Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 107 of the Cr PC under Section 117(3)
  • Section 117, sub-s. (3)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 107 of the Cr PC under Section 117(3)
  • Section 117, sub-s. (3)
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Banerji, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are railway employees serving within a Sub-Division of the district of Manbhum. On 8-5-1956 petitioner Jatindra Mohan Biswas was produced before the Sub-divisional Officer, Purulia, under arrest under Section 151 CrPC by the Officer-in-Charge of the Adra Government Railway Police Station. He was released on bail on 9-5-1956. On 12-5-1956, after perusing a report submitted by the Sub-Inspector of the Adra Government Railway Police Station, the Sub-divisional Officer drew up proceedings under Section 107 CrPC against Jatindra Mohan Biswas and three other petitioners, directing them to appear on 23-5-1956 and to show cause why they should not execute bonds of Rs. 2000 each to keep the peace for one year.

The Sub-divisional Officer further directed the petitioners to execute ad interim bonds of Rs. 2000 each "to remain peaceful till the decision of the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC" and fixed 18-5-1956 for execution of those ad interim bonds.

On 18-5-1956 a petition was filed on behalf of the petitioners challenging the order purportedly made under Section 117(3) CrPC; that petition was refused and the petitioners were ordered to furnish ad interim bonds on the date fixed. On 23-5-1956 the petitioners contended that normalcy had returned to the locality and that there was no occasion to furnish ad interim bonds; that request was also refused. The petitioners then approached this Court seeking to set aside the order under Section 117(3) CrPC and to quash the entire proceedings under Section 107 CrPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Sub-divisional Officer was justified in passing a composite order under Section 112 and under Section 117(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  2. Whether the Magistrate was bound to give reasons while ordering the petitioners to execute ad interim bonds under Section 117(3) CrPC.
  3. Whether this is a fit case for quashing the entire proceeding under Section 107 CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • They challenged the validity of the order purportedly passed under Section 117(3) CrPC and sought quashing of the entire Section 107 proceedings.
  • On 23-5-1956 they argued that normalcy had returned to the locality and thus there was no occasion to require them to execute ad interim bonds or proceed under Chapter VIII CrPC.
  • Their counsel cited authority for the proposition that an ad interim order under Section 117(3) is justified only after parties appear in court and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire (citing In re Venkatasubba Reddy, AIR 1955 Andhra 96, and other cases).

Respondent / Police / Court Sub-Inspector

  • The Court Sub-Inspector stated that members of the opposite party were likely to create a breach of the peace and were alleged to have been responsible for causing strikes at other places and for circulating leaflets. This statement was not challenged by the petitioners at that hearing.
  • Learned Additional Standing Counsel did not argue that the petitioners had not been prejudiced by the composite order or by the Section 117(3) order lacking reasons.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Venkatasubba Reddy, AIR 1955 Andhra 96 The proposition (as stated by the single Judge in that case) that an ad interim order under Section 117(3) is justified only after the parties appear in Court and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire into the matter. The Court relied on this authority to support the position that an ad interim order under Section 117(3) ought normally to follow the commencement of an enquiry and appearance in Court; it was cited by petitioners' counsel and treated as aligned with the Court's view.
Ranganadha Mudaliar v. Emperor, 1934 Mad WN 1353 An earlier decision referred to in the opinion (from which the Venkatasubba Reddy judgment dissented). Mentioned as the decision from which the Andhra single Judge dissented; the Court referenced this context but did not elaborate further on its ratio in this opinion.
Jaswant Singh Jaswansingh v. Ranchod Nanda Dhakad, AIR 1954 Madh-B 192 Cited in support of the contention regarding the proper exercise of magistrate's power under the relevant provisions of Chapter VIII (ad interim measures under Section 117(3)). The Court observed that the decision was cited in support and "appears to be correct," but it did not discuss the case in detail in this opinion.
Tejsingh v. State, AIR 1954 Madh-B 39 Cited as supporting authority for the petitioners' contention about proper procedure for ad interim orders. The Court noted the citation and indicated the decision appears to be correct without detailed discussion.
Emperor v. Yusif Jumo, AIR 1943 Sind 175 Cited in support of the same general proposition about magistrate's powers and the circumstances in which interim measures may be taken. The Court accepted the decision as cited by petitioners' counsel and stated it appeared to be correct, but it did not analyze it at length.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a statutory analysis of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure (security for keeping the peace and for good behaviour), emphasizing the distinct roles of the relevant sections:

  • Section 107 arises when a magistrate is informed that a person is likely to commit a breach of the peace, disturb public tranquillity, or do any wrongful act likely to occasion such a breach; if satisfied there is sufficient ground, the magistrate should order the person to show cause why he should not execute a bond for keeping the peace.
  • Section 112 prescribes that when a magistrate deems it necessary to require a person to show cause under Sections 107–110, he shall make a written order setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of bond, term, and details of sureties.
  • Sections 113 and 114 govern the procedure when the person is present in court or absent (reading over the order, issuing summons or warrant). The proviso to Section 114 allows immediate arrest to prevent a breach of the peace, before the person appears.
  • Section 117(1) authorizes enquiry into the truth of the information and taking further evidence as necessary. Section 117(3) permits, pending completion of the inquiry under subsection (1), that the magistrate "if he considers that immediate measures are necessary" may direct the person to execute a bond for keeping the peace and may detain him until such bond is executed — but crucially, this power is subject to "reasons to be recorded in writing."

From this statutory scheme the Court drew several key conclusions:

  • An ad interim order under Section 117(3) is a temporary emergency measure intended to operate in the context of an ongoing enquiry and must have a direct relation to the object for which proceedings under Chapter VIII are taken.
  • Two distinct types of emergency exist: (a) where the magistrate fears a breach of peace before a person appears (handled by the proviso to Section 114), and (b) where the person is present or has been brought before the court and the magistrate, during the course of an enquiry under Section 117(1), considers immediate measures necessary. The nature of these emergencies is distinct.
  • A magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 117(3) together with an order under Section 112 at the same time when the person has not yet been called to or is not yet undergoing the enquiry under Section 117(1). Section 117(3) is properly exercised only after the enquiry under subsection (1) has commenced and the magistrate, in the course of the enquiry, forms the view that immediate measures are necessary.
  • Section 117(3) explicitly requires the magistrate to record reasons in writing for the emergency measure. Absent written reasons, a superior court cannot ascertain what facts during the enquiry influenced the magistrate to pass an ad interim order; this frustrates meaningful review of whether the discretion was exercised judiciously or capriciously.

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court found that:

  • The Sub-divisional Officer passed a composite order under Section 112 and Section 117(3) before any enquiry under Section 117(1) had been commenced and while the persons were not being enquired into — i.e., he lacked jurisdiction to make the Section 117(3) emergency order at that stage.
  • The magistrate did not record any reasons in writing when demanding ad interim bonds; on the date fixed for execution he merely referred to a police report indicating the opposite party members were likely to create a breach of the peace, which the Court held to be insufficient.
  • Because no written reasons were furnished before the emergency measure was taken, the petitioners were prejudiced: they had no opportunity to know what facts or circumstances weighed with the magistrate when passing the ad interim order.
  • On 23-5-1956 petitioners' assertion that normalcy had returned was not challenged by the Court Sub-Inspector (though the Sub-Inspector asserted other allegations relating to strikes and leaflets). The strikes mentioned were beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate seised of the proceedings.

Taking all circumstances into consideration, the Court concluded there was no necessity to continue the Section 107 proceedings against the petitioners and that the composite order under Section 112/Section 117(3) was legally defective.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed the proceedings under Section 107 CrPC and set aside the order made under Section 117(3) CrPC. The application was allowed and the rule made absolute. (Kanhaiya Singh, J. agreed.)

Implications: The direct effects of the decision are:

  • The Section 107 proceedings against the petitioners were quashed.
  • The ad interim order purportedly passed under Section 117(3) (and the composite order under Section 112/117(3)) was set aside for lack of jurisdiction and absence of reasons recorded in writing.

The opinion does not articulate broader doctrinal consequences beyond the statutory interpretation and the application to these petitioners; it does not state that a new legal precedent is being established beyond its rulings in this matter.

    Jagdish Prasad Verma And Others v. The State Opposite Party.

    Banerji, J.:— The petitioners are railway employees and have been serving in various capacities within the Sub-Division of the district of Manbhum. On 8-5-1956, petitioner Jatindra Mohan Biswas was produced before the Sub-divisional Officer, Purulia, under arrest under Section 151 of the Cr PC, by the Officer-in charge of the Adra Government Railway Police Station. He was released on bail on 9-5-1956, but, on 12-5-1956, after perusing a report submitted by the Sub-Inspector of the Government Railway Police Station at Adra the learned Sub-divisional Officer drew up proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC, not only against petitioner Jatindra Mohan Biswas, but also against the three remaining petitioners directing them to appear before him on 23-5-1956, and to show cause as to why they should not be ordered to execute a bond of Rs. 2000/- each to keep the peace for a period of one year.

    2. He further directed the petitioners to execute ad interim bonds of Rs. 2000/- each ‘to remain peaceful till the decision of the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC’ He fixed 18-5-1956 for execution of the ad interim bonds.

    3. A petition was filed on behalf of the petitioners on 18-5-1956, challenging the order purported to have been made under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC, but the prayer was turned down and it was ordered that the petitioners must furnish ad interim bonds on the date fixed. On 23-5-1956, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that normalcy had already returned in the locality concerned and there was no occasion now to furnish any ad interim bond. That prayer was also refused and the petitioners have now come to this Court for setting aside the order purported to have been passed under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC and also for quashing the entire proceeding under Section 107 of the Cr PC.

    4. Three points arise for decision in this case: firstly, it has to be determined whether the learned Sub-divisional Officer was justified in passing a composite order under S. 112 and under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC, secondly, whether he was bound to give reasons while ordering the petitioners to execute ad interim bonds under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC, and, thirdly, whether it is a fit case for quashing the entire proceeding under Section 107 of the Cr PC.

    5. In order to appreciate whether a Magistrate is justified in demanding an ad interim bond under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC, while making an order under S. 112 of the Code to show cause under any of the sections, namely, Ss. 107, 108, 109 or 110, a survey of the few sections, touching on the subject under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure may best be made here.

    6. Chapter VIII relates to security for keeping the peace and for good behaviour. The jurisdiction of a Magistrate of the class mentioned in Section 107 of the Cr PC, arises under that section when such a Magistrate is informed that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity. If such a Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against such a person, he should order him to show cause why he should not execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping the peace for a particular period. As we are not concerned here with Sections 108, 109 and 110 of the Cr PC, I will not refer to those sections.

    7. It has to be established, prior to a person being asked to show cause, that he is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity. The next section is Section 112 of the Cr PC which gives the details of the nature of the order that has to be pas ed by the Magistrate and has to be served on the person proceeded against. This section is in the following words:

    “When a Magistrate acting under S. 107, S. 108, S. 109 or S. 110 deems it necessary to require any person to show case under such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and loss of sureties (if any) required.”

    8. If the person in respect of whom such order is made is present in Court, S. 113 requires that the order shall be read over to him or, if he so desires, the substance thereof shall be explained to him. Section 114 mentions the procedure is cases where the person so proceeded against is not present in Court. In those cases the Magistrate shall issue a summons requiring him to appear or, when such person is in custody, a warrant directing the officer in whose custody he is, to bring him before the Court. If in the opinion of the Magistrate, there is reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace which cannot be prevented without the immediate arrest of that person, the proviso to S. 114 enables the Magistrate to issue a warrant for his arrest solely for the purpose of preventing a commission of a breach of the peace.

    9. The enquiry as to the truth of the information upon which action has been taken starts after the order under S. 112 has been read over and explained under S. 113 to a person present in Court or when any such person appears or is brought before the Magistrate in compliance with or in execution of a summons or warrant issued under S. 114. When proceeding to enquire into the truth of the information under S. 117, sub-s. (1), Magistrate is empowered to take such further evidence as may appear to him to be necessary. Section 117, sub-s. (3) runs as follows:

    “117(3). Pending the completion of the inquiry under sub-s. (1) the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquillity or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of whom the order under S. 112 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded.”

    10. It appears that a temporary order under S. 117(3) is to be made in the case of an emergency and must have direct relation to the object for which the proceedings are taken. A review of the relevant sections mentioned above will show that two types of emergency may exist—one in the case of a person being proceeded against, prior to his appearance before a Magistrate, under the proviso to S. 114 and the other when he is already present in Court or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with or in execution of a summons or a warrant. The nature of the two emergencies is quite distinct and separate.

    11. It is only when the person is present in Court or has been brought before the Court that a Magistrate can take into consideration whether circumstances do exist for taking immediate measures and, when he is fully satisfied that such circumstances do exist, then and then only he can direct the execution of an ad interim bond, but, before taking recourse to this action, he has to put his reasons in writing. It is manifestly clear that S. 112 and S. 117 provide two different procedures for two different ends and, therefore, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under S. 117(3) along with one under S. 112, as has been done in this case.

    12. At the time when he passed an order under S. 117(3), the persons proceeded against were act before him and he had not started to enquire into the truth of the information upon which action had been taken. An emergency order under S. 117(3) can only be made when the Magistrate has started to enquire into the truth of the information under S. 117(1) and, in the course of that enquiry, he considers that immediate measures are necessary.

    13. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has cited the decision in In re, Venkatasubba Reddy, (S) AIR 1955 Andhra 96 (A), where a single Judge of the Andhra High Court dissenting from the decision in the case of Ranganadha Mudaliar v. Emperor, 1934 Mad WN 1353 (B), held that an ad interim order was justified only after the parties appear in Court and the Magistrate proceeded to enquire into the matter.

    14. He has also cited the following decisions in support of his contention. These are Jaswant Singh Jaswansingh v. Ranchod Nanda Dhakad, AIR 1954 Madh-B 192 (C), Tejsingh v. State, AIR 1954 Madh-B 39 (D) and Emperor v. Yusif Jumo, AIR 1943 Sind 175 (E). It is not necessary to discuss in detail these decisions which appear to me to be correct.

    15. An order made under S. 117(3) is certainly bad if it is not accompanied by reasons recorded in writing why the Magistrate wants to take, this emergency measure. It must be remembered that orders under S. 117(3) are not routine orders which have to be passed merely on the report of a police officer.

    16. Before a Magistrate contemplates making such an emergency order, he is bound to direct his consideration to the question of such an emergency and the necessity of a prompt and immediate measure. Such an order must also have a direct relation to the object for which the proceedings are taken. If he does not state his reasons in writing prior to his taking an emergency measure under S. 117(3), it will be extremely difficult for a superior Court to know what fact or facts during the enquiry under S. 117(1) influenced the Magistrate to pass an ad interim order.

    17. The discretion exercised under this sub-section has always to be examined to ascertain whether it has been done judiciously or capriciously, and this it is impossible to be done in absence of any reasons recorded by the Magistrate. In this particular case, the learned Magistrate did not give any reason, whatsoever, when demanding ad interim bonds from the petitioners. Later, on the date fixed for execution of the ad interim bonds, he merely expressed that the police report indicated that the members of the opposite party were likely to create a breach of the peace. To my mind, even this reason is not sufficient to pass an order under S. 117(3).

    18. The Magistrate is bound to state the reasons for which he thought there was likelihood of those persons committing a breach of the peace during the proceeding itself. I am satisfied, therefore, that the order passed under S. 117(3) was bad in law. Learned Additional Standing Counsel has not argued before us, and, indeed he was not in a position to argue on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, that the petitioners had not been prejudiced by a composite order and also an order passed under S. 117(3) for which no reason was recorded by the learned Magistrate.

    19. It is difficult to hold that the petitioners were not prejudiced when on the date fixed for execution of the ad interim bonds they had no opportunity to know what facts or circumstances weighed with the learned Magistrate in passing an emergency order.

    20. On 23-5-1956, as already stated, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the condition in the alleged disturbed locality had returned to normalcy and, therefore, there was no occasion to proceed against them under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This fact was not challenged by the Court Sub-Inspector, but the prayer of the petitioners was turned down on the ground of a statement made by him (Court Sub-Inspector) that the members of the opposite party had been responsible for causing strike at other places and for circulating leaflets.

    21. What those leaflets are we do not know. It is clear that the strikes for which the members of the opposite party were being made responsible on that day were beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in seisin of the proceedings.

    22. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, therefore, I do not think there is any necessity to continue the proceedings against the petitioners. The proceedings are, accordingly, quashed and the order of the learned Magistrate-passed under Section 117(3) of the Cr PC, is also set aside.

    23. The application is allowed and the rule made absolute.

    24. Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— I agree.

    D.H.Z

    25. Rule made absolute.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Jagdish Prasad Verma And Others v. The State Opposite Party.
    (Aug 13, 1956)