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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (R.K. Choudhary, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision application was presented by the defendant (the petitioner) in Mortgage Suit No. 12 of 1956 pending before the First Additional Subordinate Judge at Hazaribagh. The plaintiff instituted the suit to enforce a mortgage alleged to have been executed by the petitioner on 8 December 1952. The petitioner contested, asserting that she executed the registered document believing it to be a security bond, not a mortgage, and that no consideration passed. She alleged that her husband was a working partner in the cloth shop Sri Vishnu Bastra Bhandar and that capital for the shop was supplied by her husband, the plaintiff's father-in-law, and the plaintiff's husband's brother; she further alleged that those persons formed an undivided Mitakshara Hindu family so that there was no occasion for the petitioner to take a loan from the plaintiff.

To support her claim about the family and partnership relationships, the petitioner produced certified copies of documents from the Income-tax Department (firm registration papers, returns of income, balance sheets and assessment records) and asked the court below to call for the originals from the Income-tax Department. The Subordinate Judge refused that prayer and later rejected the petitioner's application to receive the certified copies in evidence on the ground that the papers were neither public documents nor legally obtained certified copies. The petitioner then sought revision in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Income-tax Department documents produced (registration, returns, balance sheet, assessment records) are public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  2. Whether the admissibility of those documents in evidence by a person other than the assessee is barred by Section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act.
  3. Whether certified copies of those documents are admissible under Section 65(e) and/or obtainment under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act when sought by a person other than the maker (assessee) of the documents.
  4. Whether the petitioner had any right to inspect or obtain certified copies (for example, by claiming to be a partner) such that Section 76 would apply in her favour.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Defendant in the mortgage suit)

  • The documents in question are public documents and therefore admissible (relying on Section 74 of the Evidence Act and several authorities).
  • Because the documents are public, certified copies are admissible under Section 65(e) of the Evidence Act.
  • Under Section 76 of the Evidence Act a person who has an interest in a document is entitled to obtain certified copies; the petitioner asserted an interest (arguing a partnership connection with the shop) and thus claimed a right to copies.
  • Relied on several case authorities (listed below in the precedents) to support the right to obtain and produce certified copies.

Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff / Opposite party)

  • Submitted that Section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act makes the documents confidential and therefore inadmissible in evidence when sought to be produced by a person other than the assessee.
  • Contended that the certified copies tendered were not certified copies within the meaning of Section 76 of the Evidence Act and therefore were not admissible.
  • The plaintiff's counsel conceded, however, that the documents were public documents under Section 74 (this concession conceded only the character as public documents, not admissibility for a non-assessee).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Anwar Ali v. Tafodal Ahmad, ILR 2 Rang. 391 (AIR 1925 Rang. 84) Held that Section 76 of the Evidence Act does not authorize issue of certified copies of income-tax returns to private persons who have no right to inspect; issue unlawful under Section 54 of the Income-tax Act. The judgment was cited in support of the proposition that a non-assessee cannot obtain certified copies; the Court treated it as supporting the view that certified copies issued to non-right-holders are unlawful and inadmissible.
Ma Hla Mra Khine v. Ma Hla Kra Pru, AIR 1938 Rang. 276 High Court set aside an order compelling production of income-tax returns; emphasised Section 54 makes returns confidential between assessee and department and prevents forcing the assessee to obtain and furnish such material to a litigant. Relied on as authority that Section 54 prevents a court-ordered route to procure confidential material from the Income-tax Department via the assessee; supports denial of certified copies to non-assessee.
Promatha Nath v. Nirode Chandra, AIR 1940 Cal. 187 Held original assessment orders within the scope of Section 54; a certified copy produced by a defendant (non-assessee) was not admissible; observations that an assessee may waive confidentiality but use by a co-assessee to detriment of another would be problematic. Cited and quoted to show that assessment materials are confidential and that certified copies produced by non-makers are inadmissible; the Court used it to reinforce that confidentiality protects assessees from third-party use.
Smt. Pandei v. Babulal Sah, AIR 1958 Pat. 237 Single Judge held documents filed with the Income-tax Department are confidential; no person other than the maker of the return was entitled to a certified copy. Relied upon as a directly supportive authority for the proposition that non-makers cannot claim certified copies; the Court followed this view.
Quaen-Empress v. Arumugam, ILR 20 Mad. 189 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that, if documents are public documents, an interested person (e.g., accused) has a right to inspect and obtain copies; the Bench held that an interested accused was entitled to inspect and obtain copies. The Court observed that this case does not support the petitioner's narrower contention that mere interest (without a statutory or inspection right) entitles a person to certified copies; the opinion distinguished this authority from the present facts.
Chandi Charan v. Boistab Charan, ILR 31 Cal. 284 Illustrates that a party seeking certified copy was held to be entitled to inspect the original document. Used to show prior decisions where entitlement to copy depended on a right to inspect; the Court did not accept these as authorising copies for persons who lack any inspection right under Section 54.
Mutter v. Eastern and Midland Rly. Co., (1888) 38 Ch. D. 92 English authority indicating that the right to inspect and take copies depends on the applicant's interest and necessity for protection of such interest. Referred to for the general proposition about interest and right to inspect in English law; the Court noted that Indian position differs and denied a corresponding general common‑law right in India.
Venkata Gopala Narasimha Rama Rao v. Chitluri Venkataramayva, AIR 1940 Mad. 768 (Full Bench) / referenced as AIR 1940 Mad. 70 (FB) Full Bench held an assessee could put a certified copy of his own return in evidence; Leach, C.J. described departmental practice allowing certain persons (maker, known partner, manager/representative of HUF) to inspect or receive copies. The Court accepted that an assessee (or those whom the department permits to inspect such as a known partner) may waive Section 54 and produce certified copies, but distinguished that from a non-maker (the petitioner here), who had no right to inspect.
Suraj Narain v. Jhabbu Lal, AIR 1944 All. 114 Held Section 54 does not prevent an assessee disclosing contents of documents; interpreted “right to inspect” in Section 76 broadly as the right to look into the record. The Court accepted the narrow point that an assessee may waive confidentiality but disagreed with the broader interpretation of “right to inspect” adopted in that case for the purposes of Section 76.
Smt. Buchibai v. Nagpur University, AIR 1946 Nag. 377 Held assessee may waive the right conferred by Section 54 and give evidence of the particulars contained; interpreted Section 76 permissively (a single person with a right to inspect suffices). The Court disagreed with that interpretation of Section 76 and treated the decision as not supporting the petitioner's position that a non-maker could obtain certified copies merely by showing some interest.
Emperor v. Osman Chotani, AIR 1942 Bom. 289 Police-seized documents: court held production could be compelled; raised the issue whether confidentiality persisted once documents were outside income-tax officers' custody. The opinion noted the decision but observed the factual issue it decided (documents seized by police) does not arise in the present case and did not need to be examined here.
Somanna v. Subba Rao, AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 200 Cited by petitioner as authority for admissibility of certified copies. The Court noted the reliance but did not treat it as controlling; the Court adhered to the position that non-assessees cannot obtain or produce such documents except under Section 54(3).
AIR 1938 Andh. Pra. 200 Single Judge held certified copies of income-tax returns could be given in evidence under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act, without requiring a public servant to produce the originals. Cited by petitioner as support for admissibility, but the Court concluded that the combined effect of Section 54 and Section 76 precluded a non-maker from obtaining certified copies; therefore the Court did not follow that approach for non-assessees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured analytical sequence:

  1. Characterisation of documents: The Court accepted (and noted the plaintiff's concession) that the Income-tax Department papers are public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
  2. Examination of Section 54 of the Income‑tax Act: The Court reproduced and analysed Section 54(1) and Section 54(2), observing that the statutory scheme treats particulars contained in returns, statements, accounts, records and assessment proceedings as confidential and prohibits a court from requiring a public servant to produce them or to give evidence about them save as provided in the Income‑tax Act. Section 54(2) creates penal consequences for disclosure by a public servant.
  3. Purpose of Section 54: The Court explained the evident legislative object—to keep such material strictly confidential between the assessee and the Income‑tax Department so that assessees are not deterred from making full and frank disclosures to the department by fears of disclosure in other fora. On that basis the Court concluded Section 54 disentitles persons other than the assessee to put such documents in evidence where doing so would disclose matters meant to be confidential.
  4. Assessee's freedom to waive: The Court acknowledged that the assessee (maker of the return) may waive the protection granted by Section 54 and place such documents in evidence if he or she so elects; that is consistent with authorities cited. But the statutory protection cannot be used by third parties to deprive the assessee of the benefit of confidentiality.
  5. Interaction with Section 76 Evidence Act: The petitioner relied on Section 76 (certified copies) and Section 65(e) (admissibility of public documents). The Court interpreted Section 76 as requiring that any person obtaining a certified copy must be someone who has a right to inspect the original document. If a person has no right to inspect the original, a copy given to that person will not be a "certified copy" within Section 76 and will be inadmissible.
  6. Effect of Section 54 on the right to inspect: Because Section 54 makes such documents confidential between the assessee and the Department, persons other than the maker lack a right to inspect them; therefore certified copies obtained on behalf of non-makers cannot be "certified copies" within Section 76 and are inadmissible.
  7. Petitioner's asserted partnership/right to inspection: The Court observed that on the petitioner's own pleading she was not a partner; the petitioner's husband was alleged to be a partner along with the plaintiff's husband and both husbands are alive. Consequently, the petitioner did not have the status claimed (partner entitled to inspection) and could not rely on any partner-right to obtain copies.
  8. Review of authorities: The Court reviewed and distinguished the authorities relied upon by the petitioner. Decisions holding that an assessee (or an authorised person such as a known partner or manager of a HUF) may inspect or obtain copies were accepted as limited to makers or persons whom the department customarily permits to inspect. Decisions that suggested a broader right of an interested person were not accepted as applicable to the present statutory context. The Court emphasised that some High Courts have taken differing views, but concluded the weight of authority and statutory language supported the narrower construction.
  9. Exceptions under Section 54(3): The Court noted that its conclusion was subject to the limited exceptions provided by Section 54(3) of the Income-tax Act; absent any applicable exception, the documents could not be produced by non-assessees.
  10. Procedural / factual deficiency in petition: Finally, the Court observed that the petitioner did not set out how she obtained the certified copies, what right entitled her to them, or what interest she had in the shop during her husband's life-time. This factual omission reinforced the legal conclusion that she had no right to produce the copies.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISMISSED. The revision application fails and is dismissed with costs; hearing fee of Rs. 100 was assessed. (Order of the Subordinate Judge upholding refusal to admit the certified copies was affirmed; V. Ramaswami, C.J., concurred.)

Implications:

  • The Court reaffirmed that documents produced or prepared under the Income-tax Act and characterised by Section 54(1) are confidential as between the assessee and the Income‑tax Department and, except where the statute provides (including waiver by the assessee or the limited exceptions in Section 54(3)), persons other than the maker (assessee) may not obtain certified copies or produce such documents in evidence.
  • The opinion emphasises that Section 76 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to circumvent Section 54: Section 76 is applicable only when the person obtaining a certified copy has a statutory or recognised right to inspect the original; if Section 54 deprives third parties of any such inspection right, certified copies supplied to them are not "certified copies" within Section 76 and are inadmissible.
  • The decision is narrowly framed: it resolves the application at hand by applying Section 54 and relevant authorities to hold that the petitioner (a non-maker who did not demonstrate a right to inspect or lawful obtainment of copies) could not produce certified Income-tax Department documents in evidence. The Court did not purport to lay down a broader constitutional or general common-law rule beyond this statutory analysis.

This summary is restricted to and faithful to the reasoning and statements contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the text of the judgment.

    Sm. Banarsi Devi v. Sm. Janki Devi Opposite Party.

    R.K Choudhary, J.:— This application in revision is presented by the defendant of mortgage suit No. 12 of 1956 pending in the court of the first Additional Subordinate Judge at Hazaribagh. The plaintiff-opposite party instituted a suit against the petitioner for enforcing a mortgage alleged to have been executed by her in favour of the plaintiff on the 8th of December, 1952. The petitioner put a contest in the suit and pleaded that her husband was a working partner in the cloth shop named Sri Vishnu Bastra Bhandar at Hazaribagh town, the capital of which was to be supplied by the husband, the father-in-law and the husband's brother of the plaintiff and that as a safe-guard and to ensure against loss due to neglect by the petitioner's husband the petitioner was made to execute and register a document which she was given to understand, was a security bond.

    2. Her further case is that she did not execute the mortgage bond in question knowing it to be a mortgage bond and that no consideration passed thereunder. She also stated that the husband, the father-in-law and the husband's brother of the plaintiff were members of an undivided Hindu Mitakshara family and that there was, thus, no occasion for taking any loan by the petitioner from the plaintiff. In order to establish that the aforesaid relations of the plaintiff were members of a Mitakshara joint family, the petitioner produced certified copies of certain documents of the Income-tax Department relating to the registration of the firm, return of income and balance sheet filed by the husband of the plaintiff and assessment of taxes therein, and made a prayer to the court that the originals of those documents should be called for from the Income-tax Department. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the prayer of the petitioner for calling for the originals of those documents and against his order the petitioner filed Civil Revision No. 944 of 1957 in this Court. In view of the fact, however, that no order had been passed by the learned Subordinate Judge refusing to admit the certified copies of those documents in evidence, the civil revision was withdrawn at the time when it was placed for admission. Thereafter, the petitioner made an application in the court below for taking the above certified copies in evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the prayer holding that the papers which were sought to be exhibited were neither public documents nor legally obtained certified copies. Being, thus, aggrieved, the petitioner has come up to this Court in revision.

    3. Mr. Prem Lal appearing for the petitioner has contended that the papers referred to above are public documents and the decision of the court below on this point is wrong in law. Several authorities have been cited in support of this contention which clearly establish that the above documents are public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. I need not refer to those authorities because Mr. Bhabanand Mukherji appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party has conceded that they are public documents.

    4. It has then been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the documents in question being public documents, the certified copies thereof were admissible in evidence under Section 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. In reply to this argument, Counsel for the opposite party submitted that under Section 54(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act the above documents are inadmissible in evidence and that the certified copies thereof, which were sought to be put in evidence, were not certified copies within the meaning of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act and, as such, were not admissible in evidence. The decision of the question at issue is not free from difficulty, and the views of the different High Courts on this point are conflicting.

    5. I will, first, take up the point whether the admissibility of the above documents is barred under Section 54 of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (i) of S. 54 states that all particulars contained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of this Act, or in any evidence given, or affidavit or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings under this Act other than proceedings under this Chapter, or in any record of any assessment proceeding, or any proceeding relating to the recovery or a demand, prepared for the purposes of this Act, shall be treated as confidential, and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), no court shall, save as provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record, or to give evidence before it in respect thereof.

    6. Sub-section (2) of that section provides that if a public servant discloses any particulars contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence, affidavit, deposition or record, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, and shall also be liable to fine. According to this section, the documents in question are confidential documents and they cannot be required to be produced by any public servant before a court, nor could such public servant be required to give evidence before a court in respect thereof, and if any disclosure is made in this regard, the public servant is liable to punishment.

    7. The object of this section seems to be that the matters referred to in such documents should be kept strictly confidential as between the assessee and the Income-tax Department so that the assessee may not hesitate in placing before the department even confidential matters for the purposes of assessment without fear of any disclosure of those matters. If, therefore, such documents are permitted to be put in evidence by persons other than the assessee, the whole object of the section would be frustrated. In my opinion, this section disentitles a person other than the assessee to put such documents in evidence so as to disclose the matters contained therein which under the law have to be kept confidential as between the assessee and the Income-tax Department.

    8. The position of the assessee may be different and, on the principle that a person entitled to an advantage can very well waive the same the assessee, if he so likes, can make use of such documents at the risk of disclosing matters which have to be kept confidential for him. But the documents could not be used by a person other than the assessee so as to deprive the assessee of the advantage given to him under the law.

    9. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the petitioner that Section 54 provides for such documents to be confidential and prevents the court only from calling for these documents to be produced by any public servant or requiring such public servant to give evidence before it in respect thereof and that this section does not forbid the putting into evidence of the certified copies of those documents, the matter relating to which is governed by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

    10. It is contended that under Section 76 of the Evidence Act the certified copies of these documents could be obtained by the petitioner and, as such, they were admissible in evidence. The argument put forward is that a person who has got some interest in a document is entitled under that section to obtain copies thereof, and it has, therefore, been contended that the petitioner being a partner in the shop with respect to which the documents in question relate is interested in those documents and certified copies thereof obtained by her are admissible in evidence. I am unable to agree with the above contention.

    11. In order that Section 76 of the Evidence Act may be applicable the person who obtains a certified copy of a document must be one who has a right to inspect that document. If, however, that person has no right to inspect that document, a certified copy thereof given to him will not be a certified copy within the meaning of the section and will, therefore, be inadmissible in evidence. On the principle underlying in Section 54 of the Income-tax Act making documents like those in question confidential as between the maker thereof and the Income-tax Department, it is obvious that apart from the maker thereof no one has got a right to inspect the same, and that being the position, certified copies obtained thereof on behalf of a person other than the maker thereof cannot be treated as certified copies within the meaning of the section and will not, therefore, be admissible in evidence.

    12. So far as the claim of the petitioner that she, being a partner of the shop, had a right to obtain certified copies of those documents is concerned, it is enough to say that on her own case she is not a partner of the shop in question. According to her case, her husband was a partner along with the husband of the plaintiff. Admittedly the husbands of both the petitioner and the plaintiff are alive and, therefore, there could be no question of the petitioner being a partner and claiming a right of copy as a partner.

    13. The view taken by me gains support from various authorities. In Anwar Ali v. Tafodal Ahmad, ILR 2 Rang. 391 : (AIR 1925 Rang. 84) the defendant obtained from the Income-tax Officer copies of Income-tax returns made by the plaintiff. It was held that Section 76 of the Evidence Act, itself did not authorize the issue of certified copies of income-tax returns to the defendant, as no private person (presumably other than the plaintiff) had the right to inspect them, and issue of these copies was clearly unlawful under Section 54 of the Income-tax Act.

    14. In Ma Hla Mra Khine v. Ma Hla Kra Pru, AIR 1938 Rang. 276 the defendant sought to obtain disclosure of the income-tax returns submitted by the plaintiff by a direction to him to obtain certified copies thereof and to produce the same. The court below allowed the prayer. The High Court relying on the principle laid down in ILR 2 Rang. 391 : (AIR 1925 Rang. 84) set aside the order and held as follows:

    “It may be that the plaintiff has the right to obtain certified copies of these returns for her own purposes, but the object of Section 54 was to make these returns confidential as between the assessee and the income-tax department, and against the whole world, except for certain limited purposes provided by the section itself. It would clearly be an evasion of the prohibition contained in the section were the defendant in a court of law entitled to force the plaintiff to obtain and furnish any information from the income-tax office against her interest which the defendant was unable to obtain for herself.”

    15. In Promatha Nath v. Nirode Chandra, AIR 1940 Cal. 187 there was a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant with regard to their shares in a particular firm which was an unregistered firm.

    16. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had only six annas share in the firm while, according to the defendant, he had eight annas interest therein, and in support of his case the defendant sought to tender certified copies of assessment orders. The plaintiff objected to their admissibility. It was held by the High Court that the original assessment orders were within the scope of Section 54 of the Income-tax Act and that a certified copy thereof produced by the defendant was not admissible. In this connection I may better quote the observation made by Panckridge, J. therein:

    “I apprehend that by describing the particulars contained in an assessment order as confidential what is meant is that the Department may not disclose such particulars save with the express consent of the assessee. Under the Income-tax Manual, an assessee is entitled to one copy of an assessment order free of charge, and apparently to further copies if he is prepared to pay for them. The object of that provision of the Manual is, apparently, to enable assessees who contemplate appealing to the Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner of Income-tax, to prepare the relevant materials which they may desire to lay before those officers.

    It may be that in the case of a sole assessee there is no objection to his using the copy so obtained as evidence in legal proceedings if there are no other objections to its admissibility. It may reasonably be said that the provision that an assessment order shall be treated as confidential is a privilege which an assessee may waive if he thinks fit to do so. However, it would be a startling thing if a joint assessee were to be permitted to use the copy of such an order to the detriment of his co-assessee in contentious proceedings between them.

    If a person who has been assessed to income-tax can object to the materials in the possession of the Income-tax Department being disclosed, it is surely a matter of indifference whether the person who desires to make them public is a co-assessee or a stranger.”

    17. In a single Judge decision of this Court in Smt. Pandei v. Babulal Sah, AIR 1958 Pat. 237 the same view has been taken. In that case the plaintiff, the widow of one of the partners of a firm, brought a suit for a declaration that the partnership business stood dissolved from the date of the death of heir husband and for accounts. One of the pleas taken in defence by the defendant was that the husband of the plaintiff was not a partner.

    18. It was stated on behalf of the plaintiff that the partnership firm had filed returns of income in certain years and in certified copies of those returns were produced in court, it would establish that the husband of the plaintiff was a partner of the firm. C.P Sinha, J., after considering the various authorities for and against the contentions raised on behalf of the parties held that the principle behind Section 54 is that all such documents as are mentioned therein, filed or statements made before the Income-tax Department are all very confidential in nature, the object being that people, that is the assessees, should feel that they can freely state the facts with regard to their income which might involve confidential matters relating to their business without fear of the matters being disclosed, and that it is with that end in view to give absolute freedom to the income-tax assessees to make statements of their income to the department untrammelled by any fear of disclosure of those statements that such restrictions have been imposed on the grant of copies and production of such documents. It was also held that no person other than the maker of the return was entitled to a certified copy of the return and, as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to have a certified copy.

    19. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Prem Lal on behalf of the petitioner on the cases of Quaen-Empress v. Arumugam, ILR 20 Mad. 189, Chandi Charan v. Boistab Charan, ILR 31 Cal. 284, and Mutter v. Eastern and Midland Rly. Co., (1888) 38 Ch. D. 92 for the purpose, of showing that the petitioner was interested in the documents in question and was, therefore, entitled to obtain certified copies thereof under Section 76 of the Evidence Act, and on the case of Venkata Gopala Narasimha Rama Rao v. Chitluri Venkataramayva, AIR 1940 Mad. 768 (F.B), Suraj Narain v. Jhabbu Lal, AIR 1944 All. 114; Smt. Buchibai v. Nagpur University, AIR 1946 Nag. 377; Emperor v. Osman Chotani, AIR 1942 Bom. 289 and Somanna v. Subba Rao, AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 200 for the purpose of showing that the certified copies in question were admissible in evidence.

    20. In the case of ILR 20 Mad. 189 (FB) the accused wanted to have certified copies of police reports and chargesheet. The question before the High Court was whether they were public documents and whether the accused was entitled to obtain copies thereof. There was difference of opinion between the Judges who constituted the Full Bench on the first point and I need not refer to I the same as that has no relevancy to the present case. But all of them unanimously held that if the I documents in question were public document, the I accused was interested in them and had, therefore, the right to inspect them and to obtain copies thereof.

    21. Thus the case does not support the contention of the petitioner that even though a person has no right to inspect but has only an interest in a document, he is entitled to have a copy thereof. In ILR 31 Cal. 284 also the party who wanted to have a certified copy of a certain document was held to be entitled to inspect that document. Of course, in that case reliance was placed on the case (1888) 38 Ch. D. 92 a reference to which has already been made. In that case it was held that when the right to inspect and take a copy is not expressly conferred by Statute, the extent of such right depends on the interest which the applicant has in what he wants to copy, and on what is reasonably necessary for the protection of such interest.

    22. In England there is a common law right to inspect and take copies of public documents but in India I do not think that there is any such common law right, and the rights of the parties to inspect and obtain copies depend upon the various Statutes with respect to documents referred to in those statutes.

    23. Section 7 itself lays down that every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it. Therefore, if the person seeking to obtain a copy has got no right to inspect that document, he cannot have a copy thereof under this section. If that be so, a copy obtained by such a person is a copy obtained illegally and against the provision of this section and is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

    24. In AIR 1940 Mad. 70 (FB) the assessee wanted to put in a certified copy of his statement with regard to profit and loss showing the details of his net income filed by him in respect of his return of income furnished under Section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act. It was held that the assessee was entitled to Tint the certified copy of this document referred to above in evidence. Thus, that was a case of an assessee who sought to produce before the court certified copies of his own return waiving the advantage given to him by Section 54 of the Income-tax Act of treating the document confidential. Moreover, as appears from the judgment of Leach, C.J who pronounced the judgment of the Full Bench, the assessee under the law was entitled to inspect the, documents certified copies of which were obtained by him. I will better quote the following passage from his judgment in this connection:—

    “Para 85 of the notes and instructions compiled by the Income-tax Department for the guidance of its officers states that the following persons shall, in practice, be allowed to Inspect or to receive copies: (1) in any case the person who actually made the return. (2) any partner (known to be such) in a firm registered or unregistered to whose income the return relates; and (3) the manager of a Hindu undivided family to whose income the return relates, or any other adult member of the family who has been treated as representing it. There is nothing in Section 54 to prohibit this practice and it is only right that a person who is concerned with an assessment should be allowed to obtain copies of the documents relating to his assessment to income-tux should he so desire, and if copies are supplied to may put them in evidence in a suit if the Evidence Act allows it”.

    25. His Lordship further observed that Section 54 does not make the issue of a certified copy of an income-tax return to an assessee unlawful, that the return is a confidential document and cannot be disclosed to a third party, but there can be no objection to the maker of the return having a copy for his own purposes if he so desires and that so far as the assessee is concerned he is not bound to treat the document as confidential.

    26. This case, therefore, is of no assistance to the petitioner for supporting her contention that she not being a maker of the documents in question was entitled to obtain certified copies thereof and to put them in evidence. His Lordship, however, at one place observed that there is nothing in Section 54 which prohibits a party from putting in evidence a certified copy of an income-tax return, if that return is a public document and much stress has been laid on this general observation.

    27. But this observation must be read in the context of the case before the Full Bench and on so reading, it is manifest that what his Lordship meant in that case was that the assessee could not be prohibited from putting in evidence a certified copy of his own income-tax return. In AIR 1944 All. 114 it was held that Section 54 could not be taken to mean that an assessee cannot himself disclose the contents of the documents referred to therein and that the words “right to inspect” in Section 76 of the Evidence Act do not necessarily mean that the person should have a right to inspect the original record but only mean that he should have a right to look into the record.

    28. There is no dispute so far as the first part of the above decision is concerned, and I am also of the view that an assessee can waive an advantage conferred upon him by Section 54 of the Act and can disclose the contents of the documents referred to in that section. But with respect to the interpretation of the words “right to inspect” I do not feel inclined to agree with the view taken by their Lordships in that case. The section already quoted makes it perfectly clear that the person can obtain a copy of the document which be is entitled to inspect. There is no question of either inspecting the original record or to look into the record.

    29. In AIR 1946 Nag. 377 also it was held that it was open to the assessee to waive the right conferred by Section 54 of the Income-tax Act and to give evidence of particulars contained in documents referred to in that section and as already pointed out, I agree with this view. But in that case it was held that under Section 76 of the Evidence Act it was not necessary that the public generally must have a right to inspect it and that it was sufficient if there was any single person who had a right to inspect.

    30. The interpretation of this Section, in my opinion, is under misconception. Though their Lordships have quoted that section in their judgment, they appear to have omitted to consider the effect of the words “shall give that person” used in that section. In AIR 1942 Bom. 289 the documents were seized by the police in a certain criminal case, and the question for decision was whether the police could be compelled to produce them in court.

    31. It was held that the production of the document could be compelled by the court. The view taken by their Lordships appears to be that the documents are confidential so long as they are in the hands of the officers of the Income-tax Department, but if they are in the hands of persons other than those officers, the documents do not continue to have the characteristic of being confidential in their hands. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of that decision because that question does not arise in the present case.

    32. In AIR 1938 Andh. Pra. 200 a single judge of that court mainly relying on the general observation of Leach, C.J already referred to while dealing with that case held that certified copies of income-tax returns could be taken in evidence under Section 65(c) of the Indian Evidence Act and if that document could lie given in evidence, without requiring a public servant to produce it, there is nothing in the section to prevent that from being done.

    33. After considering the various authorities referred to above my concluded opinion is that a person other than an assessee is not entitled to inspect the documents characterised as being confidential in Section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act and to obtain certified copies thereof under Section 76 of the Evidence Act. I am also of the opinion that apart from the assessee such documents cannot be produced in evidence by any other person unless they come within the exceptions laid down in Sub-section (3) of Section 54 of the Income-tax Act. In that view of the matter, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified and must be upheld.

    34. Moreover, the petitioner has not made any statement in her revision application as to how she could obtain the copies and as to how, in fact, she was entitled to use them. It is not stated what interest she had in the shop during the life-time of her husband who, as already stated, was alleged to be a working partner in that shop. In that view of the matter also, the application has to fail.

    35. The result, therefore, is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee: Rs. 100/-.

    36. V. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.

    V.S.B

    37. Application dismissed.

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    Sm. Banarsi Devi v. Sm. Janki Devi Opposite Party.
    (Nov 28, 1957)