R.K Choudhary, J.:— This application for issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been made by four teachers of the Vivekanand High School at Sakchi in the district of Singhbhum whose services have been terminated by order dated 12-1-1956 by the managing committee of the Ramkrishna Mission, Vivekanand Society. The petitioners state that they were holding permanent appointments in the said school and that the Honorary Secretary of the Ramkrishna Mission, Vivekanand Society, Jamshedpur (opposite party No. 1) issued orders on 12-1-1956 terminating the services of the petitioners with immediate effect without giving them any opportunity of hearing or without calling upon them to show cause as to why their services should not be terminated.
2. It is further stated that the petitioners filed appeals to the Inspector of Schools, Chota Nagpur Division, who, on 6-10-1956, informed the petitioners that their appeals have been submitted to the Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, with his findings and recommedations thereon. On 4-3-1957, the petitioners received from the District Inspector of Schools, Chota Nagpur Division, a memorandum forwarding extract copy of a letter from the Secretary, Board of Secondary Schools, Bihar, to the Inspector of Schools. According to that communication, the petitioners were informed that the President rejected the request of the discharged teachers to be reinstated in the school as these teachers did not maintain discipline and did not behave properly at a time when the school faced difficulties. The petitioners thereupon filed the present application in this Court for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the managing committee dated 12-1-1956 terminating their services with immediate effect and the order of the President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, communicated to the petitioners by the District Inspector of Schools referred to above. Notice was issued to the opposite party to show cause why the above order should not be quashed and the Honorary Secretary (opposite party No. 1) has shown cause by filing a counter-affidavit sworn by the Head Master of the school.
3. An objection has been raised to the grant of any writ in the present case under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on an application being made by the four petitioners against four different orders of the same date passed against them separately terminating their services. It has been contended that the four petitioners were served with four different orders terminating their services and they should, therefore, have made four separate applications for separate writs. The objection is well founded and must prevail. The statement of law on this subject is given in Halsbury's Laws of England (Second Edition), Volume IX, paragraph 1325 at page 783 in these terms:
“Two or more persons cannot join in a single application for a writ of mandamus to enforce separate claims. There must be separate applications for separate writs, and this although the several applicants are successors in the office in respect of which the claims arise.”
4. It is manifest from the above passage that separate applications must be made for issue of separate writs to quash separate orders otherwise on one application, if it succeeds, several separate writs will have to be issued. That will lead to an absurd position. I am, therefore, of the view that the present application should fail on this ground alone. The same view has, been taken in Mandir Thakar Dawara, Dhuri v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 Pepsu 159 (A) and Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Raj 185 (B).
5. Even on merit, the petitioners have no case. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that in this case there has been violation of the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the services of the petitioners have been terminated without giving them reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. It is, however, an undisputed fact in this case that the petitioners entered into their services under agreements though they were execution subsequent to their appointment. It a also an admitted fact in the case that, even under the rule under the Education Code or notification of the Government of Bihar, Education Department relating to the terms of their service, they had to enter into an agreement with the managing committee after entering into service.
6. The terms of the agreements which were executed by the petitioners are annexures 1 to 4 of the counter-affidavit filed by opposite party no. 1 which are in similar terms. Clause 6 of the agreement recites that the above agreement may be terminated a any time by either party on giving to the other party one calendar month's notice in writing if intention to determine the same, or by paying one month salary in lieu of such notice, provided that the said school authority shall be entitled to terminate the service of the said teacher without notice in the event of gross misconduct. The appointment having been made on a contract, the parties were bound by the terms of the contract and, if the contract permitted the managing committee to terminate the services of the petitioners without any notice, there was nothing wrong with the orders passed by the managing committed terminating the services of the petitioners.
7. Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India does not apply to a case where the services of a person have been terminated in terms of the contract of service. This view is fully supported by a decision of this Court in Nand Kishore Prasad v. The State of Bihar, 1957 BLJR 22 : (AIR 1957 Pat 541) (C). It was held in this case that Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India has no application to cases where a person is discharged in terms of the contract of service and that the order of discharge is not tantamount to a dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. It was further held that the employer is entitled under the terms, of the special contract to terminate the post without notice and without assigning any reason for his action and that in such a case there is no violation of any constitutional provision. This decision fully applies to the facts of the present case. The contention of the petitioners, therefore, has to be rejected.
8. Our attention has been drawn to the provisions of the Bihar Education Code as well as to the notification No. II/R4.CI/55E-5172 of 7-9-1955 issued by the Government of Bihar, Education Department. It is not, however, necessary to examine in detail the above rules. In the present case the services of the petitioners, as already stated, being on contract basis, they were bound by the terms of the contract which provided for the termination of their services without any notice or without giving any reason.
9. Moreover, as held in Sri Saligram Sanghi v. R. Prasad, 1957 BLJR 114 (D), the Bihar Education Code is a mere compilation of executive orders issued from time to time by the State Government for the guidance of the Director of Public Instruction, who is the head of the Department of Public Instruction, and his subordinates, and, for efficient administration of the educational institutions in accordance with the educational policy of the State Government, and it is not a collection of statutory rules. Thus it is manifest that these rules have got no statutory value and, therefore, no writ can be issued if there has been any violance of those rules.
10. For the reasons given above, there appears to be no merit in the application which must be dismissed with cost; hearing fee Rs. 100/-.
11. V. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.
H.G.P
12. Application dismissed.