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  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of O. 1, Civil P.C (hereinafter referred
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code. Sub-rule (2),
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of O. 1 of the Code
  • Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of O. 1, Civil P.C (hereinafter referred
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code. Sub-rule (2),
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of O. 1 of the Code
  • Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Opposite parties 1 and 2 sued opposite party 3 for specific performance. Two applicants (interveners) applied under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1, Civil P.C. to be impleaded as parties. The trial Court (Additional Subordinate Judge) rejected that application by an order dated 3-11-1983 (the opinion later refers to confirmation of an order passed on February 3, 1983). The interveners challenged the trial Court's refusal by filing the present revision in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the interveners-applicants are "necessary parties" or "proper parties" within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code and therefore ought to be impleaded in the suit for specific performance.

Arguments of the Parties

Interveners' Arguments

  • The property agreed to be sold by opposite party 3 to opposite parties 1 and 2 was joint Hindu family property acquired from joint family funds, and therefore the interveners should be impleaded.
  • Counsel for the interveners argued that considerations in a case of specific performance of immovable property differ from a contract simpliciter (a distinction the Court did not accept).
  • The interveners urged prevention of multiplicity of suits as a ground for impleading them.
  • The interveners' counsel asked the Court not to follow the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and drew attention to decisions in Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni v. Natverlal Shankerlal Upadhyaya and Shivashankareppa Mahadevappa Parakanhatti v. Shivappa Parappa Kupati.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • Plaintiffs relied on the Full Bench decision in Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik (AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148), which held interveners in identical factual circumstances were neither necessary nor proper parties and could not be impleaded under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik, AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148 Full Bench held interveners who were joint-family members claiming interest in subject property were neither necessary nor proper parties and could not be impleaded under Order 1, Rule 10(2). The Court noted the facts were identical and treated the Full Bench decision as supporting dismissal of the interveners' application.
Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni v. Natverlal Shankerlal Upadhyaya, AIR 1975 Guj 178 Principle that parties to the contract are the only necessary parties to a suit for specific performance; exception where a person in possession claiming title adverse to the vendor should be impleaded. The Court observed this authority and held it lent no support to the interveners because they were not in possession of the property in dispute.
Shivashankareppa Mahadevappa Parakanhatti v. Shivappa Parappa Kupati, AIR 1943 Bom 27 Emphasized that ordinarily the parties to the contract are the necessary parties in specific performance suits (and recognized the possession-based exception noted above). The Court treated this decision similarly to the Gujarat decision and found it did not assist the interveners, who were not in possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began from the principle that ordinarily the plaintiff is dominus litis and the parties to the suit are determined by statute; alteration is permissible only under statutory powers (Order 1, Rule 10(2)). It explained the statutory distinction between "necessary parties" (those who ought to have been joined) and "proper parties" (those whose presence is necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate the questions in the suit).

Applying that framework, the Court found the question whether the defendant acquired the property with joint family funds (making it joint family property) was wholly foreign to the scope of the suit as framed by the plaint and the defendant's written statement; therefore the interveners were not "necessary parties."

The Court also rejected the interveners' attempt to draw a distinction between specific performance of immovable property and a contract simpliciter, holding the array of parties is the same regardless of the subject matter. It considered authorities: the Madhya Pradesh Full Bench decision supported non-impleadment in identical facts, while the Gujarat and Bombay decisions recognized only a narrow exception (a person in possession claiming adverse title), which did not apply here because the interveners were not in possession.

The Court further reasoned that allowing impleadment would convert the lis into disputes among defendants and enlarge the controversy unnecessarily. It emphasized that a decree for specific performance is in personam and will not bind non-parties; hence impleading all persons claiming any interest to avoid multiplicity of suits would be impermissible and beyond the statute's scope.

Holding and Implications

Revision dismissed.

Direct effect: The revision is dismissed and the trial Court's order refusing to implead the applicants under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code is confirmed; the applicants remain non-parties and are not impleaded. The opinion does not discuss any broader precedent being established beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

    Ram Bilash Pandey And Others v. Jai Narayan Gupta And Others Opposite Parties.

    1. Opposite parties 1 and 2 instituted a suit for specific performance against opposite party 3. The applicants applied under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of O. 1, Civil P.C (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) for being impleaded as parties. This application was rejected by the trial Court by its order dated 3-11-1983. In consequent the interveners-applicants have come up in revision to this Court.

    2. Shortly stated the ground, on which the applicants solicited that they may be impleaded as defendants to the suit, was that the property, which had been agreed to be sold by defendant-opposite party 3 to the plaintiffs-opposite parties 1 and 2, was joint Hindu family property and had been acquired by opposite party 3 from the joint family funds which were in his possession. The Additional Subordinate Judge was of the view that the applicants-interveners were neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit and the application moved by them under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code was not legally maintainable. The correctness of this view has been assailed before me.

    3. Ordinarily a plaintiff to a suit is dominus litis. It is for him to decide the forum where the suit is to be instituted and the persons who have to be impleaded as a party. His choice as to the place of institution of the suit or the parties to it can only be altered or interfered with by the Court under powers given to it by the statute. There is no dispute in the instant case with regard to the place where the suit ought to have been instituted. The only dispute relates to the question as to whether the applicants are proper or necessary parties to it.

    4. The provisions of law, which govern a case of this nature, is contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code. Sub-rule (2), inter alia, provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, direct that the name of any person who ought to have been joined whether as the plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in such suit may be added. The persons who ought to have been joined as the plaintiff or as the defendants as the case may be are for the sake of convenience, referred to as necessary parties. The expression ‘proper party’ has been coined in relation to such persons whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely (to) adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. It has, therefore, to be examined whether the applicants on the averments made by them would be considered either as ‘necessary parties’ or ‘proper parties’. If they do not fall in any of these categories, the revision application must fail.

    5. Now the question as to whether the property had been acquired by the defendant-opposite party 3 with joint family funds and was in consequence a joint family property, was wholly foreign to the scope of the suit. On the allegations made in the plaint and in the written statement filed by opposite party 3, the adjudication of this question was not necessary. It cannot, therefore, be said that the intervener-applicant were necessary parties to the suit. The only question which requires examination is whether they fall under the category of proper party.

    6. Learned counsel appearing for the Interveners-applicants contended that the claim of the plaintiff-opposite parties 1 and 2 related to immoveable property. He submitted that the considerations which would arise in a case of specific performance of a contract simpliciter would not govern the instant case. I am unable to appreciate the distinction which is sought to be drawn by the learned counsel between a contract governing immovable property and a contract simpliciter. The array of parties in a suit for specific performance shall be the same irrespective of the subject matter of the contract.

    7. On behalf of plaintiff-opposite parties 1 and 2 reliance has been placed on a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik, AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148. The facts of that case are identical with the facts of the present case. There also interveners sought to be joined as parties in a suit for specific performance on the ground that they were members of a joint Hindu family and were interested in the subject matter of the suit. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, after a careful examination of the various decisions of different Courts, came to the conclusion that the interveners were neither necessary parties nor proper parties. They could not be given the benefit of Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code. It accordingly turned down the request of the interveners to be impleaded as parties to the suit for specific performance.

    8. Learned counsel for the interveners-applicants has pleaded that I should not follow the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. He has invited my attention to the decisions of the case of Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni v. Natverlal Shankerlal Upadhyaya, AIR 1975 Guj 178 and the case of Shivashankareppa Mahadevappa Parakanhatti v. Shivappa Parappa Kupati, AIR 1943 Bom 27. In these cases, the principle that in a suit for specific performance, the parties to the contract are the only necessary parties to the suit has been stressed. To this general rule, an exception has been engrafted and that is to the effect that if a person is in possession of a property in respect of which a suit for specific performance is filed, he should also be impleaded as a party thereto if he claims a title adverse to the vendor. This exception is based on the principle that the plaintiff of the suit will ultimately obtain possession against the person who is in actual possession of the property and claims a title adverse to the vendors. If such person is also brought on record and given a chance to contest the suit, there is no likelihood of inconvenience to the purchaser and multiplicity of legal proceedings is also avoided. In the instant case, the intervener-applicants were not in possession of the property which was the subject matter of the suit for specific performance. The Gujarat and Bombay High Courts' decisions, therefore, lend no support to the contention advanced on behalf of the intervener-applicants.

    9. As already observed earlier, a party to a suit cannot be thrust on an unwilling plaintiff, unless otherwise provided by law. The lis is between the purchaser on one hand and the vendor on the other except such unusual cases as are referred to in the case of Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni (AIR 1975 Guj 178) (supra), no other person is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the suit. In case, the intervener-applicants' prayer for impleadment had been allowed, the result would have been to convert the lis as a dispute between the defendants inter se. At all events the controversy in the suit would have been unnecessarily enlarged by the introduction of facts with which the plaintiff would have no direct concern.

    10. Learned counsel for the interveners-applicants contended that the impleadment for the applicants is necessary in order to prevent multiplicity of suits. It is to be remembered that the decree in a suit for specific performance is not a decree in rem. It acts in personem and binds only the persons who were parties to the suit. It is well known that a person cannot pass a title to his vendee which is better than the title he himself possessed. The interveners-applicants claim to be members of a joint Hindu family along with original defendants. Their case was that the property in respect of which the plaintiff-opposite parties 1 and 2 had filed the suit for specific performance had been acquired with the help of joint family funds. There may be other persons who may have adverse interest to that of the defendant-opposite party 3 over the property in dispute. The result of the decree even if adverse to defendant-opposite party 3 shall not bind either the interveners-applicants or any other person claiming to have interest in the property in suit. On the reasoning advanced by the learned counsel for the intervener-applicants on this aspect of the case would make it permissible for the Court to direct under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of O. 1 of the Code to implead every person claiming any interest in the suit property. The test of preventing multiplicity of suits will, therefore, result in the obnoxious consequence of converting a suit for specific performance into a roving inquiry into diverse claims against the defendant to the suit. True it is that the Courts have pointed out that the policy of law is to avoid multiplicity of legal proceedings. The dictum, however, is not a rule of universal application and has to be applied within the four corners of the statute governing jurisdiction and procedure.

    11. For the reasons already stated above, I find no force in this revision application which is accordingly dismissed. The order passed by the trial Court on February 3, 1983, is hereby confirmed.

    Revision dismissed.

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    Ram Bilash Pandey And Others v. Jai Narayan Gupta And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Dec 21, 1983)