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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • the Income Tax Act (with provisions of Section 34)
  • Section 34(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 34(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • Section 34(1) of the Act
  • Second proviso to Section 34(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • Section 34(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, as amended in 1953
  • Article 220 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Article 132 (4) and Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution
  • Section 34(1)(a) of the Act
  • Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • the Income Tax Act (with provisions of Section 34)
  • Section 34(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 34(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • Section 34(1) of the Act
  • Second proviso to Section 34(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • Section 34(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, as amended in 1953
  • Article 220 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Article 132 (4) and Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution
  • Section 34(1)(a) of the Act
  • Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Jagannath Fakirchand, is the karta of a Hindu undivided family (HUF) engaged in the business of trading in cotton, grain and other commodities. The HUF had already been assessed for Assessment Years (AYs) 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47, and appeals against those assessments were pending.

In 1946 the respondent sued an ex-employee, Jagannath Ramkishan, for rendition of accounts. Ramkishan asserted that the transactions were those of a partnership between himself and the respondent. The civil court accepted Ramkishan’s claim, and the High Court of Bombay later dismissed the respondent’s appeal. After Ramkishan’s death, his widow, Kalavatibai, was substituted in that appeal.

Relying on the civil findings, the Income-tax Department assessed Kalavatibai under Section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 for the three AYs. On 10 October 1956 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) allowed her appeal, held the income to be that of a partnership, and authorised the Income-tax Officer (ITO) to reopen the assessments of the partnership and of the respondent.

Pursuant to the AAC’s direction, the ITO issued a notice dated 18 February 1957 to the respondent under Section 34(1). The Bombay High Court, in W.P. No. 14000/57, quashed the notice, ruling that (i) the respondent had not been a party to the AAC proceedings, and (ii) the second proviso to Section 34(3), inserted in 1953 and invoked to validate the late notice, was unconstitutional as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution. The Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court under Articles 132(4) and 133(1)(b).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second proviso to Section 34(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (as amended in 1953) is constitutionally valid or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  2. Consequently, whether the notice dated 18 February 1957 issued to reopen the respondent’s assessments for AYs 1944-45 to 1946-47 is valid in law.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. Prashar, Income-tax Officer, Market Ward, Bombay v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas Declared the second proviso to Section 34(3) unconstitutional for violating Article 14. The Court adopted its reasoning to conclude that the proviso could not save the impugned notice.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sardar Lakhmir Singh (Civil Appeals Nos. 214 & 215 of 1958) Held the same proviso invalid for arbitrariness under Article 14. The Court reiterated this decision to reinforce the finding of unconstitutionality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the only statutory peg on which the Revenue hung the belated notice was the second proviso to Section 34(3). In earlier decisions delivered the same day, the Court had already found that proviso to create an unreasonable and discriminatory classification, thereby offending Article 14. Because the respondent had not been a party to the AAC proceedings against Kalavatibai, the appellate direction could not validly extend the limitation period against him. With the proviso struck down, no jurisdiction existed to reopen assessments that were otherwise time-barred. Accordingly, the notice of 18 February 1957 lacked legal authority.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed; costs awarded to the respondent.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Bombay High Court’s judgment, invalidating the second proviso to Section 34(3) of the 1922 Act and thereby nullifying the reopening notice. The decision, read with companion cases decided the same day, definitively bars the Revenue from invoking that proviso to reopen time-barred assessments based on appellate directions issued in proceedings to which the assessee was not a party.

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    P.V Godbole, Income Tax Officer, Ahmednagar And Another v. Jagannath Fakirchand .

    S.K Das, J. — The facts of this appeal have been stated by my learned Brother Kapur, J. As I am in agreement with him, I need not re-state the facts.

    2. Assessment Years were 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. The notice was issued by the Income Tax Officer on February 18, 1957 pursuant to a direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in an appeal of another assessee. The only question is whether the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 as amended in 1953 saves the proceedings impugned.

    3. For the reasons given by me in S. Prashar, Income Tax Officer Market ward Bombay v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas in which judgment has been delivered today, I would dismiss the appeal with costs,

    Kapur, J.— This is an appeal brought on behalf of Revenue against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay on a certificate granted by that Court.

    4. In WP No 14000/57 the present respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer to issue notice under Section 34(l) of the Indian Income Tax Act, hereinafter called the “Act” Assessment Years are 1944-45 1945-46 and 1946-47 and the notice was issued by the Income Tax Officer on February 18, 1957 pursuant to a direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in an appeal of another assessee that the income was the income of a partnership of which the respondent and the other assessee were partneRs The High Court held that the respondent was a stranger to the proceedings before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that the second proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act under which the notice was given was unconstitutional as it offended Article 14 of the Constitution.

    5. The facts of the appeal are these: the respondent was the karta of a Hindu undivided family which carried on business as merchants and commission agents in cotton, grains and other commodities. That Hindu undivided family was assessed for Assessment Years 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. The assessment for the year 1944-45 was completed by the Income Tax Officer on March 14, 1949 and an appeal was taken against that assessment to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and was decided on February 9, 1955 and then an appeal was taken to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which has not been shown to have been decided. For Assessment Years 1945-46 and 1946-47 the assessment was completed in March and May 1950 respectively. Appeals were taken against these assessments to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who remanded the cases to the Income Tax Officer and they have not yet been decided. As regards Assessment Year 1946-47, a notice under Section 34(1) was issued and the order in that case was passed on March 6, 1956. Against that order an appeal was taken to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which is still pending It appears that for the Year of assessment 1945-46 no notice under Section 34(1) of the Act was issued.

    6. In 1946 the respondent on behalf of the Hindu undivided family filed a suit against one Jagannath Ramkishan for rendition of accounts as the Munim of the respondent. His defence was that he was a partner and not a Munim which was accepted and the suit was dismissed. An appeal against that decree was dismissed by the High Court, Jagannath Ramkishan died during the pendency of the appeal and his widow Kalavati was impleaded. In the meantime proceedings under Section 34(1)(a) of the Act were started against Kalavatibai for Assessment Years 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47 in respect of the business which her husband Jagannath Ramkishan had claimed to be a partnership business of the respondent's Hindu undivided family and himself. Two orders were passed by the Income Tax Officer for those yeaRs Kalavatibai took appeals against those orders and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on October 10, 1956 in allowing those appeals gave a finding that the business belonged to the partnership as claimed by Jagannath Ramkishan and the Income Tax Officer was authorised to make assessments under the provisions of Section 34 on the said partnership as also on the respondent for Assessment Year 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. Thereupon a notice was issued with regard to the three Assessment Years on February 18, 1957 against Jagannath Fakirchand and Jagannath Ramkishan. These notices were challenged and were held to be illegal. Against that order of the High Court this appeal is brought on a certificate of the High Court under Article 132 (4) and Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution.

    7. For the reasons given in Civil Appeal No. 705/57 (S.C Prashar, ITC v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas) judgement in which has been delivered today, this appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Sarkar, J.— This case is concerned with the three Assessment Years 1940-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. The assessee is the respondent Jagannath Fakirchand, the Karta of a Hindu undivided family who had been assessed as such for the years 1944-45 to 1946-47 and appeals from the assessment orders in respect of these years were pending.

    2. The assessee had filed in 1946 a suit against an ex-employee, Jagannath Ramkishan for accounts of certain transactions. Jagannath Ramkishan contended that he was not an employee but the transactions were the transactions of a business carried on in partnership between him and the assessee. The trial court upheld the contention of Jagannath Ramkishan. The assessee appealed to the High Court of Bombay against the decision of the trial court but in the meantime Jagannath Ramkishan had died and his wife, Kalavatibai, had been substituted in his place in that appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal but said nothing as to whether Jaganath Rimkishan was a partner.

    3. In view of the decision in the appeal mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Revenue Authorities started proceedings against Kalavatibai under Section 34(l)(a) of the Income Tax Act and assessed her on the entire income in the aforesaid three years, realised from the said transactions. Kalavatibai then appealed from this assessment and in the appeal she contended that her husband's estate was not liable for the tax on the entire income as the income belonged to a firm of which her husband was only one of the partneRs The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted this contention of Kalavatibai and observed: “In view of my finding... that the business belonged to the partnership … the Income Tax Officer is hereby authorised to make assessments under the provisions of Section 34 on the said partnership as also on the other partner, Shri Jagannath Fakirchand for Assessment Years 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47.”

    4. In pursuance of this order the Income Tax Officer started proceedings under Section 34(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 against the assessee by issuing a notice on February 18, 1947 calling on him to file a return in respect of the aforesaid three assessment year as that income had escaped assessment. There upon the assessee moved the High Court of Bombay under Article 220 of the Constitution for a writ to quash the aforesaid notice and to prohibit proceedings being taken thereunder. The High Court allowed the writ. Hence this appeal.

    5. The only question in this appeal is whether the second proviso to Section 34(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, as amended in 1953, could save the proceedings impugned. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment in CIT v. Sardar Lakhmir Singh (Civil Appeals Nos. 214 & 215 of 1958), I think that that proviso is invalid as offending Article 14 of the Constitution and affords no protection to the Revenue Authorities. It may be added that the impugned notice as issued in consequence of an order under Section 31 in a proceeding to which the assessee was not a party.

    6. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs:

    ORDER

    7. By the Court: In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    P.V Godbole, Income Tax Officer, Ahmednagar And Another v. Jagannath Fakirchand .
    (Dec 12, 1962)