1. Whether the death of the husband of the petitioner, while he was on election duty, can be said to be “resulting solely and directly from accident caused by external violent and any other visible means”? If the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the petitioner would be entitled to compensation for the death of her husband in terms of the memorandum of understanding executed by the Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar and the different insurance companies; otherwise, she would get nothing from the insurance companies.
2. The petitioner is the widowed wife of one Parshuram Singh who was posted as Health Worker under Incharge Medical Officer, Primary Health Centre, Kuchai Kote in the district of Gopalganj. By an order (Annexure 3) issued by the District Election Officer, Gopalganj, Parshuram Singh was appointed as the second polling officer for booth no. 231 of 26 Baikunthpur assembly constituency for the general election held in the year, 2000 for the Bihar Legislative Assembly. Booth no. 231 was set up at the primary school in village Pakha and polling was scheduled to be held there on 22.2.2000 The members of the election party, including Parshuram Singh, arrived at the booth at about 4.30 P.M on 21.2.2000 and engaged themselves in the election work. Upto this stage the facts are not in dispute but beyond this point the contesting insurance company does not expressly admit the case of the petitioner. According to the petitioner's case, at about 6 in the evening Parshuram Singh went to the bank of the river Gandak, flowing by the side of the village, for relieving himself. He came back deeply agitated and frightened and is reported to have told his colleagues that on the bank of the river he encountered some armed miscreants who threatened that ‘anything might happen’ if the polling team did not help and co-operate with them during the election on the following day. At about 9 PM he developed pain in the chest and was sent to the village hospital. On receiving whatever treatment that was possible there, he came back to the school and here he died due to heart failure between mid night and 1 AM.
3. On a written report submitted by the Presiding Officer, U.D Case No. 1 of 2000 was instituted at Baikunthpur police station at seven in the morning of 22.2.2000
4. The doctor who conducted a post mortem on the body of the deceased did not find any external injury on his person but recorded his opinion regarding the cause of death as follows:
“In my view death occurred due to cardio-respiratory failure on account of massive myocardial infarction, heart attack triggered by extreme fear or excitement.”
5. The police in its final form stated that the cause of death was heart failure due to extreme fear.
6. After the death of Parshuram Singh, his widowed wife, the present petitioner made a claim for compensation under the Group Personal Insurance Cover in terms of the M.O.U Her claim was forwarded to the Election Commission which in turn sent it to the insurance company. The insurance company rejected the claim and intimation was given to the petitioner by letter, dated 23.1.2001 issued by the National Insurance Company (Annexure 11). It will be useful to reproduce here the relevant portion of this letter which is as follows:
“The cause of death as shown in the post mortem does not support that the cause of death was due to any bodily injury caused by accident as per the policy conditions.
“Mental shock fright or grief as per the policy conditions does not come under the grom view (sic. purview) of accident unless it has caused some body injury.”
(emphasis added)
7. After that the petitioner was left to fend for herself. It is both surprising and sorrowful that the Election Commission which had paid close to Rs. 5 crores as premium to the Insurance Companies did not take up the matter with the insurance companies and did not extend any help or cooperation to her even in this litigation.
8. Before proceeding further it may be noted that the insurance company does not accept the latter part of the petitioner's case. It accepts the case of the petitioner only to the extent that her husband Parshuram Singh had gone on election duty where he died due to heart attack. It is suggested on behalf of the insurance company that the story of his being threatened by some armed miscreants and the threat setting off the heart attack was an after thought and was added only with the view to make out a claim for compensation under the M.O.U It is pointed out that there was no contemporaneous recorded evidence in support of the story of the threat and the story came to light only after the death of Parshuram Singh and even then it was not stated in the written report submitted by the Presiding Officer of the polling booth to the police but was mentioned for the first time in his subsequent statement recorded by the Investigating Officer.
9. I am not prepared to reject or disbelieve the case of the petitioner regarding her husband being threatened by some armed miscreants and the threat causing him to suffer a fatal heart attack for the reasons stated on behalf of the insurance company. To anyone familiar with the election process in this State, the whole thing would appear perfectly natural. Threats being given to a member of the polling party on the eve of the election is one of the commonest phenomena. It is also understandable that the matter might not be reported to the police at that time because on the eve of the election the police are themselves stretched to the utmost; the police at that time are totally engaged in dealing with the law and order problem and the large scale use of violence. Even if some one would go to them, they would have no time to take notice of an isolated case of threats being given to an individual member of the polling party. Further, nothing can be made out of the omission in the written report submitted by the Presiding Officer of the booth to the local police. It is to be kept in mind that the death took place in the middle of the night and the Presiding Officer reported the matter at 6.40 in the morning when the polling was to begin shortly. He was on election duty at a strange place among total strangers. In those circumstances if he confined his report to a few lines simply informing the police about the death of his second polling officer, it cannot be contended that the incident of threat never took place because the informant omitted to mention it in his report.
10. Further, the subsequent statement of the Presiding Officer was recorded on the same day in which he clearly stated about the incident of threat received by Parshuram Singh and its effect on him. The Presiding Officer of the booth or the other members of the polling team stood to gain nothing from inventing the story of threat to the deceased; till the time of making their statement before the police they had not come in contact with the petitioner or any member of the family of the deceased. In those circumstances it would be too much to assume that they would concoct a false story in order to benefit the family of someone who was practically a complete stranger to them.
11. It may also be noted that though not admitting the petitioner's case on the point of threat given to her husband, counsel for both the parties mainly argued the matter on the basis of the facts as narrated on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel for the insurance company contended that the death of the petitioner's husband would not qualify for any compensation under the M.O.U even if the death took place in the manner as stated by the petitioner.
12. I, therefore, proceed on the basis that the death of Parshuram Singh, the husband of the petitioner took place in the manner as stated on behalf of the petitioner.
13. Now it is time to take a closer look at the M.O.U, forming the basis of the petitioner's claim. For the general assembly election, 2000 the employees of the State Government who were drafted for election duty were provided with a Group Personal Accident Insurance Cover and to that end a Memorandum of Understanding was executed by the Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar and the representatives of four insurance companies on 9.2.2000 In terms of the M.O.U the insurance companies were given a cheque for the premium amount of Rs. 4,74,85,439/- which was received on behalf of the four companies, by the National Insurance Company Limited. The M.O.U classified the Government employee on election duty in two categories; the employees of the State Government came in category ‘A’ whereas the members of the central para-military forces deployed on election duty were put in category ‘B’. The M.O.U provided that in the event of death due to accident while performing election duty the amount of compensation payable would be Rs. 10 lacs in the case of a person belonging to category ‘A’. The application of the insurance cover was however restricted by a clause in the M.O.U under the marginal heading ‘scope of cover’ which reads as follows:
“The insurance is intended to provide for the payment of compensation in the event of death only resulting solely and directly from accident caused by external violent and any other visible means.”
14. And it is this clause on which the claim of the petitioner is floundered.
15. The key words occurring in the clause are some of the old, standard expressions used by insurance companies in order to make accident policies highly restrictive. This is because the insurers found great difficulty in defining the risk in an accident policy so as to exclude injuries and death resulting from what are generally known as natural causes. Insurers therefore, resorted to defining the risk much more narrowly with the result that the accident policies are normally full of limitations and qualifications.
16. A plain reading of the cover clause in the M.O.U would make it clear that it is intended to impose a two fold limitation. A death in order to qualify for the insurance cover must not only be accidental but the accident causing death must itself result from some external, violent and other visible means. This two fold limitation is based on what is called, in the Law of Insurance, the distinction between ‘accidental result’ and ‘accidental means’. An unexpected and unforeseen consequence or result from a normal or routine activity may constitute an accident but it would not qualify as ‘accidental means’. Thus, if a person suffers a fatal heart attack while dancing (considered to be a normal activity) the death may be called ‘accidental’ but it would fail to attract the insurance cover because it was not due to ‘accidental means’. On the other hand, if a person dies due to heart attack suffered as a result of over-exertion on being chased by a ferocious dog (an unintended occurrence, and not a normal activity) the death might attract the insurance cover as it was caused by ‘accidental means’. This, in simple terms, is the distinction sought to be introduced in the cover clause of the M.O.U with a view to make the application of the insurance cover more restrictive.
17. The question, however, is how over the years the courts have understood and interpreted the restrictive cover clause in the insurance policy.
18. On examining this branch of the law of insurance one finds a series of decisions which tend to do away with the distinction between ‘accidental result/death’ and ‘accidental means’. One also finds another set of decisions which though maintaining the formal distinction between ‘accidental result’ and ‘accidental means’ have so interpreted the key words in the restrictive clause (e.g accident, external, violence and any other means etc.) as to greatly relax the rigours of the ordinary meanings of those words.
19. Of the cases in which the distinction between ‘accidental result/death’ and ‘accidental means’ was sought to be done away with, a fine example is to be found in the U.S Supreme Court decision in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1933) 291 U.S 491. In Landress the judicial view that there was no distinction between accidental death and accidental means found one of its most forceful expressions in the dissenting opinion of Cordozo, J.
20. Landress was a case of death by sunstroke. The insured while playing golf one day, fatally succumbed to the heat. His beneficiary claimed compensation under the Insurance policy on the ground that the layman regarded death from sunstroke as accidental death. The majority decision of the court rejected the claim and held that the claimant must demonstrate something unforeseen or unexpected in the act itself: “for here the carefully chosen words defining liability distinct between the result and the external means which produces it. The insurance is not against an accidental result.”
21. However, Cordozo, J. dissented from the majority and in his dissenting opinion observed as follows:
“Sunstroke, though it may be a disease according to the classification of physicians, is nontheless an accident in the common speech of men…. The suddenness of its approach and its catastrophic nature … have made that quality stand out when thought is uninstructed in the mystries of science …. Violent it is for the same reason, and external because the train of consequences is set in motion by rays of the sun beating down upon the body, a cause operating from without.
“The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog. ‘Probably it is true to say that in the strict sense and dealing with the region of physical nature, there is no such thing as an accident.’ … on the other hand, the average man is convinced that there is, and so certainly is the man who takes out a policy of the accident insurance. It is his reading of the policy that is to be accepted as our guide, with the help of the established rule that ambiguities and uncertainties are to be resolved against a company ….. The proposed distinction will not survive the application of that test.’
“When a man has died in such a way that his death is spoken of as an accident, he has died because of an accident, and hence by accidental means. So court of high authority have held…..”
22. The dissenting opinion of Cordozo, J. in Landress had great influence on the development of this branch of the law of insurance in the different States in the U.S Scales Adams F. in his essay “Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evaluation of Accidental Death Insurance” 86 Iowa L. Rev. 173 nicely summed up the effect of Cordozo's dissent in the following words:
“Cardozo's dissent might have been merely an elegant footnote in the history of accidental death insurance, but then a funny thing happened: the Erie decision. In an irony made possible by Erie's check on federal common law, the majority decision in Landress (being merely an unauthorized exercise in federal common lawmaking) has faded into a widely-condemned echo. Only Cardozo's dissent retains substantial influence. And it has been substantial. As might be expected, Cardozo's evocative literary allusion has had a lasting impact on courts even among those judges who were not quite sure what a Serbonian Bog was.”
(emphasis added)
23. The dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J. in Landress and its effect on subsequent decisions by courts have also been discussed in Mac Gillivray on Insurance Law, fifth edition, Vol. II, pages 787, 788. The relevant passage is as follows:
“Divergence in modern American authorities. In Landress v. The Phoenix, where the United States Supreme Court decided by a majority that death by sunstroke was not death by “violent external and accidental means”, Cardozo, J. delivered a powerful dissenting opinion in which he held, in effect, that the use of the phrase “external violent and accidental means” adds nothing to the problem which the court has to consider, which is in every case whether the death or disability was accidental in the usual sense of that word. This opinion has prevailed in a number of jurisdictions, including New York, where, as Conway, J. has said, “There is no longer any distinction made between accidental death and death by accidental means, nor between accidental means and accidental results.” (Burr v. Continental Travellers, (1946) 67 N.E 2d 248) complete a cleavage now exists between the jurisdictions which have adopted the view of Cardozo, J. and those which have not, and how far-reaching effects of that cleavage are, can be seen from the following examples. Of the jurisdictions in which the view of Cardozo, J. has been adopted: in New York assureds who took an over-dose of veronal in an attempt to cure earache [Romsbachor v. Prudential (1937) 7 N.E 2d 18] who died from a dose of novocaine properly administered by a medical man [Aderblum v. Metropolitan Life (1940) 30 N.E 2d 728], and who exerted force to open a jammed desk and contracted hernia. [Simson v. Travellers Mutual Accident (1942) 45 N.E 2d 457] have all recovered under accident policies in the form now under consideration. In Illinois, where the life assured spread petrol in a house with a view to arson, and was killed because it caught fire before he was ready, an innocent beneficiary recovered on the footing of death by accidental means; (Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life (1957) 142 N.E 2d 5) and in the district of Columbia, death by sunstroke has been held to be death by external violent and accidental means. (Raley v. Life and Casuality of Tenn (1957) 117A 2d 110, so also (Idaho) O'Neil v. New York Life (1944) 152 P. 2d 70), and (Okhlahoma) U.S Fidelity & Gurantee v. Dowds (1950) 219 P 2d 215). Of the jurisdictions which have followed the majority decision in Landress' case: In Washington it has been held that a death from a heart attack is within such a clause only if the action which led to the attack was unintentional; [Commercial Travellers v. Walsh (1955) 228F. 2d 200] in Alabama, that injury resulting from looking, deliberately, at a blow-lamp at close range was not covered; [Emergency Aid Ins. v. Dobbs (1955) 83 So. 2d 335; of Gay v. Pacific Mutual Life (1956 237 F. 2d 448]; in Ohio and N. Carolina, that the aggressor in a quarrel, who knows or ought to know that he will be in danger of bodily harm as a natural result of his conduct, cannot allege that the resulting injury was caused by accidental means; [Hirschfeld v. Kentucky Central Life & Accident (1951) 103 N.E 2d 839; Scarborough v. World Ins. (1956) 94 S.E 2d 558]; but in California, although “accidental means” is in that stage given its strict interpretation, it has been held that fist-fighting is not likely to result in death, and that an assured who, while so engaged, fell and struck his head on the pavement, died from accidental means; [Rooney v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident (1947) 170 P. 2d 72]; in Tennessee, assured was killed by playing “Willian Tell” with a pepper pot on his head, and his death, perhaps surprisingly, was held not through accidental means. [Beker v. National Life & Accident (1956) 298 S.W 2d 715].”
24. If the view propounded by Cardozo, J. is to be followed which indeed commends itself to me very strongly, then nothing more is required because no one can deny that the death of Parshuram Singh was the result of an accident and was an accidental death.
25. But, let us also examine the other view in which though the distinction between accidental result and accidental means is formally maintained, the key restrictive words like accident, external, violent and visible means are attributed a very broad and unrestricted meanings.
26. Let us first take the word ‘Accident’. Black's Law Dictionary, seventh edition defines accident to mean as follows:
“accident, 1. An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated. 2. Equity practice. An unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, neglect, or misconduct accidental, adj.
‘The word “accident” in accident policies means an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation. A result, though unexpected, is not an accident; the means or cause must be accidental. Death resulting from voluntary physical exertions or from intentional acts of the insured is not accidental, nor is disease or death caused by the vicissitudes of climate or atmosphere the result of an accident; but where, in the act which precedes an injury, something unforeseen or unusual occurs which produces the injury, the injury results through accident.” 1A John Alam Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice: 360, at 455 (rev. vol. 1981).
“Policies of liability insurance as well as property and personal injury insurance frequently limit coverage to losses that are caused by ‘accident’. In attempting to accommodate the Layman's understanding of the term, courts have broadly defined the word to mean an occurrence which is unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary, either by virtue of the fact that it occurred at all, or because of the extent of the damage. An accident can be either a sudden happening or a slowly evolving process like the percolation of harmful substance through the ground. Qualification of a particular incident as an accident seems to depend on two criteria: the degree of foreseability, and 2, the state of mind of the actor in intending or not intending the result.” John F. Dobbyn, Insurance Law in a Nutshell 128 (3d ed. 1996).
27. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, sixth edition defines accident as follows:
“Accident; Accidental; Accidentally. The courts have established a long line of cases which identify the essential characteristics of an accident as an event which was neither expected nor intended and which causes hurt or loss [Hensey v. White (1990) 1 Q.B 481; Fenton v. Thorley (1903) A.C 433; Boyle v. Wright (1969) V.L.R 699; R. v. Pico (1971) R.T.R 500].
“In deciding for the purposes of an insurance policy whether an event was “accidental” a distinction has to be made whether the cause was the deliberate taking of an appreciated risk, and therefore not accident [Gray v. Barr (1971) 2. Q.B 554 where a person intending to scare another with a gun shot him; held not accident], and cases where the cause (such as excessive drinking) although a deliberate act, led to the taking of a risk (such as dangerous driving) which was not deliberate and not appreciated but which was nevertheless the immediate cause of the event [Chief Constable of West Midlands Police v. Bellingham (1979) 1 W.L.R 747].”
28. In Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. v. Ritta Farnandes, 1969 ACJ 419 (a case arising, under the Workmen's Compensation Act) the Supreme Court held that even if a workman died from a pre-existing disease, if the disease was aggravated or accelerated under the circumstances, his death results from injury by accident. In taking this view the Supreme Court noticed with approval a decision of the House of Lords in Clover Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, 1910 AC 242.
29. Coming now to the word “external” used in the expression “accident caused by external violent and any other visible means”, it is described in Stroud's as follows:
“EXTERNAL: In an insurance against “bodily injury caused by violent, accident, external and visible means” but excepting “natural disease, or weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease” - “external” is used in contradistinction to such unnatural cases as disease or weakness.”
30. The next word is ‘violent’ and violence is defined by Black's as follows:
“Unjust or unwarranted use of force, usu. accompanied by fury, vehemence, or outrage; physical force unlawfully exercised with the intent to harm. Some courts have held that violence in labour dispute is not limited to physical conduct or injury, but may include picketing conducted with misleading signs, false statements, erroneous publicity, and veiled threats by words and acts.”
31. If in labour disputes the expression violence may include veiled threats by words and acts, I see no reason why plain and open threats by armed miscreants may not come within the meaning of the word “violent”.
32. Next, the word “visible” is defined by Black's to mean:
“visible, 1. Perceptible to the eye; discernable by sight, 2. Clear, distinct, and conspicuous.”
33. In the Law of Insurance by Raoul Colinvaux (fifth Edition), discussing the true meaning of the expressions “violent, external and visible”, the author points out that in a large number of cases though the policies insured against bodily injury caused “by violent, accident, external and visible means only”, the decisions turned mainly on the question whether or not the particular injury was caused by accidental means:
“That was because such words as, ‘violent’, ‘external’ and ‘visible’ have been given wide meanings, practically co-extensive with ‘accident’.
“Thus, “violent” does not necessarily imply actual violence as where the assured is bitten by a dog. “Violent means” include any external, impersonal cause, such as drowning, or the inhalation of gas, or even undue exertion on the part of the assured. The word “violent” is merely used in antithesis to “without any violence at all”.
“Similarly “external” is used to express anything which is not “internal” and any cause which is “external” in this sense is also “visible” within the meaning of an accident policy. These words refer to the accident, not the injury, and are used to distinguish injuries covered by the policy from those due simply to such causes as disease or senility which arise in the body of the deceased.
“Thus, the words ‘by violent, external and visible means’ add little if anything, to an accident policy and have been adversely criticized by the court of appeal.” [Re: United London and Scotish Insurance, Brown's claim (1915) 2 Ch. 167].”
34. In the light of the above there can be no denying that the death of Parshuram Singh was an accidental death caused by accidental means. If the view expressed in the book, the Law of Insurance that the words “by violent, external and visible means” add little if anything to an accident policy is to be accepted, then his death would attract the insurance cover without anything else. But even if the applicability clause in the M.O.U is to be given a literal interpretation and the distinction between accidental result and accidental means is to be maintained, I come to the unescapable conclusion that the act of threatening by the armed miscreants was plainly covered by the expression “external violent and any other visible means” and the deceased encountering those threats while he had gone to relieve himself was clearly an accident that triggered off the heart attack and, thus, resulting solely and directly into his death. It appears to me, therefore, that the death of the petitioner's husband was fully covered by the cover clause in the M.O.U
35. I would like here to briefly examine some of the cases in which the courts held that the death was covered by the insurance policy even while maintaining the distinction between accidental death and death by accidental means.
36. In Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1959, Mo) 327 SW2d 252, the court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the insured's death from a coronary occlusion was effected by accidental means, even though the insured suffered from a pre-existing coronary sclerosis and an old myocardial infarction, where the insured was subject to emotional stress from a verbal assault and an actual physical assault by another person. The court said that if an accident sets in motion agencies that result in death, such injury is regarded as the sole, direct and proximate cause of death, even though the injured person was suffering from physical infirmity or disease.
37. In Bankers' Health & Acci. Co. v. Shadden (1929, Tex Civ App 15 SW2d 704, the insured, a man 50 years of age, in good health, and long a United States mail carrier by occupation, being unable on a cold morning to start his Ford car by means of the self-starter, undertook to crank it in the usual manner, consuming approximately an hour in hour in doing so, and in the course of his deliveries immediately afterward, he experienced great discomfort, became suddenly worse, and declined until he died, before returning from the trip, from dilation of the heart due to the strain and exertion involved.
38. In Railway Mail Ass'n v. Forbes (1932, Tex Civ App) 49 SW2d 880, the death of an insured resulted directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes, from a strain on his heart received in lifting a mail sack in the course of his employment, and upon evidence that the employee had no heart disease prior to the time of the alleged injury which was or could have been a contributory cause of his death.
39. In Commercial Travellers Ins. Co. v. Walsh (1955, CA9 Wash) 228 F2d 200, 56 ALR 2d 796 the insured, while engaged in receiving heavy sacks of grain when slid down a plank from a truck to the loading floor, instinctively grabbed one and held it for a moment upon seeing that it was about to slip off the plank, thereby straining himself so that he suffered a coronary occlusion. The court said that although the insured's action in reaching for the slipping sack was unintentional in the instant case, where an insured does a deliberate act and the exertion causes a heart attack, it cannot be held that the death was caused by accident means.
40. In Carrothers v. Knights of Columbus [(1973) 10 III App 3d 73d, 295 NE2d 307] the insured suffered an acute myocardial infarction and died approximately 50 minutes after engaging in an alercation in a parking lot during which he was struck and his face slashed with a knife, the court saying that the fatal heart attack was an unforeseen and unexpected result of the stress and activity engendered by the altercation.
41. In the light of the discussions made above, it plainly appears to me that looked at from any point of view (whether with or without maintaining the distinction between accidental result/death and accidental means), the death of Parshuram Singh, the husband of the petitioner will be covered by the policy. The stand of the insurance company that his death was not covered by the insurance because there was no bodily injury on his person is plainly misconceived and I am afraid it must be said that the insurance company does not seem to fully realise the correct meaning of the cover clause in the M.O.U
42. Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of a claim under a contract of insurance was not maintainable and urged the court to dismiss this case on that score alone. In support of his submission he relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. Asha Goel, (2000) 8 SCC 560 : 2001 AIR SCW 161. The decision relied upon by Mr. Priyadarshi does not lay down an absolute bar against entertaining a writ petition claiming compensation under an insurance policy. The court was careful in qualifying its observation on the issue of maintainability of a writ petition by using the word “ordinarily” and the issue was made further clear in para 11 of the decision when it was observed as follows:
“It is to be kept in mind that in case an insured or nominee of the disease insured is refused relief merely on the ground that the claim relates to contractual rights and obligations and he/she is driven to a long drawn litigation in the civil court, it will cause serious prejudice to the claimant/other beneficiaries of the policy. The pros and cons of the matter in the context of the facts situation of the case should be carefully weighed and appropriate decisions should be taken.”
43. I am convinced that if the petitioner who is the widow of a lowly placed employee of the State Government is non-suited by this Court simply on the ground of non-maintainability of this writ petition she may not even find it possible to file a suit paying a heavy amount as court fee, much less sustain and go through the rigours of a long drawn proceeding in slow motion before a Civil Court. Moreover, as seen above, there is hardly any dispute of facts and the case essentially turns upon a true interpretation of the cover clause in the M.O.U I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission that this writ petition was liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.
44. Mr. Priyadarshi next contended that though the death of the petitioner's husband might be called an accidental death, the accident did not result from any violent external or other visible means and, therefore, the death did not qualify for compensation under the M.O.U In support of his submissions, he relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Ranjani Bai v. New India Assurance Company Limited, A.I.R 1956 Bombay 633.
45. I am unable to see how that decision can help the respondent insurance company in this case. In Ranjani Bai (supra) the husband of the claimant died suddenly in consequence of a fall from a window from the fourth floor of a building in which he was residing. The insurance policy had a clause similar to the one in the M.O.U before this Court. In that case, however, the plea taken by the Insurance company was that the fall resulting in the death of the deceased was not accidental but suicidal. It was a pure question of fact on which the learned Judge held against the insurance company. Further, relying upon some old English decisions the learned Judge also rejected the plea based on any distinction between an accidental death and a death resulting from external violent and any other visible means. (See paras 15 to 19 of the decision). It is, therefore, clear that the decision in Ranjani Bai (supra) is of no help to the insurance company.
46. For the reasons discussed above, I am clearly of the view that the death of the petitioner's husband is fully covered by the M.O.U and the petitioner is entitled to payment of compensation in terms of the M.O.U The respondent Insurance company is accordingly directed to make payment of the compensation amount to the petitioner without any further delay. Before parting with the records of the case, this court would like to observe that in order to avoid any such controversy in future, the Election Commission must insist on a suitable amendment in the cover clause of M.O.U It appears to me that in place of the expression “death only resulting solely and directly from accidental cause by external violence and any other visible means”, the expressions used in Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act may be substituted, that is to say, “death arising out of and in the course of election duty.”
47. In the result, this writ petition is allowed but with no order as to costs.