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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-F, Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-F, Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Indian Leaf Tobacco Limited (“the Company”) has operated for about forty years, purchasing, stemming, grading and packing roughly 35 % of the tobacco grown in Andhra Pradesh. In 1962 it maintained twenty-one depots to facilitate this activity. On 16 August 1963 the Company notified its workers’ union that eight of those depots would close on 30 September 1963.

The union raised an industrial dispute covering (i) the proposed closure and (ii) several wage-related demands. On 14 November 1963 the State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad, under s. 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”). The first issue referred was whether the union’s demands that no 1962-season depot be closed and that no 1962-season workman be retrenched were justified.

The Company lodged a preliminary objection that depot closure was a managerial prerogative and not an “industrial dispute.” On 13 August 1964 the Tribunal issued an interim award upholding that objection. After recording evidence for more than a week and hearing extended argument, the Tribunal delivered a final award on 11 December 1964, deciding Issue 1 wholly against the workmen. The workmen obtained special-leave and appealed to the Supreme Court against both the interim and the final awards.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the union’s demand that the Company refrain from closing eight depots.
  2. Whether, despite the closure, the retrenched workmen were entitled to reinstatement or other relief on the ground that the closure was not genuine but a device to deny benefits.
  3. Whether the closure of eight depots amounted to a “closure of business” or merely a stoppage of part of the undertaking, and the consequent impact on workmen’s entitlement to compensation under the ID Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ (Workmen’s) Arguments

  • Closure of the depots did not constitute a closure of business in law because the Company continued similar operations at thirteen other depots; therefore the Tribunal could order the depots to remain open.
  • The Company’s action was mala fide: business formerly done at the eight depots was allegedly shifted to nearby “buying points,” including two new points opened after closure, merely to deprive long-serving employees of accrued benefits.
  • Reliance was placed on Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, 1956 SCR 872, and the decision reported at 1953 LAC 563 to contend that cessation of one unit is not a closure of the entire undertaking.

Respondent Company’s Arguments

  • Closing a depot is an act of management wholly within the Company’s discretion; no industrial dispute can arise over such closure, and the State Government lacked power to refer the issue.
  • The stoppage was genuine and necessitated by business expediency—reduced purchasing aimed at quality and economy—and the principal handling work done at the depots was not transferred elsewhere.
  • All affected workmen received retrenchment compensation at the higher rate prescribed by s. 25-F of the ID Act, so no further relief was due.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, 1956 SCR 872 Distinction between retrenchment and closure; compensation is linked to retrenchment, not closure. Used to illustrate that tribunals cannot order employers to resume a closed unit; compensation issues only arise after bona fide closure.
Employees of M/s India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd., Calcutta v. India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd., Calcutta, 1953 LAC 563 Grant of retrenchment compensation where one unit of a company is closed. Explained as a retrenchment, not a closure case, in the legal context existing before ss. 25-FF and 25-FFF were enacted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Bhargava J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held that ordering an employer to keep open or reopen a closed branch exceeds the powers of an Industrial Tribunal. Closure—even of part of an undertaking—is a managerial decision, and tribunals cannot compel an employer to continue unwanted business activities. Accordingly, the State Government’s reference of the first limb of Issue 1 (prohibiting depot closure) was incompetent.

The Court distinguished the case law relied upon by the appellants. Pipraich Sugar Mills was concerned with the permissible grant of compensation after closure, not with compelling continued operation; likewise, the 1953 LAC 563 decision was justified as a retrenchment case in the legal regime predating ss. 25-FF and 25-FFF. Those sections now expressly govern compensation on closure, rendering the appellants’ reliance misplaced.

Turning to the factual allegations of mala fides, the Court accepted the Tribunal’s detailed findings—based on a week of evidence—that the closure was “real and genuine.” The handling functions formerly performed at the depots were not transferred to the buying points; the Company had legitimately reduced purchases for reasons of quality and economy. Because no business remained at the depots, reinstatement or continued employment was impossible. The only residual right was to monetary compensation, which the Company had already paid under s. 25-F.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

The Supreme Court affirmed both the interim and final awards. The union cannot compel the Company to reopen depots, and the retrenched workmen, having received statutory compensation, are entitled to no further relief. The judgment reinforces the managerial prerogative to close part of an undertaking while clarifying that workers’ remedies after genuine closure lie only in statutory compensation, not reinstatement. No new legal precedent was created beyond applying established principles under the Industrial Disputes Act.

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    Workmen Of The Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. Guntur v. Management Of Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. Guntur .

    Bhargava, J.— This appeal, by special leave, has arisen out of an award made by the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad in an industrial dispute between the respondent, the Indian Leaf Tobacco Limited, Guntur (hereinafter referred to as “the Company”), and its workmen. Development Company Admittedly, the Company is an associate of the Imperial Tobacco Company Ltd., and the main business carried on by the Company is that of purchasing tobacco of all varieties and qualities, stemming, grading and packing of tobacco and supplying it to the Imperial Tobacco Co., as well as exporting the tobacco to various foreign countries in the world. The Company has been carrying on this business for about 40 years and handles almost 35 per cent of the tobacco grown in the State of Andhra Pradesh. For the work of stemming, grading and packing tobacco, the Company has two factories, one at Anaparty in East Godavari District, and the other at Chirala in Guntur District. In connection with this business, the Company, in the year 1962, was maintaining 21 depots where, according to the workmen, the appellants, the Company was carrying on the work of collecting tobacco, though the Company's case was that the principal work done at these depots was that of handling the tobacco purchased at other places and only included the work of purchasing tobacco on a small scale.

    2. On 16th August, 1963, the Company gave a notice to the Union of the appellant workmen that 8 out of 21 depots mentioned therein would be closed down with effect from 30th September, 1963. Thereafter, an industrial dispute was raised by the workmen which related to the closure of these 8 depots, as well as to a number of other demands, including revision of basic wages and dearness allowance, additional discomfort allowance, etc. The State Government, by its Order dated 14th November, 1963, referred the dispute for adjudication under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad. The first issue, which was referred for adjudication, was as follows:

    “How far the demands of the union viz. (i) that no depot which worked during 1962 season should be closed, and (ii) that no workman who worked in 1962 season should be retrenched, are justified?”
    There were ten other issues, but we need not reproduce them, as we are not concerned with them in this appeal.

    3. In the proceedings for adjudication, the Company took a preliminary objection that the closure the depots was a managerial function, that there could not be an industrial dispute over such closure, that the Government, therefore, had no power to refer this issue for adjudication, and that the Tribunal also had no power to adjudicate on it. Thereupon, the Tribunal framed a preliminary issue as to “whether the employer is justified in alleging that Issue 1 framed by the Government cannot be deemed to relate to an industrial dispute, and as such, whether the Government had the power to refer it for adjudication”. The Tribunal decided this preliminary issue by giving an interim award on 13th August, 1964. The preliminary objection was allowed and a further direction was made that the effect of this decision on Issue 1 will be decided later after hearing the parties. Thereafter, the Tribunal proceeded to hear the reference on this question as well as on all other issues referred to it and, ultimately, gave its award on 11th December, 1964. In that award, both the parts of Issue 1 were decided against the workmen. The workmen have now come up in this appeal against the interim award dated 13th August, 1964 as well as against the final award insofar as it relates to issue 1.

    4. The decision given by the Tribunal in the interim award, holding that the reference covered by Issue 1 was not competent, has been challenged by learned counsel for the appellants on the ground that the closure of a depot does not amount to closure of business in law and, since the same business was continued by the Company at least 13 other depots, the closure of the 8th depots in question was unjustified. For the proposition that the closure of the depots did not amount to closure of business, learned counsel rolled on the views expressed by this Court in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union 1956 SCR 872 where the Court explained the reason for the decision given by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited, Calcutta v. India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd., Calcutta 1953 LAC 563. It, however, appears to us that this question raised on behalf of the appellants is totally immaterial insofar as the question of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the first part of Issue 1 is concerned. The closure of the 8 depots by the Company, even if it is held not to amount to closure of business of the Company, cannot be interfered with by an Industrial Tribunal if, in fact, that closure was genuine and real. The closure may be treated as stoppage of part of the activity or business of the Company. Such stoppage of part of a business is an act of management which is entirely in the discretion of the Company carrying on the business. No Industrial Tribunal, even in a reference under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, can interfere with discretion exercised in such a matter and can have any power to direct a Company to continue a part of the business which the Company has decided to shut down. We cannot possibly accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that a Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act has power to issue orders directing a Company to reopen a closed depot or branch, if the Company, in fact, closes it down.

    5. An example may be taken of a case where a Bank with its headquarters in one place and a number of branches at different places decides to close down one of the branches at one of those places where it is functioning. We cannot see how, in such a case, if the employees of that particular branch raise an industrial dispute, the Bank can be directed by the Industrial Tribunal to continue to run that branch. It is for the Bank to decide whether the business of the branch should be continued or not, and no Bank can be compelled to continue a branch which it considers undesirable to do.

    6. In these circumstances, it is clear that the demand contained in the first part of Issue 1 was beyond the powers and jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and was incorrectly referred for adjudication to it by the State Government.

    7. Of course, if a Company closes down a branch or a depot, the question can always arise as to the relief to which the workmen of that branch or depot are entitled and, if such a question arises and becomes the subject-matter of an industrial dispute, an Industrial Tribunal will be fully competent to adjudicate on it. It is unfortunate that, in this case, when dealing with the preliminary issue, the Tribunal expressed its decision in the interim award in general words holding that Issue 1 as a whole was beyond its jurisdiction. If the reasoning in the interim award is taken into account, it is clear that the Tribunal on that reasoning only came to the conclusion that it was not competent to direct reopening of the 8 depots which had been closed, so that the Tribunal should have held that the first part of Issue 1 only was outside its jurisdiction.

    8. So far as the second part of that issue is concerned, as we have said above, it was competent for the Tribunal to go into it and decide whether the claim of the workmen that they should not be retrenched was justified. On an examination of the interim award and the final award, we, however, find that the Tribunal in fact did do so. The case reported in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. 1956 SCR 872 was also concerned only with the question as to the relief that can be granted to workmen when there is closure of a business. No question arose either before the Court, or in the cases considered by the Court, of an Industrial Tribunal making a direction to the employers to continue to run or to reopen a closed branch of the business. The Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd., Calcutta 1953 LAC 563 was dealing with the question of retrenchment compensation as a result of the closure of one of the units of the company concerned, and it held that the workmen were entitled to retrenchment compensation in accordance with law. This Court, in the case of Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. 1956 SCR 872, only explained why the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in granting retrenchment compensation in that case. The opinion expressed by the Court was that, though there is discharge of workmen both when there is retrenchment and closure of business, the compensation is to be awarded under the law not for discharge as such but for discharge on retrenchment and if, as is conceded, retrenchment means in ordinary parlance discharge of the surplus, it cannot include discharge on closure of business. It was in this context that the Court went on to add that in the case of Employees of M/s India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd., Calcutta 1953 LAC 563 what had happened was that one of the units of the Company had been closed which would be a case of retrenchment and not a case of closure of business. It may be noted that, at the time when this decision was given, Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF had not been introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act, and the only right to retrenchment compensation granted to the workmen was conferred by Section 25-F. It was in the light of the law then prevailing that the Court felt that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Employees of M/s India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd. 1953 LAC 563 granting retrenchment compensation could be justified on the ground that the services of the workmen had not been dispensed with as a result of closure of business, but as a result of retrenchment. That question does not arise in the case before us. Since then, as we have indicated above, Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF have been added in the Industrial Disputes Act, and the latter section specifically lays down what rights a workman has when an undertaking is closed down. In a case where a dispute may arise as to whether workmen discharged are entitled to compensation under Section 25-F or Section 25-FFF it may become necessary to decide whether the closure, as a result of which the services have been dispensed with, amounts to a closure in law or not. In the case before us, it was admitted by learned counsel for both parties that the workmen, who have been discharged as a result of the closure of the 8 depots of the Company, have all been paid retrenchment compensation at the higher rate laid down in Section 25-F, so that, in this case, it is not necessary to decide the point raised on behalf of the workmen.

    9. In connection with the second part of Issue 1, it was also urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the business, which was being carried on at the 8 depots, had not in fact been closed down and had merely been transferred to buying points situated in and around the closed depots, including two new buying points established by the Company after the closure of these 8 depots. The argument was that the workmen were old employees who had served the Company for a long time and were entitled to certain benefits as a result of that long service. The Company closed these 8 depots mala fide with the object of depriving the workmen of those benefits and merely altered the nature of the business by closing the depots and carrying on the same business at the buying points. This point urged by learned counsel cannot, however, be accepted in view of the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal.

    10. The Tribunal examined in detail the allegations made on behalf of the workmen in this respect. In fact, the interim award mentions that, for the purpose of deciding the preliminary issue and the first issue, evidence was recorded by the Tribunal for more than a week and arguments of Advocates of the parties were heard for even a longer period. After examining the evidence, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the stoppage of the work at the depots was genuine and that the work which was being carried on at the depots had not been transferred to the buying points established by the Company. The closure of the business at the depots was necessitated by reasons of expediency inasmuch as the Company had to reduce its purchases in its quest for quality and its desire to run the business economically. The principal work, which used to be done at the depots, was not that of purchasing tobacco, but of handling it and that work was not transferred at all to any buying point. The Tribunal, thus, came to the finding that the closure of these depots was real and genuine and that the suggestion of the appellants that only a device was adopted of carrying on the same business in a different manner had no force at all if the same business had been continued, though under a different guise, the claim of the workmen not to be retrenched could possibly be considered by the Tribunal; but, on the finding that there was a genuine closure of the business that used to be carried on at the depots, no question could arise of the retrenchment being set aside by the Tribunal. The Tribunal could not ask the Company to re-employ or reinstate the workmen, because there was no business for which the workmen could be required. In these circumstances all that the workmen could claim was compensation for loss of their service and in that respect, as we have indicated above, the workmen have received adequate compensation.

    11. Consequently, the appeal has no force and is dismissed; but we make no order as to costs.

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