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  • (no specific act/article title mentioned, only a reference to the validity of non-reasoned awards)
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
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Disposition
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  • (no specific act/article title mentioned, only a reference to the validity of non-reasoned awards)
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Orissa entered into Agreement No. 4-F-2 with the respondent for construction of the Ramaguda Minor Irrigation Project in Kukudakhandi Block. The work, valued at Rs 9,99,510, started on 4 May 1973 and was scheduled to finish on 4 November 1974, but was actually completed on 30 December 1975. The State asserts that it made final and full payment (Rs 23,74,001 including extra work) and that no further claims were raised until the contractor demanded arbitration on 28 September 1976.

Under the contract’s arbitration clause, the Chief Engineer appointed Shri A. N. Nanda as arbitrator, who was later replaced by Shri B. Patnaik by order of the Subordinate Judge. On 18 March 1983 the arbitrator issued a non-speaking award of Rs 15,23,657 with 10% interest from 9 September 1975 until payment. The Subordinate Judge set the award aside on 15 September 1984, but the Orissa High Court reinstated it on 6 July 1987, reducing future interest to 6%.

The State of Orissa obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a non-reasoned (lump-sum) arbitral award is invalid per se.
  2. Whether clause 11 of the contract excluded the disputed claims from arbitration, thereby depriving the arbitrator of jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the amount awarded was so excessive as to render the award liable to be set aside.
  4. Whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — State of Orissa

  • The award is invalid because it is non-speaking; the validity of such awards is pending before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court.
  • Clause 11 makes the Engineer-in-Charge/Superintending Engineer’s decision final on additional-work claims, so the matters were not arbitrable.
  • The sum of Rs 15,23,657 is disproportionately high and shocks the conscience of the court.
  • The arbitrator had no power to grant interest pendente lite.

Respondent — Contractor

The opinion does not provide a detailed account of the respondent’s submissions; it merely notes that the contractor pursued the claims before the arbitrator.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Orissa v. Gokulachandra Kanungo (1981) 52 Cut LT 416 Lower courts in Orissa had held arbitrability despite clause limiting Engineer’s finality. Explained why the Subordinate Judge felt bound to treat the dispute as arbitrable.
Bombay Housing Board v. Karbhase Naik & Co. (1975) 1 SCC 828 Construction of clauses similar to clause 11 regarding additional work. Court distinguished facts; held clause 11 did not oust arbitration in the present dispute.
Chief Administrator, Dandakaranya Project v. Prabartak Commercial Corp. AIR 1975 MP 152 Where rate-fixing clause vested exclusive jurisdiction in Engineer, dispute not arbitrable. Held inapplicable because current dispute did not concern rate fixation covered by clause 11.
Food Corporation of India v. P.L. Juneja AIR 1981 Del 43 Illustrated contractual clauses reserving final decision to a manager and limiting arbitration. Court noted clause in that case materially different from present contract; thus not persuasive.
Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture (1967) 1 SCR 324 Arbitrator’s factual or legal mistakes not reviewable if not apparent on face of award. Used to reject challenge to quantum of award.
Allen Berry & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 295 Same principle on limited judicial review of awards. Reinforced refusal to reassess evidence or amount.
State of Orissa v. Gangaram Chhapolia AIR 1982 Ori 277 Observation about prevalence of arbitration malpractice in Orissa. Court noted need for scrutiny but declined to treat large award as invalid per se.
Executive Engineer (Irrigation), Balimela v. Abhaduta Jena (1988) 1 SCC 418 Arbitrator lacks authority to grant interest pendente lite. Relied on to delete interest from 26 Sept 1981 to 18 Mar 1983.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Validity of Non-reasoned Award: The Court refused to entertain the challenge because it was raised for the first time in the special-leave petition and because current law does not hold unreasoned awards void per se. Pending reference to a larger Bench was not a ground to delay or overturn the award.

2. Applicability of Clause 11: Reading clause 11 together with the arbitration clause 23, the Court found that the issues decided by the arbitrator (claims for additional work) did not fall within the matters expressly reserved for final determination by the Engineer-in-Charge or Superintending Engineer. Therefore the disputes were arbitrable.

3. Quantum of Award: Citing settled law that courts may not re-appraise evidence or quantum absent an error on the face of the award, the Court held that a large figure alone does not vitiate an award. Given that extra work had indeed been done and the arbitrator was technically qualified, the amount did not “shock the conscience” of the Court.

4. Interest Pendente Lite: Following Abhaduta Jena, the Court held that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to award interest during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. It therefore deleted interest for the period 26 September 1981 to 18 March 1983 while affirming post-decree interest at 6% as directed by the High Court.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order making the arbitral award a rule of the court, subject to deletion of pendente lite interest for the specified period.

Implications: The decision preserves the finality of non-reasoned awards under existing law, clarifies that contractual clauses reserving certain decisions to engineers will not oust arbitration unless the specific dispute falls squarely within the reservation, and reiterates that arbitrators cannot grant interest pendente lite. No new precedent was set on the broader question of reasoned awards, but the ruling underscores judicial reluctance to disturb concluded arbitral determinations absent clear statutory or contractual bar.

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    State Of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu .

    Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.— This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa, dated July 6, 1987. It arises out of a contract entered into between the State and the respondent for the construction of certain projects for irrigation. During 1973-74 the respondent was entrusted with the job of ‘Construction of Ramaguda Minor Irrigation Project in. Kukudakhandi Block’ vide agreement No. 4-F-2. The value of the work was Rs 9,99,510. The work pursuant to the contract commenced on May 4, 1973 and November 4, 1974 was the stipulated date for completion of the work. However, on December 30, 1975 the work was actually completed. It is asserted by the appellant that the respondent contractor accepted the final payment and was duly paid a sum of Rs 23,74,001 for the work done by him, including the extra work. Thereafter, no amount was due to the respondent, according to the appellant, and he did not raise any claim whatsoever before the department. On September 28, 1976 the last payment was alleged to have been made by the respondent. On October 30, 1976 the last bill was prepared which was nil one. The respondent, thereafter, raised a claim and gave notice for appointment of an arbitrator. Consequently, the Chief Engineer appointed one Shri A.N Nanda as the arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause. However, on the application of the respondent the learned Subordinate Judge removed Shri A.N Nanda and appointed one Shri B. Patnaik as the arbitrator. It may be mentioned that the application was made for removal of the arbitrator Shri B. Patnaik but the same was ultimately dismissed. Before the arbitrator, the respondent filed the claim raising some claims which, according to the appellant, were fictitious and baseless. These claims were for the alleged extra work in respect of which the decision of the Superintending Engineer under clause 11 of the contract was final and the same was excluded from the purview of the arbitration clause.

    2. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to deal with such claims. The appellant filed a counter-claim for Rs 2,11,400, denying all the claims of the respondent. All the documents and relevant papers were produced before the arbitrator. It is stated that as the application for removal of Shri B. Patnaik as arbitrator was pending, an application had been made before Shri B. Patnaik to adjourn the proceedings which was refused and the award was made. This award was claimed to have been made virtually ex parte. This, however, was not so and it appeared that the arbitrator on hearing the parties and considering the evidence produced before him made the award. The arbitrator made the said award on March 18, 1983 but the same was a non-speaking and non-reasoned award for a lump sum of Rs 15,23,657 plus interest @ 10 per cent from September 9, 1975 till the date of payment or decree. Objections to the said award were filed in the court. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld the objection to the award and set aside the award on September 15, 1984. There was an appeal to the High Court and the High Court set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and made the award of the arbitrator, rule of the court. It also directed payment of future interest at 6 per cent.

    3. Being aggrieved thereby the State of Orissa has preferred this appeal. In support of this appeal, it was submitted that the award in question was a lump sum of money and it was without any reason, in favour of the respondent. It was also submitted that the validity of the non-reasoned award is awaiting determination by a larger Bench of this Court. Hence, it was urged that this question should await decision of the larger Bench. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that we would not be justified in acceding to this request on the part of the appellant. In this case the submission that the award was bad being an unreasoned one, was neither mooted before the learned Subordinate Judge nor before the High Court. This contention was also not raised in the objection to the award, filed originally. It is only in the special leave petition that such a plea has been raised for the first time. Arbitration is resorted to as a speedy method of adjudication of disputes. Stale and old adjudication should not be set at naught or examination of that question kept at bay on the plea that the point is pending determination by a larger Bench of this Court. Even if it is held ultimately that the unreasoned award per se is bad, it is not sure whether such a decision would upset all the awards in this country which have not been challenged so far. Certainly, in the exercise of our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution and in view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we would not be justified in allowing the party to further prolong or upset adjudication of old and stale dispute.

    4. In that view of the matter, we think that the pendency of this point before the larger Bench should not postpone the adjudication and disposal of this appeal in the facts of this case. The law as it stands today is that awards without reasons are not bad per se. Indeed, an award can be set aside only on the ground of misconduct or on an error of law apparent on the face of the award. This is the state of law as it is today and in that context the contention that the award being an unreasoned one is per se bad, has no place on this aspect as the law is now. This contention is rejected.

    5. It was next contended that in view of clause 11 of the contract the matters upon which the arbitrator has adjudicated were excluded and these were not arbitrable. It was submitted that clause 11 of the contract between the parties made on these matters the decision of the Engineer-in-charge final and binding. Hence, inasmuch as the arbitrator has purported to act upon this field which was only to be decided by the Engineer-in-charge, the award was bad. The disputes over which the arbitrator has purported to make an award, were regarding works covered by the agreement. It was submitted that the proviso to clause 11 of the agreement categorically provided that in the event of dispute over a claim for additional work, the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle would be final and, hence, the arbitrator by entertaining the additional claim of the contractor had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him and, as such, misconducted himself.

    6. In order to judge this contention, therefore, it is imperative first to refer to clause 11 of the agreement. It provides as follows:

    “Clause 11. The Engineer-in-charge shall have the power to make any alteration in or additions to the original specifications drawings, designs, and instructions that may appear to him necessary or advisable during the progress of work and the contractor shall be bound to carry out the work in accordance with any instructions which may be given to him in writing signed by the Engineer-in-charge and such alteration shall not invalidate the contract. Any additional work which the contractor may be directed to do in the matter above specified as part of the work, shall be carried out by the contractor on the same conditions in all respects on which he agreed to do the main work and at the same rates as are specified in the tender for the main work. The time for completion of the work shall be extended in the proportion that the additional work bears to the original contract work and the certificates of the Engineer-in-charge shall be conclusive as to such proportion and if the additional work includes any class of work shall be carried out at the rates entered in the sanctioned schedule of rates of the locality during the period when the work is being carried on and if such last mentioned class of work is not entered in the schedule of the rate of the district, then the contractor shall within 7 days intimate the rate which it is his intention to charge for such class of work and if the Engineer-in-charge does not agree to this rate he shall by notice in writing be at liberty to cancel his order to carry out such class of work and arrange to carry such class of work in such manner as he may consider advisable. No deviation from the specification stipulated in the contract or additional items of work shall ordinarily be carried by the contractor and should any altered, additional or substituted work be carried out by him unless the rates of the substituted, altered or additional items have been approved as fixed in writing by the Engineer-in-charge.
    The contractor shall be bound to submit his claim for any additional work done during any month or before the 15th day of the following months accompanied by the copy of the order in writing of the Engineer-in-charge for the additional work and that the contractor shall not be entitled to any payment in respect of such additional work if he fails to submit his claim within the aforesaid period:
    Provided always that if the contractor shall commence work or incur any expenditure in regard thereof before the rates will have been determined as lastly hereinbefore mentioned, then in such case he shall only be entitled to be paid in respect of the determination of the rates as aforesaid accordingly to such rate of rates as shall be fixed by the Engineer-in-charge. In the event of a dispute the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle will be final.”

    7. This clause has to be read in conjunction with the arbitration clause i.e clause 23, which provides as follows:

    “Clause 23. Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other question, claim, right, matter, or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of, or relating to the contract, designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions or otherwise concerning the works or the execution, or failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of work, or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a Superintending Engineer of the Circle. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a government servant. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to this contract.”

    8. The learned Subordinate Judge was inclined to hold that the Harbitrator had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on disputes which he has purported to do but in view of the Bench decision of the High Court of Orissa in State of Orissa v. Gokulachandra Kanungo (1981) 52 Cut LT 416 he held that he was not free to decide that the dispute was not arbitrable and rejected this plea. The High Court also did not entertain this objection. It was canvassed before us and submitted that in view of clause 11, the matters in dispute and the amount due for the alleged additional work, were not arbitrable at all. We have noticed clause 11 which makes the decision of the Engineer-in-charge final in respect of some issues. In this connection, it is important to refer to the proviso to clause 11 which states that in case of dispute about the rates and time for completion of the work and any dispute as to proportion that the additional work bears to the original contract work, the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle would be final. The points upon which the arbitrator in the instant case has adjudicated are not those which are excepted or covered by clause 11 of the agreement. In that view of the matter, this clause has no application in the instant controversy.

    9. Our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court in Bombay Housing Board v. Karbhase Naik & Co., Sholapur (1975) 1 SCC 828, AIR 1975 SC 763, (1975) 3 SCR 407. There in view of clause 14 of the said contract, it was open to the respondent to make claim on the basis of the rates quoted. There, clause 14 was more or less identical to clause 11 in the present case. This particular contention, however, did not arise in that case. The court held that the respondent there being contractor, was not bound to carry out additional or altered work and there was no reply to the notice stating the rates intended to be charged and the respondent there was not free to commence and complete the work on the basis that since the rates quoted were not accepted, it would be paid at such rates to be fixed by the Engineer-in-charge and that if it was dissatisfied with the rate or rates fixed by the Engineer-in-charge, it could raise a dispute before the Superintending Engineer and that the time limit for completion would be extended in all cases. This Court observed that only the rates were settled by the agreement. The respondents were under no obligation to carry out the additional or altered work but that is not the dispute before us in the present case. On the construction of clause 11 of the contract, we are unable to accept the contention but on the points that the arbitrator has awarded in this case, were excluded by clause 11 of the contract herein. Shri Mehta, however, strongly relied on certain observations of a Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of the Chief Administrator, Dandakaranya Project, Koraput v. M/s Prabartak Commercial Corpn. Ltd., Calcutta AIR 1975 MP 152, 1975 MPLJ 68, wherein while considering clause 13-A of the agreement there the High Court held that the dispute whether charges for stone chips could be adjudicated, was not arbitrable. That was a case of rates which was within the jurisdiction of the Engineer-in-charge by clause 13-A of the bargain between the parties. In the instant case it is not the rate which is in dispute. The Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to several decisions of this type and came to the conclusion on the construction of clause 13-A in that case that the dispute that had arisen between the parties in arbitration, was excluded by clause 13-A of the agreement. In view of the clause in the instant case and the nature of the dispute which had arisen, we are of the opinion that such decisions also cannot give much assistance to the appellant. Reliance was also placed on certain observations of the Delhi High Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. P.L Juneja AIR 1981 Del 43. There the Division Bench of the High Court was concerned with the questions which were to be decided by the court and not by the arbitration. There also the clause was very much dissimilar to the present one which is set out hereinbefore. Clause 15(c) provided that the question whether a particular service is or is not to be covered by any of the services specifically described and provided for the contract, or is or is not material to any such services shall be decided by the Regional Manager whose decision shall be final and binding. It was not the case whether any additional work was done and if so, the extent of such work. In the aforesaid view of the matter it is not possible to hold that in view of nature of instant dispute, the matters at issue were not (sic) excluded and the arbitrator did not (sic) commit any wrong in proceeding with the arbitration.

    10. It was next contended that an amount of Rs 15,23,657 has been granted for additional work over and above the payment of Rs 23,74,001 and this was disproportionately high and the award for this amount was per se bad. It is well settled that when the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either upon law or on facts. Therefore, when arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him, where such mistake does not appear on the face of the award and the documents appended to or incorporated so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside. The law on this point is well settled. See in this connection the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (1967) 1 SCR 324, AIR 1967 SC 1032 and Allen Berry & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 295, (1971) 3 SCR 282, AIR 1971 SC 696. It was, however, contended that the amount of the award was so shockingly high that it shocked the conscience of the court and the award must be set aside. The fact that merely the award amount is quite high as commented by the High Court or that a large amount has been awarded, does not vitiate the award as such. In the instant case the original award was for Rs 9,99,510. Admittedly, additional work was done and payment for such work was determined at Rs 23,74,001 and claim for further additional work was made for Rs 15,23,657. One has to judge whether the amount of the award was so disproportionately high to make it per se bad in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It is clear from the facts that the arbitrator is a highly qualified person having several Indian and foreign degrees and at the relevant time was acting as Chief Engineer-in-charge of the State Government. Having regard to the nature of claims involved and the fact that the additional work has been done for which large amounts have been paid and in this case it is evident that all due opportunities were given to the parties to adduce all evidence, we are unable to accept the submission that the award was so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the court and, as such, it cannot be held that the award was bad per se. In our opinion, the High Court was right in dismissing the challenge to the award on this ground.

    11. In support of the submission that the award must be held to be bad in this case, Mr Mehta drew our attention to certain observations of Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Gangaram Chhapolia AIR 1982 Ori 277, (1982) 54 Cut LT 214, where at p. 279 the learned Judge observed the malady of the racket of arbitration was rampant in Orissa. The learned Judge was apparently paying heed to the observations of Justice Holmes of America that the court should take note of “the felt necessities of the time”.

    12. In our opinion, the evidence of such state of affairs should make this Court scrutinise the award carefully in each particular case but that does not make the court declare that all high amounts of award would be bad per se. As mentioned hereinbefore, it cannot be said that the amount of award was disproportionately high to hurt the conscience of the court in this case.

    13. It is now well settled that the interest pendente lite is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. In this connection reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Executive Engineer (Irrigation), Balimela v. Abhaduta Jena (1988) 1 SCC 418 where this Court held that the arbitrator could not grant interest pendente lite. In the aforesaid view of the matter this direction in the award for the payment of such interest must be deleted from the award. The order of the High Court is modified to the extent that the award is confirmed subject to deletion of the interest pendente lite. We make it clear that in the facts of this case interest for the period from September 26, 1981 to March 18, 1983, the date of the award be deleted. The High Court has, however, granted interest from the date of the decree. That is sustained.

    14. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed except to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties will pay and bear their own costs.

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    Comments

    State Of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu .
    (Jul 22, 1988)