AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the order of Shri Onkar Nath, Sub Judge 1st Class, Kaithal, dated 25-1-1956, which held that the trial court had no jurisdiction and returned the plaint for presentation to a proper court.

The suit arises from a pre-Partition partnership trading as Messrs. Beliram-Satnarain. The partners and their shares, as alleged in the plaint, were: Sat Narain (plaintiff) one-half; Hari Ram (defendant) one-fourth; and Kundan son of Hussaini one-fourth. Kundan, a Muslim, was murdered in India on 12-10-1947; his post-mortem was made at Kaithal on 14-10-1947. The partnership dissolved on account of Kundan's death.

After accounts, a sum of Rs. 500/11/- was found due to the deceased and deposited by the plaintiff in the treasury on 12-7-1949. The firm was subsequently assessed to income-tax at Rs. 4,712/3/-, and one-fourth of that (stated as Rs. 1,178/-/9) was due to the firm from Kundan.

On 11-6-1951 the Custodian recovered from the plaintiff Rs. 3,795/- as the calculated profits alleged to be Kundan's share in the partnership. The plaintiff alleges he was not given an opportunity to prove that the sum was not due as profits to Kundan; that the Custodian acted as judge in his own cause and, by attaching the plaintiff's property, illegally realised the alleged amount. The plaintiff sued the Custodian for recovery of a total of Rs. 5,750/-, which included Rs. 3,795/- claimed as illegally recovered.

The Custodian filed a written statement asserting that the civil court lacked jurisdiction. The trial court accepted that plea and returned the plaint, relying on Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act to bar civil jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed this order; the present opinion decides whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's suit in view of Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act.
  2. If Section 46 applies, whether clauses (c) and (d) of that section bar the civil court: specifically, (c) the bar on questioning the legality of actions taken by the Custodian or Custodian-General "under the Act", and (d) the bar on suits respecting matters which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under the Act to determine.
  3. Whether the Custodian had authority under the Act (as it stood in 1951) to investigate partnership accounts and determine or assess the share of profits due to an evacuee partner.
  4. Whether amendments made to Section 48 in 1956 (by Ordinance VI of 1956 and Act XCI of 1956) can be applied retrospectively so as to validate the Custodian's 1951 actions.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff / Appellant's Arguments

  • The Custodian illegally recovered Rs. 3,795/- from the plaintiff without affording an opportunity to prove that the amount was not due as profits; the Custodian acted as a judge in his own cause.
  • The plaintiff relied on evidence (post-mortem report and statements by the plaintiff and Bashir Ahmad, son of Kundan) to show that Kundan was murdered in India on 12-10-1947 and never left India, implying that Kundan was not an evacuee and his property could not vest in the Custodian.
  • The plaintiff contends the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the Custodian's actions where those actions were not authorised by the Act.

Custodian / Respondent's Arguments

  • The Custodian's written statement argued that civil court jurisdiction was barred by Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act; the trial court returned the plaint on that basis.
  • The Custodian relied specifically on clauses (c) and (d) of Section 46 as barring the civil court from entertaining the suit.
  • The respondent contended that amendments made to Section 48 in 1956 (by Ordinance VI of 1956 and Act XCI of 1956) vested powers in the Custodian to investigate and determine sums due, and that those amendments should be treated as retrospective so as to validate the Custodian's actions in 1951.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi v. Harnam Singh, 58 Pun LR 490 : (AIR 1957 Punj 58) Held that the Custodian had no jurisdiction to launch inquiries into the liabilities of third parties. The court expressed respectful agreement with the view in this precedent and applied it to support the conclusion that the Custodian's investigatory action into the partnership accounts (to assess the partner's share of profits) was without jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and functional interpretation of Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and analysed the nature of the Custodian's actions in light of that section and the statutory powers existing in 1951.

First, the court observed that clause (a) of Section 46 was not attracted because the present suit did not ask the civil court to determine whether any particular property was evacuee property. The Custodian relied only on clauses (c) and (d).

Clause (c) was analysed to mean that a civil court cannot question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian "under the Act" — i.e., an action sanctioned or authorised by the Act. The court emphasised that if the Custodian merely purports to act as though authorised by the Act but in truth acts without legal authority, the civil court may examine and question the legality of that action. Put differently, the court can decide whether the action was genuinely "under the Act"; if not, clause (c) does not bar jurisdiction.

Clause (d) was read as creating a narrower bar: the civil court is precluded from entertaining suits concerning matters which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under the Act to determine. Again, the phrase "under this Act" was interpreted to mean "sanctioned or authorised by this Act." The civil court, the opinion stated, can and must examine whether the matter falls within the exclusive domain of the Custodian under the Act; if the court concludes it does not, it retains jurisdiction.

Applying these interpretations, the court separated the plaintiff's claim into two discrete issues:

  1. Recovery of Rs. 1,178/-/9 (one-fourth share of income-tax): The court found nothing in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act authorising the Custodian-General or the Custodian to decide this matter, and no decision had been made by them. Consequently, this part of the plaintiff's claim did not fall under clauses (c) or (d).
  2. Recovery of Rs. 3,795/- (alleged one-fourth share of profits): The court examined whether the Custodian had any authority to investigate partnership accounts and assess profits. It concluded that, as of 1951, Section 48 of the Act did not vest the Custodian with power to call for partnership accounts or to conduct such an inquiry. The court stated the Custodian was not authorised "to call upon the partners to render him any accounts" nor to "investigate what profits will be due to any particular partner."

The respondent's argument that later 1956 amendments to Section 48 bestowed such powers was addressed: the court found that the 1956 amendments could not be given retrospective effect unless expressly provided. The opinion noted that Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act XCI of 1956 expressly deemed the amendments to come into force on 22-10-1956, and that the amendments affected vested rights rather than being purely procedural; thus, the general rule that statutes operate prospectively applied.

Even assuming — hypothetically — that the amendments operated retrospectively, the court analysed the amended Section 48 text (as quoted in the opinion). Sub-section (1) in amended form permitted recovery of "any sum due to the State Government or to the Custodian" as if it were an arrear of land revenue; Sub-section (2) made the Custodian's decision as to the sum due final for the purposes of sub-section (1). The court reasoned that those sub-sections presuppose a definite, ascertained amount already known to the Custodian which he seeks to recover. They do not authorise a prior investigatory inquiry by the Custodian into partnership accounts to ascertain whether any sum is due.

Consequently, the court concluded that the Custodian's proceedings in going into the partnership accounts, ex parte assessing an amount due to Kundan, and recovering that amount from the plaintiff by coercive means were ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The court relied on and expressly agreed with the earlier authority (New Delhi v. Harnam Singh) that the Custodian had no jurisdiction to launch inquiries into third-party liabilities.

Although the plaintiff urged that uncontradicted evidence established Kundan had been murdered in India (and therefore was not an evacuee), the court stated it was unnecessary to decide that factual point because it had already concluded the Custodian's acts were ultra vires and thus the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is accepted. The court set aside the trial court's order that the plaint be returned for presentation to a proper court and remanded the case for decision on the merits. The court held that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's suit and that the Custodian's ex parte assessment and recovery of Rs. 3,795/- was ultra vires and without jurisdiction.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the trial court's jurisdictional dismissal/return of plaint is overturned; the suit will proceed to be decided on its merits in the trial court.
  • Court directions: the parties were directed to appear in the trial court on 22-4-1959; the costs in the appellate court shall abide the final event.
  • Broader consequences: the opinion does not purport to create a new general precedent beyond the particular application of Section 46 and the limitations on the Custodian's powers as they existed in 1951; the court expressly agreed with the prior decision in New Delhi v. Harnam Singh that the Custodian lacks jurisdiction to launch inquiries into third-party liabilities.

End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

    Sat Narain Beli Ram v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Jullundur And Anr

    1. This if an appeal against the order of Shri Onkar Nath. Sub Judge 1st Class, Kai-thal, dated 25-1-1956, holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question and returning the plaint for presentation to a proper Court. The facts as alleged in the plaint are as under. A firm styled as Messrs. Beliram-Satnarain carried, on business of timber merchants some time before the partition of the country in 1947. The partners of the said firm were us below : Sat Narain plaintiff to the extent of one-half; Hari Ram defendant to the extent of one-fourth; and Kundan son of Hussaini to the extent of one-fourth.

    Kundan son of Hussaini was a muslim and was murdered in India on 12-10-47 and the post mortem of his body was made at Kaithal on 14-10-1947. The aforesaid partnership dissolved on account of the death of Kundan; and on accounts being gone into, a sum of Rs. 500/11/- was found due to the deceased and was deposited by the plaintiff in the treasury on 12-7-1949. The firm was later, assessed to income-tax and was required to pay Rs. 4712/3/- and one-fourth of the same, i. e., Rs. 1,178/-/9 was due to the firm from Kundan.

    On 11-6-1951 the Custodian recovered from the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 3,795 as the calculated profits falling to the share of Kundan in the aforesaid partnership. The plaintiff was not given any opportunity to prove that the aforesaid sum was not due as profits to Kundan and the Custodian by becoming a Judge in his own cause arrived at the aforesaid imaginary figure and with a view to realise the same proceeded to attach the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff brought the present suit against the Custodian on the aforesaid allegations for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,750/- detailed below :

    Rs. 3,795/- illegally recovered from him by the Custodian;

    2. The Custodian filed a written statement urging inter alia that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This objection was given effect to by the trial Court which returned the plaint for presentation to a Court having jurisdiction in the matter. It was found that section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act barred the jurisdiction of the civil Court and the matter in question could only be determined by the Custodian, Aggrieved against the aforesaid order the plaintiff has come up to this Court in first appeal and the only point that falls for decision in the same is whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act reads as under --

    "46. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in certain matters. -- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction -

    Obviously the provisions of clause (a) are not attracted to the facts of this case because of the reason that the civil Court is not asked in the present suit to determine whether or not any particular property is an evacuee property. The learned counsel for the, Custodian relies only on clauses (c) and (d) of the section as barring the jurisdiction of the civil Court.

    3. Now clause (c) of Section 46 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court only to the extent that a civil Court is not entitled to question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian under the Act. In order to attract the applicability of this clause it must be shown that the Custodian-General ox the Custodian have taken an action under the Act and the suit in question aims at impugning the legality of that action. The words "under the Act" are of great significance and can only be interpreted to mean "as sanctioned or authorised by the Act''. If the Custodian-General or Custodian take an action which is not sanctioned or authorised by the Act, but which they merely purport to take as one under the Act, the civil Court is perfectly entitled to question the legality of the same.

    A civil Court can certainly examine whether the action of the Custodian-General or the Custodian, the legality of which is impugned before the Court, is- one which was sanctioned or authorised by the Act, and if the Court comes to the conclusion that it was authorised, it will have no more jurisdiction in the matter. If, however, the Court comes to the conclusion that the action impugned was not sanctioned or authorised by the Act, it will have every jurisdiction to question the legality of the said action, and the mere fact that the Custodian-General or the Custodian have purported to act under the Act would not, in any way, bar the jurisdiction of the Court to question the legality of the same.

    4. Clause (d) of Section 46 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court to a very limited extent. The only bar created by this clause is that a civil Court will not entertain a suit respecting any matter which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under the Act to determine. The words "under this Act" as used in this clause can again be interpreted only as meaning "sanctioned or authorised by this Act". The civil Court can obviously examine whether the matter over which it is asked to adjudicate is the one which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act to determine.

    Once the civil Court comes to the conclusion that the matter is of the type stated above, the civil Court would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the said matter. But if the civil Court is of the opinion that the Custodian-General or the Custodian are not empowered by or under the Act to determine that matter, it would have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. The mere fact that the Custodian-General or the Custodian think that they are empowered by or under the Act to determine the matter will not, in any case, stand in the way of the civil Court exercising jurisdiction in respect of the same. In the light of the above interpretation of the section it hast now to be seen whether section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in the present suit.

    5. Now, the present suit involved decision on two separate matters. The first related to the recovery of Rs. 1,178/-/9 as Kundan's one-fourth share of the income-tax paid by the firm. There is nothing in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act which provides for a decision of this matter being given by the Custodian-General or the Custodian. Admittedly, no decision has been given by any of them on this point. The case relating to the recovery of this amount does not, therefore, fall either under clause (c) or under clause (d), of Section 46 of the Act.

    6. With regard to the second item of Rs. 3,795/, the Custodian claimed this amount on the ground that on rendition of the partnership accounts this amount would be due to him as being one-fourth share of profits of Kundan son of Hussaini, I really fail to understand how the Custodian was authorised to go into the accounts of the partnership and to arrive at an imaginary figure of profits due to One of the partners. He was not authorised by any provision of law to call upon the partners to render him any accounts. He had no power, under the Act to call for the accounts or to investigate what profits will be due to any particular partner.

    Section 48 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time, i.e., in 1951 did not vest the Custodian with any authority of making an inquiry of this type. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that the section was amended in 1956 at first by Section 13 of Ordinance VI of 1956 and then by Act XCI of 1956 and that the said amendments vested powers in the Custodian for holding an investigation into the fact whether any particular amount was due to the Custodian or not. The contention is that the amendments made in the section must be treated as retrospective and the Custodian must be deemed to have acted under the powers given by the amendments. In the first place, the amendments made, in 1956 cannot be held, to have any retrospective effect. Neither the Ordi-nance nor the Act effecting the said amendments in Section 48 provides for a retrospective operation being given to the same.

    It is specifically provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act XCI of 1956 that the amendments shall be deemed to have come into force on 22-10-1956, and no further retrospective effect beyond the aforesaid date can be given to the provisions of the Act. The amendments affected the vested rights of the litigants and are not merely procedural ones, and the well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that a legislation enacted at any particular time is ordinarily prospective and not retrospective applies with full force to the present case. Even assuming that the amendments operated retrospectively the present case is not, in my opinion, covered even by the amendments. Sub-section (1) of Section 48 in its amended form provides as under --

    "(1) Any sum due to the State Government or to the Custodian under the provisions of this Act may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue."

    The pre-requisite of this sub-section is that a deter-mined sum is payable to the Government or the Custodian and it is only this sum which is made recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Sub-section (2) provides as under :

    "(2) For the purpose of Sub-section (1) the decision of the Custodian as to the sum due to the State Government or to the Custodian shall be final."

    This sub-section evidently relates to a sum which is claimed to be recoverable under Sub-section (1) of this section. That sum must clearly be a definite and ascertained amount and when it is sought to be recovered a question may be raised that it is not due and may then be decided by the Custodian. The two sub-sections read together make it quite clear that they refer to cases where a definite ascertained amount already known to the Custodian is sought to be recovered by him. They do not authorise the Custodian who is not aware of the state of accounts of any partnership to launch an inquiry into the accounts and then try to find out if any sum at all is due to him and what that sum is.

    The Act does not authorise him, in any way, to call upon the partners of an evacuee firm to render accounts of the partnership to him. The proceedings under Sub-section (2) can only arise if the Custodian begins to recover an amount under Sub-section (1). Till the Custodian has started proceedings under sub-section (1), the provisions of Sub-section (2) cannot obviously come into play.

    In my opinion, the entire proceedings taken by the Custodian in going into the accounts of the partnership and ex parte assessing the amount due to Kundan and in recovering the said amount from the plaintiff by use of or the threat of the use of the coercive machinery of law were ultra vires and without jurisdiction. It was held in Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi v. Harnam Singh, 58 Pun LR 490 : (AIR 1957 Punj 58), that the Custodian bad no jurisdiction at all to launch inquiries into the liabilities of third parties. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid case.

    7. Mr. Faqir Chand Mital further contends that the evidence furnished by the post mortem report on the dead body of Kundan and also the one furnished by the statements of the plaintiff and of Bashir Ahmad, son of the deceased Kundan, fully proved that Kundan had been murdered in India on 12-10-1947 and that at no point of time he ever left India. Ho urges that the aforesaid evidence, unre-butted as it stands on the record, shows that Kundan was not an evacuee and that the property belonging to him could not possibly vest in the Custodian. I do not, however, feel the necessity of going into this point, as in my opinion, the action of the Custodian in recovering the estimated profits of the share of Kundan in the partnership was altogether ultra vires and the civil Court obviously has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.

    8. For the reasons given above, I accept the appeal, set aside the order passed by the trial Court and remand the case for decision on merits. The costs in this Court will abide the final event. The parties have been directed to appeal in the trial Court on 22-4-1959.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sat Narain Beli Ram v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Jullundur And Anr
    (May 3, 1959)