that he be produced before the police. We see no reason to discredit PW 16 whose evidence has found acceptance by the courts below.

    8. Certainly better evidence on the ballistic aspects could have been produced by the prosecution but the materials on record analysed by the two courts carefully leave us in no doubt that the guilt of the appellant has been brought home.

    9. The question that now remains is one of sentence. We should have considered this matter more anxiously, although the discretion exercised by the courts below is not interfered with except for special reasons. But in the circumstances manifest here the appellant's crime is cruel and inhuman and the consequential deaths dastardly and pathetic. We are aware that the general trend in courts and among jurists as well as penal codes in this country and in other countries is towards abolition of capital punishment. Indeed, we have had occasion to consider this matter in some detail in Ediga Anamma v. State of A.P (1974) 4 SCC 443 where we have pointed out how the draft Bill before Parliament revising the Penal Code leans towards the more humane alternative of the two punishments prescribed for murder. However, a Bill is not law nor are we disposed to interfere with the punishment inflicted. It is entirely a matter for the clemency of the Governor or the President, if appropriately moved to commute or not to commute.

    10. We dismiss the appeal.

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    Comments

    Bishan Dass v. State Of Punjab .
    (Jan 10, 1975)