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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act 25 of 1955),
  • SECTION 3 PROVIDENT FUNDS ACT 1925
  • sub-section (1) of S. 25 of Act 25 of 1955
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • sub-section (1) of S. 25
  • sub-section (3) of S. 25,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act 25 of 1955),
  • SECTION 3 PROVIDENT FUNDS ACT 1925
  • sub-section (1) of S. 25 of Act 25 of 1955
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • sub-section (1) of S. 25
  • sub-section (3) of S. 25,
Smart Summary

Full Bench Summary: Application for Maintenance under Section 25(1), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench considered the question whether a party to a decree of divorce may apply for maintenance under sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 after the decree has been granted.

On August 23, 1968 a Single Judge affirmed a decree of divorce obtained by Durga Dass (appellant) against Tara Rani alias Tara Devi (respondent), originally granted by the Senior Subordinate Judge of Ludhiana. In the same order the Single Judge accepted the respondent's application under Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and awarded permanent alimony of Rs. 50 per mensem to be payable until remarriage and maintenance of chastity, making this alimony a charge on the appellant's movable and immovable property.

The appellant appealed against the order made under Section 25(1) of the Act to the Division Bench under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench, having regard to conflicting views in earlier decisions and the importance of the question, referred the issue to a Full Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. “Whether a party to a decree of divorce can apply for maintenance under sub-section (1) of S. 25 of Act 25 of 1955 after such a decree has been granted?”

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Once a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage is granted, the status of husband and wife ceases to exist; accordingly, an application for alimony under Section 25(1) is not competent after the decree.
  • Section 25(1) only applies while the parties retain the status of husband and wife; after a decree the status ends and the section therefore does not apply.
  • Support for this position was sought from the observations of Raju, J., in Mehta Gunvantray Maganlal v. Bai Prabha Keshavii (AIR 1963 Guj 242).

Respondent's Arguments

  • Section 25(1) applies to all proceedings under the Act, including proceedings for divorce and nullity of marriage; therefore an application for alimony may be made either before or after the decree.
  • No provision in Section 25 limits its operation to proceedings other than divorce or nullity; treating divorce proceedings differently would create an unjust distinction (for example, between judicial separation and divorce).
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 25 treats the parties as husband and wife for the purpose of rescinding an alimony order even after a decree; this demonstrates that the statute contemplates alimony orders continuing post-decree and being subject to rescission on grounds such as remarriage or lack of chastity.
  • The respondent relied on more recent decisions that supported this view, including Patel Dharamshi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kanji (AIR 1968 Guj 150) and Arya Kumar Bal v. Ila Bal (AIR 1968 Cal 276).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mehta Gunvantray Maganlal v. Bai Prabha Keshavii, AIR 1963 Guj 242 Supported the view that after a decree of divorce/nullity the status of husband and wife ceases and Section 25(1) would not be competent post-decree (observations of Raju, J.). The Court identified this decision as supportive of the appellant's argument but noted that later decisions and subsequent reasoning led to departure from that approach.
Jagdish Chander Gulati v. Parkash Vati, 1965 Cur LJ 696 (Puni) Contained observations not supporting the view in the Gujarat case, but the Division Bench decision arose from judicial separation proceedings (Section 10) rather than divorce, so it did not strictly apply to the present divorce context. The Court acknowledged this decision as not supporting Mehta Gunvantray Maganlal, but observed its limited applicability because it dealt with judicial separation rather than divorce/nullity.
Patel Dharamshi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kanji, AIR 1968 Guj 150 A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court rejected the observations of Raju, J., in the earlier Gujarat case and adopted a contrary view that supported alimony applications post-decree. The Court relied on this decision as supporting the respondent's position that Section 25 permits post-decree applications for permanent alimony.
Arya Kumar Bal v. Ila Bal, AIR 1968 Cal 276 Held that permanent alimony is incidental to the main proceedings under the Act and that parties continue to be described for alimony purposes as they were in the original proceedings. The Court cited this decision as further support for the proposition that Section 25(1) authorizes orders of permanent alimony even after a decree, reinforcing the respondent's submissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded by close textual analysis of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, considering both sub-section (1) (which authorises making an order for maintenance and support at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto) and sub-section (3) (which provides for rescission of an order if the beneficiary re-marries or, in the case of the wife, has not remained chaste, etc.).

The court observed that:

  • Section 25 uses the description of the parties as husband and wife in the context of proceedings under the Act and expressly contemplates that a court may make an order at or subsequent to the time of passing any decree.
  • Sub-section (3) treats the parties as husband and wife for the purpose of deciding whether an alimony order should be rescinded after a decree has been obtained — demonstrating that the statute contemplates the continuation of the relevant descriptions and remedial scheme even after a decree of divorce or nullity.
  • Because permanent alimony is incidental to the main proceedings under the Act, the grant of such relief is properly considered part of the remedies available in proceedings under the Act and is not confined to a pre-decree stage.
  • Accordingly, there is no textual basis to limit subsection (1) so as to render it inapplicable to proceedings in which a decree for divorce or nullity has already been granted; to do so would create an unjustifiable distinction between types of proceedings (for example, judicial separation versus divorce).
  • The Full Bench found persuasive the later decisions which rejected the earlier Gujarat view (Mehta Gunvantray Maganlal) and expressly supported post-decree applications for permanent alimony (Patel Dharamshi Premji and Arya Kumar Bal).

On these grounds the Full Bench answered the referred question in the affirmative and upheld the Single Judge's decision to permit the respondent's application under Section 25(1) even though it was made after the decree of divorce.

Separately, the Bench considered a narrow contention by the appellant that the Single Judge's order made the alimony a charge on "movable and immovable property" and that this should not include the appellant's Provident Fund amount under Section 3 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925. The court accepted this limited argument (the respondent did not contest it) and modified the order so that the charge would not include the Provident Fund amount.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED

Holding (direct effect on the parties):

  • The Full Bench held that an application for maintenance under sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 may be made after a decree of divorce has been granted; the Single Judge's grant of permanent alimony to the respondent, though applied for after the decree, was lawful and is upheld.
  • However, the order as to the alimony being a charge on the appellant's movable and immovable property was modified to exclude the appellant's Provident Fund amount (in view of Section 3 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925). This modification was accepted by the court and the remainder of the Single Judge's order was sustained.
  • The appeal is otherwise dismissed; the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

The opinion explains and applies Section 25(1) and (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act and relies on more recent decisions supportive of post-decree applications for permanent alimony. The decision's practical consequences are the upholding of the respondent's entitlement to alimony despite the application being made after a divorce decree, with the limited modification excluding the Provident Fund from the charge. The opinion itself does not elaborate further on broader legal consequences beyond these direct effects on the parties.

Disposition: Appeal partly allowed (modification limiting the charge to exclude Provident Fund); otherwise appeal dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.

    Durga Dass, v. Tara Rani, .

    Mehar Singh, C.J:— The question that is for consideration of this Full Bench is—

    “Whether a party to a decree of divorce can apply for maintenance under sub-section (1) of S. 25 of Act 25 of 1955 after such a decree has been granted?”

    2. On August 23, 1968, a learned Single Judge affirmed the decree of divorce against Tara Rani alias Tara Devi respondent, obtained by her husband, Durga Dass appellant, from the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Ludhiana. At the same time and in the same order the learned Judge proceeded to accept an application by the respondent under Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act 25 of 1955), and allowed a sum of Rs. 50/- per mensem as alimony to her till remarriage and maintenance of chastity, making the amount of alimony a charge on the movable and immovable property of the appellant. It is against the order made under Section 25(1) of the Act by the learned Judge that this appeal has been made by the appellant under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent.

    3. On the side of the appellant, before the Division Bench it was urged that in the case of a decree of nullity of marriage or decree of divorce, after such a decree has been made, having regard to Section 25 of the Act, an application for alimony is not competent, because by reason of such a decree the status of the parties as husband and wife comes to an end and the provisions of the section are only attracted so long as the parties continue in that status. Support for this view was sought from Mehta Gunvantray Maganlal v. Bai Prabha Keshavii, AIR 1963 Gui 242 On the other side, however, reference was made to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Chander Gulati v. Parkash Vati, 1965 Cur LJ 696 (Puni). Which did not support the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Guiarat case, but as the case before the Division Bench was one arising out of proceedings for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act, it did not strictly apply to the present case However, in view of the importance of the question, the argument on the side of the wife, the respondent, that Sec. 25 of the Act refers to all proceedings, including proceedings in a decree of divorce, and so an application for alimony under it may be made by a party to the proceedings under the Act either before or after the decree, and in the absence of any authoritative pronouncement on the point, the question, as above, was referred to a Full Bench, and this is how this appeal has come before us.

    4. In the Act, Section 25, which alone has been the subject of consideration during the arguments reads—

    “25. (1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall, while the applicant remains unmarried, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant and the conduct of the parties, it may seem to the court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent.

    (2) If the court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under sub-section (1), it may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just.

    (3) If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has re-married or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, if such party is the husband, that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it shall rescind the order”.

    5. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that as soon as a decree was granted to the appellant for divorce against the respondent, the status of the parties as husband and wife ceased to exist. They no longer continued to have the status of the appellant being the husband and the respondent being the wife. It is urged that sub-section (1) of S. 25 only envisages an order of alimony so long as the status of husband and wife continues to exist as between the parties. On the grant of a decree of divorce in this case, such relationship and status ceased to exist between the parties. So sub-section (1) of S. 25 not having any application to this case the order of the learned Judge ought not to for maintained. Support for this is sought from the observations of Raju, J., in the Gujarat case cited before. The reply on the side of the respondent is that sub-section (1) of S. 25 applies to all proceedings under the Act covering also proceedings for divorce and nullity of marriage. No proceedings under the Act being excepted from the purview of sub-section (1) of S. 25, it is urged that an argument is not available to the appellant so as to limit the meaning and scope of sub-section (1) of S. 25 only to proceedings under the Act other than those for divorce or nullity of marriage. It is said that there is no justification for confining the application of this provision to proceedings other than those for divorce or nullity of marriage. It would mean that while in the case of such proceedings application for alimony under sub-section (1) of S. 25 must be made before the decree is made, though in other proceedings under the Act, such as those for judicial separation, such an application will be competent even after the decree has been made. sub-section (1) of S. 25 justifies no such distinction and it applies to the status of the parties as in the original proceedings and a right of alimony is given to a party against whom a decree is made, as in the original proceedings, the subsequent making of the decree resulting in no change in this respect. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that this argument finds conclusive support from sub-section (3) of S. 25, because after a decree in proceedings under the Act if the Court is satisfied that a party in whose favour an order of alimony has been made, has remarried or, if such a party is the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, if such a party is the husband, that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside the wedlock, it shall rescind the order granting alimony. It is obvious that the statute continues to describe the parties as husband and wife, even after a decree has been obtained in proceedings under the Act when the Court is called upon to decide whether an order of alimony made under sub-section (1) of S. 25 should or should not be continued because of particular conduct of one or the other of the parties, that is to say, husband or the wife. Thus sub-sec. (3) continues to give the description of husband and wife to the parties even after a decree has been made in proceedings under the Act and when alimony has been granted to one of them against the other. In support of this approach the learned counsel for the respondent has first relied on Patel Dharamshi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kanji, AIR 1968 Guj 150, in which a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court has not approved the observations of Raju, J., in the earlier case of Mehta Gunvantry Maganlal, AIR 1963 Guj 242 and has proceeded to a contrary view on considerations substantially as advanced in these arguments. He has sought support next from Arya Kumar Bal v. Ila Bal, AIR 1968 Cal 276, in which same view has been taken and the learned Judges have pointed out that the relief for the grant of permanent alimony is really a relief which is incidental to the passing of a decree in the main proceedings under the Act, so that the parties continue to be described in the same manner in and with the same status in this respect as before.

    6. When the language of sub-section (3) of S. 25 is taken along with the provisions of sub-section (1) of the same section, there can be no manner of argument that in Section 25 the statute has used the description of the parties as husband or wife to proceedings under the Act not only confined to a stage before or by the time of passing of a decree under the Act, but for the purposes of the grant of permanent alimony even after that. When there is an order granting permanent alimony to one of the spouses under sub-section (1), for his or her conduct referred to in sub-section (3) as husband or wife, as the case may be, the order can be rescinded. So that the description of the parties for the matter of Section 25 continues to be exactly the same as it was in the proceedings originally initiated under the provisions of the Act for any decree under those provisions. The fact that proceedings for the grant of permanent alimony are incidental to the main proceedings, merely lends support to this approach, which is even otherwise made clear, beyond the pail of controversy or argument, by sub-section (3) of S. 25 of the Act. In this approach, no exception can be taken to the order of the learned Single Judge granting alimony to the respondent merely because an application in this respect was made on her behalf after the decree for divorce had been made against her. So the answer to the question is in the affirmative. The costs in this reference will abide the event.

    7. R.S Narula, J.:— I agree with the answer proposed by my Lord, the Chief Justice and also with the reasons given in support thereof.

    8. Prem Chand Jain, J.:— I agree.

    9. Final order of the Division Bench consisting of Mehar Singh, C.J and Prem Chand Jain, J.

    10. Mehar Singh, C.J:— (After referring to the facts and the answer of the Full Bench in Para 8, his Lordship observed): There is only one other argument which is urged in this appeal by the learned counsel for the appellant and that is that while under Section 25 of the Act, the learned Judge has made the amount of the permanent alimony allowed by him a charge on the movable and immovable property of the appellant, such a charge is not admissible in so far as the Provident Fund amount of the appellant is concerned in view of Section 3 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925 (Act 19 of 1925), and this matter is not brought in controversy by the learned counsel for the respondent, who presses that so far as the other amounts available to the appellant are concerned those are not subject to this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, but then the learned counsel for the appellant has only confined his argument to the amount of the Provident Fund of the appellant.

    11. In the circumstances this part of the argument on the side of the appellant is accepted and the order of the learned Single Judge making a charge for the permanent alimony allowed to the respondent on the movable and immovable property of the appellant will not include in that property the amount of the Provident fund of his. Only this modification is made in the order of the learned Single Judge, otherwise the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

    12. Prem Chand Jain, J.:— I agree.

    13. Appeal partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Durga Dass, v. Tara Rani, .
    (May 14, 1969)