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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 73 (Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, Article 73)
  • Section 61(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Section 10 of the Interpretation Ordinance of Hong Kong, corresponding to Section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889
  • Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, Sections 46 to 48
  • Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • American Jurisprudence, 2d. Vol. 2 (Administrative Law), Article 340
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 73 (Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, Article 73)
  • Section 61(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Section 10 of the Interpretation Ordinance of Hong Kong, corresponding to Section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889
  • Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, Sections 46 to 48
  • Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • American Jurisprudence, 2d. Vol. 2 (Administrative Law), Article 340
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Prior to June 15, 1963, several operators, including one Ram Bichar Singh, applied to the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority (RTA) for a permanent stage-carriage permit on the Chapra–Masrakh–Siwan–Gopalganj route. Ram Bichar Singh died on April 12, 1965, before his application was finally decided. His widow, Smt. Dhani Devi, succeeded to the possession of his transport vehicles and, acting under Section 61(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the RTA transferred to her the permits that her late husband already held for other routes.

On May 4, 1966, the RTA considered all pending applications for the disputed route, allowed Dhani Devi to continue her late husband’s application, and directed that the permit be granted to her. Unsuccessful applicants, including Sant Bihari Sharma and Chandra Kirti Singh, appealed under Section 64, contending that the RTA lacked jurisdiction to let a legal representative pursue a deceased applicant’s request. The State Transport Appellate Authority accepted this contention, cancelled the grant to Dhani Devi, and ordered the permit to go to Sant Bihari Sharma (with a second preference to Chandra Kirti Singh).

Dhani Devi filed a revision under Section 64-A. The Transport Minister (revisional authority) allowed her revision, restored the RTA order, and held that substitution was permissible. Sant Bihari Sharma and Chandra Kirti Singh then filed writ petitions in the Patna High Court. The High Court allowed the writs, quashed the grant to Dhani Devi, and remanded the matter. Dhani Devi appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon the death of an applicant for a stage-carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority has the power to substitute the person who succeeds to the possession of the deceased’s vehicles and allow that successor to prosecute the pending application.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Verappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., (1952) SCR 583 An operator has no vested right to a permit; only a right to apply and have the application considered in accordance with law. Cited to underscore that possession of vehicles alone does not create an automatic right to a permit, setting the context for discretionary power of the RTA.
Rattanlal v. State Transport Authority, AIR 1957 All 471 Held that a right to apply for a permit was neither heritable nor transferable and that heirs could not continue an appeal. Disagreed with; Supreme Court declined to follow this view, signalling that substitution can be permissible.
Meenakshi v. Mysore S.T.A. Tribunal, AIR 1963 Mys Mysore High Court allowed a widow to continue her late husband’s application. Referred to as supportive authority, though ultimately reversed on another ground in a later Supreme Court case.
Hanuman Transport Co. v. Meenakshi (Supreme Court) Reversed the Mysore High Court decision on a different issue and expressly left the substitution question open. Clarifies that the Supreme Court had not previously settled the substitution issue.
Maruthuavanan v. Balasubramaniam, AIR 1963 Mad 292 Permitted continuation of an appeal by a surviving partner after the co-partner’s death. Used as persuasive authority supporting the view that proceedings can continue through successors.
Kuppuswami v. Ramchandran, AIR 1964 Mad 356 Allowed legal representatives to pursue a revision petition after the original applicant’s death. Further persuasive authority favouring substitution.
Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, 1961 AC 901 Concerned the effect of statutory repeal on pending proceedings; held rights did not survive repeal. Distinguished as irrelevant to the present issue since no repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act was involved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that neither the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 nor the rules made thereunder expressly deal with the death of an applicant while a permit application is pending. Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act were found inapplicable. Nonetheless, the Court reasoned as follows:

  • Section 61(2) explicitly empowers the RTA to transfer an existing permit to the successor of a deceased permit-holder. By analogy, the authority can similarly permit a successor to prosecute a still-pending application because the relief sought (a permit) is inseparable from possession of the relevant vehicles.
  • Under Section 57, time limits apply to filing original applications and objections. If a successor had to file a fresh application after the predecessor’s death, time constraints would preclude that possibility, effectively extinguishing any chance of securing the permit. Allowing substitution avoids that inequitable result.
  • Administrative bodies may craft reasonable procedures where the statute is silent. Hence the RTA may, in its discretion, devise a fair method for substitution, consider factors personal to the successor (experience, resources, record), and afford rival applicants an opportunity to object if necessary.
  • The Court reviewed prior case law. It expressly disapproved the contrary view of the Allahabad High Court in Rattanlal, while finding support in Madras and Mysore decisions that allowed continuation by legal representatives.
  • Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted that Dhani Devi was found by the RTA to be an experienced displaced operator. No rival applicant sought adjournment or challenged her substitution on factual grounds; the sole objection was one of alleged lack of jurisdiction. The appellate authority erred in treating the application as abated, and the Transport Minister correctly restored the RTA’s order.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside and order of the Transport Minister restored.

Immediate Effect: The permit for the Chapra–Masrakh–Siwan–Gopalganj route stands granted to Smt. Dhani Devi.

Broader Implications: Although no formal rule was laid down, the Supreme Court’s reasoning affirms that Regional Transport Authorities (and appellate/revisional forums) possess discretionary power to substitute successors of deceased applicants in pending permit proceedings. This clarification diminishes the likelihood of automatic abatement upon an applicant’s death and guides RTAs to adopt reasonable procedures consistent with natural justice.

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    Dhani Devi (In Both The Appeals) v. Sant Bihari Sharma And Others(In Both The Appeals)

    BACHAWAT, J.— Several persons including one Ram Bichar Singh filed applications for the grant of a permanent stage carriage permit for the Chapra-Masrakh-Siwan-Gopalganj route before June 15, 1963 and last date appointed for the receipt of the applications by the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority. Ram Bichar Singh died on April 12, 1965 before the final disposal of his application. His widow Dhani Devi succeeded to the possession of the transport vehicles left by him and accordingly under Section 61(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Regional Transport Authority transferred to her all the permits held by him for other routes. On May 4, 1966, the Regional Transport Authority considered all the applications, allowed Dhani Devi to prosecute the application filed by her husband and directed the grant of the permit to her. Sant Bihari Sharma, Chandra Kirti Singh and other unsuccessful applicants filed appeals against the order under Section 64. At the hearing of the appeals it was contended that the order was without jurisdiction as Dhani Devi had no right to prosecute the application filed by her husband. The State Transport Appellate Authority accepted the contention, set aside the order appealed from and directed the grant of the permit to Sant Bihari Sharma and in case of his failure to comply with certain conditions gave the second preference to Chandrakirti Singh. Dhani Devi, Chandrakiriti Singh and another applicant filed revision petitions against the order under Section 64-A. The Transport Minister allowed the revision petition of Dhani Devi and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. He held that the order of the Regional Transport Authority was not without jurisdiction. Sant Bihari Sharma and Chandrakirti Singh filed two writ petitions in the Patna High Court challenging the said order. The High Court allowed the petitions, quashed the order for the grant of permit to Dhani Devi and remanded the matter for disposal according to law. The present appeals have been filed by Dhani Devi against the orders passed by the High Court.

    2. The sole question in this appeal is whether on the death of an applicant for a stage carriage permit in respect of his transport vehicles the Regional Transport Authority has power to allow the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles to prosecute the application filed by the deceased applicant. No express provision on the subject is to be found in the Motor Vehicles Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 has no application as no executor or administrator was appointed to the estate of the deceased Ram Bichar Singh.

    3. No transport vehicles can be used save in accordance with a permit issued under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act. Four types of permits may be issued under Chapter IV viz. stage carriage permit, (Sections 46 to 48); contract carriage permit (Sections 49 to 51); private carrier's permit, (Sections 52 and 53) and public carrier's permit, (Sections 54 to 56). A person in possession of a transport vehicle is not entitled to a permit as a matter of right, see Verappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. (1952) SCR 583 His only right is to make an application for the grant of a permit under Section 45 and to a consideration of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If he dies after obtaining the permit, the Regional Transport Authority has power under Section 61(2) to transfer the permit to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit. We are inclined to think that in the case of death of the applicant before the final disposal of his application for the grant of a permit in respect of his vehicles the Regional Transport Authority has power to substitute the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles in place of the deceased applicant and to allow the successor to prosecute the application. As the relief sought for in the application is dependent upon and related to the possession of the vehicles, the application is capable of being revived at the instance of the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles.

    4. Under Section 57 an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier permits must be made within the appointed time and published in the prescribed manner. The representations relating thereto must also be made before the appointed time. In the event of the death of an applicant after the expiry of the time appointed for making the applications, the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle cannot, having regard to the lapse of time, make another application in his own right. The successor cannot obtain the permit unless he is allowed to prosecute the application filed by his predecessor and we see no reason why he cannot be permitted to do so. Where the successor is allowed to prosecute the application, the Regional Transport Authority may have to take into consideration many matters personal to the successor, such as his experience, the facilities at his disposal for operating the services and his adverse record, if any. The matters personal to the deceased applicant can no longer be taken into account. The rival applicants should, if necessary be given suitable opportunity to file objections against the grant of the permit to the successor. Section 57 does not deal with the situation arising on the death of an applicant nor has it prescribed any time for the making of an application for substitution of the successor or for the filing of objections against the grant of the permit to him. In the absence of any statute or statutory rule the Regional Transport Authority may devise any reasonable procedure for dealing with the situation. As stated in American Jurisprudence, 2d. Vol. 2 (Administrative Law), Article 340, p. 155: “where the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions”. (see also Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 73 (Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, Article 73, p. 399). The Regional Transport Authority has complete discretion in the matter of allowing or refusing substitution. It is not bound to embark upon prolonged investigation into disputed questions of succession. Nor is it bound to allow substitution if such an order will delay the proceedings unreasonably or will otherwise be detrimental to the interests of the public generally.

    5. Under Section 57(1) an application for a contract carrier's permit or a private carrier's permit may be made at any time, and therefore the Regional Transport Authority can more readily allow the successor to prosecute the application filed by his predecessor. The Regional Transport Authority may similarly deal with the situation arising on the death of an applicant for the variation of the permit under Section 57(8) or the renewal of the permit under Section 58. Likewise in the case of the death of an applicant during the pendency of an appeal under Section 64-A or a revision petition under Section 64-A the appellate or the revisional authority has power if it thinks fit to substitute the successor in place of the deceased applicant in the records of the proceedings.

    6. We may now refer to the relevant decisions on the subject under consideration. In Rattanlal v. State Transport Authority AIR 1957 All 471 one Munnalal died during the pendency of appeals filed by him against the orders rejecting his application for the grant of a stage carriage permit and directing the issue of the permit to another applicant. The Appellate Authority refused to order substitution of his son Rattanlal in his place. Rattanlal filed a writ petition challenging the order. The Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition. It held that the right to apply for the grant of a permit was not heritable or transferable and Rattanlal's heir had no right to continue the appeals. In Meenakshi v. Mysore S.T.A Tribunal AIR 1963 Mysore several persons including Gopalsetty applied for the grant of a stage carriage permit. The Regional Transport Authority decided to grant the permit to another applicant. Unsuccessful applicants other than Gopalasetty filed appeals against the order. During the pendency of the appeals Gopalasetty died. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals and remanded the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh disposal. After the matter went back to the Regional Transport Authority, the widow of Gopalasetty was substituted in his place and was allowed to prosecute the application presented by him. On a consideration of all the applications the Regional Transport Authority granted the permit to the widow of Gopalasetty. The order was set aside by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground inter alia that the widow could not continue the application filed by Gopalasetty. On a writ petition filed by the widow, the Mysore High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. It held that the application presented by Gopalasetty could be prosecuted by his widow. The decision of the Mysore High Court was reversed by this Court on another point in Hanuman Transport Co. v. Meenakshi. But this Court then declined to express any opinion on the question whether the successor can be permitted to prosecute the application filed by his predecessor. In Maruthuavanan v. Balasubramaniam AIR 1963 Mad 292 two partners of a firm filed an appeal from an order rejecting their application for the grant of a permit. During the pendency of the appeal one of the partners died. The Madras High Court held that the appeal could be continued by the surviving partner. In Kuppuswami v. Ramchandran AIR 1964 Mad 356 one Lakshmi applied for a variation of the stage carriage permits held by her. Her application was rejected by the Regional Transport Authority. She filed a revision petition against the order under Section 64-A. During the pendency of the revision petition she died. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal permitted the guardian of her minor legal representatives to continue the revision petition, set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the variation sought for. Two of the rival operators filed writ petitions challenging the order. The Madras High Court held that the legal representative of Lakshmi could continue the revision petition. For the reasons already given, we are not inclined to agree with the Allahabad decision. In Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang 1961 AC 901 the Privy Council held that the right of a crown lessee of premises in Hongkong to get his petition and cross-petition for the grant of a rebuilding certificate pursuant to the proposal of the Director of Public Works to be considered by the Governor-in-Council under Section 3-B of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (Hong Kong), 1947 was not a right or a privilege either accrued or acquired within the meaning of Section 10 of the Interpretation Ordinance of Hong Kong, corresponding to Section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 and that on the repeal of the Ordinance, the proceedings could not be continued and the Governor could not pass any order under Section 3-B. This decision is not relevant, as we are not concerned in the present case with the effect of repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act on a pending application for the grant of a permit..

    7. Let us now turn to the facts of the present case. The appellant's husband Ram Bichar Singh made an application for the grant of a stage carriage permit. Upon his death during the pendency of the application, the Regional Transport Authority allowed the appellant to prosecute the application filed by him. She made no formal application for substitution; but no objection was raised on that ground nor was any adjournment asked for by the rival claimants in order to enable them to file objections. Ram Bichar Singh is said to have left behind other heirs also, but no objection was taken on the ground of their non-joinder. The Regional Transport Authority directed the grant of the permit to the appellant. On the materials on the record, the Regional Transport Authority found that the appellant was an experienced and displaced operator. That finding was not challenged in appeal. The only point taken in the appeal was that the application of Ram Bichar Singh had abated and that the Regional Transport Authority had no power to allow her to continue the application. The Appellate Authority accepted the contention and set aside the order directing the grant of the permit to the appellant. The Transport Minister rightly set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and held that the Regional Transport Authority has power to permit her to prosecute the application filed by her deceased husband. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the Transport Minister.

    8. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Transport Minister is restored. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Dhani Devi (In Both The Appeals) v. Sant Bihari Sharma And Others(In Both The Appeals)
    (Oct 18, 1968)