Wanchoo, C.J:— An application has been made by Pratap Mal under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ or direction to the Income-tax Officer, Jodhpur Division. In this application a prayer was made for issue of a temporary injunction restraining the Income-tax Officer from making any assessment of income-tax on the income for the year 1949–1950 on any resident of Jodhpur Division, including the applicant. An ad interim injunction was issued to the opposite party restraining him from proceeding to assess income-tax on the applicant, and a notice was also issued of this ad interim injunction. A further notice was issued to the opposite party asking him to show cause why an ad interim injunction be not issued to him restraining him from proceeding with the assessment of income-tax on all the residents of Jodhpur Division.

2. The opposite party has appeared in answer to the notices issued to him, and opposes the issue of an ad interim injunction restraining him from assessing income-tax on all the residents of Jodhpur Division. Further, the opposite party also prays that the ad interim injunction issued restraining him from proceeding to assess income-tax on the applicant be suitably modified, and he should be allowed to proceed with the examination of the account books of the applicant for the year 1949–1950, though it is said on his behalf that he would not assess the income-tax for that year.

3. This application has been made on the basis of a decision of this Court in Madan Gopal Kabra v. The Union of India (1951 Rajasthan Law Weekly 56). We have heard learned counsel at length on the question whether an ad interim injunction can be and should be issued restraining the opposite party from proceeding to assess income-tax on all the residents of Jodhpur Division. This raises a question of great general importance inasmuch as the applicant wants the injunction to be issued not only in his favour but also in favour of all other residents of Jodhpur Division, who have not come up to this Court. In effect, therefore, the applicant, who is a stranger to others, wants that on his application such an injunction should be issued in favour of other strangers.

4. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that he is entitled to ask for such an injunction even in favour of strangers. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party contends that such an injunction on the motion of a stranger cannot and, at any rate should not, be issued by this Court.

5. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the applicant on a number of English cases dealing with the writ of prohibition. The earliest of those cases is Worthington v. Jeffries (1874-75 X Common Pleas 379). That was a case in which a stranger moved for a writ of prohibition in connection with a suit pending in the Mayor's Court of the City of London. It was held in this case that

“Where a superior court is clearly of opinion, both with reference to the facts and the law, that an inferior court is exceeding its jurisdiction, it is bound to grant a writ of prohibition; whether the applicant for the prohibition is the defendant below or a stranger.”

The next case relied upon is the Queen (on the Prosecution of the Penarth Local Board v. The Local Government Board, [(1882–83) X Queen's Bench 309.] In this case a writ of prohibition was refused, but Brett L.J, who delivered the judgment in Worthington v. Jeffries, cited above, made the following observations at page 321, on which learned counsel for the applicant strongly relies:—

“I think I am entitled to say this, that my view of the power of prohibition at the present day is that the Court should not be chary of exercising it, and that wherever the legislature entrusts to any body of persons other than to the superior Courts the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals, the Courts ought to exercise as widely as they can the power of controlling those bodies of persons if those persons admittedly attempt to exercise powers beyond the powers given to them by Act of Parliament.”

6. The arrangement is that this Court should exercise the power conferred upon it by the Constitution of India, and stop the opposite party from assessing income-tax for the year 1949–1950 on all the residents of Jodhpur in view of the case Madan Gopal Kabra v. The Union of India, cited above, even though those (1951 RLW 56) persons have not come up to this Court.

7. The third case relied upon on behalf of the applicant is [(1894) 1 Queen's Bench 552] Farquharson v. Morgan. That was not a case of a stranger, but reliance has been placed on the following observations of Lord Halsbury at page 556:—

“It has been long settled that, where an objection to the jurisdiction of an inferior Court appears on the face of the proceedings, it is immaterial by what means and by whom the Court is informed of such objection… I find no authority justifying the withholding of a writ of prohibition in such a case”.

8. The last case referred to by learned counsel for the applicant is Chamber v. Green, [(1875) XX Equity Cases 552]. This case strikes a slightly different note and has dealt with the case of Worthington v. Jeffries, mentioned above. The question that was considered was whether a writ of prohibition must issue on the application of a stranger to the suit. Sir G. Jessel, M.R, at page 554 observed as follows:—

“The law is well settled that when a stranger comes to a superior court for a writ of prohibition, he must show that the inferior court is exceeding its jurisdiction both in fact and law, and that it is a matter of discretion whether or not the superior Court shall set it aside.”

Taking this view, it was held that it was within the discretion of the superior Court to grant a writ of prohibition on the application of a stranger or to withhold it, and in that particular case the discretion was exercised by withholding the writ.

9. A consideration of these cases shows that in England some Judges, at any rate, have held the view that the granting of writ of prohibition on the application of a stranger is discretionary. The matter was considered by the Court of Appeal in Broad v. Parkins, [(1888) XXI Queen's Bench 533], upon which learned counsel for the opposite party relies. That was not a case of stranger, but of a party. But the application for a writ was made after the judgment of the inferior Court had been delivered and before execution proceedings. It was then held, even in the case of an application by party, that “the granting of a writ of prohibition to an inferior Court that has exceeded its jurisdiction is discretionary.” Dealing with this aspect of the matter, Messrs Short and Mellor observe in their book “The practice of the Crown Office”, Second Edition (1908), at page 264, as follows:—

“Applications by strangers have not been encouraged in recent times, and since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Broad v. Parkins it is submitted that they would have to make out a very strong case indeed in order to obtain the writ.”

Learned counsel for the opposite party urges that there has been no case in England in the last 40 years or so in which a writ of prohibition was granted on the application of a stranger. Learned counsel for the applicant admits that there has been no such case in recent times, but his argument is that it does not follow from this that the old cases have been over-ruled. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the trend of authorities now is that a writ of prohibition should not generally be granted on the application of strangers, except, perhaps, in the strongest possible cases. We do not think that the present case belongs to that exceptional class of cases, and there is, therefore, no reason to grant an ad interim injunction of the nature desired by the applicants. If even the writ should not generally be granted on the application of a stranger, there is much less reason for granting an ad interim injunction on such an application. Learned counsel for the opposite party also referred two Indian cases in support of his contention that such an ad interim injunction should not be granted on the application of a stranger.

10. The first of these cases is Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secy., to Government, Uttar Pradesh Labour Department, A.I.R 1951 Allahabad (F.B). That is a decision of a Full Bench, and it was held that

“Though Art. 226 makes no mention as to who shall apply for an appropriate order under the Article, other writs, directions or orders cannot be placed on the same footing on the writ of habeas corpus and only those persons whose interests are directly affected by a statute or an order can apply for redress under the Article.

11. The next case is a decision of the Supreme Court, Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India (A.I.R 1951 Supreme Court 41). It was held by three of the learned Judges that:

“The rights that could be enforced under Art. 32 must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such rights and approaches the Court for relief.”

12. Article 226 is the counter-part of Article 32, so far as the High Courts are concerned, and the trend of authorities in India also is that generally speaking it is only the person whose fundamental right has been infringed who can approach the court for relief. There is a well-known exception in the case of the writ of Habeas corpus, and it may be that a similar exception might be made in the case of a writ of quo warranto. But so far as the writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari are concerned, the authorities seem to lay down that only the person affected can approach the Court for relief. We are, therefore, of opinion that the applicant as a stranger cannot ask us to issue an ad interim injunction restraining the opposite party from assessing income-tax for the year 1949–1950 on all the residents of Jodhpur Division.

13. We may finally point out that even in those English cases where a writ of prohibition has been issued on the application of a stranger, the order in each case was in connection with a single suit or matter pending before an inferior Court or quasi judicial body. There is not a single case where a general order in favour of strangers of the nature desired by the applicant has been passed. We, therefore, refuse to grant an ad interim injunction against the opposite party restraining him from assessing income-tax on all the residents of Jodhpur Division.

14. We now turn to the case of the applicant himself. The main contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party in this connection is based on section 22(4) of the Income-tax Act, which deals with the return of income, and reads as follows:—

“The Income-tax Officer may serve on any person who has made a return under sub-section (1) or upon whom a notice has been served under sub-section (2) a notice requiring him, on a date to be therein specified, to produce, or cause to be produced, such accounts, or documents as the Income-tax Officer may require:

Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not require the production of any accounts relating to a period more than three years prior to the previous year.”

Learned counsel contends that as a notice has been issued already to all the residents of Jodhpur Division to file their returns of income for the previous year, i.e, 1950–1951, the Income-tax Officer can require those who submit a return to produce their account books of three years previous to 1950–1951. As such this Court should not now pass an ad interim injunction restraining the Income-tax Officer from demanding the account books for the year 1949–1950, because that would be going against the provisions of sec. 22(4) and would, therefore, be ineffective order. We are of opinion that there is great force in this contention, and this Court should not now prohibit the Income-tax Officer from demanding production of the account books for the year 1949–1950, as that would be interfering with the legitimate powers of the Income-tax Officer under section 22(4). Interest of justice would, in our opinion, be sufficiently served if we restrain the Income-tax Officer from actually assessing income-tax on the income of the year 1949–1950 under section 23 of the Income-tax Act. We, therefore, modify the ad interim injunction already issued to the opposite party, and order him not to assess income-tax on the income of the year 1949–1950, pending disposal of this application.

15. Taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, we pass no order as to costs of this interim matter.