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  • provisions of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act,
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  • provisions of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Bachan Kaur, brought a suit on 6 January 1958 for an injunction restraining thirty-four defendants (all described as chamars of the village) from interfering with her ownership and possession of approximately 5 bighas of land in Khasra Nos. 344 and 346 in Chamar Majri, Mauza Lehal (contiguous to the town of Patiala). The plaintiff's claimed title derived from purchases made by her husband, Mehar Singh, from village biswadars in November and December 1940, followed by a gift in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants resided in Khasra No. 345, which lay between the disputed parcels.

The dispute had earlier produced criminal proceedings under Section 145 CrPC; the Executive Magistrate and, on revision, the District Magistrate (order dated 17 September 1956) found that exclusive possession had not been proved by either side and directed the parties to seek relief in a civil court. The trial Judge found for the plaintiff (except for a portion marked 'EFGH') and entered a decree for possession. The defendants' appeal to the Additional District Judge failed, and the matter proceeded via second appeal to this Court.

During hearing before this Court, additional evidence was ordered to be received under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC and the matter was sent to the lower appellate Court for that purpose. Revenue records (jamabandis, Exhibits A.1 to A.7) indicating long possession by the chamars were tendered; the trial Court had earlier rejected them because certified copies were not produced under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Patwari was not examined. The Single Judge, after receiving additional evidence, reversed the courts below and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff then appealed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent; the Letters Patent Bench set aside the Single Judge's judgment and remitted the case for fresh decision because some defendants had died during the pendency of the appeal and their legal representatives had not been brought on record — raising the question of a decree against a dead person being a nullity. The present opinion addresses the consequences of those developments and directs further proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of some of the defendants during the pendency of the appeal results in total abatement of the appeal or otherwise affects the right of surviving defendants to continue the appeal.
  2. Whether additional evidence (specifically revenue records/jamabandis) received under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC can be challenged at the present stage where they were admitted without objection earlier, and if admitted, whether the opposite party must be permitted an opportunity to rebut such additional evidence.
  3. What procedural course should be followed by the lower appellate Court after admission of additional evidence so as to secure a fair opportunity to the parties and proper determination of the issues.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (or parties relying on admission of revenue record) Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellants (Mr. Kaushal) relied upon authorities, including a Privy Council decision ((1907) ILR 34 Cal 1059 (PC)) and Division Bench decisions of the Lahore High Court, to contend that documents admitted without objection in the first instance cannot be challenged in appeal; therefore the jamabandis (Exhibits A.1 to A.7) having been received without objection earlier, their admissibility could not be questioned at the present stage.
  • The appellants referred to Order 41, Rules 27 and 28 CPC to argue (according to the text) that it is not necessary to permit rebuttal of the additional evidence.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (represented by Mr. Atma Ram) contended that production of copies of jamabandis without the Patwari's evidence was inadequate proof and that admissibility could still be questioned, i.e., the copies lacked certification under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Patwari should have been examined.
  • The respondents argued that some defendants had died and that such deaths produced total abatement of the appeal; they relied on a number of decisions (e.g., Vinod Sagar v. Vishnubhai AIR 1947 Lah 388; State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram AIR 1962 SC 89; Ram Sarup v. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553; Puran Singh Basawa Singh v. Hazara Singh Punjab Singh AIR 1966 Punj 312) in support of the abatement contention.
  • The respondents also contended that they were not given an opportunity to rebut the additional revenue evidence that had been accepted by the Single Judge, and thus they were denied a fair opportunity to meet evidence that raised a rebuttable presumption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1907) ILR 34 Cal 1059 (PC) (Privy Council) That admissibility of a document which has been admitted without objection in the first Court cannot be questioned in appeal. The court relied on this principle to decline to consider objections to the admissibility of Exhibits A.1 to A.7 at that stage, because no objection had been taken to their reception initially.
Fauja Singh v. Allah Ditta, AIR 1931 Lah 722 (Division Bench) Where evidence is erroneously allowed in a manner different from that prescribed by law and no objection is taken in the Court of first instance, the objection cannot be raised later on appeal; the producing party may get opportunity to remedy defects if timely objected. The court cited this decision to support the view that the jamabandis, admitted without objection earlier, could not be challenged at the present stage.
Suraj Bhan v. Hafiz Abdul Khaliq, AIR 1944 Lah 1 (Division Bench) Admission of a copy of a copy in evidence where admissibility was not questioned at an initial stage. Referenced to reinforce the principle that an objection to admissibility waived early cannot be raised later; used to justify reception of Exhibits A.1 to A.7.
Vinod Sagar v. Vishnubhai, AIR 1947 Lah 388 (Cited by respondents) Authority on abatement caused by death of a party. The court observed that this and other similar authorities relied upon by respondents were not relevant to the present controversy and did not persuade the court to hold total abatement.
State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 (Cited by respondents) Authority on abatement or related procedural points. The court noted it was cited by respondents but found it not relevant to the issues in the present case.
Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 (Cited by respondents) Authority relied on regarding abatement. The court accepted that it was cited but held it had no relevancy for the present controversy.
Puran Singh Basawa Singh v. Hazara Singh Punjab Singh, AIR 1966 Punj 312 (Cited by respondents) Authority on abatement issues. Cited by respondents; the court found it not pertinent to the facts before it.
Nanak v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1946 Lah 399 (Full Bench) Where a decree for possession is obtained against multiple trespassers, each trespasser has an independent right to appeal; the death or non-appeal of one defendant does not disentitle another co-defendant to appeal; acceptance of one appeal does not create inconsistent decrees. The court regarded this Full Bench decision as controlling and binding. Applying it, the court held there would be no abatement of the appeal by reason of the death of some defendants; it struck the names of certain deceased appellants from the record where their legal representatives could not be impleaded due to limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct strands: (1) admissibility and effect of the revenue records, (2) procedural consequence of deaths of defendants, and (3) the fairness requirement of permitting rebuttal evidence.

On the admissibility of the jamabandis (revenue records), the Court noted that the jamabandis tendered (Exhibits A.1 to A.7) lacked certification under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act and that the Patwari who could have been examined was not produced. Nevertheless, because no objection had been taken in the court which first received the documents and because precedent (including a Privy Council authority and Division Bench decisions from Lahore) establishes that admissibility may not be challenged on appeal where no initial objection was made, the Court declined at that stage to reopen the admissibility question and concluded that Exhibits A.1 to A.7 had been properly received in evidence.

On the consequences of the death of some defendants during the appeal, the Court considered the respondents' reliance on various authorities asserting abatement but found them inapposite. Instead, the Court found the Full Bench decision in Nanak v. Ahmad Ali (AIR 1946 Lah 399 (FB)) determinative: that each trespasser has an independent right to appeal and the death or non-appeal of one defendant does not deprive co-defendants of their appellate rights. Applying that principle to the present facts, the Court held there would be no total abatement. The practical consequence where legal representatives cannot now be impleaded (because the period of limitation has expired) is that the names of those deceased appellants must be struck off the record (specifically Sawan — appellant No. 4; Sarakhu — appellant No. 7; Bhagwan Dass — appellant No. 19).

On the question whether the respondents should have been permitted to rebut the additional revenue evidence: the Court emphasized a fundamental rule of justice that whenever additional evidence is permitted, the opposite party must be given an opportunity to rebut it. The Court rejected the appellants' submission (based on Order 41, Rules 27 & 28 CPC) that rebuttal was unnecessary. The Court found that allowing additional evidence without any opportunity for rebuttal could produce grave injustice, especially when such evidence gives rise to rebuttable presumptions. Accordingly, the Court held that respondents must be permitted to lead evidence in rebuttal of the revenue record admitted as additional evidence.

As to the proper procedural course, the Court concluded it would be inappropriate to disturb findings on issues already fully tried by the lower courts. Since additional evidence had been allowed only on a specific issue, the Court directed the lower appellate Court to permit the respondents to lead rebuttal evidence limited to that revenue record issue, then record its finding on that issue and submit a report to this Court along with any evidence led in rebuttal. The Court specified the parties must appear before the lower appellate Court on 16 November 1970, and directed the lower appellate Court to submit its report within three months thereafter.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • No total abatement of the appeal by reason of the death of some defendants; the Court held the Full Bench decision in Nanak v. Ahmad Ali governs and such deaths do not prevent surviving co-defendants from pursuing their appeal.
  • Certain deceased appellants' names struck off from the record where their legal representatives cannot now be impleaded due to expiration of limitation (specifically: Sawan — appellant No. 4; Sarakhu — appellant No. 7; Bhagwan Dass — appellant No. 19).
  • Rebuttal must be permitted: The lower appellate Court is directed to permit the respondents to lead evidence in rebuttal of the additional revenue/jamabandi evidence produced by the appellants.
  • Procedural directions: Parties to appear before the lower appellate Court on 16 November 1970; after recording the rebuttal evidence, the lower appellate Court must submit its report to this Court within three months from that date; other fully tried findings should not be disturbed.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by allowing the appeal to proceed notwithstanding deaths of some appellants (subject to striking off of named deceased appellants) and by ensuring the respondents are given a fair opportunity to rebut additional evidence. The Court treated and applied existing precedents (notably Nanak v. Ahmad Ali) as binding; the opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond application of existing authority, and it contains no extended pronouncement altering established law.

Judgment concluded with directions to the lower appellate Court and an order consistent with the reasoning above: "Judgment accordingly."

    Harichand And Others v. Mst. Bachan Kaur And Others

    1. There seems to be no end to this litigation. The relevant facts giving rise to this are stated in the judgment of Shamsher Bahadur, J., which was reversed by the Letters Patent Bench. I am reproducing the judgment of Shamsher Bahadur, J. only with regard to the facts in order not to cover the ground all over again:—

    “The plaintiff Bachan Kaur brought a suit for an injunction restraining the thirty-four defendants from interfering with her ownership and possession of the disputed land measuring 5 bighas in Khasra Nos, 344 and 346 situated in Chamar Majri in Mauza Lehal which is contiguous to the town of Patiala. The plaintiff seeks to derive her right in the disputed land as an owner through her husband Mehar Singh who purchased it from the biswadars of the village and subsequently made a gift of it in favour of his wife. Khasra No. 572/344 measuring 1 bigha and 10 biswas was purchased by Mehar Singh on 15th of November, 1940 from one Chanan Singh out of shamilat deh. Another parcel of land of the same area under Khasra No. 571/344 was purchased again from the shamilat land on 19th of November 1940 from Tara Singh, another biswedar of the village, Two more purchases were made of 2 bighas from Chanan Singh on 23rd of December, 1940. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff on 6th of January, 1958 against the thirty-four defendants who are all chamars of the village and admittedly reside in Khasra No. 345 which is hedged between Khasra Nos. 344 and 346, for an injunction that they should be restrained from interfering with her possession. It appears that the chamars including the defendants residing in the locality had been resisting the efforts of the plaintiff and her husband to obtain possession of the land in suit. The dispute culminated in criminal proceedings which were initiated in the Court of the Executive Magistrate, Patiala, under Section 145 of the Cr PC by Jasbir Singh and Harbans Singh sons of Mehar Singh. The trial Magistrate came to the conclusion that the petitioners had not proved themselves to be in possession of the land in suit which was recorded as shamilatdeh. A revision petition was preferred before the District Magistrate, Patiala, who by his order of 17th of September, 11956 (Exhibit P.W 11.N) affirmed the decision of the trial Magistrate and directed the parties to get their claims settled in a Civil Court. According to the District Magistrate the land in suit recorded as shamilatdeh had not been established to be in exclusive and physical possession of either party. The defendants denied the ownership or possession of the plaintiffs in the suit land and various other objections were raised which it is not necessary for purposes of this appeal to set out. The trial Judge on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had proved her title to the suit land as also her possession except the portion marked ‘EFGH’ in khasra No. 346 covered by two kothas. A decree was accordingly made in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants' appeal having failed before the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala, they have now come to this Court in second appeal.

    2. When the appeal came up for hearing, I considered it necessary to receive additional evidence under O. 41, R. 27 of the CPC and the case was sent to the lower appellate Court for this purpose. The trial Court had rejected the evidence of the revenue records in which the defendants had been shown in possession over a stretch of many years and their prayer for additional evidence was not acceded to before the lower appellate Court, The earliest entry on record is Exhibit D.G of 3-12-1965 Bk. corresponding to the year 1912 A.D in which it is stated that the chamars had been rehabilitated in khasra No. 345 after they had been asked to vacate the land which was required for the Government hospital. The adjoining khasra Nos. 344 and 346 had been given to these chamars for purposes of their vocation. According to Exhibit D.G, which purports to be an order in appeal the chamars had been in possession of khasra Nos. 343, 344 and 346 for a period of twelve years. According to this order it was directed that a mutation should be made to this effect. In pursuance of this order a mutation was made in favour of the chamars on 26-4-1966 B.K (Exhibit D.F) Thereafter, the revenue entries right from the year 1966-1967 Bk. to 1990-1991 Bk. disclose that land in these khasra numbers was in possession of the chamars. These entries are Exhibits A.1 to A.7 which had not been accepted by the trial Court and which I directed the Lower Appellate Court to receive in evidence it appears, however, that adequate proof of these entries has not been adduced before the lower appellate Court. The jamabandis which purport to be copies of the originals have not been certified to be true under the provisions of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, according to which:—

    “Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorised by law to make use of a seal, and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.”

    3. These Jamabandis were tendered in evidence by the Advocate for the defendants who made a statement that he would not examine the Patwari whom he had summoned to make a comparison of the copies with the original. The counsel contented himself by saying that he had himself compared the copies with the originals and had found them to be correct. It appears that the Patwari was given up as the defendants did not want him to be corss-examined by the plaintiff. It seems that no objection had been taken to the production of the copies of the jamabandis by the counsel himself but it is contended by Mr. Atma Ram, the learned counsel for the respondent, that this by itself could not relieve the defendants from the necessity of adducing adequate proof. Mr. Kaushal has argued on the basis of the Privy Council authority in (1907) ILR 34 Cal 1059 (PC) that the admissibility in evidence of a document which has been admitted without objection in the first Court cannot be questioned in appeal. The record does not show that the plaintiff made any objection to the filing of the documents or the statement of the counsel that they were true copies of the original. It is no doubt true that the Patwari should have been examined but considering that no objection was taken to the admissibility of these documents, I decline to consider at this stage the question of their admissibility. Reference may also be made to a Division Bench authority of Sir Shadi Lal, C.J and Tapp, J. in Fauja Singh v. Allah Ditta, AIR 1931 Lah 722, where the law was stated thus:

    “It is well established that where a fact has been erroneously allowed to be proved in a maimer different from which the law requires, and no objection is taken in the Court of first instance, such objection cannot be taken? later in appeal. This view is based on the principle that if objection is taken at the proper time to the reception of certain evidence (not inadmissible in itself) owing to such evidence not being produced in the form prescribed by law, an opportunity can be afforded to the party producing such evidence to remedy the defect and satisfy the requirements of the law.”

    4. In Suraj Bhan v. Hafiz Abdul Khaliq, AIR 1944 Lah 1, a Division Bench authority of Din Mohammad and Sale, JJ., a copy of a copy was admitted in evidence as its admissibility was not questioned at an initial stage. It is argued by Mr. Kaushal that if an objection had been taken with regard to the admissibility of the jama-bandis the Patwari would have been immediately summoned to remedy the defect. In his submission, it is now too late for the respondents to take an objection to the admissibility of documents which had been received without objection before the lower appellate Court. In view of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council and the Division Benches of the Lahore High Court, I am of the view that the documents Exhibits A. 1 to A. 7 have been properly received in evidence and their admissibility cannot be questioned at this stage.”

    5. After considering the additional evidence which the learned Single Judge permitted, he reversed the decision of the Courts below and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Against this decision, the plaintiff preferred an appeal under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent. This appeal came up for hearing before my Lord the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Tuli. It was argued before the Letters Patent Bench that some of the defendants had died during the pendency of the letters patent appeal and their legal representatives had not been brought on the record, and therefore, there was a decree against a dead person. It was also argued before the Bench that the abatement would be total and not partial. However, the Bench left the question of abatement open and set aside the Judgment of the learned Single Judge and remitted the case for a fresh decision taking the view that a judgment against a dead party was a nullity. That is how the matter has been placed before me.

    6. The learned counsel for the respondents again argued that by reason of the death of some of the defendants appellants, there would be total abatement. He relied upon a large number of decisions, including Vinod Sagar v. Vishnubhai, AIR 1947 Lah 388, State Of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89, Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553, and Puran Singh Basawa Singh v. Hazara Singh Punjab Singh, AIR 1966 Punj 312. In my opinion, none of these cases has any relevancy so far as the present controversy is concerned. The matter really stands concluded by a Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Nanak v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1946 Lah 399 (FB), The judgment of the Full Bench was delivered by Achhru Ram, J. and it was held that:—

    “Where a person claiming to be the true owner of certain property obtains a decree for possession of that property against trespassers, each trespasser has an independent right to appeal against the decree and the mere circumstance that one of the defendants, does not appeal from the decree or even confesses judgment, would not disentitle the other to appeal. In effect and in substance in a case of this type there are as many decrees for ejectment or dispossession as there are trespassers one trespasser agreeing to a decree being passed against him or not appealing from a decree after it has been passed, has the effect only of dislodging him from the property. If his other co-defendant files the appeal and succeeds, it cannot be said that in consequence of the acceptance of his appeal two inconsistent decrees will come into existence. The decree that becomes final against the non-appealing defendant is only a decree for his ejectment. The effect of the acceptance of the appeal of the co-defendant will be that he cannot be ejected.”

    7. This principle fully applies to the facts of the present case. No decision in similar circumstances taking the view that abatement will be total, has been brought to my notice, and, in any event, I am bound by this decision. I would, therefore, hold that in the circumstances of this case, there would be no abatement at all. The consequence of the death of some of the appellants would be that their names would be struck off from the record as their legal representatives cannot be impleaded now as the period of limitation has expired. The names of those appellants are Sawan, appellant No. 4, Sarakhu appellant No. 7 and Bhagwan Dass appellant No. 19.

    8. On the merits, Mr. Atma Ram, learned counsel for the respondents raised the contention that his clients were not allowed any opportunity to rebut the additional evidence which was let in by Shamsher Bahadur, J. This is so. The learned counsel for the appellants have referred to O. 41, Rr. 27 and 28 of the CPC, for the proposition that it is not necessary to permit rebuttal of the additional evidence. I am unable to agree with this contention. It is a fundamental rule of justice that whenever additional evidence is let in, the opposite party has to be permitted to rebut it; otherwise it will lead to grave injustice, particularly when the evidence is of such a nature that it raises a rebuttable presumption, and that rebuttable presumption can only be displaced if an opportunity is allowed in that behalf. As no opportunity has been allowed merely on the ground that the additional evidence is in the shape of revenue record, it is fair that such an opportunity should be allowed and I hold accordingly.

    9. The only question is what course the proceedings should take in order to give that opportunity? In my opinion, it would not be proper to disturb the findings of the Courts below on the other issues that have been fully tried. Additional evidence has been allowed only on one issue and it will be proper that after the rebuttal is given the lower appellate Court should record a finding on that issue and then submit its report along with any evidence led in rebuttal to this Court. So far as the appellants are concerned, they have produced whatever evidence they wanted to produce in pursuance of the order of the learned Single Judge. The opportunity would only be accorded to the respondents in this behalf to rebut that evidence.

    10. I accordingly direct the lower appellate Court to permit the respondents to lead any evidence in rebuttal of the revenue record produced as additional evidence by the appellants.

    11. The parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on 16th of November, 1970. The lower appellate Court will, after recording the evidence in rebuttal, submit its report to this Court within three months from the date the parties appear before it.

    12. Judgment accordingly.

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    Harichand And Others v. Mst. Bachan Kaur And Others
    (Oct 26, 1970)