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Attorney(S)
  • Anand Swroop and R.S. Mittal
  • Nagindar Singh and S.K. Pipat
Judges
  • Mehar Singh
  • P.C Pandit, JJ.
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  • Anand Swroop and R.S. Mittal
  • Nagindar Singh and S.K. Pipat
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  • Mehar Singh
  • P.C Pandit, JJ.
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Smart Summary

High Court — Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 206 & 231 of 1961 (P.C. Pandit, J. — with Mehar Singh, J. agreeing)

Factual and Procedural Background

Des Raj was the owner of 65 bighas and 10 biswas of land and a house in village Dharana, tehsil Jhajjar, district Rohtak. On his death, the land was mutated in favour of his widow, Smt. Rajo.

In November 1954, Ude Chand and others (the collaterals of Des Raj) brought a suit for possession alleging that Smt. Rajo had contracted a karewa marriage with their brother, Kesho Ram, and had thus forfeited her rights. That suit was defended by Smt. Rajo and Kesho Ram, and during its pendency the parties effected a compromise on 17 June 1955.

The compromise provided that Smt. Rajo would continue in possession of 40 bighas of land during her lifetime (remainder to go after her death to the collaterals and Kesho Ram in equal shares); 25 bighas 10 biswas would immediately pass to the collaterals and Kesho Ram in equal shares; the house would belong to Kesho Ram; Smt. Rajo would have a life interest in another residential house (not the subject of the suit); and Smt. Rajo would not have the right to alienate the land and house. The Subordinate Judge recorded an order on 17 June 1955 dismissing the plaintiffs' suit "according to the conditions of the compromise."

A mutation was sanctioned on 31 January 1956 in accordance with the compromise. Smt. Rajo then filed a subsequent suit (forming the subject-matter of the present appeals) seeking a declaration that she was full owner of the 40 bighas she possessed (not merely a life estate) and claiming possession of the 25 bighas 10 biswas on the ground that the earlier compromise had been obtained by fraud and was not binding. She relied on section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (which came into force on 17 June 1956) to assert that she had become absolute owner.

The trial Court rejected the fraud plea, held the earlier compromise binding, and found Smt. Rajo to be full owner of 40 bighas by virtue of section 14. It dismissed her claim to the 25 bighas 10 biswas (which had passed before the Act came into force).

Both parties appealed to the District Judge. The District Judge held that the compromise required registration and being unregistered was inadmissible in evidence and could not pass title; nevertheless he rejected the fraud plea and, applying section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, held that Smt. Rajo was the full owner of 40 bighas and was entitled to recover 25 bighas 10 biswas from the collaterals. The collaterals' appeal to the High Court (by Ude Chand and others) was dismissed by Shamsher Bahadur, J. on 4 April 1961, who concluded the compromise was ineffective for want of registration and that Smt. Rajo had become absolute owner of 40 bighas under section 14(1).

The present two Letters Patent Appeals (Nos. 206 and 231 of 1961) followed from those proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compromise recorded in the earlier suit was binding on Smt. Rajo, in particular whether it was vitiated by fraud.
  2. Whether the compromise required registration and, if unregistered, whether it was inadmissible in evidence and incapable of passing title.
  3. What effect the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (specifically section 14 and its sub-sections) had on the parties' rights — in particular, whether Smt. Rajo became absolute owner of the 40 bighas in her possession when the Act came into force and whether she had any right to the 25 bighas 10 biswas which were not in her possession on that date.

Arguments of the Parties

Smt. Rajo's Arguments

  • The compromise in the earlier suit had been obtained by fraud and was therefore not binding on her.
  • By virtue of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (coming into force on 17 June 1956), she became the absolute owner of the 40 bighas that were in her possession.
  • She sought a declaration of full ownership of the 40 bighas and recovery of the 25 bighas 10 biswas which had been given to the collaterals under the compromise.

Ude Chand and Others (the Collaterals) — Arguments

  • They admitted that a compromise was entered into in the earlier suit and that the terms were as recorded, but denied any fraud; their position was that Smt. Rajo voluntarily consented and thumb-marked the compromise document.
  • They maintained that the compromise was binding and, by reason of the order dismissing the earlier suit on its terms and the subsequent mutation, they had rights under the arrangement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Benarsi Dass v. Bui Chand Where the terms of an instrument (e.g., lease) set out in the plaint are admitted by the defendant, production of the document is unnecessary; the defendant's admission suffices even if admissibility might be debatable. Used to support the conclusion that because the parties' pleadings admitted the terms of the compromise, the court need not decide the admissibility/registration point to bind the parties by those terms.
Gurdas Mal v. Baij Nath, A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 662 Where contents of a document requiring registration are admitted, the question of admissibility does not arise. Relied upon to support the proposition that admitted terms remove the necessity of producing the document for enforcement of the admitted terms.
Niaz Gul v. Ram Ditta, 52 P.R. 1883 Support for the proposition that an admitted document need not be produced and that admission may render admissibility issues irrelevant. Referred to as another authority to the same effect on admitted documents and registration issues.
Chedambaram Chetty v. Karunalyayalangapuly Taver, 3 Mad H.C.R. 342 Where execution of an agreement is admitted by defendants and it purports to create interest in immovable property, production is unnecessary and plaintiff may obtain relief on plaint and answers taken together despite alleged lack of registration. Quoted and applied to justify deciding rights on the basis of admissions in pleadings rather than resolving the registration admissibility issue.
S.A. Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal, 19 P.R. 228 Although a document evidencing partition may be inadmissible for want of registration, a decree may be given on the admission of the parties. Received as supporting authority for granting relief where parties have admitted the document's contents despite registration defects.
Inter alia Raghunath Sahu v. Bhimsen Naik, A.I.R. 1965 Orissa 59 Interpretation that the word "acquired" in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act must be given a restricted meaning — covering cases where a Hindu female had no prior interest and acquires property for the first time by modes specified in that sub-section. Applied to distinguish those cases from the present case; used to support that Smt. Rajo's 40 bighas (already held as a widow's estate) fell under section 14(1) rather than the restricted s.14(2) concept of "acquired."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (1) whether the compromise bound the parties and whether fraud invalidated it; and (2) the legal effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on the parties' rights.

On the question of fraud and binding effect of the compromise: both the trial Court and the District Judge had recorded concurrent findings of fact that Smt. Rajo's plea of fraud was not substantiated. The pleadings in the subsequent suit admitted the terms of the compromise; the only factual dispute was whether the compromise had been procured by fraud. Because the courts below disbelieved the fraud allegation, the parties were held to be bound by the compromise terms.

The Court noted that the question whether the compromise required registration and was inadmissible in evidence had not been pleaded by the parties and no issue was framed on that point; it appears to have been raised during argument before the District Judge. P.C. Pandit, J. held it unnecessary to decide the registration/admissibility point in view of the admissions in the pleadings and the concurrent finding that fraud was not proved. To support this position the Court relied on multiple precedents (Benarsi Dass v. Bui Chand; Gurdas Mal v. Baij Nath; Niaz Gul v. Ram Ditta; Chedambaram Chetty; S.A. Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal) establishing that where the contents of a document requiring registration are admitted by the opposing party, production and formal admissibility are not essential to give effect to the admitted terms.

On the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Court divided the property by reference to possession at the date the Act came into force (17 June 1956):

  • For the 25 bighas and 10 biswas: Smt. Rajo admittedly was not in possession of this land when the Act came into force. The Court held that she had no right to that portion and that the collaterals became the owners of that land.
  • For the 40 bighas: this land was in Smt. Rajo’s possession when the Act came into force. The Court held that her widow’s estate in the land was converted into full ownership by the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act under section 14(1). The Court emphasised that she had not "acquired" title by reason of the compromise-deed and that the restricted meaning of "acquired" in sub-section (2) (as explained in Raghunath Sahu v. Bhimsen Naik) did not apply to this case.

On costs, the Court made no order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • Smt. Rajo is declared the full owner of the 40 bighas of land which were in her possession when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force; the collaterals' appeal in respect of the 40 bighas (Letters Patent Appeal No. 231) is dismissed in that respect.
  • Smt. Rajo has no right to the 25 bighas 10 biswas which were not in her possession when the Act came into force; the collaterals' claim to that portion is upheld and the corresponding Letters Patent Appeal (No. 206) is accepted in that respect.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Implications: The direct effect is that property is allocated according to possession at the date the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force: Smt. Rajo obtains ownership of the 40 bighas she possessed on that date by operation of section 14(1); the collaterals retain ownership of the 25 bighas 10 biswas which were not in her possession. The Court resolved the dispute without deciding the registration/admissibility issue, treating the parties' admissions and the findings on fraud as sufficient for disposing of the rights. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying established authorities on admitted documents and the interpretation of section 14; its application of those principles determined only the parties' rights in these appeals.

Order: As recorded by P.C. Pandit, J., with Mehar Singh, J. agreeing — "Order accordingly."

Show full summary ...

    Ude Chand And Others v. Mst. Rajo .

    P.C Pandit, J.:— This order will dispose of two connected Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 206 and 231 of 1961.

    2. One Des Raj was the owner of 65 Bighas and 10 Biswas of land and a house in village Dharana, tehsil Jhajjar, district Rohtak. On his death, the land was mutated in favour of his widow, Smt. Rajo. In November, 1954, Ude Chand and others, who were the collaterals of Des Raj, brought a suit for possession of this property on the ground that Smt. Rajo had contracted a karewa marriage with their brother Kesha Ram and had thus forfeited her rights in the property. The suit was resisted both by Smt. Rajo and Kesho Ram and they denied the alleged karewa. During the pendency of this suit, a compromise was effected between the parties on 17th June, 1955, whereby Smt. Rajo was allowed to continue in possession of 40 bighas of land till her lifetime and after her death it had to go to the collaterals and Kesho Ram in equal shares. The remaining land viz., 25 bighas 10 biswas, was to immediately pass on to the collaterals and Kesho Ram in equal shares. As regards the house, it was agreed that it belonged to Kesho Ram, Smt. Rajo was left with another residential house, which was, however, not the subject-matter of the suit, but it was settled that she would have only a life interest therein and after her ??? it would also go to the collaterals and Kesho Ram in equal shares. It was also provided in the compromise that Smt. Rajo would not have the right to alienate the land and the house in any manner. The Subordinate Judge, who was trying that suit, did not record the compromise in the form of a decree, but he passed an order on 17th June, 1955 as follows:—

    “According to the conditions of the compromise, which the parties will observe, the suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. The parties would bear their own costs”.

    3. This decree was followed by a mutation, which was sanctioned on 31st January, 1956 in terms of this compromise. Thereafter, Smt. Rajo continued to remain in possession of the property, which had fallen to her share. In February, 1953 Smt. Rajo filed a suit, out of which the present appeals have arisen, for a declaration that she was the full owner of 40 bighas of land in her possession and not only the holder of a life estate therein. She also claimed possession of 25 bighas and 10 biswas of land, which had been given to the collaterals, Ude Chand and others, and her allegations were that the compromise had been obtained from her by fraud and was, consequently, not binding on her. She had become an absolute owner of the property in dispute by virtue of the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, which had come into force on 17th June, 1956. The suit was resisted by Ude Chand and others, who pleaded, inter alia, that the compromise was duly executed between the parties in the previous case and was binding on Smt. Rajo.

    4. The trial Court did not accept the plea of fraud and held that the compromise in the previous litigation between the parties was binding upon Smt. Rajo. It was held that she had become a full owner of 40 bighas of land in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Regarding the rest of the property, which had passed on to the collaterals before the Hindu Succession Act came into force, the suit was dismissed.

    5. Against this decision, both the parties filed appeals, which were disposed of by the learned District Judge, Rohtak. He held that the compromise required compulsory registration and the same being unregistered was inadmissible in evidence and could not pass any title to the defendants. The plea of fraud set up by Smt. Rajo was rejected. It was also held that Smt. Rajo had become the full owner of 40 bighas of land by virtue of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. It was further found that she was entitled to get back from Ude Chand and others 25 bighas and 10 biswas of land purported to have been transferred by her in their favour under the compromise. On these findings, the appeal of Smt. Rajo was accepted, while that of Ude Chand and others dismissed. The result was that Smt. Rajo was declared to be the full owner of the whole of the land and was awarded a decree for possession of 25 bighas and 10 biswas in the hands of Ude Chand and others. Her claim to the house was, however, negatived.

    6. Against this decision, two appeals were filed in this Court by Ude Chand and others, which were both disposed of by one judgment by Shamsher Bahadur, J. on 4th April, 1961. The learned Judge found that the compromise was ineffective for want of registration and that Smt. Rajo had become absolute owner of 40 bighas of land under section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. With regard to the land in possession of the collaterals, the learned Judge remarked that the appeal in respect of this land also must fail, because of the finding that the compromise could not be enforced for want of registration and, consequently, no valid title had passed to the collaterals who held this land in pursuance of the compromise. In the result, the learned Judge dismissed both the appeals. That led to the filing of the present two appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

    7. The case of Smt. Rajo in the plaint was that Ude Chand and others had filed a suit for possession of 65 bighas and 10 biswas and one house against her on 19th November, 1954 in which they alleged that since she had entered into karewa with their brother, Kesho Ram, she had lost all rights in the property in dispute. While defending this suit, she denied all the allegations made against her and that suit was dismissed on 17th June, 1955. During the pendency of that suit, the collaterals through fraud got a compromise deed executed and thumb-marked by her and in this deed it was written that out of the land she would get 40 bighas till her lifetime and the remaining land, that is, 25 bighas and 10 biswas, would go to the collaterals in equal shares. Regarding the house it would remain in possession of Kesho Ram. Ude Chand and others in their written statement admitted that the said compromise referred to by Smt. Rajo was, in fact, entered into, but they denied that any fraud was played upon her. Their case was that she had voluntarily given her consent to this compromise and on the basis of the same their suit was dismissed. From the pleadings of the parties, it would be apparent that both the sides were agreed as to the terms of the compromise that was effected in the previous suit. The only difference between them was that, according to Smt. Rajo, this compromise was the result of a fraud practised on her by the collaterals; while, according to them, she had herself agreed to all the terms thereof and thumb-marked this document of her own sweet will. The issue, therefore, to be tried was whether any fraud had been committed by the collaterals in this respect. Both the trial Court and the learned District Judge have given a concurrent finding of fact that the plea of fraud set up by Snt. Rajo had not been substantiated by her. That being the state of affairs, both the parties were bound by the terms of the compromise. The question as to whether this compromise required registration or not and, consequently, inadmissible in evidence was not set up by the parties in the pleadings. It is, therefore, that no issue was framed on this point. It appears that this matter was raised during the course of arguments before the learned District Judge. But as I look at the matter, it is not necessary to go into this question, in view of the pleadings of the parties in the instant case. It was ruled by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Shadi Lal Chief Justice and Martineau, J. in Benarsi Dass v. Bui Chand,1 that where the terms of the lease as set out in the plaint were admitted by the defendant, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to produce in evidence the document and although it might not be admissible so far as the plaintiff was concerned, the defendant's admission was enough and the Court need not look at the document, the admissibility of which might be a debatable question. Also see in this connection the decision of Jai Lal, J. in Gurdas Mal v. Baij Nath . A.I.R 1928 Lah. 662. in which it was held that where the contents of a document requiring registration, but not registered, had been admitted, the question of its admissibility or otherwise did not arise. Reference in this respect may also be made to a Bench decision of the Punjab Chief Court in Niaz Gul v. Ram Ditta . 52 P.R 1883.. To similar effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in Chedambaram Chetty v. Karunalyayalangapuly Taver . 3 Mad High Court Reports 342., where it was held—

    “In a suit upon a razinama, the execution of which was admitted by the defendants, which purported to create an interest in immovable property, the civil Judge dismissed the suit because the document had not been registered in accordance with Act 16 of 1864, Section 13.

    Held (reversing the decree of the Civil Judge) that the existence of the agreement not having been disputed, its production was not necessary and that the plaintiff was entitled to whatever relief the effect of the plaint and answer, taken together, would entitle him on the admission of the defendant.”

    8. S.A Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal . 19 P.R 228. a Madras Division Bench held that though a document evidencing a partition was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, a decree might be given on the admission of the parties. As I have mentioned above, on the state of the pleadings in the present case, and the plea of fraud set up by Smt. Rajo not having been proved by her, she and the collaterals were both bound by the terms of the compromise on which there was no dispute between them.

    9. Now the question is what will be the effect of the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, on the rights of the parties. So far as 25 bighas and 10 biswas of land is concerned, Smt. Rajo, admittedly, was not in its possession when this Act came into force. That being so, she has no right to this land and the collaterals become the owners thereof.

    10. As regards 40 bighas of land, which was in possession of Smt. Rajo at the time of the enforcement of the Act, the case was not covered by sub-section (2) of section 14, but by section 14(1) of the Act. She had not acquired title to this land on the basis of the compromise-deed. She was the widow of Des Raj, after whose death she acquired the widow's estate in this land along with his other property, but this estate was converted into full ownership by the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. There is ample authority for the proposition that the word “acquired” in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act has to be given a restricted meaning and would cover those cases only where the Hindu female had no interest previously in the property and it was for the first time by virtue of the gift, will or the other modes mentioned in this sub-section that the property was acquired by her (see Inter alia Raghunath Sahu v. Bhimsen Naik . A.I.R 1965 Orissa 59.). In view of what has been said above, the appeal of the collaterals (Letters Patent Appeal No. 231 of 1951) qua 40 bighas of land is dismissed, while regarding 25 bighas and 10 biswas (Letters Patent Appeal No. 206 of 1961) is accepted. In the circumstances of these cases, however, I will make no order as to costs.

    11. Mehar Singh, J.:— I agree.

    12. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Ude Chand And Others v. Mst. Rajo .
    (Nov 29, 1965)