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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from Title Suit No. 118 of 1986 (277/1988) filed by the plaintiffs seeking a declaration of good title to suit land based on a sale deed executed by defendant no. 1 in their favor, and a declaration that a subsequent deed of cancellation of that sale deed and a deed of gift to defendant no. 2 were void and fraudulent. The plaintiffs claimed they had paid full consideration and were in possession of the suit land, while defendants contended that full consideration was not paid, and the sale deed was validly cancelled. The trial court framed issues regarding maintainability, cause of action, limitation, title, and reliefs. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the lower appellate court reversed the decision, holding the suit barred by limitation and the deed of cancellation valid. The plaintiffs then filed this second appeal challenging the appellate court's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether after execution of the registered sale deed dated 09.02.1978, the vendor had any right left to cancel the same by executing a deed of cancellation dated 21.11.1978?
  2. Whether in the absence of any recital in the sale deed that the vendor shall have any right to cancel the sale deed, the registered sale deed can be cancelled by the vendor?
  3. Whether the lower appellate court allowed the appeal without reversing the findings of the trial court?
  4. Whether material evidence was ignored by the lower appellate court?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Plaintiffs paid the full consideration amount and were in possession of the suit land as proved by several witnesses including the scribe and attesting witnesses of the sale deed.
  • Defendant no. 1 did not produce any credible evidence to prove non-payment of consideration except his own testimony.
  • The sale deed did not contain any clause allowing the vendor to cancel it, and the deed of cancellation was executed without notice and was therefore void.
  • The deed of gift executed by defendant no. 1 in favor of defendant no. 2 was fraudulent and the suit was filed within limitation from the date of this deed.
  • Reliance was placed on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and decisions in Michhu Kuanr v. Raghu Jena, Ramdhari Rai v. Gorkh Rai, and Smt. Sudama Devi v. Bibi Shalrna Khatoon.
  • The appellate court failed to consider the surrounding circumstances and material evidence, particularly the evidence on possession and payment of consideration.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The sale deed was cancelled validly by defendant no. 1 due to non-payment of full consideration money.
  • The plaintiffs had knowledge of the deed of cancellation and delayed filing suit beyond the period of limitation.
  • Passing of title was dependent on payment of consideration, which was not proved by plaintiffs.
  • The plaintiffs' oral evidence was contradictory and unreliable, and no evidence was produced to prove possession.
  • Reliance was placed on case law including Michhu Kuanr, Mossamat Tunni Kuer v. Gauri Naun, and Ram Kesar Mahton v. Gulzar Jadav to support the validity of the deed of cancellation and non-passing of title.
  • The appellate court rightly held the suit barred by limitation and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Michhu Kuanr v. Raghu Jena, AIR 1961 Orissa 19 Proof of payment and intention in sale deeds; evidentiary standards. Appellants relied on this case to support their claim of payment and possession; respondents distinguished it as factually different.
Ramdhari Rai v. Gorkh Rai, AIR 1931 Patna 236 Completion of sale on execution of sale deed and effect of payment of consideration. Cited by appellants to support that title passes on execution and registration of sale deed even if consideration is due.
Smt. Sudama Devi v. Bibi Shalrna Khatoon, 2007 (1) PLJR 572 Title passes on sale deed execution and registration; limitation for suit starts accordingly. Appellants relied on this case to argue limitation should run from deed of gift, not deed of cancellation.
Mossamat Tunni Kuer v. Gauri Naun, 1956 BLJR 8 Intention of parties and surrounding circumstances in property transactions. Respondents cited to argue that non-payment of consideration prevents passing of title.
Ram Kesar Mahton v. Gulzar Jadav, 1956 BLJR 261 Importance of handing over documents and possession in sale transactions. Respondents relied on this to emphasize non-handing over of chirkut and possession issues.
Smt. Sona Devi v. Nagina Singh, AIR 1997 Patna 67 Duty of appellate court to reverse trial court findings when allowing appeal. Cited to hold that lower appellate court erred by allowing appeal without reversing trial court findings.
S.V.R Mudaliar v. Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari, AIR 1995 SC 1607 Appellate court's duty to consider trial court's reasons when reversing decisions. Supported the principle that appellate court failed to properly consider trial court's findings.
Santosh Hazari v. Purushotam Tiwari (Dead) by L.R.s, JT 2001 (2) SC 407 Appellate court's obligation to consider all issues and evidence when hearing first appeal. Held that appellate court ignored material evidence and issues, which was a legal error.
Madhukar v. Sangram, 2001 (3) PLJR 192 (SC) Scope and duties of appellate courts in first appeals. Supported the conclusion that appellate court failed to discharge its duty properly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence regarding payment of consideration and possession. It found that the plaintiffs had proved payment of the entire consideration and delivery of possession through credible witnesses, including the scribe and attesting witnesses of the sale deed. The absence of any reliable evidence from defendants to disprove payment was noted. The court held that the sale deed was complete on execution and registration, and the vendor (defendant no. 1) had no right to cancel it subsequently by a deed of cancellation. The deed of cancellation was held to be void and legally ineffective under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court also found that the lower appellate court erred by ignoring the trial court's findings, failing to consider material evidence on possession, and allowing the appeal without reversing the trial court’s specific findings. The appellate court’s approach violated settled legal principles regarding appellate review and the burden of proof. The limitation period was held to run from the date of the deed of gift, not the cancellation deed, thus the suit was not barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

The second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside, and the judgment and decree of the trial court are affirmed, decreeing the plaintiffs’ suit.

The direct effect of this decision is to restore the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs have good title and possession of the suit land and that the deed of cancellation executed by defendant no. 1 is void and ineffective. No new precedent is set beyond the application of established principles regarding sale deeds, cancellation, possession, and limitation. There is no order as to costs in this case.

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    Jaideo Yadav v. Raghunath Yadav

    S.N Hussain, J.

    This second appeal has been filed by plaintiffs-respondents Ist Set-appellants challenging the judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below.

    2. The matter arises out of Title Suit No. 118 of 1986 (277/1988) which was filed by the plaintiffs for the following reliefs:-

    (a) Declaration that the plaintiffs had good title to the suit land by way of sale deed executed by defendant Ist party in favour of the plaintiffs and that the deed of cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed executed by defendant Ist Party was void.

    (b) Declaration that the deed of gift executed by defendant Ist Party in favour of defendant 2 Party on 15.05.1986 was fraudulent, sham and inoperative and did not confer any title or possession upon defendant 2 party with respect to the suit land as the plaintiffs are in possession of the same.

    (c) The deed of gift be cancelled and defendants 2 party be injuncted from coming upon the suit land.

    (d) Cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiffs.

    (e) Any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiffs are entitled.

    3. The claim of the plaintiffs was that after receipt of the full consideration amount, defendant no. 1 executed sale deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1) in favour of the plaintiffs with regard to suit premises and got it registered and although possession was given to the plaintiffs on the date of sale, but the chirkut of the sale deed was not given to the plaintiffs by defendant no. 1 as he wanted to remove the trees standing on the said land. From the said consideration amount, defendant no. 1 purchased another land by registered deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1.B) in the name of his son Kapildeo Yadav. It was also claimed by the plaintiffs that they had no knowledge that defendant no. 1 had executed a deed dated 16.11.1978 (Ext.A) cancelling the plaintiffs sale deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1) and hence when certified copy of the deed of cancellation (Ext.1.C) was handed over by the defendants to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs being illiterate person could not read it and relying upon the words of defendant no. 1 thought that it was Ext.-1. Hence, it is averred that the said deed of cancellation (Ext.-A) was without any notice or information to the plaintiff and it was never given effect to as the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit premises continued. The plaintiffs also claimed that they came to know the said fact only after defendant no. 1 executed a deed of gift dated 15.05.1986 (Ext.-B) in favour of defendant no. 2 with respect to the suit land and hence the plaintiffs immediately filed the aforesaid title suit on 24.06.1986

    4. The defendants appeared in the suit and filed their written statement admitting execution of sale deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1) in favour of the plaintiffs, but claiming that full amount was not paid and balance was to be paid later, but when the same was not paid the said sale deed was cancelled by the deed of cancellation dated 16.11.1978 (Ext.A). It was also claimed that the plaintiffs had full knowledge of Ext.-A, but did not take any step for several years. It was also averred that in the year 1986, defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 intended to exchange their lands and hence defendant no. 1 executed a deed of gift (Ext.-B) of the suit land in favour of defendant no. 2, whereas defendant no. 2 executed a deed of sale of his land in favour of defendant no. 1, both dated 15.5.1986 (Ext.-B and 1.B). Hence, it was stated that the plaintiffs had no cause of action for the suit as the deed of cancellation was legal, valid and proper and was legally given effect to.

    5. After considering the respective claims of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues for deciding the title suit:-

    (i) Is the suit framed and filed maintainable?

    (ii) Have the plaintiffs any cause of action?

    (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation?

    (iv) Have the plaintiffs got any right, title on the basis of sale deed dated 3.2.1978?

    (v) To what relief or reliefs plaintiffs are entitled for ?

    6. On the basis of the aforesaid issues evidence were led and arguments were made on behalf of both the parties, after considering which the learned Additional Munsif-I, Purnea decreed the suit on contest by his judgment and decree dated 23.05.1989 after arriving at the following findings:-

    (a) Considering the relevant portions of the sale deed, the recitals do not indicate the intention of the parties that the title would pass on mere registration of the document or the title would pass on payment of consideration money and hence the intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances has to be considered.

    (b) From the recital of the sale deed (Ext.-1), it is quite apparent that defendant no. 1 wanted to sell the suit land to the plaintiffs for purchasing another land from the consideration money.

    (c) The defendants had not denied that on the same day, defendant no. 1 had purchased some land by Ext.-1.B.

    (d) Passing of consideration money was essence of contract and sale.

    (e) Portion of the disputed sale deed itself shows that the consideration money was never paid to defendant no. 1.

    (f) I also do not find that any condition was imposed on the plaintiff at the time of execution of the impugned sale deed.

    (g) Defendant no. 1 has not examined any witness except himself in support of his case, whereas defendant no. 2 has examined only one witness except himself who is his cousin.

    (h) The witnesses adduced on behalf of the plaintiff is more reliable than the witnesses of the defendants.

    (i) The defendants did not choose to adduce any evidence to prove the alleged absence of consideration for the sale deed, although in fact they challenged in their written statement that no consideration for sale was paid.

    (j) Defendant no. 1 has paid the consideration money to his vendor out of the consideration money received by the plaintiffs.

    (k) Defendant no. 1 has failed to prove that the plaintiff has not paid the consideration amount.

    (l) The plaintiff has been able to prove that he had paid consideration money at the time of execution of the sale deed and the title had passed to the plaintiff on the execution and registration of the document.

    (m) Once the title passes to the vendee by registered sale deed, the subsequent deed of cancellation by the vendor does not nullify the effect of already completed sale deed.

    (n) Defendant no. 1 had no right to execute deed of gift in favour of defendant no. 2 and the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff on the date of the execution of the deed of gift by defendant no. 1 and hence the suit is not barred by law of limitation.

    7. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned trial court, defendant no. 2 filed Title Appeal No. 44 of 1989 (51/1991), but the learned court of appeal below did not frame any points for deciding various issues involved in the suit and decided the title appeal on the issues framed in the suit.

    8. Finally, the learned Additional District Judge, Purnea after hearing the parties allowed the appeal vide its judgment and decree dated 21.02.1994 after arriving at the following findings:-

    (a) The plaintiffs have produced several witnesses including himself, the scribe and the attesting witness of sale deed (Ext.1) to show that the plaintiffs paid consideration amount to the defendant no. 1 with regard to the sale deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.1), whereas the vendor himself deposed that no consideration money was paid though no other witness was produced by defendant no. 1.

    (b) So far the question of possession is concerned, the plaintiffs claimed their possession, whereas defendant no. 2 claimed his possession over the suit land.

    (c) After examination of scribe and attester by the plaintiffs, it was not expected from defendant no. 1 to examine any witness except himself on the point of payment of consideration money.

    (d) Evidence was adduced with regard to facts contained in the petition of amendment of the plaint without any objection from the defendants.

    (e) Since there was no such description in the said sale deed, it is difficult to believe the story that chirkut was retained for cutting the trees and due to this reason, evidence of plaintiffs' witnesses on this point has to be rejected.

    (f) It appears that defendant no. 1 removed the trees when transferring the land to defendant no. 2 because trees are not mentioned in the deed of gift Ext.-3.

    (g) Oral evidence of the plaintiffs on the point of payment of consideration is not reliable, whereas defendant no. 1 has been able to establish by his evidence and surrounding circumstances that consideration money was not paid. In the circumstances of the case, there cannot be any presumption about payment of consideration money of Ext.-1.A by defendant no. 1 from the consideration money received from the plaintiffs with respect to the sale in question.

    (h) Passing of title was dependent upon passing of consideration money and hence when the consideration money was not paid by the plaintiffs to defendant no. 1, the title never passed to the plaintiffs and they never came in possession of the suit land.

    (i) It cannot be said that deed of cancellation has got no legal value as it speaks of non payment of consideration money on repeated demands.

    (j) The certified copy of the deed of cancellation was issued on 19.12.1978 and hence the suit is barred by Article 113 of the Limitation Act.

    (k) The suit as framed is not maintainable and the plaintiffs had no cause of action and they are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

    9. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below, the plaintiffs filed the instant second appeal which was admitted on 18.10.1995 on the following substantial questions of law:-

    (i) Whether after the execution of the registered sale deed dated 09.02.1978, has the vendor any right left to cancel the same by executing a deed of cancellation dated 21.11.1978?

    (ii) Whether in the absence of recital in the sale deed that the vendor shall have any right to cancel the sale deed, can the registered sale deed be cancelled by the vendor?

    (iii) Whether the lower appellate court has allowed the appeal without reversing the findings of the trial court?

    (iv) Whether the material evidence has been ignored?

    10. On the aforesaid substantial questions of law, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has submitted that plaintiffs examined several witnesses on the point of possession and several witnesses on the issue of payment of consideration, but defendant no. 1 did not examine any witness on the aforesaid point except himself, whereas defendant no. 2 examined his brother as D.W.2, apart from himself, but there was absolute absence of any evidence on behalf of the defendants to prove non-payment of consideration money with respect to the sale deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1) as alleged by them. It is also claimed that defendant no. 1 while deposing as D.W.1 admitted that no notice was ever sent to the plaintiffs with regard to payment of the remaining consideration amount or regarding his intention to cancel the aforesaid sale deed. It is also averred that the aforesaid sale deed (Ext.-1) did not contain any statement regarding any amount of consideration due, whereas Ext.-1.B, the sale deed by which defendant no. 1 purchased some other land in the name of his son showed that consideration money of Ext.-1 was paid which is clear from the recital of Ext.-1 that defendant no. 1 was selling his land to the plaintiffs for purchase of another land. Hence, defendants failed to discharge their onus to prove that consideration money was not paid by the plaintiffs to defendant no. 1. He has relied upon a decision in case of Michhu Kuanr v. Raghu Jena, reported in A.I.R 1961 Orissa 19.

    11. Learned counsel for the appellants has also averred that the learned court of appeal below has failed to see the surrounding circumstances which were clearly in favour of the plaintiffs and even in the worst case the sale is complete on execution of the deed and if any amount of consideration is due, the vendor may take legal recourse for recovery of that amount. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as two decisions of Patna High Court in case of Ramdhari Rai v. Gorkh Rai, reported in AIR 1931 Patna 236 and in case of Smt. Sudama Devi…Defendant- v. Bibi Shalrna Khatoon…Plaintiff-., reported in 2007 (1) PLJR 572.

    12. Learned counsel for the appellants has also claimed that the learned court below has neither considered the evidence of the plaintiffs with regard to payment of consideration money by the plaintiffs to defendant no. 1 and has also failed to give any finding with regard to possession of the suit land. It is further stated that the deed of cancellation (Ext.-A) is ab initio void as defendant no. 1 had no right to cancel the sale deed and the plaintiffs were in continuous possession and hence there is no occasion for counting limitation from the date of execution of deed of cancellation, rather limitation was to be counted from the date when the deed of gift (Ext.-B) was executed in favour of defendant no. 2 and from that date, the suit filed by the plaintiff was well within the period of limitation. It is also stated that in these circumstances, the suit would be governed by Article 56 of the Limitation Act and not Article 113 thereof.

    13. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 has claimed that registered deed of sale of the suit land was executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs on 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1) which was cancelled by defendant no. 1 vide deed of cancellation dated 16.11.1978 (Ext.-A) and much thereafter defendant no. 1 executed a deed of gift in favour of defendant no. 2 on 15.5.1986 (Ext.-B) with respect to the suit land and only thereafter Title Suit No. 118 of 1986 was filed on 24.06.1986 It is also claimed that a copy of deed of cancellation dated 16.11.1978 (Ext.-A) was served upon the plaintiffs by defendant no. 1 on 19.12.1978, but the plaintiffs filed the instant suit about eight years after the knowledge of the said deed of cancellation and hence the suit was barred by the law of limitation as the title of the plaintiffs was extinguished by Ext.-A and not by Ext.-B. He claimed that the learned court of appeal below rightly held that the suit was barred by the law of limitation.

    14. Learned counsel for respondent no. 1 has also averred that admittedly defendant no. 1 was the rightful owner of the suit land and he had executed (Ext.-1) in favour of the plaintiffs in lieu of agreed consideration money, but passing of title was dependent upon passing of the consideration money and hence when the plaintiffs failed to pay any amount of consideration, the defendant no. 1 was fully entitled to cancel the sale deed (Ext.-1) which he did by Ext.-A. Learned counsel for respondent no. 1 also averred that there was only oral evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs and even those witnesses gave contradictory statements with respect to the place on which the consideration was paid which fully falsified the plaintiffs' claim and in addition to that the chirkut of Ext.-1 was admittedly never given to the plaintiffs. He further submitted that although the plaintiffs claimed that the chirkut was not handed over to the plaintiffs even after receipt of consideration money by defendant no. 1 as he intended to cut away trees standing on the land, but the said statement was clearly falsified by Ext.-1 itself which showed that the subject matter of sale was the suit land with all its attachment including trees. Learned counsel for respondent no. 1 stated that in addition to that no document or chit of paper was produced on behalf of the plaintiffs with respect to their possession, nor it was sufficiently proved by any witness also.

    15. Learned counsel for respondent no. 1 also averred that the ratio of the case decided by Orissa High Court in case of Michhu Kuanr (Supra) was completely different from the present case as in that case scribe, identifier etc., were not examined, whereas a bench of this court in case of Mossamat Tunni Kuer v. Gauri Naun, reported in 1956 BLJR 8, has held that it depends upon the intention of the parties and the court has to look into the attending and surrounding circumstances. He also claimed that payment of consideration is an important aspect and no strenuous material has to be looked into, whereas non-handing over of chirkut is an important consideration in such matter. On this point, he has relied upon a decision of this court in case of Ram Kesar Mahton v. Gulzar Jadav, reported in 1956 BLJR 261. Hence, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 has stated that the judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below is legal and proper and it needs no interference.

    16. So far substantial questions of law no. (i) and (ii) are concerned, they are inter related and as such are being taken up together. The sale deed dated 09.02.1978 (Ext.-1) executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs is clearly with respect to the suit land. From the recitals of the said sale deed, it transpires that although it contained no clear statement with regard to payment of consideration money, but there were sufficient indications in the sale deed which showed that the consideration money had been paid inasmuch as it is clearly recited in the sale deed that possession was given to the plaintiffs and if they are dispossessed from the land sold, they would recover the consideration amount with interest from defendant no. 1 or his heirs. Furthermore, the scribe and identifier of the sale deed, Ext.-1, deposing as P.W.6 and P.W.7 along with P.W.1 and P.W.4 clearly proved the payment of entire consideration money by the plaintiffs to defendant no. 1, whereas there is complete absence of any reliable or independent evidence on behalf of the defendants to disprove the said pleading of the plaintiffs.

    17. Furthermore, the delivery of possession by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs is proved by the sale deed Ext.-1 itself which was also supported by other evidence of the plaintiffs including P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 who were all reliable witnesses, but were completely ignored by the learned court of appeal below. So far the question of non-handing over of the Chirkut of sale deed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs is concerned, the plaintiffs had specifically got their plaint amended pleading that the chirkut was not handed over to the plaintiffs by defendant no. 1 as defendant no. 1 wanted to cut trees as possession had already been delivered to the plaintiffs, but the said pleading of the plaintiffs supported by the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs was not denied by defendants as no additional written statement was filed as against the said amendment in plaint, nor there was any pleading contradicting the amended pleading of the plaintiffs. In the said circumstances, there was no occasion for the learned court of appeal below to rely upon the points raised by the defendants which were not even supported by their pleadings.

    18. In the said circumstances, when the entire consideration amount was paid to defendant no. 1 by the plaintiffs and possession was given by defendant no. 1 to the plaintiffs, the sale, as per Ext.-1, was complete as a result of which the plaintiffs acquired full right, title and interest in the suit properties. Hence, this case is fully covered by the two decisions of this court in case of Ramdhari Rai and in case of Smt. Sudama Devi (Supra). In the aforesaid circumstances, the case laws relied upon by learned counsel for respondent no. 1 in case of Mossamat Tuni Kuer and in case of Ram Kesar Mahto (Supra) are not at all relevant to the facts and circumstances of this case.

    19. Thus the sale having been completed, consideration money having been paid and possession having been delivered full title over the suit property accrued to the plaintiffs and hence defendant no. 1 had no occasion to cancel the sale deed for which there is no provision in law at all and even in case any amount of consideration remained due, the only option for defendant no. 1 was to sue the plaintiffs for that money, but there is no pleading or material on behalf of the defendants to show that they had ever sued for that. Hence, the deed of cancellation (Ext.-A) is in complete violation of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and defendant no. 1 had no right at all to execute the said deed of cancellation which did not affect the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs in any manner whatsoever even if a copy thereof was served upon the plaintiffs and hence the same is merely to be ignored and limitation cannot be legally counted from that date. Accordingly, it is held that the sale having been complete, the vendor had no right left to cancel the same by Ext.-A which is absolutely ab initio illegal liable to be ignored and the suit cannot be held to be time barred on account of said deed of cancellation.

    20. So far substantial question of law no. (iii) is concerned, it is apparent from the judgments and decree of the learned courts below that the trial court had decreed the suit on the basis of certain findings with regard to issues involved in the suit, but from paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment of the learned court of appeal below, it is quite apparent that the said findings of the trial court had not been reversed by the learned court of appeal below, rather on the basis of some findings of its own, the learned lower appellate court had allowed the title appeal without even appreciating the findings of the learned trial court on the concerned issues. The law is well settled in this regard that where the judgment of the lower appellate court is a judgment of reversal it is primary duty of the appellate court to consider the reasons given by the trial court and those reasons must also be reversed. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of this court in case of Smt. Sona Devi v. Nagina Singh, reported in A.I.R 1997 Patna 67 (paragraph-21). This itself is a substantial question of law sufficient to set aside the decree of the learned court of appeal below. In this regard, reference may be made to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of S.V.R Mudaliar v. Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari, reported in A.I.R 1995 Supreme Court 1607.

    21. So far substantial question of law no. (iv) is concerned, it is quite apparent from paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment of the learned court of appeal below that material witnesses, P.Ws 2, 3 and 5, who sufficiently and validly proved the continuous possession of the plaintiffs on the basis of sale deed, Ext.-1, were not at all considered by the learned court of appeal below which also did not give any finding with respect to possession although it was a very important aspect of the case. The law is well settled in this regard that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the appellate court to don itself with all the issues and evidences led by the parties before recording its findings, as the first appeal or a title appeal is valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for re-hearing, both on questions of facts and law. Furthermore, while reversing the finding of fact, the first appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasonings assigned by the trial court on the basis of pleadings and evidence of the parties and only thereafter it can discharge the duties expected of it. Reference in this regard may be made to two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushotam Tiwari (Dead) by L.R.s, reported in J.T 2001 (2) Supreme Court 407, as well as in case of Madhukar v. Sangram, reported in 2001 (3) P. L.J.R.192 (SC). Hence, in this regard also, the learned court of appeal below has completely ignored well considered findings and judgment of the learned trial court which was based on full consideration of the evidence and pleadings of the parties.

    22. Thus, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as pleadings and evidence of the parties, the provisions of law and the case laws applicable thereto, this court finds that the judgment and decree of the trial court are based upon specific and correct findings after due consideration of the pleadings and evidence of the parties as well as the provisions of law applicable thereto, whereas the learned court of appeal below has not only ignored the pleadings and evidence of the parties, but had also ignored the specific reasonings and findings of the trial court on the relevant issues and had passed the impugned judgment and decree in complete violation of the specific provisions of law as well as case laws applicable to the instant case. Hence, this court is left with no option, but to allow this second appeal.

    23. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below is hereby set aside, the judgment and decree of the trial court is hereby affirmed and the claims and suit of the plaintiffs are decreed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.

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    Jaideo Yadav v. Raghunath Yadav
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