Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Cl. (b) of Section 299 and Cl. (3) of Section 300, IPC
  • Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, and 452, I.P.C
  • Section 302 or 304, I.P.C Navratan Mal
  • Sections 302 and 326, I.P.C
  • Section 304 Part II I.P.C
  • Section 302, I.P.C
  • Section 300, I.P.C
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Cl. (b) of Section 299 and Cl. (3) of Section 300, IPC
  • Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, and 452, I.P.C
  • Section 302 or 304, I.P.C Navratan Mal
  • Sections 302 and 326, I.P.C
  • Section 304 Part II I.P.C
  • Section 302, I.P.C
  • Section 300, I.P.C
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Milap Chandra Jain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal was filed by the accused-appellant (through jail) against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, which convicted him under Sections 302 and 326, I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and three years respectively, together with fines of Rs. 100 under each count.

The incident occurred on March 16, 1988 at about 10 P.M. Houses of the accused Bharat Singh Rajput and the deceased Devilal (and his son Ashutosh, who was injured) were in Sanjay Nagar Colony, Bhilwara. The accused was allegedly abusing the deceased in front of his house; on intervention by the informant Ladulal (P.W.2) the accused returned to his house, then came back with a sword, entered the deceased's house and attacked Devilal and Ashutosh, inflicting several injuries. The injured were taken to hospital. Ladulal lodged a report (Ex. P/1) at 11:30 P.M., which led to registration of FIR (Ex. P/2) and investigation.

After investigation a challan was filed charging the accused under Sections 302, 307, 326, 324 and 452 I.P.C.; the magistrate committed the case to sessions. At trial the prosecution examined 19 witnesses and proved 33 documents. The accused's Section 313 statement denied or disclaimed the prosecution story; he produced no defence witnesses but proved 8 defence documents. The trial court convicted him as noted above, giving rise to this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. (murder) was proved beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the facts only established an offence under Section 304 Part II, I.P.C. (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) as contended by the defence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's counsel contended that the evidence does not prove an offence under Section 302, I.P.C.; at best the facts establish an offence under Section 304 Part II, I.P.C.
  • The appellant relied upon a number of precedents (as listed in the opinion) to support the contention that the case facts were distinguishable from those warranting a Section 302 conviction.

Respondent / Public Prosecutor's Arguments

  • The learned Public Prosecutor supported the conviction and judgment under appeal.
  • The Public Prosecutor relied upon a number of authorities (as listed in the opinion) to support the judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dungar v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 RLW 163 The opinion does not state a specific legal principle from this case; it is cited by the defence as a comparative factual authority. The court held the facts of Dungar distinguishable (one injury; death after nine days) and therefore not applicable to the present case.
Atma Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 520 The opinion does not state a specific legal principle from this case; cited by defence for factual comparison. The court found it distinguishable because in Atma Singh the accused had no intention to cause injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and did not repeat blows.
Badrilal (Badri Lal) v. State of Rajasthan, 1981 Cr LR (Raj) 565 The opinion does not state a specific legal principle from this case; cited by defence for factual comparison. The court noted factual differences: there was no previous enmity, occurrence was sudden, and one axe-blow was given — distinguishable from the present case.
Jhalam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 Cr LR (Raj) 438 The opinion does not set out a rule from Jhalam Singh; it was cited by defence concerning private defence grounds. The court observed that Jhalam Singh involved exercise of private defence where the accused caused death but was held to have exceeded the right; the facts differ from the present case.
State of Rajasthan v. Narain, 1986 Cr LR (Raj) 197 The opinion does not state a particular legal principle from this case; cited for factual comparison. The court noted differences: Narain had no motive, eight injuries of which only one proved fatal; distinguished from present facts.
Sucha Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 658 The opinion does not state a rule from this case; cited by defence on facts. The court found Sucha Singh distinguishable (no previous enmity, no motive, only one blow to head).
Gokul Parashram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cr LR (SC) 491; 1981 Cri LJ 1033 The opinion does not state a particular principle; cited for factual comparison (one blow on a non-vital part). The court regarded it as factually distinguishable because that case involved a single blow to a non-vital part.
Nav Ratan Mal v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 625 The opinion does not specify the legal principle relied upon; it was relied upon by the Public Prosecutor. The court indicated that the other cases relied upon by the Public Prosecutor do not help his argument; specific application not described.
Harji Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 460 (DB) Used to state and apply guidelines (via citation) distinguishing Cl. (b) of Section 299 and Cl. (3) of Section 300 IPC — focusing on degree/probability of death from the intended injury and other factors like nature of injuries, weapon and force used. The court quoted Harji Ram and accepted its guidance (which, in turn, relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Royavarapu‑Punnayya) to determine that the degree/probability of death and surrounding circumstances supported a finding of murder under Section 302.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Royavarapu‑Punnayya The opinion records the broad guidelines from this case: distinction between Cl. (b) of S.299 and Cl. (3) of S.300 depends on the degree/probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury; "likely" means "probable" and "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" means death will be the most probable result. The court applied these guidelines (via Harji Ram) when assessing whether the injuries and manner of attack established murder under Section 302.
Noor Khan v. Laxmi Narain, 1976 Cr LR (Raj) 646 The opinion states that this case "does not relate to a case under Section 302 or 304" — no specific principle cited. The court treated it as inapplicable to the present case.
Navratanmal Vyas v. State Of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 625 The opinion states this was a case of sprinkling kerosene oil and setting fire to the body of the wife; no general principle is extracted in the opinion. The court noted it as factually inapposite and therefore unhelpful to the Public Prosecutor's reliance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step assessment of the evidence presented at trial and framed the central question as whether Section 302 or only Section 304 Part II was proved.

Key elements of the court's factual and legal analysis (as stated in the opinion) are:

  • Three eyewitnesses — Smt. Uma Devi (P.W.1, widow of the deceased), informant Ladulal (P.W.2) and injured Ashutosh (P.W.9, son of the deceased) — gave categorical evidence that the accused inflicted injuries on Devilal and Ashutosh with a sword.
  • The eyewitness statements were corroborated by contemporaneous and material documentary evidence: the immediately lodged FIR (Ex. P/1), site plan (Ex. P/4), site inspection memo (Ex. P/3), and the memo (Ex. P/5) by which the amputated left hand of the deceased and amputated fingers of Ashutosh were taken into possession by the police from the place of occurrence.
  • The dying declaration of the deceased Devilal (Ex. P/22) was recorded at 11:50 P.M. by Dr. M.L. Dangi (P.W.20), and the injury reports (Ex. P/8 for the deceased and Ex. P/19 for Ashutosh) corroborated the ocular testimony.
  • The accused was arrested within 21 hours of the occurrence (arrest memo Ex. P/25). On his information (Ex. P/26, Ex. P/27) the sword (Article 1) and blood-stained clothing were recovered (Ex. P/9 and Ex. P/11), and human blood was found on the clothing.
  • The court relied on Section 300 Illustration (c) as an example of liability where an intentional sword-cut sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature renders the assailant guilty of murder even if death was not specifically intended.
  • The court referred to the guidance (via Harji Ram and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Royavarapu‑Punnayya) that the distinction between different degrees of culpable homicide turns on the degree or probability of death from the intended injury — including consideration of nature of injuries, chances of survival, weapon used and force applied.
  • Applying these principles to the proved facts — repeated, forceful blows with a sword, the manner in which the accused armed himself and entered the deceased's house, the extensive blood at the scene, the amputations and the medical testimony that one injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death — the court concluded there was no doubt that the accused intended to cause the injuries and that murder under Section 302 was established.
  • The court examined and expressly distinguished the cases relied upon by the defence on the basis of differing facts (for example, single injury, absence of intention to cause fatal injury, lack of motive, suddenness of occurrence, or injuries to non-vital parts).
  • The court also considered the authorities cited by the Public Prosecutor and concluded that most of them did not materially aid the prosecution; some cited cases were inapposite by reason of facts (for example, a case of setting fire) or subject-matter.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. was well proved against the accused-appellant. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentences imposed by the Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, were maintained.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's conviction under Section 302 and Section 326 and the sentences (life imprisonment for the Section 302 conviction and three years for Section 326, with fines as recorded) were upheld.
  • The court explicitly found the defence authorities distinguishable on factual grounds and did not reduce the conviction to Section 304 Part II. The opinion does not assert or announce any new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles quoted from authorities (notably the guidance drawn from State of Andhra Pradesh v. Royavarapu‑Punnayya and Harji Ram).

Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

    Bharat Singh v. State Of Rajasthan .

    Milap Chandra Jain, J.:— This appeal has been submitted by the accused-appellant through the jail against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, convicting him under Sections 302 and 326, I.P.C and sentencing him imprisonment for life and three years respectively and payment of fine of Rs. 100/- under each count. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus.

    2. Houses of the accused Bharat Singh Rajput and the deceased Devilal and his son Ashutosh (injured) are situated in Sanjay Nagar Colony, Bhilwara. On March 16, 1988 at about 10 P.M, the accused was standing in front of the house of the deceased Devilal and was abusing him. On the intervention of the informant Ladulal P.W 2, he (accused) returned to his house saying that the deceased had challenged a Rajput and he would be done away. He came back from his house with a sword and came inside the house of deceased Devilal. There he attacked deceased Devilal and his son Ashutosh with his, sword and inflicted several injuries with it on them. On their hue and cry, several persons of the locality were attracted there and he ran away. The injured Devilal and Ashutosh were brought to the hospital. Ladulal P.W 2 lodged report Ex. P/1 in the police station the same night at 11.30 P.M On its basis, FIR Ex. P/2 was registered and investigation was commenced. After usual investigation, a challan was filed against the accused Bharat Singh under Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, and 452, I.P.C in the court of the Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara who committed him to the court of sessions, Bhilwara. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses and tendered and proved 33 documents. The accused disclosed in his statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.PC that he was not arrested but he was called in the police station and he went there. He either denied the prosecution story or said that it is false. The accused did not produce any witness in his defence. He tendered and proved 8 documents only in his defence. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C is not proved from the evidence on record but offence punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C is only proved from the statements of the eye witnesses, namely, Mst. Uma Devi P.W 1, Ladulal P.W 2 and Ashutosh P.W 9. He relied upon Dungar v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 RLW 163, Atma Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 520, Badrilal v. State of Rajasthan, 1981 Cr LR (Raj) 565, Jhalam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 Cr LR (Raj) 438, State of Rajasthan v. Narain, 1986 Cr LR (Raj) 197 and Sucha Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 658.

    3. The learned Public Prosecutor duly supported the judgement tinder appeal. He relied upon Nav Ratan Mal v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 625. Harji Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 460, Gokul Parashram Patil v. State Of Maharashtra, 1981 Cr LR (SC) 491 : 1981 Cri LJ 1033.

    4. Eye-witnesses, namely, Smt. Uma Devi P.W 1 (widow of the deceased) informant Ladulal P.W 2 and injured Ashutosh P.W 9 (son of the deceased) have categorically stated on oath that the accused Bharat Singh caused injuries to the deceased Devilal and Ashutosh with his sword. Their statements find corroboration from the immediately lodged FIR Ex. P/1, site plant Ex. P/4, site inspection memo Ex. P/3 and the memo Ex. P/5 through which amputed left hand of the deceased Devilal and amputed fingers of injured Ashotosh were taken into possession by the police from the place of Occurrence. Dying declaration of the deceased Devilal Ex. P/22 was recorded at 11.50 P.M by Dr. M.L Dangi P.W 20. The injury report Ex. P/8 of the deceased Devilal and the injury report Ex. P/19 of the injured Ashutosh also corroborate their statements. The accused was arrested within 21 hours of the occurrence i.e at 2.30 P.M on March 17, 1988 through arrest memo Ex. P/25. He was examined the same day and simple injuries were also found on his person vide injury report Ex. D/8. In the scuffle, he received these injuries. On his information Ex. P/26, sword Art. 1 was recovered through the recovery memo Ex. P/9 and on his information Ex. P/27 his blood-stained Baniyan and Chaddi were recovered through recovery memo Ex. P/11 and human blood was found on them. It is thus well proved from the overwhelming evidence on record that the accused Bharat Singh was the author of the injuries which were found on the bodies of deceased Devilal and injured Ashutosh.

    5. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether offence under Section 302, I.P.C is well proved or 304 Part II, I.P.C is proved. Ladulal P.W 2 has specifically mentioned in his report Ex. P/1 that on his intervention the accused Bharat Singh went to his house telling that he had been challenged by Devilal and he would do him away, he came therefrom with a naked sword in his hand and entered into the house of the deceased Devilal. He has also said so in his statement on oath. It is well proved from the statements of the three eye-witnesses, namely, Mst. Uma Devi P.W 1 (Widow of Devilal), informant Ladulal P.W 2 and injured Ashutosh P.W 9 (son of Devilal) that the accused Bharat Singh inflicted repeated blows with his sword with great force upon the deceased Devilal and injured son Ashutosh P.W 9 and as a result thereof the left hand of the deceased was got complete cut and fingers of Ashutosh P.W 9 were also got cut. The manner in which the accused-appellant brought the naked sword from his house, entered into the house of the deceased and inflicted blows from his sword leave no doubt that the accused appellant intended to cause the injuries which were noted on the body of the deceased. The site inspection memo Ex. P/3 and site plan Ex. P/4 show that blood was found inside the house of deceased Devilal over great area Dr. M.L Sharma P.W 14 examined the injured Devilal at 10.45 P.M on March 16, 1988 and at 8.50 P.M on March 17, 1988 he conducted the post-mortem examination on his dead body. He has categorically stated that the injury No. 1 of the deceased Devilal was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death. Illustration (c) given in Section 300, I.P.C runs as under:—

    “(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a mart in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death.”

    6. It has been observed in Harji Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 460 (DB) at page 469 paras 24 and 25, as follows:—

    “24. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Royavarapu-Punnayya their Lordships were pleased to lay down broad guide lines for the courts to draw the distinction between Cl. (b) of Section 299 and Cl. (3) of Section 300, IPC and were pleased to observe that it is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. That it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of gravest, medium or lowest degree. It was further held that the word ‘likely’ in cl. (b) S. 289 conveys the sense of ‘probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury” sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death mean that death will be the ‘most probable’ result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. Their Lordships made it clear that the guide lines laid down in the decision were only broad guidelines and not case iron imperatives.

    25. The nature of injuries, chances of survival or the probability of death are the circumstances, Courts are to keep in mind while determining whether the crime amounts to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Cases may fall under cl. III of S. 300, IPC despite assailant confining the beating to the legs and arms and none of the injury being individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Injuries in many a case indicate the intention of the assailant. Similarly, the weapon used and the force applied in using that weapon are also important factors to be taken into consideration.”

    7. All these facts and circumstances leave no manner of doubt that the offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C is well proved against the accused-appellant.

    8. The facts and circumstances of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant are quite different and distinguishable. In Dungar v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 RLW 163, one injury was only inflicted by the accused and the injured died after nine days. In Atma Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 520, the accused had no intention to cause injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and he did not repeat the blows. In Badri Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1981 Cr LR (Raj) 565, there was no previous enmity, occurrence took place at the spur of the moment and one axe-blow was given on the left parietal bone by the accused. In Jhalam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 Cr LR (Raj) 438, the accused while exercising the right of private defence caused injuries with a sword resulting into death and the Court held that the accused exceeded her right of private defence. In State of Rajasthan v. Narain, 1986 Cr LR (Raj) 197, there was no motive, eight injuries were inflicted and only one proved fatal. In Sucha Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LR (Raj) 658, there was no previous enmity, there was no motive and only one blow was given on the head. In Gokul Parashram Patil v. State Of Maharashtra, 1981 Cr LR (SC) 491 : (1981 Cri LJ 1033) one blow with a knife was given on a non-vital part of the body of deceased.

    9. Harji Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 460 (DB), cited by the learned Public Prosecutor, has been dealt with in para 6 above. The other cases relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor do not help him. No case starts at page 22 of 1987 Cr LR (SC) (sic). Noor Khan v. Laxmi Narain, 1976 Cr LR (Raj) 646, does not relate to a case under Section 302 or 304, Navratanmal Vyas v. State Of Rajasthan, 1985 WLN (UC) 625, is a case of sprinkling kerosene oil and setting fire to the body of the wife. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The conviction and sentences of the accused-appellant Bharat Singh awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara are maintained.

    10. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bharat Singh v. State Of Rajasthan .
    (Mar 25, 1994)