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  • section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • section 225 of the English Companies Act, 1948.
  • section 443 of the Indian Companies Act
  • Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960.(3)
  • sub-section (3) of section 446
  • Companies Court Rules, 1959.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • section 225 of the English Companies Act, 1948.
  • section 443 of the Indian Companies Act
  • Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960.(3)
  • sub-section (3) of section 446
  • Companies Court Rules, 1959.
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Madan Mohan Prasad, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Central Bank of India filed a creditor's petition under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking winding up of a company on the ground that the company was unable to pay a debt due to the bank. The company filed a show-cause petition prior to admission; the winding-up petition was admitted and a subsequent Letters Patent Appeal was summarily dismissed. The winding-up petition remains pending and awaits hearing on the merits. While the winding-up petition was pending, the bank instituted a suit for realisation of the debt (Title Suit No. 320 of 1975) in the subordinate judge's court at Patna. On 7 April 1976 the company filed the present application seeking dismissal of the winding-up petition (or, alternatively, an adjournment of the hearing) on the ground that the correctness of the bank's account was disputed, that the bank was not entitled to compound interest, and that the dispute should be resolved in a regular civil suit which, it argued, had rendered the matter sub judice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the institution of a suit by a creditor in a civil court for realisation of a debt operates as a bar to the continuance or hearing of a winding-up petition filed by that creditor.

Arguments of the Parties

Company's Arguments

  • The account of the dues submitted by the bank is incorrect.
  • The bank is not entitled to charge compound interest.
  • Because the debt is in dispute, the matter should be decided in a regular civil suit rather than in winding-up proceedings.
  • The bank has already filed a civil suit for realisation (Title Suit No. 320 of 1975), and therefore the winding-up petition should be dismissed as the matter has become sub judice, or at least the hearing of the petition should be adjourned until the civil suit is decided.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the bank's opposing arguments in the present application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Company Ltd., [1867] 36 LJ Ch 827 Judicial reluctance to adjourn or suspend a winding-up petition because a pending petition hanging over a company is inconvenient; the court should either make an order on the petition or dismiss it. The court cited Lord Justice Cairns' observation to support the proposition that winding-up petitions should not be adjourned lightly and that adjournment can prejudice the company because a winding-up order, if made later, dates back to presentation of the petition.
In re St. Thomas Dock Company, [1875–1876] 2 Ch D 116 A petition may be stood over where there is no practical benefit in making a winding-up order (e.g., when company's property is mortgaged to an extent that leaves nothing for creditors), and where specific circumstances justify a postponement. The court noted that the order in that case was passed for reasons entirely different from the present case (no practical benefit of winding up); it used the case to illustrate that postponement may be justified in distinct factual situations but not generally because a creditor files a suit for realisation.
In re Great Western (Forest of Dean) Coal Consumers' Company, [1882] 21 Ch D 769 While a creditor prima facie has a right to a winding-up order if a debt is shown, that right may be rebutted (for example by a large mass of creditors opposing winding up or where winding up would bring no practical good). The court cited Fry J.'s observation to show that winding-up petitions can be rejected where it would produce no practical good; but this case does not support a rule that filing a separate suit bars winding-up proceedings.
In re Chapel House Colliery Company, [1883] 24 Ch D 259 Postponement of a winding-up petition may be refused where postponement would do great harm to the company and where the petitioner would not be in a better position by obtaining a winding-up order later. The court referenced the decision to indicate that postponement was rejected in past cases where it would prejudice the company and that such decisions were based on the specific facts, not on a general rule that a civil suit precludes winding-up proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the question as whether the creditor's institution of a civil suit for recovery of the debt should operate as a bar to the continuance of a winding-up petition. Noting that the point was one of first impression and that counsel could not produce direct authority on the point, the court analysed the statutory scheme in Part VII of the Companies Act, 1956.

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions as follows:

  • Section 433(e): the statutory entitlement for a creditor to file a petition where the company is unable to pay its debts (the statutory basis for the bank's petition).
  • Section 443(1): provides the orders the court may make "on hearing a winding-up petition" (including dismissal, adjournment, interim orders, or a winding-up order). The court emphasised that the powers in section 443 are to be exercised after hearing the petition on its merits—the phrase "on hearing a winding-up petition" indicates the timing for such orders.
  • Section 442: allows, after presentation of a winding-up petition and before a winding-up order, for applications to stay proceedings in other courts (to be made to the court where the suit is pending if in the Supreme Court/High Court, or to the winding-up court if the suit is in another court) and empowers those courts to stay or restrain the proceedings on such terms as they think fit.
  • Section 446: imposes restrictions once a winding-up order has been made (no suit may be proceeded with except by leave of the court) and vests the winding-up court with jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of suits or proceedings by or against the company, and to transfer proceedings pending in other courts to the winding-up court (sub-section (3)).
  • Section 466: permits the winding-up court to stay proceedings after a winding-up order is made on application by the official liquidator or any creditor/contributory if it is shown that proceedings ought to be stayed.

From these provisions the court reasoned that the legislature provided specific mechanisms to manage parallel proceedings (power to stay or restrain other suits, transfer them, and to control proceedings once a winding-up order is made). If the legislature had intended that merely instituting a suit in another court should automatically stay winding-up proceedings, a provision to that effect would have appeared in the Act; no such provision exists. Instead, the scheme contemplates that the court seised of the winding-up petition has power to restrain or obtain transfer of suits so that it can adjudicate comprehensively upon rights and claims of creditors, contributories and others interested in the company.

The court also considered English authorities which show judicial hesitance to adjourn or suspend winding-up petitions except for specific reasons. Those authorities were used to illustrate that postponement or dismissal of winding-up petitions has been justified only on distinct factual grounds (for example, where winding up would produce no practical benefit), and not on a general principle that the institution of separate civil suits bars winding-up proceedings.

Applying this reasoning to the present case, the court observed that:

  • The petition for winding up had not been heard on merits, the views of other creditors were unknown, and the court had not examined evidence as to the company's financial position or the bona fides of the dispute over the debt.
  • A creditor's filing of a civil suit to preserve limitation or pursue recovery is a remedy available in law and, by itself, does not justify dismissal or adjournment of the winding-up petition.
  • Accordingly, there was no statutory or jurisprudential justification to dismiss the winding-up petition or to adjourn its hearing solely because the creditor had instituted a civil suit.

The court additionally noted facts suggesting delay by the company (including a prolonged period during which a compromise reportedly prevailed, delayed publication of the statutory advertisement, and defaults in payments under an agreed instalment arrangement) and observed an impression that the company's petition might not be bona fide. Nevertheless, the court declined to award costs because it recognised that costs should not be imposed as punishment.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Direct effect: The company's application (seeking dismissal of the creditor's winding-up petition or an adjournment of its hearing on account of a civil suit filed by the creditor) was dismissed. The winding-up petition therefore remains pending for hearing on its merits.

Consequences and implications as explained in the opinion:

  • The mere institution of a civil suit by a creditor for realisation of a debt does not, by itself, bar or require dismissal/adjournment of a winding-up petition filed by that creditor under section 433(e).
  • The Companies Act contains specific provisions (notably sections 442, 446 and 466) enabling courts to stay, restrain, transfer or control suits and proceedings in the context of winding-up so as to allow the winding-up court to adjudicate comprehensively; the statutory scheme therefore contemplates active case management rather than an automatic stay of winding-up proceedings because of a separate suit.
  • The opinion does not expressly state that it is creating a binding new precedent beyond deciding the application before the court; it addresses the statutory scheme and applies it to the facts, dismissing the company's application for the reasons given.

    Central Bank Of India v. Sukhani Mining And Engineering Industries Pvt. Ltd. And Others

    Madan Mohan Prasad, J.:— This is an application filed by the company on the 7th of April, 1976, for dismissing the petition for a winding-up order filed by a creditor.

    2. The Central Bank of India, a creditor of the company, filed the petition for winding-up under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), on the ground that the company was unable to pay the debt due to the bank. Before the petition aforesaid was admitted, the company was heard and it filed a show-cause petition. The application was, however, admitted. As against that there was a Letters Patent Appeal which was summarily dismissed. The petition for winding-up is thus awaiting hearing on merits. It appears that during the pendency of the application for winding up, the bank filed a suit for realisation of the money, being Title Suit No. 320 of 1975, in the court of the subordinate judge at Patna. In view of that the company has come up with the present application.

    3. In this application it has been stated, and this was stated earlier too, that the account of the dues submitted by the bank is not correct and that the bank is not entitled to charge compound interest. Further, it has been stated that this being a disputed matter it should be gone into in a regular civil suit. Then it is said that the bank has already filed a suit and the matter relating to the correctness of the account has become sub-judical on that account. In view of these reasons a prayer has been made that the petition for winding up be dismissed.

    4. At the hearing, I may add, the counsel for the company prayed that, if not dismissed, the hearing may be adjourned until the decision of the suit aforesaid.

    5. The point for decision thus is whether the institution of a suit by a creditor in the civil court for the realisation of the debt is or ought to act as a bar to the continuance of a winding-up proceeding. The point is one of first impression and counsel for the parties have failed, in spite of sufficient time being given for this very purpose, to produce before me any direct decision on the point.

    6. Looking at the Act, I do not find any provision which either ousts the jurisdiction of this court in continuing and deciding the winding-up proceeding in spite of the fact that there is a suit by the creditor for the realisation of the debt. The relevant provision which entitles a creditor to file a petition for winding up of a company is to be found in clause (e) of section 433 which merely says that a company may be wound up by the court if the company is unable to pay its debts. Section 434 of the Act states the circumstances in which a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. That need not detain me, for, there is nothing relevant therein to the issue for decision. Then comes section 443 of the Act which provides for the final order which the court is entitled to pass, the relevant part of which reads:

    “443. (1) On hearing a winding-up petition, the court may—

    (a) dismiss it, with or without costs; or

    (b) adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally; or

    (c) make any interim order that it thinks fit; or

    (d) make an order for winding up the company with or without costs, or any other order that it thinks fit:

    Provided that the court shall not refuse to make a winding-up order on the ground only that the assets of the company have been mortgaged to an amount equal to or in excess of those assets, or that the company has no assets.”

    7. The other parts of the section are not relevant to the questions at discussion. It would be relevant to refer to two other sections which would be useful to the present discussion. They are sections 442 and 446 of the Act. Section 442 provides as follows:

    “At any time after the presentation of a winding-up petition and before a winding-up order has been made, the company, or any creditor or contributory, may—

    (a) where any suit or proceeding against the company is pending in the Supreme Court or in any High Court, apply to the court in which the suit or proceeding is pending for a stay of proceedings therein; and

    (b) where any suit or proceeding is pending against the company in any other court, apply to the court having jurisdiction to wind up the company, to restrain further proceedings in the suit or proceeding;

    and the court to which application is so made may stay or restrain the proceedings accordingly, on such terms as it thinks fit.”

    8. And section 446 lays down:

    “446. (1) When a winding-up order has been made or the official liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding-up order, shall be proceeded with, against the company, except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose.

    (2) The court which is winding up the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of—

    (a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company;

    (b) any claim made by or against the company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India);

    (c) any application made under section 391 by or in respect of the company;

    (d) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in course of the winding up of the company;

    whether such suit or proceeding has been instituted or is instituted, or such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the order for the winding up of the company, or before or after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960.

    (3) Any suit or proceeding by or against the company which is pending in any court other than that in which the winding up of the company is proceeding may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be transferred to and disposed of by that court.

    (4) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court.”

    9. There is one more section which I would like to refer to and that is section 466 of the Act which provides that the court may at any time after making a winding-up order, on the application either of the official liquidator or of any creditor or contributory, and on proof to the satisfaction of the court that all proceedings in relation to the winding up ought to be stayed, make an order staying the proceedings, either altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit.

    10. It is on the basis of section 443(1)(a) and (b) of the Act that the learned counsel for the company has urged that the petition ought to be dismissed or at least adjourned until the decision of the suit. In my view, the order to be passed under section 443 of the Act is to be passed after the hearing of the petition for winding up on its merits. The scheme of the Act makes it clear too. Part VII of the Act deals with winding-up. Chapter I begins with section 425 relating to the modes of winding up sections 426 to 432 relate to contributories. Then begins Chapter II of the Part relating to winding up by the court. Section 433 deals with circumstances in which the company may be wound up; section 434 with the circumstances when the company is deemed to be unable to pay its debts; sections 435 to 438 relate to transfer of proceedings; sections 439 to 441 deal with provisions as to the application for winding up, the right to present the petition where the company is being wound up voluntarily or subject to the court's supervision and section 441 with the commencement of winding up by the court. In the case of winding up of a company by the court it is deemed to commence at the time of presentation of the winding-up petition. Section 442, which I have quoted earlier, provides the court with power to stay or restrain proceedings against a company during the period of presentation of the petition for winding up and before the passing of a winding-up order and then comes section 443. It will be important to bear in mind that the wordings of section 443 begin with “on hearing a winding-up petition…” The order under section 443, therefore, in my view, is to be the order which has to be passed on the hearing of the winding-up petition itself. It may either result in dismissal of an order for winding up or adjournment of the hearing or any other interim order deemed fit by the court.

    11. The rules relating to the procedure of the hearing of a petition for winding up are to be found in Part III of the Companies Court Rules, 1959. The application has thus to be heard on its merits and then the court is entitled to pass any of the orders under section 443.

    12. What is important to be noticed next is that the legislature has provided for the situation where there is a suit pending before a winding-up order has been passed or even thereafter, as will appear from sections 442 and 446. The provision of section 442 shows that where the suit or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court or the High Court the application has to be made to that very court for a stay of the suit or proceeding and if it is pending in any other court, the application has to be made to the court having jurisdiction to wind up the company, to restrain further proceedings in the suit or proceeding. Similarly, section 446 lays down that no suit or legal proceeding shall be commenced or if pending at the date of the winding-up order, shall be proceeded with, except by the leave of the court. The court in this case is the court where the suit or proceeding is pending. According to sub-section (2), however, the court which is winding up the company has jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of any suit or proceeding by or against the company, whether such suit or proceeding has been instituted or is instituted before or after the order for the winding up of the company. What has to be noticed from these provisions is that the legislature intended to provide for the stay of the suit or proceeding itself. I venture to think that if the legislature had intended that on account of the fact that a suit or proceeding has been filed in another court, the court in seisin of the winding-up application will stay the winding-up proceeding on that ground alone, there would have been a provision to that effect in the Companies Act. But I find none. The reason is not far to seek. To my mind, a winding-up proceeding is not merely for the benefit of the petitioner but of all its shareholders, creditors or contributories. When a court is seized with a winding-up application it can stay the suit or proceeding in the other court. In view of sub-section (3) of section 446 such a suit or proceeding can be transferred to the court which is winding up. Therefore, the intention of the legislature appears to be to clothe the court in seisin of the winding-up proceeding with all the powers to restrain suits or proceedings to get them transferred to itself to hear them in order to be able to adjudicate finally upon the rights and claims of the various kinds of persons interested in a company and its working. It seems to me that for that reason the legislature has not provided that as soon as a suit is instituted in any court, the winding-up proceeding itself should be stayed.

    13. In In re Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Company Ltd., [1867] 36 LJ Ch 827, although the point at issue was whether the court should order the winding up of the company which had not yet commenced its business, Lord Justice Cairns was invited to adjourn the hearing of the petition and he observed as follows:

    “I am averse to adjourning or suspending the petition, for this reason, that I think it is always a very inconvenient thing for a company to have a pending petition for a winding-up order hanging over their heads. I think the court should, as far as possible, either make an order upon the petition for the winding up of the company, if it is a fit case, or, if not, dismiss the petition.”

    14. His Lordship further observed:

    “……because it is well known if the petition is adjourned, it is adjourned with the consequences imminent over the company, if the winding-up order is made, the winding up will date back to the presentation of the petition, and avoid, therefore, or imperil anything that is being done by the company in the meantime.”

    15. It will be noticed that section 443 of the Indian Companies Act is equivalent to section 225 of the English Companies Act, 1948. I have not been able to lay my hands on any case directly on the point. There are, however, a few cases which may have some bearing and I propose to notice them. In the famous case of In re St. Thomas Dock Company, [1875–1876] 2 Ch D 116 (Ch D) a petition for winding up a company formed to repair and work a floating dock in the West Indies was filed by one of the debenture-holders and was opposed by the company. In that case the petition for winding up was ordered to stand over for six months upon the company undertaking not to consent to a winding-up order on another petition or to winding up voluntarily, etc. The reason for the order will appear from the judgment of Jessel M.R to be entirely different. The creditor there had filed the petition that there was no probability of the creditor getting anything at all because the whole of the property of the company was subject to a mortgage exceeding its value. The learned Master of the Rolls, therefore, found that there would be no use ordering the winding up of the company. On behalf of the company it was said that the dock which had not been completed earlier because of unfortunate accidents, had started earning money and it was likely to be a very prosperous concern and earn profit and, therefore, time was asked for. On that ground the aforesaid order was passed.

    16. In the case of In re Great Western [Forest of Dean) Coal Consumers' Company, [1882] 21 Ch D 769, 773, there was a creditor's petition for winding up of the company. In that case Fry J. observed:

    “As against the company I conceive that, prima facie, a person who is shown to have a debt which the company does not satisfy has a right ex debito justitiae to a winding-up order. But that prima facie right may be rebutted……the moment it is shown that there is a large mass of other creditors who are opposed to the winding-up.”

    17. In this case also the prayer for winding up was rejected because the learned judge found that there was to be no practical good resulting from the winding-up order and the petition was ordered to stand over for a period of six months on the company giving certain undertakings.

    18. In In re Chapel House Colliery Company, [1883] 24 Ch D 259 (CA), there was a petition by the debenture-holder for the winding-up of the company, which was being opposed by other creditors. Mr. Justice Kay had directed the petition for the winding-up to stand over for two months. As against that there was an appeal. The property of the company, the colliery, was subject to a large mortgage and it appeared that if it was so it would not realise enough to pay the mortgage and there would be nothing left for the debenture-holders. Lord Justice Baggallay held that in that case the petitioner would not be in a better position by obtaining a winding-up order. His Lordship rejected the prayer for a postponement on the ground that it would do the company great harm, for, it would almost paralyse the company and the order of winding up, if at all passed, would relate back. Their Lordships, Cotton and Bowen L., JJ., agreed.

    19. There is thus no decision either of the Indian or of English courts which I could lay my hands on or which could be brought to my notice to show that the mere fact that a creditor files a suit for the realisation of the debt could debar him from proceeding with his petition for winding up the company. There is nothing either to show that the court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to proceed with the winding-up proceeding or that it would even be proper to stay the winding-up proceeding itself or dismiss the petition for that reason alone.

    20. What am I asked in this case to do? I am asked to stay this proceeding because there is a suit for realisation of the money by the creditor. The petition for winding up has not yet been heard. The wishes of the other creditors are not known to me. We have not yet gone into the evidence to find out whether the company is running at a loss or at a profit and whether it is likely to run at a loss, whether the creditor's dues are disputed or otherwise and yet I am asked to dismiss the petition for winding up or at least to adjourn its hearing, merely because the creditor has filed a suit and obviously a creditor is bound to file a suit in order to escape the rigours of the law of limitation and that is a remedy open to a creditor in law.

    21. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any justification for dismissing the petition for winding up or to adjourn the hearing of that petition on the ground urged on behalf of the counsel. This application is accordingly dismissed.

    22. Like Lord Jessel M.R in the case of St. Thomas' Dock Company, [1875–1876] 2 Ch D 116, I have a very strong impression, to adopt his words, that this is not a bona fide petition by a company. Before I admitted the application for winding up, I allowed the company a hearing. It was said that the matter had been compromised between the parties and the parties would abide by that and for that reason I deferred the publication of the advertisement in the newspapers lest the company's reputation was harmed by that. For a considerable period, the matter of compromise was kept hanging and for that reason the proceeding was delayed.

    23. Ultimately, the company failed to pay the dues by instalments as agreed to between them and thereafter the advertisements were ordered to be published on the 5th of April, 1974, after nearly one year of the date of its admission on April 27, 1973, for various reasons. The petition has not been heard during two years which have elapsed since then. To a large extent, I find from the records, the fault lies with the company for delaying the present proceeding. I was, therefore, at first inclined to pass an order for costs, but I am conscious that award of costs should not be done by way of punishment and I, therefore, refrain from doing so.

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    Central Bank Of India v. Sukhani Mining And Engineering Industries Pvt. Ltd. And Others
    (Apr 22, 1976)