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  • O. 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code,
  • Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
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  • O. 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code,
  • Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted by the plaintiff-respondent, a tenant, against the defendants (landlords) seeking a declaration and permanent injunction. The plaintiff alleged he had taken the house on rent seven years earlier, had been paying rent regularly and that rent had been paid up to 30-11-1979, although the landlords never issued receipts. The plaintiff sought a decree declaring payment up to 30-11-1979 and an injunction restraining forcible dispossession.

The defendants contested the suit. The trial Court found that rent had been paid only up to 31-8-1974 at Rs. 80 per month and that subsequent payments alleged by the plaintiff were not proved; accordingly, the trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

In the appeal filed by the plaintiff, an application under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved to allow withdrawal of the suit. The defendants opposed that application, contending there was no sufficient reason and that the application was made to avoid the adverse trial Court decision. The lower Appellate Court allowed the application, set aside the trial Court's judgment and decree, and dismissed the suit as withdrawn. The defendants appealed to this Court (second appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a plaintiff can, under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, withdraw a suit "at any time" after a decree has been passed by the trial Court (i.e., at the appellate stage) as a matter of course.
  2. Whether permitting withdrawal at the appellate stage, after a trial Court decree in favour of the defendants, improperly affects vested rights of the decree-holder (including related proceedings such as an ejectment application before the Rent Controller).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The plaintiff should not be permitted to withdraw the suit in appeal because the trial Court had given a categorical finding that the plaintiff failed to prove payment of rent up to 30-11-1979.
  • That trial Court finding is material because the defendants have filed an ejectment application against the plaintiff before the Rent Controller; permitting withdrawal would adversely affect the defendants.
  • Reliance was placed on the precedent Kanhaiya v. Mst. Dhaneshwari (AIR 1973 All. 212).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appeal is a continuation of the suit and, therefore, under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff was entitled to withdraw the suit "at any time".
  • The respondent relied on authority interpreted to permit withdrawal under Order 23, Rule 1 (a specific precedent cited by the Court was Kamta v. Gaya Prasad (AIR 1972 All 143)).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanhaiya v. Mst. Dhaneshwari, AIR 1973 All. 212 The opinion records that reliance was placed on this decision by the appellants. The Court notes that Kamta v. Gaya Prasad (AIR 1972 All 143) was dissented subsequently by that Court in Kanhaiya's case; the Court treated this as part of the authorities considered when resolving the question of withdrawal at appellate stage.
Kamta v. Gaya Prasad, AIR 1972 All 143 Cited by the respondent's counsel as authority relevant to withdrawal under Order 23, Rule 1. The Court observed that an earlier observation in Kamta's case — that the view in Kedar Nath was rendered nugatory by the Supreme Court in Hulas Rai — was not justified and treated Kamta's connection to Hulas Rai as misplaced for the specific question of withdrawal.
Kedar Nath v. Chandra Kiran, AIR 1962 All 263 Held (as stated in this opinion) that Order XXIII, Rule 1 does not give an absolute right to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit at the stage of second appeal and that withdrawal lies within the discretion of the Court. The Court cited Kedar Nath with approval as supporting the discretionary approach — that withdrawal at appellate stage is not an absolute right.
Vidyadhar Dubey, 1970 All LJ 732 (AIR 1971 All 41) Recorded in the opinion as a case in which the view in Kedar Nath was cited with approval. The Court noted that Kedar Nath's view was cited with approval in Vidyadhar Dubey, reinforcing the discretionary interpretation of Order XXIII, Rule 1 at the appellate stage.
Hulas Rai, AIR 1968 SC 111 Cited by others (via Kamta) as a Supreme Court authority; the opinion explains Hulas Rai was invoked by Kamta as having some bearing. The Court explicitly stated that the case of Hulas Rai "had nothing to do with the right of an appellant to withdraw the suit at the appellate stage" and therefore it was not a proper basis to negate Kedar Nath's reasoning on withdrawal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court concluded that the lower Appellate Court acted illegally in permitting the plaintiff to withdraw the suit after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had dismissed the suit.

The Court analyzed the phrase "at any time" in Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and interpreted it as applicable to a suit pending in the trial Court. The Court reasoned that once the trial Court has passed a decree, certain rights vest in the party in whose favour the decree is passed; therefore the plaintiff cannot, as a matter of course, withdraw the suit "at any time" at the appellate stage after a decree has been passed.

In addressing the authorities, the Court observed that a learned single Judge in Kedar Nath took the view that Order XXIII, Rule 1 does not confer an absolute right to withdraw at the stage of a second appeal and that withdrawal lies within the court's discretion. That view was cited with approval in Vidyadhar Dubey. The opinion further explained that Kamta v. Gaya Prasad had suggested that Kedar Nath's view was rendered nugatory by Hulas Rai, but the present Court stated that such an inference was not justified because Hulas Rai had nothing to do with the right to withdraw at the appellate stage.

Applying these principles to the present facts (including the trial Court's categorical finding against the plaintiff and the existence of related ejectment proceedings), the Court held that withdrawal at the appellate stage was not permissible in this case and that the lower Appellate Court's allowance of withdrawal was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

The Court set aside the order of the lower Appellate Court which had allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the suit and which had set aside the trial Court's judgment and decree. The matter was remitted to the District Judge for decision on the appeal on merits in accordance with law. The parties were directed to appear in the District Judge's Court on 30th March 1984.

Direct effect: the plaintiff's withdrawal allowed by the lower Appellate Court was nullified; the appeal must be decided on merits by the District Judge. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond applying and preferring the view that withdrawal at the appellate stage is not an absolute right where a decree has already been passed and rights have vested in the decree-holder.

Appeal allowed.

    Jubedan Begum And Others v. Sckhawat Ali Khan .

    This appeal is directed against, the order of the Additional District Judge. Sangrur, dated 25-10-1982, whereby the plaintiff was allowed to withdraw the suit, after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dismissing his suit.

    2. The plaintiff-respondent who is a tenant under the defendants filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction, alleging that he had taken the house in dispute on rent seven years back from the defendants and had been paying rent regularly and the rent up to November, 1979 had been paid by him, but the landlords never issued any receipt in this respect. Since the defendants were threatening to dispossess him forcibly, on the ground of non-payment of rent, he filed the suit for declaration to the effect that he had already paid rent up to 30-11-1979 and thus prayed for a decree for permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from dispossessing him forcibly from the suit property. However, the suit was contested on behalf of the defendants. Ultimately, the trial Court found that the rent at the rate of Rs. 80/- per mensem up to 31-8-1974 only had been paid by the plaintiff, and thereafter the rent had not been paid, as alleged in the plaint. Consequently, plaintiff's suit was dismissed. In appeal filed on behalf of the plaintiff, an application under O. 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed wherein it was prayed that he be allowed to withdraw the suit. That application was resisted on behalf of the defendants, on the ground that there was no sufficient reason for withdrawing the suit, and the application was filed by the plaintiff simply to avoid decision which has been given in favour of the defendants by the learned trial Court. However, the learned lower Appellate Court found that as the defendants could not be said to have acquired any right under the decree and the withdrawal of the suit would not adversely affect the substantive rights of the defendants the plaintiff was entitled to withdraw the same. Consequently, the application was allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court were set aside and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed as withdrawn. Dissatisfied with the same, the defendants have filed the second appeal in this Court.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the plaintiff could not be allowed to withdraw the suit in appeal, because a categoric finding has been given by the trial Court that he had failed to prove that he had paid rent up to 30-11-1979. According to the learned counsel, this finding is very material as the defendants have already filed an application for ejectment against the plaintiff before the Rent Controller. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appeal is a continuation of the suit and, therefore, in view of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code, the plaintiff was entitled to withdraw the suit at any time. On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed on Kanhaiya v. Mst. Dhaneshwari, AIR 1973 All. 212.

    4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that the lower Appellate Court has acted illegally in allowing the plaintiff to withdraw the suit after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit. The words “at any time” in Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code would apply to the suit pending in the trial Court. Once the decree is passed by the trial Court, then certain rights are vested in the party in whose favour the suit is decided. Thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to withdraw the suit, as a matter of course, at any time after the decree is passed by the trial Court. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, Kamta v. Gaya Prasad, (AIR 1972 All 143) was dissented subsequently by that Court in Kanhaiya's (supra). In paragraph 6 thereof, it was observed as under:—

    “A learned single Judge of this Court in Kedar Nath v. Chandra Kiran, AIR 1962 All 263 also took the view that Order XXIII, Rule, 1 (1) does not give an absolute right to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit at the stage of second appeal and that the matter of withdrawal of the suit under the aforesaid provision of the Code lay within the discretion of the Court. This case was cited with approval in the case of Vidyadhar Dubey, 1970 All LJ 732 (AIR 1971 All 41) (supra). The observation of the learned single Judge in Kamta's case, 1971 All WR (HC) 667 : (AIR 1972 All 143) (supra) that the view taken in Kedarnath's case (supra) has been rendered nugatory due to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hulas Rai, AIR 1968 SC 111 (supra) does not appear to be justified. The case of Hulas Rai had nothing to do with the right of an appellant to withdraw the suit at the appellate stage.”

    Thus, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, the plaintiff could not be allowed to withdraw the suit at appellate stage. Consequently, the appeal succeeds. The order of the learned lower Appellate Court allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his suit, is set aside and the case is sent back to the District Judge for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

    5. The parties have been directed to appear in his Court on 30th of March, 1984.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Jubedan Begum And Others v. Sckhawat Ali Khan .
    (Mar 6, 1984)