1. The petitioner is an employer and the non-petitioner Ratan Singh is the employed person. The revision is directed against the order of the Additional District Judge II, Bharatpur, dated 5 May, 1984, by which he upheld the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, dated 30 September, 1982, and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. By his order, dated 30 September, 1982, the authority decided two applications filed by the employed person Ratan Singh under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), and directed the employer to pay a sum of Rs. 25,240 to the employed person.
2. The material facts may be noticed in brief. The non-petitioner Ratan Singh was holding the post of Assistant Executive Officer in the employer-bank, Bharatpur. He submitted two applications under S. 15(2) of the Act claiming wages for the period from July 1979 and August 1979, at the rate of Rs. 916 per month and for the period of September 1979 and June 1980, at the rate of Rs. 936 per month in his first application. He also claimed Rs. 20 as annual increment. In his second application, he claimed wages for the period from July 1980 to July 1981 at the rate of Rs. 916 per month and also claimed annual increments at the rate of Rs. 40 per month to Rs. 80 per month. It was alleged that the employer had wrongly withheld the payment of wages to the employed person. The applications were contested by the employer on several grounds. The main grounds taken by the employer were that Ratan Singh was holding the post of Assistant Executive Officer in an officiating capacity. Since his promotion was found improper, he was reverted to the post of clerk which he held in substantive capacity. He was put under suspension on 2 February, 1979, as departmental enquiry was initiated against him. The bank was paying subsistence allowance to Ratan Singh as per rules. The authority had no jurisdiction to allow wages to Ratan Singh and could not investigate the cause of suspension. Any loss of wages resulting from suspension is not to be deemed to be a reduction from wages under S. 7 of the Act. The authority after recording the evidence of the parties held:
“(1) The reversion was bad; and
(2) The suspension order was not passed by the competent officer.”
He, therefore, rejected the defences taken by the employer and allowed the applications. He directed the employer to pay a sum of Rs. 25,240 in total under the two applications to the employed person Ratan Singh. The employer went in appeal under S. 17 of the Act before the District Judge which was heard by the Additional District Judge, Bharatpur. The same contentions were raised by the employer in appeal. The learned Additional District Judge by his impugned order, dated 5 May, 1984, dismissed the appeal, and upheld the order of the authority. Aggrieved against the order of the Additional District Judge, the employer has come up in revision.
3. I have heard Sri. G.G Sharma learned counsel for the employer and Sri B. Bagri, learned counsel for the employed person.
4. The preliminary objection was raised by Sri Bagri against the maintainability of this revision. It was argued by him that the District Judge deciding an appeal under S. 17 of the Act is not subordinate to the High Court and as such no revision lies against the impugned order of the District Judge under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The contention is lifeless and bizarre. Section 17 of the Act lays down that an appeal against the order of the authority may be preferred before the District Court. The phrase used in S. 17(1) is “District Court” and not “District Judge. Needless to say that District Court is subordinate to the High Court, vide S. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. A District Court decides a case within the meaning of S. 115, Civil Procedure Code, when it decides the appeal under S. 17 of the Act. The scheme of S. 17 as regards the appeals is that the appeal is not made to a “persona designata,” but to a Court. The District Court is not a persona designata but a civil Court subordinate to the High Court. No right of further appeal against the order of the District Court passed in appeal lies. Therefore, the High Court had got jurisdiction to exercise its revisional powers under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order passed in appeal by a District Court under S. 17 of the Act.
5. In Bhanwri Singh v. Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, Loco Shops, Western Railway, Ajmer, [1958 R.L.W 420], it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the District Judge is not persona designata under S. 17 of the Act and, therefore, a revision lies against his order to High Court under S. 115, Civil Procedure Code. The preliminary objection thus holds no water.
6. In assailing the impugned orders, it was contended by Sri Sharma, learned counsel for the employer-bank, that the authority has a very limited jurisdiction under the Act. Explanation II occurring in S. 7(1) of the Act specifically lays down that any loss of wages resulting from suspension is not deduction of wages. The employed person was put under suspension on 2 February, 1979 and he was paid subsistence allowance allowed under the rules. The Authority under the Act as well as the Additional District Judge committed grave errors in assuming jurisdiction and allowing the full wages for the suspension period. It was argued that the legality as to whether the order of suspension was proper or not and the causes for suspension cannot be investigated by the Authority under the Act. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Lakpat Rai v. Om Prakash, [A.I.R 1960 Raj. 99].
7. Sri Bagri, learned counsel for the employed person, tried his best to sustain and support the impugned orders. It was argued by him that it is open to the Authority under the Act to see whether the order of suspension was passed by the competent officer or not. If the order of suspension was passed by an officer not competent to pass it, such an order can be disregarded by the authority. I have taken the respective submissions into consideration.
8. A look into S. 7 of the Act shows that Explanation II occurring in Sub-sec. (1) provides as to what deductions shall not be deemed to be deductions. If any case is covered by the explanation, then the Authority under the Act will have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter because in that event it will be a case of no deduction. Reference in this connection may be made to Ghose v. Dulia, [1969-I L.L.J 194], decided by a Division Bench of this Court. The position, therefore, boils down to this that the Authority under the Act would exercise jurisdiction not vested in it, if it decides the question whether the order of suspension was justified in law.
9. It is of course open to the Authority under the Act to see whether the order of suspension was passed by an officer competent to pass such an order. If the order of suspension has been passed by an officer or authority not competent to pass it, it is then open to the Authority under the Act to ignore or disregard such an order of suspension.
10. The pertinent question before me is whether the order of suspension of the employed person was passed by the officer competent to pass it. The order of suspension is annexure 3, dated 2 February, 1979, passed by Sri P.C Jain, Administrator of the employer-bank. The employer-bank is a co-operative society registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, The employer-bank is, therefore, governed by the provisions of this Act. Section 33 of Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act speaks about the constitution of a committee to carry out the management of the affairs of the society. Section 36 speaks about the removal of committee or member thereof. It authorises the Registrar to remove the committee and appoint an Administrator. It would be useful to read Ss. 36(1)(a) and 36(2) which have a direct bearing on the controversy in hand:
“36. Removal of committee or member thereof.—
(1) If, in the opinion of the Registrar … the Registrar may after …
(1)(a) remove the committee and appoint a Government servant as an administrator to manage the affairs of the society and shall submit his report justifying the removal of the committee to the State Government within a period of fifteen days from the date of removal of the committee.
(2) The administrator so appointed (or the committee so nominated, as aforesaid) shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may from time to time give, have powers to perform all or any of the functions of the committee or of any officer of the society and take all such action as may be required in the interest of the society.”
11. It appears that the committee was removed by the Registrar and an administrator to manage the affairs of the employer-bank was appointed by him. Order annexure 3 shows Sri Prakash Chandra Jain was appointed as an administrator of the employer-bank and he was performing the functions of the committee as laid down in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act.
12. The State Government has framed Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Rules, 1966, in exercise of the powers granted to it under S. 148 of the aforesaid Act. Rule 41 of these rules relates to officers and employees of Co-operative Societies. Sub-rule (4) authorises the Registrar to direct the committee to place any officer or servant of the society under suspension. Sub-rule (5) enjoins upon this committee to carry out the directions of the Registrar and place such an officer or servant under suspension forthwith. Sub-rules (4) and (5) read as under:
“41. Officers and employees of co-operative societies.— (1) to (3) … (4) Where in the course of an audit under S. 68 or an inquiry under S. 70 or an inspection under S. 71 or S. 72 it is brought to the notice of the Registrar that a paid officer or servant of a society has committed or has been otherwise responsible for misappropriation, breach of trust or other offence, in relation to the society the Registrar may, if in his opinion, there is prima facie evidence against such paid officer or servant and the suspension of such paid officer or servant is necessary in the interest of the society direct the committee of the society pending the investigation and disposal of the matter, to place or cause to be placed such paid officer or servant under suspension from such date and for such period as may be specified by him.
(5) On receipt of a direction from the Registrar under Sub-rule (4), the committee of the society shall, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the bye-laws, place or cause to be placed the said officer or servant under suspension forthwith.”
13. The Registrar issued orders, annexure 1, in January 1978, and annexure 2 in September 1978 directing the administrator to place those persons under suspension who had committed acts of misconduct. In appendix 2 attached with annexure 2, the name of the employed person Ratan Singh has been mentioned as an employee to be placed under suspension. It was in compliance of orders annexure 1 and annexure 2 that the administrator Sri P.C Jain passed the order annexure 3 on 2 February, 1979 placing the employed person Ratan Singh under suspension.
14. It may be recalled that the committee was removed by the Registrar and an administrator was appointed to carry out the functions of the employer-bank. The administrator under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act had powers to perform all the functions of the committee. The administrator was, therefore, fully competent under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 41 to pass the order of suspension in pursuance to the directions issued by the Registrar.
15. It is unfortunate that neither the authority nor the Additional District Judge dealt with the provisions of S. 36 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act and rule41 of the rules.
16. The Authority under the Act has a very limited jurisdiction. It does not lie within his jurisdiction or competency to examine the order of suspension on merits and to see whether it is justified in law or not. If the order of suspension has been passed by an officer competent to pass it, the Authority under the Act cannot examine its validity to see as to whether it was justified in law or not.
17. Here in the instant case, the Authority under the Act acted improperly and exercised jurisdiction not vested in it when it entered into the question whether the order suspending the employed person was or was not justified in law. The impugned orders cannot be, therefore, sustained.
18. In the result, the revision is allowed. The impugned orders, dated 30 September, 1982, passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and the order of the Additional District Judge (2), Bharatpur, dated 5 May, 1984, are set aside. The application filed by Ratan Singh under S. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is hereby dismissed. The money received by Ratan Singh under the impugned orders shall be refunded by him to the employer-bank, viz., the Bharatpur Central Co-operative Bank, Ltd., Bharatpur, within three months from today.
19. No order as to costs.
20. Revision allowed.