1. The claim in appeal here is for enhanced compensation.

2. Shyam Kumar Bahri and his brother, Ashok Kumar Bahri, were both killed when their motor cycle met with an accident with one truck PUJ 1299 coming from the opposite direction. This happened on July 11, 1979, at about 9 p.m. on the Hoshiarpur-Jullundur Road. The Tribunal held this to be a case of contributory negligence with both the truck driver and Shyam Kumar Bahri, deceased, being equally to blame. A sum of Rs. 39,000 was awarded as compensation to the father, widow and the two minor sons of Shyam Kumar Bahri and Rs. 10,500 to the father and widow of Ashok Kumar Bahri.

3. The finding of contributory negligence cannot indeed be sustained. The version of the accident, as given in the claim application, was that the truck was being driven without headlights and it came on to the the wrong side of the road at a very high speed and hit into the motor cycle and thus caused the accident. The respondents, truck driver, owner as also the insurance company denied any negligence on the part of the truck driver but it is pertinent to note that no counter-version of the accident was put forth by either of them. What is more, no evidence was forthcoming from the side of the respondents. Even the truck driver was not examined as a witness in this case.

4. The case of the claimants rests upon the testimony of A. W. 2, Girdhari Lal, and A. W. 3, Romesh Kumar, who were both brothers-in-law of the two deceased. Being relations, their testimony does indeed deserve to be scrutinised with care. A reading thereof would, however, show that both came forth with a consistent account of the occurrence and counsel for the respondents could point to no discrepancies or contradictions in their evidence to create any doubt in their veracity. Both deposed to the truck coming at a high speed without any headlights and further that the truck came on to the wrong side of the road and hit into the motor cycle. They also stated that after causing the accident, the driver ran away. In cross-examination, there was no challenge to their testimony that the truck was being driven without headlights. What was suggested was that there was a cart going ahead of the motor cycle of the deceased and the accident occurred when they were trying to overtake it. As mentioned earlier, no counter-version had been put forth by the respondents in their written statement. It was, thus, for the first time when these two witnesses were examined in court that such a suggestion was made to them.

5. A matter of material significance here is the prompt lodging of the first information report relating to this incident by A. W. 2, Girdhari Lal. This report was made within an hour of the occurrence and the account of the accident as contained therein is wholly in consonance with what the two eye-witnesses deposed in court.

6. Taking an overall view of the evidence on record and the circumstances of the case, there can be no manner of doubt that it was the truck driver who was wholly to blame for the accident. The finding on the issue of negligence must thus be modified accordingly.

7. As regards the quantum of compensation payable to the claimants, in the case of Shyam Kumar, deceased, dependency of the claimants was computed at Rs. 500 per month. The error complained of here was in 13 being taken as the multiplier. It is now well-settled that the usual multiplier in such cases should be 16. Compensation in this case thus deserves to be computed at Rs. 500 per month with a multiplier of 16. This would work out to Rs. 96,000, which may be rounded off to Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh).

8. A similar error was committed by the Tribunal in the case of Ashok Kumar Bahri, deceased too, where after holding that the dependency of the claimants upon the deceased was to the extent of Rs. 350 per month, a multiplier of 5 was adopted. Here again, counsel for the claimants rightly contended that the appropriate multiplier should have been 16. This would work out to Rs 67,200, which may be rounded off to Rs. 70,000 (rupees seventy thousand).

9. The claimants in the case of Shyam Kumar Bahri, deceased, are accordingly hereby awarded Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation while those in the case 'of Ashok Kumar Bahri Rs. 70,000. Out of the amount awarded, a sum of Rs. 10,000 shall be payable to the father of Shyam Kumar Bahri, deceased, Rs. 20,000 each to his two sons and the balance to his widow, while in the case of Ashok Kumar Bahri, deceased, a sum of Rs. 10,000 shall be paid to his father and the balance to his widow. The claimants shall be entitled to the amount awarded along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum from the date of the application to the date of payment of the amount awarded. The compensation payable to the minor claimants shall be paid to them in such manner as the Tribunal may deem to be in their best interest.

9. Here, Mr. L.M. Suri, counsel for the respondent-insurance company, sought to contend that the liability of the insurance company must be held to be limited to Rs. 50,000 in each case. He adverted in this behalf to the provisions of Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the argument being that as no plea had been put forth by the claimants that the liability of the insurance company exceeded this amount, it must be held to be limited to Rs. 50,000, which was the sum mentioned in Section 95(2) of the Act. He cited in support Hamirpur Co-operative Transport Society Ltd. v. Kaushalya Devi [1983] ACJ 70 (HP), Des Raj v. Ram Narain [1980] ACJ 202 (All), Automobiles Transport (Rajasthan) P. Ltd. v. Dewalal [1977] ACJ 150; AIR 1977 Raj 121, and Bai Dahiben v. Jesingbhai Bijalbhai [1984] ACJ 150; [1984] 56 Comp Cas 257 (Guj). In all these authorities, there were observations to the effect that in the absence of a plea to the contrary, the liability of the insurance company must be held to be limited to the amount mentioned in Section 95(2) of the Act.

10. Recently, this court had occasion to consider the matter in Smt. Harjeet Kaur v. Balvinder Singh (FAO 265 of 1982 decided on September 6, 1985), where it was observed :

"It has been taken to be well-settled by our court that Section 95(2) of the Act merely prescribes the minimum but not the maximum liability of the insurance company. In other words, the insurance cover cannot be less than the sum mentioned in Section 95(2) of the Act, but it does not preclude a higher risk being covered by the insurance company, and, therefore, in the absence of a specific plea by the insurance company that its liability is limited to any particular sum, {not being less than the minimum prescribed) and the policy of insurance being placed on record in support of such plea, the liability of the insurance company must be held to extend to the entire amount awarded. Reference here may be made to the judgment of the Division Bench in Ajit Singh v. Sham Lal [1984] PLR 314; [ 1986] 59 Comp Cas 946 (P& H) as also the two earlier judgments of this court in Dr. Karan Singh v. Dhian Singh (FAO No. 106 of 1976 decided on August 1, 1983), and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Mohinder Kaur (FAO No. 735 of 1979 decided on July 12, 1984). No policy of insurance having been placed on record in the present case, the liability of the insurance company must be held to extend to the entire amount awarded."

11. No plea was raised in the present case regarding any limitation on the liability of the insurance company. This being so, it must be held that the insurance company was liable for the entire amount awarded in both these cases.

12. Faced with this situation, counsel for the insurance company sought amendment of the written statement to raise the plea, not taken earlier, that its liability was limited to Rs. 50,000 and also by a separate application sought permission to adduce additional evidence to place on record the policy of insurance.

13. Counsel cited a number of authorities with regard to the scope and ambit of the power of the court to allow amendment of pleadings under Order 6, Rule 17, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance was, in the main, placed upon Sardar Hari Bachan Singh v. Major S. Har Bhajan Singh, AIR 1975 P & H 205, where it was observed (headnote):

" It is well-settled law that, however negligent or careless may have been the first omission and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated for by costs......"

14. Reference was also made to Smt. Dulia Devi v. Smt. Ram Kaur [1975] 77 PLR 739, and Puran Chand v. Harjinder Singh [1984] 86 PLR 294, where similar views were expressed.

15. The law is indeed well-settled that the court possesses a wide discretion in the matter of amendment of pleadings, but it is a discretion to be exercised judiciously so as to advance the cause of substantial justice and avoid injustice. The ultimate test, as held by the Supreme Court in Pirgonda Hongonda Palil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363, is, can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side ?

16. As regards amendment of pleadings at the appellate stage, reference must be made to the judgement of J. V. Gupta J. in Ranjit Kaur v. Ajaib Singh [1984] 86 PLR 608, where it was observed that no one is e'ntitled to seek amendment of pleadings as a matter of right, particularly in appeals. It is pnly where the court finds that the proposed amendment is necessary for determination of the controversy between the parties that it may be allowed even at a late stage. The jurisdiction of the appellate court in the matter is further limited as rights of parties come into being after the passing of the decree by the trial court. A strong case has thus to be made out why the plea sought to be taken by the amendment could not be put forth earlier. In this situation, delay has also to be explained to the satisfaction of the court.

17. There is no explanation for the delay in seeking amendment in the present case. The record of the case would show that the accident here took place in July, 1979, and the claims for compensation were filed in September, 1979. The Tribunal made its award on April 3, 1981, and the appeals were filed by the claimants on September 4, 1981. No cross-objections were filed by the insurance company. On May 20, 1985, the appeals came up on the cause list. The applications for amendment of the written statement and for permission to adduce additional evidence were filed about two months thereafter on June 7, 1985. Unjustified delay is thus writ large.

18. The law relating to compensation to victims of motor accidents is but a species of welfare laws and has thus to be considered and construed from the standpoint of the claimants. There is a facility and certainty of recovery of compensation from the insurance company which is so vividly in contrast with the delays and obstacles that claimants often encounter from the other parties liable, for example, the driver and the owner. It is thus a valuable right conferred upon the claimants to recover compensation from the insurance company, which it would clearly be unjust to deprive them of by the amendment so belatedly sought. Further, it is quite possible that in the intervening period, the other parties liable may have disposed of their assets with a view to defeat the claimants from recovering the compensation awarded. In these circumstances, mere payment of costs cannot obviously provide them adequate recompense and it would thus work injustice to the claimants to permit such an amendment at this stage. As regards the insurance company, it has the provisions of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act to fall back upon to seek its remedy against the insured.

19. No occasion is thus provided for granting the insurance company permission to amend the written statement as prayed for.

20. As regards the additional evidence being allowed at this stage, it is well-settled that it should not be permitted merely to enable one of the parties to remove a lacuna in presenting its case at the proper stage or to fill up gaps in its evidence. This is not a case where the appellate court itself requires this evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties. In this view of the matter, the application for permission to adduce additional evidence too cannot be allowed. Both the applications are accordingly hereby dismissed.

21. In the result, the appeals are hereby accepted with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500 (one set only).