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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1988 INSC 104
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act
  • Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1988 INSC 104
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act
  • Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (Respondent 1) claims to be a partner in a family partnership business that was originally a proprietary concern of his late father, Abdul Samad, and later converted into a firm by deed. After Abdul Samad’s death, Defendants 1 and 2 allegedly took exclusive control of the business, denied the plaintiff any interest, and relied on a 15-1-1979 partnership deed—said to exclude the plaintiff—before the Income-tax Department. The plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 520 of 1983 in the City Civil Court, Calcutta, seeking (i) a declaration that the 1979 deed is void, (ii) dissolution of the firm, and (iii) rendition of accounts. He valued the suit at Rs 150 (Rs 50 each for declaration, accounts, and tentative profit) and paid court-fee accordingly.

Defendants objected that the valuation was grossly understated and beyond the City Civil Court’s pecuniary jurisdiction. The trial court decided the preliminary issues in favour of the plaintiff; the Calcutta High Court dismissed the defendants’ civil revision. Defendant 2 obtained special leave and appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the City Civil Court’s jurisdiction on the ground of under-valuation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts governed by Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff has an unfettered right to assign any valuation he chooses or whether the court can examine and reject a valuation that is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
  2. Consequently, whether the City Civil Court, Calcutta possesses pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain Title Suit No. 520 of 1983 given the true, reasonable valuation of the reliefs claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Defendant 2)

  • The plaintiff’s claim effectively runs into “lakhs of rupees”, as indicated by references in the plaint to profits of Rs 1,26,796.72 and over Rs 84,000, plus valuable assets such as the “Russell Exchange” property and monies in Habib Bank, Karachi branch.
  • Valuing such a substantial claim at only Rs 150 is “preposterous”, arbitrary, and a device to confer jurisdiction on a court that otherwise lacks it.

Plaintiff-Respondent’s Arguments

  • Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act permits the plaintiff to place any value he wishes on a suit for accounts; the court has no authority to question that valuation.
  • Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions in Tara Devi v. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj and Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar, as well as various High Court rulings, to contend that this right is absolute and consistently upheld.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tara Devi (Smt.) v. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, (1987) 4 SCC 69 The court may revise valuation if the plaintiff “manifestly and deliberately” undervalues the relief. Relied upon to reject the notion of an unrestricted right to fix any valuation; supports judicial scrutiny of arbitrary figures.
Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar, (1980) 1 SCC 616; AIR 1979 SC 989 While tentative valuation is permitted in suits for accounts, the plaintiff “cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief.” Quoted to emphasize that valuation must not be unreasonable or whimsical.
Krishnaji Hari Dhamdhere v. Gopal Narayan Dhamdhere, AIR 1936 Bom 166 Cited by respondent to suggest plaintiff’s right to choose valuation. Referred to only as part of respondent’s argument; not accepted as laying down an absolute rule.
Ishwarappa Malleshappa Manvi v. Dhanji Bhanji Gujar, AIR 1932 Bom 111 Same context as above. Mentioned but not adopted by the Court.
Aijaz Ahmad v. Nazirul Hasan, AIR 1935 All 849 Rejected the argument that courts are bound by the plaintiff’s arbitrary valuation. Cited illustratively to show divergent High Court views supporting court’s power to scrutinise valuation.
Attar Singh v. Manohar Singh, ILR 1947 Nag 933 Held that courts may reject arbitrary valuation in suits for dissolution and accounts. Approved as reflecting the correct principle.
Mata Ram v. Daulat, ILR 1938 Nag 558 (FB) Full Bench authority that courts can insist on reasonable valuation under Section 7(iv). Invoked to show underlying similarity of clauses (c) and (f) of Section 7(iv).
Salahuddin Hyder Khan v. Dhanoo Lal, AIR 1945 Pat 421; ILR (1945) 24 Pat 334 Patna view permitting scrutiny of valuation under Section 7(iv)(c). Used analogically to support scrutiny under clause (f).
Shama Pershad Sahi v. Sheoparsan Singh, AIR 1920 Pat 290 Similar Patna position on valuation. Referenced in the same context.
Gauri Lal v. Raja Babu, AIR 1929 Pat 626 Plaintiff’s valuation must be “approximately correct” and not “manifestly inadequate.” Cited to underline the principle against arbitrary valuation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s interpretation of earlier authorities. It affirmed that although a plaintiff in a suit for accounts may initially give a tentative valuation, that figure cannot be “ridiculous”, “arbitrary” or “manifestly inadequate”. Past Supreme Court dicta in Meenakshisundaram Chettiar and Tara Devi expressly allow judicial interference when undervaluation is deliberate.

The Court surveyed conflicting High Court decisions and preferred those holding that the court can test an unreasonable valuation (e.g., Attar Singh, Mata Ram, Gauri Lal). It characterised valuations such as Rs 150 for claims running into lakhs as whimsical, thereby obligating the court to intervene.

Applying these principles to the pleadings and materials—including allegations of profits exceeding Rs 2 lakhs and high-value assets—the Court found the plaintiff’s valuation “arbitrary and unacceptable”. However, instead of fixing a valuation itself, it remitted the issue to the trial court for fresh determination, directing that if the correct tentative valuation exceeds the City Civil Court’s pecuniary limits, appropriate action under Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure should follow.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; trial court directed to reconsider valuation; costs awarded against the plaintiff-respondent.

Immediate effect: the preliminary finding that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction is set aside; the trial court must reassess valuation and, if necessary, reject or transfer the suit for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. The judgment clarifies that plaintiffs cannot manipulate forum by arbitrarily undervaluing suits under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act, but it does not establish a new doctrinal test beyond reiterating existing Supreme Court authority.

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    Abdul Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid And Others

    Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.— The jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, Calcutta to entertain a suit being T.S No. 520 of 1983 filed by Respondent 1 is under challenge in the present appeal, on the ground that the correct value of the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court. The plaintiff-Respondent 1 has alleged that he is a partner of a partnership business along with his brothers Defendants 1 and 2. Originally it was a proprietary business belonging to Abdul Samad, father of the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 2, and was later converted into a partnership firm by a regular deed. During his lifetime the business was under the control of Abdul Samad, but on his death Defendants 1 and 2 have effectively taken charge of the business and excluded the plaintiff. A suggestion to reconstitute the partnership made and repeated by the plaintiff has been ignored. In reply to the plaintiff's letter seeking information Defendant 2 — petitioner has stated in his letter to the plaintiff that he (the plaintiff) has no interest in the firm. In para 11 of the plaint it is stated that he has on enquiry discovered that Defendants 1 and 2 have been falsely representing before the Income Tax Department, inter alia, that a new deed of partnership had been executed on 15-1-1979 to be effective from 1-1-1979 in which the plaintiff has no interest. The Income Tax Officer passed an order on 26-12-1981 on the basis of the false allegations made by the defendants. The plaintiff has challenged the aforementioned partnership deed of 1979. In para 16 of the plaint the amount of profit from the business has been described as “huge”. In the prayer portion of the plaint the plaintiff prayed for declaring the partnership deed of 1979 as illegal and void and for passing a decree for dissolution of the partnership firm and for accounts. The valuation of the suit was put at Rs 150 being the sum of Rs 50 for declaration, Rs 50 for rendition of accounts and another sum of Rs 50 for profit to the share of the plaintiff arising out of the business. Court-fee was accordingly paid.

    2. Defendants 1 and 2, besides denying the plaint allegations made by the plaintiff, challenged the valuation given by the plaintiff as grossly undervalued and arbitrary. The issues relating to the correct valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit were taken up as preliminary issues and were decided in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants challenged the order by a civil revision application before the Calcutta High Court which was dismissed. Defendant 2 has now come to this Court against the High Court's order. Special leave is granted.

    3. Mr Kacker, the Learned Counsel for the appellant, has contended that it is manifest that relief to the tune of lakhs of rupees has been claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. He said that the plaintiff has laid claim to a sum of Rs 1,26,796.72 besides another sum of over Rs 84,000 as his share in the profit or a particular period by reference to the proceeding of the Income Tax Department mentioned in para 11 of the plaint, and it is, therefore, preposterous on his part to suggest in para 19 of the plaint that it could be tentatively valued at Rs 50 only. According to the defence case which is challenged as incorrect by the plaintiff, the plaintiff requested for and was allowed a larger share “in the well established and reputed business of auctioneer known as ‘Russell Exchange’ and its assets and goodwill as well as the amount lying in ‘Habib Bank’. Karachi Branch, solely and absolutely”. The “Russell Exchange” building is a very valuable property near Park Street in the city of Calcutta. A copy of the Profit and Loss Account for the calendar year 1979 attached by the plaintiff to the additional affidavit filed on his behalf before this Court mentions figures in lakhs.

    4. Mr Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-Respondent 1, has argued that the suit is governed for the purpose of court fees by Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, and the plaintiff has the absolute right to put on the plaint any value he wishes to and the court has no jurisdiction to examine the matter. In other words, it is the sweet will of the plaintiff to choose any figure he likes and thus decide finally the court which shall have jurisdiction to entertain the suit without reference to the subject-matter of the litigation, the nature and extent of the relief claimed or any other factor. He has relied upon the decision of this Court in Tara Devi Smt. v. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj (1987) 4 SCC 69 and Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar (1980) 1 SCC 616, AIR 1979 SC 989, (1979) 3 SCR 385. Reference was also made to Krishnaji Hari v. Gopal Narayan AIR 1936 Bom 166 and Ishwarappa v. Dhanji AIR 1932 Bom 111. Mr Chatterjee claimed that the different High Courts in the country have consistently confirmed this right of the plaintiff and he has not discovered any decision to the contrary.

    5. We are afraid, the interpretation put by the Learned Counsel on the decisions of this Court is not correct and cannot be accepted. Neither of the two cited judgments relied upon by Mr Chatterjee helps him. It is true that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after taking all the accounts and he may, therefore, put a tentative valuation upon the suit, but he is not permitted to choose an unreasonable and arbitrary figure for that purpose. At p. 392 of the judgment in Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkalachalam Chettiar (1980) 1 SCC 616, AIR 1979 SC 989, (1979) 3 SCR 385 this Court while taking note of the plaintiff's right to give a tentative valuation on the suit, observed :

    “The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief.”

    In Tura Devi Smt. v. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj (1987) 4 SCC 69 the view was reiterated thus at p. 70 : (SCC para 3)

    “The plaintiff however, has not been given the absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on such relief and where the plaintiff manifestly and deliberately underestimates the relief the court is entitled to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff and to revise the same if it is patently arbitrary or unreasonable.”

    6. So far as the opinion of the High Courts is concerned, it is not uniform. The argument, “that the plaintiff can give an arbitrary valuation in the plaint, and that the court is bound to accept that” made on behalf of the plaintiff before the Allahabad High Court in Aijaz Ahmad v. Nazirul Hasan AIR 1935 All 849 was rejected, after observing that there was some authority for the extreme, view as urged in two Calcutta decisions but later a different view was taken by the said Court as also by the Allahabad Court. In Attar Singh v. Manohar Singh ILR 1947 Nag 933 the plaintiff non-applicant before the High Court filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts valuing at Rs 150 as has been done in the case before us. The defendant's objection to the valuation was rejected by the trial court “on the ground that the court was powerless to challenge the valuation put by the plaintiff on the relief claimed in the suit”. The Full Bench decision in Mata Ram v. Daulat ILR 1938 Nag 558 (FB) was attempted to be distinguished on the basis that it was a case covered by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and not by Section 7(iv)(f). The High Court while repelling the argument pointed out that the principle underlying both the clauses (c) and (f) of Section 7(iv) is substantially the same and the Full Bench decision governed the case. Accordingly it was held that when the valuation put by the plaintiff appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable the court may reject it and have the plaintiff to correct the valuation or have the suit rejected. Similar was the view of the Patna High Court in suits covered by Section 7(iv) (c) in Salahuddin Hyder Khan v. Dhanoo Lal AIR 1945 Pat 421, ILR (1945) 24 Pat 334 and Shama Pershad Sahi v. Sheoparsan Singh AIR 1920 Pat 290 . In Gauri Lal v. Raja Babu AIR 1929 Pat 626, the respondent filed a suit praying for accounts from Appellant 1. Rejecting his claim to put any valuation under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act the High Court observed that when a plaintiff is required to place the valuation on his claim he must state a valuation which need only be approximately correct but qualified it by saying that, “it must not be arbitrary or manifestly inadequate”.

    7. It is true that in a suit for accounts the correct amount payable by one party to the other can be ascertained only when the accounts are examined and it is not possible to give an accurate valuation of the claim at the inception of the suit. The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed to give his own tentative valuation. Ordinarily the court shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chosen, but the plaintiff cannot act arbitrarily in this matter. If a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount to not exercising his right in this regard. In such a case it is not only open to the court but its duty is to reject such a valuation. The cases of some of the High Courts which have taken a different view must be held to be incorrectly decided.

    8. The Learned Counsel for the parties have placed before us the materials on the record at considerable length and we do not have any hesitation in holding that the valuation put by the plaintiff (respondent before us) on the plaint is arbitrary and unacceptable. We, however, do not propose to examine the matter further and remit this question to be reconsidered by the trial court. While examining the issue it will be open to the trial court to take into consideration the statement in the plaint that the plaintiff has been ousted from the partnership business. If the court comes to the conclusion that the tentative valuation of the suit would be beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, it shall pass an appropriate order under Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs payable by the plaintiff-respondent.

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    Comments

    Abdul Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid And Others
    (Apr 12, 1988)