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  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.7. The provision of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code
  • S. 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • XIV, Rule 2 of the Civil Produce Code (hereinafter referred
  • S. 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.6.
  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Code
  • Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code
  • Order II, Rule 2
  • Order 2, Rule 2
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.7. The provision of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code
  • S. 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • XIV, Rule 2 of the Civil Produce Code (hereinafter referred
  • S. 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.6.
  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Code
  • Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code
  • Order II, Rule 2
  • Order 2, Rule 2
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs (opposite party) and the defendant (petitioner) are brothers who conducted a kerosene oil business as "National Agencies" at Jamui. The business was originally a joint family business managed by their father as karta; after his death the defendant petitioner managed it. A partnership deed was executed in 1989 and registered under the Registration Act.

On 19-4-1996 the plaintiffs filed Administrative Suit No. 24 of 1996 claiming that they and the defendant were partners, entitled to one-third share each in profits and losses; they sought rendition of accounts, declaration of shares, appropriate administration of the firm, and a decree for amounts found due, with injunctions restraining the defendant from removing or selling assets. That suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif on 7-5-1999 as barred under S.69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act (because the firm was unregistered). A revision application by the plaintiffs to this Court was dismissed as not maintainable.

While the earlier suit was pending (or after events), Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 was filed on 17-8-1998 seeking declaration of partnership rights, rendition of accounts, directions to wind up and dissolve the firm, administration till dissolution, decree for any amounts found due, and restraining the defendant from removing or selling partnership assets. In Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 the defendant raised preliminary objections to maintainability, arguing res judicata, bar under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code, and bar under S.69 of the Indian Partnership Act. The court below framed and decided these preliminary issues and held that none of the objections were sustainable and that the subsequent suit (Title Suit No. 49 of 1998) was maintainable.

The defendant filed the present civil revision against the order dated 8-6-2000 passed by the Munsif, Jamui in Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 rejecting his objection regarding maintainability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsequent suit (Title Suit No. 49 of 1998) is barred by Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether the plaintiff has omitted part of the claim in an earlier suit and is therefore precluded from bringing the omitted relief).
  2. To the extent raised below (but not pressed on revision), whether the suit was barred by S.69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act or by res judicata (not pursued by the petitioner before this Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The petitioner initially raised three grounds of objection to maintainability: (a) the suit was barred by res judicata; (b) it was barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code; and (c) it was barred under S.69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • Before this Court the petitioner did not press the points of res judicata and S.69(1) and confined his objection to maintainability under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code, contending that the cause of action in the earlier suit and the subsequent suit was the same and that the plaintiffs should have included all claims and reliefs in the earlier suit; omission of reliefs in the earlier suit precludes them from making additional claims in the subsequent suit under Order II, Rule 2.

Plaintiffs-Opposite Party's Arguments

  • The plaintiffs contended that the cause of action in the two suits is not the same: the earlier suit sought declaration of shares, rendition of accounts and proper administration but did not pray for dissolution of the firm; the subsequent suit included a prayer for dissolution (in addition to accounting), and therefore Order II, Rule 2 of the Code does not bar the subsequent suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sidramappa v. Rajashetty, AIR 1970 SC 1059 Interpretation of Order II, Rule 2: "every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action" and that if a cause of action enables larger relief than that claimed, plaintiff cannot afterwards seek the balance by independent proceedings. The Court relied on this principle to explain the scope of Order II, Rule 2 and to frame the question whether the subsequent suit sought relief beyond that founded on the earlier suit's cause of action.
Kewal Singh v. Smt Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161 Held that Order II, Rule 2 has no application where the plaintiff bases suit on separate and distinct causes of action and may relinquish one and sue on the other; plaintiff may file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct cause of action. The Court used this authority to support the proposition that a distinct or alternative relief (dissolution) may be pursued in a fresh suit when it is founded on a distinct cause of action.
Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub All Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 Part of the articulated test to determine applicability of Order II, Rule 2 — used as precedent on when a new suit is founded on a distinct cause of action. The Court quoted the test (as summarized in subsequent authorities) originating from this line to determine whether the later claim was founded on a cause of action distinct from the earlier suit.
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum (1867 (11) Moo Ind App 551) Support for the test: whether the claim in the new suit is founded on a cause of action distinct from that of the former suit. Included in the Court's summary of authorities forming the multi-part test for Order II, Rule 2 applicability.
Read v. Brown (1889 (22) QBD 128) Definition: cause of action means every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, to support his right to judgment. Quoted in the Court's exposition of what "cause of action" entails for the purpose of applying Order II, Rule 2.
Brunsden v. Humphery (1884 (14) QBD 141) If evidence to support two claims is different, then the causes of action are different; causes may be considered the same if they are identical in substance. Used to support the Court's analysis that differing foundational facts and evidence in the two suits indicate distinct causes of action.
Muss. Chand Kour v. Pratab Singh (1887-1988 (15) Ind. App. 156) Cause of action refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour; it has no relation to possible defences or the character of relief prayed for. Referred to in the Court's summary of authorities defining "cause of action" and its relevance to Order II, Rule 2.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The single question for determination was whether the subsequent suit (Title Suit No. 49 of 1998) was barred by Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court undertook the following analytical steps, based strictly on the reasoning provided in the opinion:

  1. Explanation of the principle underlying Order II, Rule 2: the rule is designed so that "no person should be vexed twice for the same cause of action." It requires that every suit include the whole of the claim and reliefs that the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action; omission generally precludes later claiming the omitted portion.
  2. Recapitulation of authoritative tests (from Supreme Court and earlier authorities) for determining whether two suits involve the same cause of action: the Court relied on the multi-part summary drawn from Kewal Singh and other authorities — whether the claim in the new suit is founded on a cause of action distinct from the former; definition of cause of action as every fact necessary to be proved; if evidence for two claims is different, causes are different; causes may be same if identical in substance; and that "cause of action" refers to the medium upon which plaintiff seeks relief and not to possible defences or the form of relief.
  3. Application to the facts: the Court observed that the earlier suit (Administrative Suit No. 24 of 1996) sought declaration of shares, rendition of accounts and proper administration. That suit was not maintainable and was dismissed under S.69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act because the firm was unregistered.
  4. Consideration of statutory exceptions: the Court noted that S.69(3)(a) of the Indian Partnership Act provides exceptions (inter alia) permitting a suit for dissolution of a partnership firm even by an unregistered firm. Thus a dissolution claim is, by statute, capable of being brought notwithstanding the S.69(1) bar on other claims by unregistered firms.
  5. Distinction between the suits: the Court found that the prayer for dissolution in the subsequent suit constituted a distinct and alternative relief which was not part of and would not have been claimed in the earlier suit. The foundational facts and the evidence required to support the dissolution claim would be different from those in the earlier suit (which focused on declaration, accounting and administration). Because the cause of action for dissolution differed in substance and evidentiary basis from the cause of action in the earlier suit, Order II, Rule 2 did not bar the subsequent suit.
  6. Conclusion on correctness of the court below: on this basis, the Court agreed with the learned Munsif's conclusion that the subsequent suit was not barred by Order II, Rule 2, and therefore the impugned order holding the suit maintainable was rightly made.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The Civil Revision application is dismissed and the order of the court below (holding Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 maintainable) is sustained.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the subsequent suit (Title Suit No. 49 of 1998), which includes a prayer for dissolution of the partnership and rendition of accounts, is not barred by Order II, Rule 2 of the Code on the facts and legal analysis in this opinion.
  • The Court recognized the statutory bar under S.69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act affecting unregistered firms for certain suits, but also noted the exception in S.69(3)(a) allowing a suit for dissolution even by unregistered firms — this statutory distinction contributed to the conclusion that the dissolution claim in the later suit was a distinct cause of action.
  • The opinion does not state that a new legal principle or binding precedent is laid down; the decision applies established tests and precedents (as cited) to the facts and affirms the lower court's order.

Revision dismissed.

    Ramesh Kumar Bhalotia v. Lalit Kumar Bhalotia And Others .

    1. The defendant is the petitioner against the order dated 8-6-2000 passed by Munsif, Jamui in Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 rejecting his objection regarding the maintainability of the suit.

    2. The plaintiffs opposite party on 19-4-1996 filed Administrative Suit No. 24 of 1996 claiming that they and the defendant petitioner are own brothers and they deal in Kerosene oil business in the name and style of National Agencies at jamui. The Kerosene oil business was a Joint family business and looked after by his father as a karta and after his death, the defendant petitioner was looking after the same. In 1989, a partnership deed was created between them which was registered under the provisions of the Registration Act. Later on the defendant - petitioner started acting dishonestly and accordingly the said suit was filed for declaration that the plaintiffs and defendant being partners of National Agencies are entitled to 1/3rd share each in profits and loss and defendant may be directed to render account of the said firm and necessary direction may be issued for rendition of the account and for proper administration of the firm and after adjudication decree for the amount of the plaintiffs share be passed against the defendant and he may be permanently restrained from removing the materials or from selling any of the assets. While the said suit was pending, the present suit Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 was filed on 17-8-1998, out of which this civil revision arises, for declaration that the plaintiffs and the defendant being partners of National Agencies are entitled to 1/3rd share and the defendant may be directed to wind up the firm and to render the account of the said firm and necessary order may be passed by the Court to the defendant for dissolution of the firm and for rendition of account and for proper administration of the business till the dissolution of firm is completed and on adjudication, if any amount is found due, decree for the same may be passed and the defendant may be permanently restrained from removing the materials or from selling any of the assets of the partnership business.

    3. The defendant filed a written statement in the aforesaid Administrative suit raising various objections including maintainability of the suit under S. 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned Munsif considered the matter and by order dated 7-5-1999 held that the suit was barred under S. 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act. The plaintiff Opposite Party filed revision application before this Court which was dismissed as not maintainable. Thereafter the defendant filed a petition under order XIV, Rule 2 of the Civil Produce Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) in Title Suit No. 49 of 1998 to decide the questions of maintainability of the suit. According to him, the suit was not maintainable on three grounds, namely, the suit was barred by principles of res judicata. It was also barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code and under S. 69 of the Act. The Court below decided that aforesaid three grounds as preliminary issues and by the impugned order held that none of the objection raised by the defendant petitioner was sustainable and accordingly held that the suit is maintainable.

    4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he will not press the point regarding the maintainability of the suit on the ground of res judicata and bar under S. 69(1) of the Act. He will confine his objection with regard to maintainability of the suit under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code. According to him, the cause of action in the earlier suit as well as in the subsequent suit being the same the plaintiff would have included all the claims and reliefs in the earlier suit. As he has not claimed entire claims and reliefs in the earlier suit, he is debarred from making additional claims and reliefs in the subsequent suit in view of the provisions contained under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.

    5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite party on the other hand submitted that cause of action in both the suits are not the same. In the earlier suit, the claim was made only for declaration of share and rendition of the accounts and there was no prayer of dissolution of the firm whereas in the subsequent suit the prayer for dissolution of the firm as also prayer for accounting was made and as such the suit is not barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.

    6. The only question that falls for determination is as to whether the subsequent suit is barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.

    7. The provision of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code is based on the principle that no person should be vexed twice for the same cause of action. The rule provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim and the reliefs which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. If he fails to do so, afterwards, he will not be entitled to sue for the portion of the claim or the relief so omitted. However, if there are different causes of actions arising even out of the same transaction, the plaintiff is not obliged to bring suit with regard to all of them. Similarly, when the cause of action on the basis of which the earlier suit was brought, does not form foundation of the subsequent suit and in the earlier suit the said relief would not have been claimed which have been claimed in the subsequent suit, the subsequent suit is not barred under the said provisions.

    8. In the case of Sidramappa v. Rajashetty, AIR 1970 SC 1059, the Apex Court while interpreting the provision of the aforesaid order held that “the requirement of Order 2, Rule 2 is that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. Cause of action is a cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings.”

    9. In the case of Kewal Singh v. Smt Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161 while interpreting the provisions, their lordships held that the aforesaid Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code has no application to cases where the plaintiff bases his suit on separate and distinct cause of action and chooses to relinquish one or the other of them. In such cases it is always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct cause of action which he may have relinquished, following the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub All Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 their Lordships laid down the test to determine the applicability of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code which runs as follows: (at P. 163 of AIR)

    “The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed may be thus summarised: (1) The correct test in cases falling under Order 2, Rule 2 is “Whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, founded on cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit (Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum) (1867 (11) Moo Ind App 551) (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment (Read v. Brown) (1889 (22) QBD 128). (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different then the causes of action are also different (Brunsden v. Humphery) (1884 (14) QBD 141). (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical (Brunsden v. Humphery). (5) The cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend on the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers “to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour” (Muss. Chand Kour v. Pratab Singh) (1887-1988 (15) Ind. App. 156). This observation was made by Lord Watson in a case under S. 43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to Order 2, Rule 2) where plaintiff made various claims in the same suit.”

    10. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it has to be seen as to whether subsequent suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code. The suit filed by the firm not registered under the provisions of the Act is not maintainable under S. 69(1)(2) of the Act. However, there are exceptions to the said provisions as contained in sub-sec. (3)(a) to S. 69 of the Act wherein it is held inter alia that a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm may be filed by even unregistered firm. In the earlier suit, the cause of action was different as there the plaintiffs claimed for declaration of share, proper administration of firm and rendition of accounts. The suit from its very inception was not maintainable in view of the bar created under S. 69(1) of the Act as the firm was not registered and accordingly it was dismissed on that ground. The prayer for dissolution of the firm made in the subsequent suit is a distinct and alternative relief which would not have been claimed in the earlier suit. The foundational facts as well as the evidence will be different in both the suits. As stated above, the cause of action means the cause of action for which the suit was brought. In the earlier Suit there was a different claim whereas in subsequent suit prayer for dissolution of the firm and other consequential relief was made and as such cause of action in both the suits are different. This apart, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to make a prayer for dissolution of the firm in the earlier suit and this is an alternative relief which they could claim by filing a fresh suit. Thus, the learned Munsif rightly held that the suit was not barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code.

    11. Accordingly, this Civil Revision application is dismissed.

    Revision dismissed.

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    Ramesh Kumar Bhalotia v. Lalit Kumar Bhalotia And Others .
    (Mar 14, 2001)