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  • section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter
  • SECTION 141 INCOME TAX ACT
  • section 143(3). The provisions of section 143(1)(a)
  • SECTION 141 A INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • sub-section (1) of section 142,(i)
  • provisions of section 143(1)(a)
  • provisions of sub-section (2),
  • Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989,
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter
  • SECTION 141 INCOME TAX ACT
  • section 143(3). The provisions of section 143(1)(a)
  • SECTION 141 A INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • sub-section (1) of section 142,(i)
  • provisions of section 143(1)(a)
  • provisions of sub-section (2),
  • Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged an intimation issued under section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requiring payment of Rs. 20,243. The petitioners' grievance was that the Income-tax Officer (ITO) lacked jurisdiction under section 143(1)(a) to vary the rate of tax and that the ITO's power under that provision was limited to the specific adjustments enumerated in the proviso to section 143(1)(a). The Department's submissions were that the assessment reflected the same figure declared by the assessee but that a demand arose because the maximum marginal rate of tax was applied instead of a normal rate shown by the assessee. The Department relied on section 167B (as amended by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989, effective April 1, 1989) and contended that, because the shares of members in the assessee were unknown, application of the maximum marginal rate for the years 1989–90 and 1990–91 was justified. The Department also noted that the assessee had not given reasons for applying the normal rate in the return and that the assessee had an alternative remedy under section 154 of the Act for the relevant period.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Income-tax Officer, in issuing an intimation under section 143(1)(a), has jurisdiction to vary the rate of tax (specifically, to apply the maximum marginal rate instead of a rate adopted by the assessee) or whether that power is outside the limited exceptions in the proviso to section 143(1)(a).
  2. Whether the ITO could apply section 167B (concerning indeterminate shares of members) by issuing an intimation under section 143(1)(a) without first providing the assessee an opportunity and framing an assessment under section 143(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction under section 143(1)(a) to vary the rate of tax; the ITO's jurisdiction under that provision is limited to the adjustments expressly provided for in the proviso to section 143(1)(a).

Respondent (Department)'s Arguments

  • The assessment was made on the same figure as declared by the assessee; the demand arose only because the maximum marginal rate was applied as against the normal rate shown by the assessee.
  • Section 167B of the Act applies where shares of members are unknown; since the shares were unknown/indeterminate, the maximum marginal rate could legitimately be applied for assessment years 1989–90 and 1990–91, relying on the amendment effected by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 (effective April 1, 1989).
  • The assessee did not state reasons in the return for applying the normal rate; therefore, applying section 167B led to correct levy and charge of tax.
  • The assessee had an alternative remedy by making an application under section 154 during the relevant period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. v. D.R. Chawla, ITO, [1985] 154 ITR 504 (Bombay High Court) Authority that an Income-tax Officer has power to make adjustments to income declared in the return by disallowing any deduction which, on the basis of the information in the return, accounts and documents, is prima facie not admissible. The court referenced this decision to acknowledge past recognition of a power to disallow prima facie inadmissible deductions in summary/provisional assessment contexts, while distinguishing the present case on the scope of section 143(1)(a) and the specific issue of applying a tax rate under that provision.
Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. CIT, [1969] 71 ITR 799 (Supreme Court) Interpretation of section 141 (provisional assessment): provisional assessment is summary, based solely on the return and accompanying accounts/documents; ITO not bound to make enquiries or hear the assessee; provision enacted to expedite tax collection. The court relied on this principle to explain the nature and object of summary/provisional assessments and to situate the limited scope of summary assessments under section 143(1)(a), while observing that where a point is arguable or disputed, fuller proceedings (under section 143(3)) and an opportunity to be heard are required.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the text of section 143(1)(a) and its proviso, noting that the provision contemplates acceptance of a return as filed except for three specified categories of adjustments:

  • Rectification of any arithmetical errors in the return or accompanying documents;
  • Allowance of loss carried forward, deduction, allowance or relief not claimed in the return but prima facie admissible on the basis of information in the return;
  • Disallowance of loss carried forward, deduction, allowance or relief claimed in the return which, on the basis of the information available in the return, accounts or documents, is prima facie inadmissible.

The court then analyzed whether the question of applying a different tax rate (maximum marginal rate versus normal rate) could fall within any of these proviso categories. It observed:

  • The application of a rate of tax does not naturally fall within the categories of "loss carried forward", "deduction", "allowance" or "relief claimed in the return".
  • Arithmetical-error correction could cover errors in calculation (for example, miscalculation of tax when a rate is undisputed), but it would not cover the substantive question whether the maximum marginal rate or the normal rate should apply where that is a contested legal issue.
  • The word "prima facie" means "on the face of it" and should be confined to matters where there cannot be two opinions; if the matter is arguable or debatable, it cannot be treated as prima facie and disallowed under the proviso.

The court considered the legislative and jurisprudential background, including the now-deleted section 141A and the authorities cited (Bombay High Court in Synthetic and Chemicals and the Supreme Court in Jaipur Udyog) acknowledging that provisional/summary assessments permit certain prima facie disallowances based on the return. However, the court emphasized that section 143(1)(a)'s limited exceptions must be strictly construed.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the court found that the ITO had applied section 167B (a provision whose applicability to the assessee was disputed) to charge tax at the maximum marginal rate via an intimation under section 143(1)(a). Because the applicability of section 167B was itself a disputed matter (not an item that was plainly prima facie inadmissible on the face of the return), the ITO should not have invoked section 143(1)(a) to create the demand without first affording the assessee an opportunity and framing an assessment under section 143(3).

Consequently, the intimation was held to be beyond the permissible scope of section 143(1)(a) in the circumstances of this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court quashed the intimation sent under section 143(1)(a) (annexure 1) and allowed the writ petition.

Implications:

  • The immediate practical effect is that the demand created by the intimation (for Rs. 20,243) is set aside.
  • The Income-tax Officer is free to proceed in accordance with law but must first provide the assessee an opportunity of being heard and then, if appropriate, frame the assessment under section 143(3) rather than by issuing an intimation under section 143(1)(a) on a disputed point of law (such as the applicability of section 167B).
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond the correct application of the ordinary rules governing the limited scope of summary intimations under section 143(1)(a); the decision is directed to the direct effect on the parties in this matter. The court made no order as to costs.

    Jks Employees' Welfare Fund v. Income-Tax Officer

    V.K Singhal, J.:— In this writ petition, the petitioners have chal-lenged the intimation received under section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be called as “the Act”), whereby the petitioner was required to make payment of a sum of Rs. 20,243.

    2. The grievance of the petitioners is that the Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction under section 143(1)(a) of the Act to make variation in the rate of tax and has limited jurisdiction as provided in the said section. The submission of learned counsel for the Department is that the assessment has been made on the same figure as was declared by the petitfoner and it was Only on account of the maximum marginal rate of tax as against the normal rate shown by the assessee that this demand was created. It has further been submitted that, in accordance with the provisions of section 167B of the Act since the shares of the members in the assessee's case were unknown, the Income-tax Officer was justified in applying the maximum marginal rate. The said section was amended by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989, with effect from April 1, 1989, and the maximum marginal rate was applied for the years 1989–90 and 1990–91. Since no reasons were shown by the assessee for applying the normal rate in the return, by applying the provisions of section 167B the tax has correctly been levied and charged. It was also submitted that the petitioner has an alternative remedy for submitting an application under section 154 of the Act during the relevant period.

    3. I have considered the matter. The provisions of section 143(1)(a) are as under:

    “143. Assessment. — (1)(a) Where a return has been made under section 139, or in response to a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142,—

    (i) if any tax or interest is found due on the basis of such return, after adjustment of any tax deducted at source or any advance tax paid and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2), an intimation shall be sent to the assessee specifying the sum so payable, and such intimation shall be deemed to be a notice of demand issued under section 156 and all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly; and

    (ii) if any refund is due on the basis of such return, it shall be granted to the assessee:

    Provided that in computing the tax or interest payable by, or refundable to, the assessee, the following adjustments shall be made in the income or loss declared in the return, namely:—

    (i) any arithmetical errors in the return, accounts or documents accompanying it shall be rectified;

    (ii) any loss carried forward, deduction, allowance or relief, which, on the basis of the information available in such return, accounts or documents, is prima facie admissible but which is not claimed in the return, shall be allowed;

    (iii) any loss carried forward, deduction, allowance or relief claimed in the return which, on the basis of the information available in such return, accounts or documents, is prima facie inadmissible, shall be disallowed:

    Provided further that where adjustments are made under the first proviso, an intimation shall be sent to the assessee, notwithstanding that no tax or interest is found due from him after making the said adjust-ments;

    Provided also that an intimation for any tax or interest due under this clause shall not be sent after the expiry of two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable.”

    4. The provisions of section 167B of the Act are applicable where the shares of the members in the association of persons or body of individu-als are unknown/indeterminate.

    5. A bare perusal of section 143(1)(a) contemplates that the Income-tax Officer has to accept the return as it is and in the proviso, three exceptions have been given which confer the jurisdiction on him for making adjustment. Action under this section cannot be taken beyond the power permitted by these three exceptions. The third exception provides that any loss carried forward, deduction, allowance or relief claimed in the return, which, on the basis of the information available in such return, accounts or documents, is prima facie inadmissible, shall be disallowed. This clause contemplates that power could be exercised only: (a)(i) in respect of loss carried forward, (a)(ii) deduction or, (a)(iii) allowance or (a)(iv) relief claimed; (b) the power in respect of the above four items should be on the basis of information available in the return, accounts or documents; (c) that these items are prima facie inadmissible.

    6. The Income-tax Officer appears to have exercised his power under this clause. A question arose as to whether the application of the rate of tax could be covered by the term “relief claimed in the return” because the application of a different rate of tax will not fall under the category of loss carried forward, deduction or allowance. There is another provision in clause (i) regarding arithmetical errors in the return. There may be a case where the rate of tax is not disputed but while calculating the tax there is an error which could be corrected under this clause, i.e, while calculating the tax on the normal rate or the maximum marginal rate there is a mistake which could be corrected and will fall in the category of arithmetical mistake, but whether the maximum marginal rate is to be applied or the normal rate is applicable is not covered by any of the two clauses of the proviso to section 143(1)(a) of the Act.

    7. The matter has also to be considered from another angle that the word “prima facie” which has been used therein means “on the face of it” and refers to the items on which there cannot be two opinions. If the matter is an arguable one or debatable then the same cannot be disallowed under the proviso referred to above.

    8. Earlier, there was a provision under section 141A in the Act, which has since been deleted, under which the Income-tax Officer was required to frame a provisional assessment for refund. The said provision contem-plated the passing of a provisional assessment order on the basis of the return and the Bombay High Court in Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. v. D.R Chawla, ITO, [1985] 154 ITR 504 has held that the Income-tax Officer has power to make adjustment to the income declared in the return by disallowing any deduction which, on the basis of the information available in such return, accounts and documents, is prima facie not admissible. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. CIT, [1969] 71 ITR 799, interpreting the provisions of section 141 of the Income-tax Act, has observed (at page 802):

    “Section 141 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, authorises the Income-tax Officer to make provisional assessment of the income of the assessee on the basis of the return made under section 139 and the accounts and documents, if any, accompanying the return. The assessment so made is summary and is based only on the return and the accounts and documents filed by the assessee. The Income-tax Officer is not bound to make any enquiry before making a provisional assessment; he is not bound even to give to the assessee any notice of his intention to make a pro-. visional assessment, nor to hear the assessee. He may, if he desires, call upon the assessee to elucidate the return or the entries posted in the accounts and documents, but he is not obliged to do so. Section 141 has been enacted with the object of expediting collection of tax on the basis of the return made by the assessee.”

    9. The object of summary assessment proceedings as contemplated under section 143(1)(a) is not only to reduce the work of the Department but is also to minimise litigation and create confidence in taxpayers for submitting true and correct returns. If it appears that the return submitted by the assessee cannot be accepted for the purpose of taking action under section 143(1)(a), then the powers of the Income-tax Officer are not fettered and he can proceed to finalise the assessment after giving an opportunity to the assessee in respect of any arguable point only under section 143(2). Thus, on a proper interpretation of this section, the rights of the Income-tax Officer are restricted with regard to the disallowances which are prima facie inadmissible. Whether the provisions of a particular section are applicable or not, will not be covered under this section. If the provisions of a particular section are applied by the assessee himself and while computing deduction, etc., under that section, there is a mistake, it could be corrected like in the case of a salaried person; in computing the income from salary, if the standard deduction as prescribed under section 16 is claimed at a lesser figure or a higher figure then that mistake could be corrected as it would fall within the category of arithmetical error in the calculation of standard deduction. The second clause of the proviso casts a duty in respect of the deduction, allowances, etc., which have not been claimed in the return, but are prima facie admissible on the basis of information available in the return. A problem may arise in such a situation where the information is not available in the return, but the deduction, allowances, etc., are prima facie admissible then no duty is cast on the Income-tax Officer to allow such a claim under this clause. On the same analogy, if any different interpretation is sought to be taken on which there could be two views or the information in respect thereof is not available in the return, then no such disallowance can be made. The Income-tax Officer should have disallowed the claim if the fact of shares of the members in the assessee's case being indeterminate was evident from the return itself. In the reply submitted by the respondents, it has been mentioned in paragraph 8 that the return of income filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1991–92 did not mention any reason for applying any rate other than those prescribed in section 167B of the Act and, therefore, the tax was charged as prescribed under section 167B. No doubt, the assessee has not mentioned the reasons as explained by the respondents, but has, at the same time, not admitted that the pro-visions of section 167B are applicable. For applying the provisions of section 167B, it was incumbent on the Income-tax Officer to have pro-vided an opportunity to the assessee and then he should have framed the assessment under section 143(3). The provisions of section 143(1)(a) cannot be invoked and the jurisdiction being limited for disallowing only prima facie inadmissible deductions, allowances, etc., the Income-tax Officer was not justified in sending intimation creating the demand by applying a provision the application of which itself was a disputed one.

    10. In the aforesaid circumstances, the intimation sent by the Income-tax Officer (annexure 1) is quashed. The Income-tax Officer would be free to proceed in accordance with law by providing an opportunity to the assessee and then frame the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act. The writ petition is allowed accordingly.

    11. No order as to costs.

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    Jks Employees' Welfare Fund v. Income-Tax Officer
    (Mar 27, 1992)