Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13, sub-s. (4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act
  • Section 25(1) of the Bihar Sales
  • Sales Tax Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13, sub-s. (4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act
  • Section 25(1) of the Bihar Sales
  • Sales Tax Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Ramaswami, C.J. (with Raj Kishore Prasad, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two consolidated references to the High Court arise from assessments under the Bihar Sales Tax Act in respect of an assessee who carried on a jute mill at Katihar and maintained a jute purchasing centre at Forbesganj. In Misc. Judicial Case No. 414 of 1953 the assessment period was 1-4-1948 to 31-3-1949; the Sales Tax Officer's order dated 22-1-1950 determined taxable turnover at Rs. 1,02,31,200 and computed sales tax at Rs. 1,91,835. In Misc. Judicial Case No. 415 of 1953 the assessment period was 1-7-1947 to 31-3-1948; the Sales Tax Officer's order dated 23-11-1949 determined taxable turnover at Rs. 74,97,000 and sales tax payable at Rs. 1,17,140/10/-.

In both matters the assessee did not produce a return or produce account books for the relevant periods; consequently the Sales Tax Officer proceeded to make assessments under Section 13(4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act "to the best of his judgment." The assessee's appeals to the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Board of Revenue were dismissed. The Board of Revenue, at the instance of the assessee, framed and referred a question of law to the High Court under Section 25(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act concerning whether it was permissible for the Sales Tax Officer to base an estimate on an Inspector's report without disclosing or giving a copy of that report to the assessee or without giving particulars or hearing the assessee on it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the circumstances of these cases, the assessment of sales tax upon the assessee is vitiated because the Sales Tax Officer did not show to the assessee the Inspector's report or did not disclose to the assessee the material particulars of the Inspector's report before making the assessment for the period in question.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (Appellant)

  • The principal contention (advanced by Mr. Baldeva Sahay) was that the assessments under Section 13(4) were illegal because the Sales Tax Officer relied mainly upon the Inspector's report without showing the report (or at least its substance) to the assessee before making the assessment.
  • That failure to disclose the Inspector's report or its material particulars and to give the assessee an opportunity to meet allegations amounted to a breach of the principle of natural justice (audi alteram partem), rendering the assessments invalid.
  • In the memorandum of appeal to the Commissioner the assessee specifically challenged the Inspector's report on several enumerated factual points (quoted in the judgment as grounds (a)–(g)), including alleged incorrect visits, allegedly imaginary discoveries of documents, assertions about sales at Forbesganj and Katihar, alleged unsigned account books, and alleged statements attributed to third parties that the assessee said did not affect him.

Respondent's Arguments (State / Government Advocate)

  • The Government Advocate submitted that the Inspector's report was not a confidential document and formed part of the record before the Sales Tax Officer; the assessee could have perused the document if he had appeared at the proper stage and asked for inspection.
  • It was also submitted that, under the statutory appellate scheme, both the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue are tribunals of fact; if the assessee had a grievance of non-disclosure they could have been asked to take further evidence or to remand for additional evidence at those stages.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheopujan Choudhury v. State of Bihar, Misc. Judi. Case No. 171 of 1954, Dated 29-2-1956 — reported in 1956 Pat LR 120 : (S) (AIR 1356 Pat 212) That the principle of natural justice cannot be confined to a fixed formula; the requirement is that a party adversely affected be given sufficient opportunity to know and answer the case he has to meet, not necessarily at every stage. The Court relied upon this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that procedural fairness depends on circumstances and that appellate remedies can satisfy audi alteram partem.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. J. Howard McGrath, (1950) 341 US 123 Frankfurter J.'s articulation that whether ex parte procedure observed "the rudiments of fair play" must be judged by circumstances (interest affected, manner, reasons, alternatives, protections, balance of hurt and good). The Court reproduced this passage to underline that no rigid formula governs natural justice and that contextual considerations determine adequacy of opportunity to be heard.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rly. Co. v. Polt, (1913) 232 US 165 Quoted as an authority within the Frankfurter passage about testing ex parte procedures against "rudiments of fair play". Used as part of the quoted authorities to illustrate the court's general point about context-specific application of natural justice.
Vestry of St. James and St. John, Clerkenwell v. Feary, (1890) 24 QBD 703 Authority for the view that the principle of natural justice may be satisfied if the statute provides for an appeal to a higher authority. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that appellate remedies can render an initial-stage non-disclosure non-fatal to the procedure as a whole.
Attorney General v. Hooper, 1893-3 Ch 483 Authority for the view that natural justice may be satisfied where provision exists for making formal representation to the authority before the order becomes finally operative. Referenced to support the view that procedural fairness can be supplied by opportunities at later stages.
Cotton Mills v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, (1940) 312 US 126 Stone J.'s statement that due process does not require a hearing at the initial stage so long as a requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective. Adduced to illustrate the analogous American principle that due process may be satisfied by hearing prior to the final order rather than at every administrative step.
Bourjois v. Clyde R. Chapman, (1936) 301 US 183 Brandeis J.'s holding that due process was not denied by a statute that provided for appeal even though it did not provide for an initial hearing. Used as another example that appellate remedy can cure absence of an initial hearing and so not every stage requires a separate hearing for due process to be satisfied.
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, West Bengal, 1955 SCR 941 : (S) (AIR 1955 SC 65) Held that assessment was invalid where the Tribunal made assessment based on information supplied by departmental representative without giving the assessee an opportunity to rebut, and where the Tribunal refused to consider the assessee's offered rebutting evidence. The Court distinguished this Supreme Court authority on the facts: in Dhakeswari the Income-tax Tribunal expressly refused to take the assessee's offered rebuttal evidence (a "trunk-load of account books"), whereas in the present case the assessee had an opportunity before appellate and revisional authorities and availed himself of that opportunity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the correct question and then by applying statutory context and established principles of procedural fairness as explained in cited authorities.

  1. Statutory power to assess: The Court noted that the assessee had not filed returns nor produced books of account; therefore under Section 13(4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act the Sales Tax Officer was entitled to make an assessment "to the best of his judgment." This establishes the Sales Tax Officer's authority to proceed without the books of the assessee.
  2. Framing the real issue: The Court reframed the Board's question to focus on whether the assessment is vitiated because the Inspector's report was not shown or because material particulars were not disclosed before assessment.
  3. On the facts the Court assumed (for the sake of argument) that the Inspector's report had not been shown prior to the assessment order, but observed that the Sales Tax Officer's assessment orders "elaborately set out" all material particulars of the Inspector's report. Thus, the substance of what the Inspector reported was incorporated into the assessment.
  4. Subsequent knowledge and opportunity to rebut: It was not disputed that after the Sales Tax Officer made the orders the assessee became aware of the contents of the Inspector's report and did challenge the report in his memorandum of appeal to the Commissioner, raising specific grounds and factual denials. The Commissioner dealt with those grounds and pointed out the assessee did not produce books or other evidence to rebut the allegations.
  5. Role of appellate/revisional tribunals: The Court emphasized that the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue are tribunals of fact; if they had considered the grievance of non-disclosure to have substance they could have taken additional evidence or remanded the matters. The statutory appellate scheme therefore furnished opportunities to the assessee to be heard on the issues raised by the Inspector's report.
  6. Principles of natural justice applied contextually: Relying on the cited authorities (including the Division Bench decision in Sheopujan Choudhury and various foreign authorities), the Court held that natural justice is not rigidly formulaic. The principle is satisfied when the party is given sufficient opportunity to know and answer the case against him at some stage of the proceeding; it does not require hearing at every administrative step.
  7. Distinguishing Supreme Court precedent: The Court examined Dhakeswari Cotton Mills (AIR 1955 SC 65) and found its ratio inapplicable. In Dhakeswari the Tribunal refused to consider the assessee's offered rebuttal evidence and effectively prevented the assessee from answering the departmental information — facts which did not obtain in the present cases where the assessee had been able to raise detailed grounds before the Commissioner and Board.
  8. Conclusion from facts and law: Because the Sales Tax Officer set out the material particulars in his orders and because the assessee had the opportunity to challenge the report at appellate and revisional stages (and did so), the Court concluded there was no violation of audi alteram partem or other principle of natural justice that would vitiate the assessments.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court answered the referred question in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee; the assessments of sales tax for both periods (1-7-1947 to 31-3-1948 and 1-4-1948 to 31-3-1949) were held to be legally valid.

Direct implications and orders:

  • The questions referred by the Board of Revenue, as reframed by the Court, were answered against the assessee.
  • A consolidated fee of Rs. 250/- was imposed for both cases.
  • It is recorded that Raj Kishore Prasad, J. agreed with the judgment (concurring).

Broader implications: The opinion applies contextual and appellate-based understandings of natural justice but does not purport to establish a new general precedent beyond applying established principles and distinguishing the Supreme Court decision in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills on its facts.

Source: Text of the opinion delivered by Ramaswami, C.J., as provided; summary prepared strictly from the content of that opinion.

    Hardutt Mull Jute Mills v. State Of Bihar

    Ramaswami, C.J:— In Misc. Judicial Case No. 414 of 1953, the assessee has a jute mill at Katihar in the district of Puraea where he carries on business in jute and jute products and cotton cloth. The assessee has also got a jute purchasing centre at Forbesganj in the same district where he carries on business of purchasing and selling jute as well as textile. For the period 1-4-1948 to 31-3-1949, the assessee did not produce any return showing the gross turnover.

    2. A notice under Section 13, sub-s. (4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act was served upon the assessee, calling upon him to produce his accounts for the period in question. More than a dozen adjournments were granted but the assessee failed to produce the account books. Thereupon the Sales Tax Officer proceeded to make an assessment under S. 13(4) of the statute to the best of his judgment. The order of the Sales Tax Officer is dated 22-1-1950. The Sales Tax Officer determined the taxable turnover at Rs. 1,02,31,200/- and the sales tax was computed at Rs. 1,91,835/-. The assessee took the matter in appeal to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, but the appeal was dismissed. The assessee then moved the Board of Revenue and filed an application in revision, but this application was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue. At the instance of the assessee the Board of Revenue has stated the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 25(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act:

    “Is it legal or permissible for a Sales Tax Officer to base his estimate on the report of an Inspector of the Department, without giving a copy of the same, when asked for, to the assessee, or without giving any information about the material particulars of the report and without hearing the assessee on the same.”

    3. In Misc. Judicial Case No. 415 of 1953 the material facts are of similar character. The assessment is for the period 1-7-1947 to 31-3-1948, and the date of the assessment order of the Sales Tax Officer is 23-11-1949. The Sales Tax Officer determined the taxable turnover at Rs. 74,97,000 and the sales tax payable at Rs. 1,17,140/10/-.

    4. In this case also the assessee took the matter in appeal to the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division, but the appeal was dismissed. The assessee preferred an application to the Board of Revenue in revision, but that application also was dismissed by the Board of Revenue. At the instance of the assessee the Board of Revenue has stated a case for the opinion of the High Court on the following question of law:

    “Is it legal or permissible for a Sales Tax Officer to base his estimate on the report of an Inspector of the Department, without giving a copy of the same, when asked for, to the assessee, or without giving any information about the material particulars of the report and without hearing the assessee on the same.”

    5. After having heard counsel for the parties we consider that the questions referred to by the Board of Revenue in these cases have not been properly framed. In our opinion the questions should be framed in the following manner so as to bring out the real controversy between the parties:

    “Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessment of sales tax upon the assessee is vitiated because the Sales Tax Officer did not show to the assessee the report of the inspector or because the Sales Tax Officer did not disclose to the assessee the material particulars of the Inspector's report before making assessment for the period in question?”

    6. On behalf of the assessee Mr. Baldeva Sa-hay put forward the argument that the assessment of sales tax made by the Sales Tax Officer was illegal since the report of the Inspector was not shown to the assessee or, at any rate, the substance of the Inspector's report was not disclosed to the assessee before the Sales Tax Officer proceeded to make the assessment. The argument of the learned counsel is based upon the circumstance that in the assessment order the Sales Tax Officer relied mainly upon the Inspector's report for estimating the gross turnover of the assessee.

    7. It is important to notice that the assessee did not file a return, nor produce the account books for both the relevant periods. The Sales Tax Officer was, therefore, entitled to proceed to make an assessment under the provisions of S. 13(4) of the statute to the best of his judgment.

    8. Mr. Baldeva Sahay did not, however, challenge the right of the Sales Tax Officer to make an assessment under S. 13(4), but the point taken by the learned counsel was that before such an assessment was made, the Sales Tax Officer should have disclosed to the assessee the substance of the Inspector's report and he should have given an opportunity to the assessee to meet the allegations made in the report against him. The contention of learned counsel is that there was a violation of the principle of natural justice and so the assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer under S. 13(4) was legally invalid. That is the summary of the argument presented by Mr. Baldeva Sahay on behalf of the assessee.

    9. I am, not, however, prepared to accept that argument as correct. It was stated by the learned Government Advocate that the report of the Inspector was not a confidential document but was on the record of the proceeding before the Sales Tax Officer. It was also said that the assessee could have perused the document if he had appeared before the Sales Tax Officer at the proper stage and asked for inspection.

    10. It is, however, not clear from the statement of the case whether the assessee was shown the Inspector's report before the Sales Tax Officer made the assessment. I shall, however, assume in favour of the assessee that the report of the Inspector was not shown to the assessee before the Sales Tax Officer made the order of assessment. Even so, I am of opinion that the order of assessment of sales tax made upon the assessee is not illegal in the special circumstances of this case. The reason is that all the material particulars of the report have been elaborately set out in the order of the Sales Tax Officer in both the cases, Misc. Judicial Case No. 414 of 1953 and Misc. Judicial Case No. 415 of 1953.

    11. It is not disputed on behalf of the assessee that after the Sales Tax Officer made the assessment orders, the assessee was aware of the contents of the Inspector's report. It is also significant that in his memorandum of appeal to the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division the assessee challenged the Inspector's report on several important points. In ground No. 7 of the memorandum of appeal the assessee states:’

    “7. For that the learned Superintendent of Sales Tax is not justified in basing his findings about the alleged transactions of Forbesganj on the wrong report of the Inspector for the following reasons; furthermore the learned. Superintendent has misled himself into dealing with the said report which seemed to refer to some period other than the period under assessment.

    (a) The Inspector did not pay more than one visit. The report about the subsequent visit when 500 bales of textiles are alleged to have been found in the Forbesganj godown of the appellant for sales in Nepal is wholly wrong. Nothing could have prevented the authorities concerned to seize the said bales if they were actually found, particularly when they are reported to bear no price marks but simply for export.

    (b) The appellant has not at all sold jute worth Rs. 7,50,000/- at Forbesganj which is mainly a purchasing centre.

    (c) The Inspector did not sign the account books as reported.

    (d) Babu Bulaki Chand Golcha did not make any statement before the Inspector as stated in the report.

    (e) The alleged discovery of ruled exercise book showing sales of cloth during the period 8-3-48 to 20-5-48 worth Rs. 10,51,086/- is wholly wrong & imaginary and the finding that every page of the said ruled exercise book has been signed by the Inspector is not correct.

    (f) The Inspector is not justified in his finding to the effect that the appellant took delivery of cloths meant for sale in Nepal under the barter scheme at Jogbani Railway station and instead of sending the same to Nepal territory the appellant brings the cloths to Forbesganj by bullock-cart and sells them at exorbitant prices. Furthermore the learned Superintendent seems to have overlooked the fact that the barter scheme was abolished during the year 1946-1947, i.e before the period in appeal.

    (g) The appellant has not at all sold any cloth at Katihar, what to speak of several lakhs as wrongly reported. As a matter of fact the appellant is not entitled to deal in cloth at all and as such the alleged statement of Messrs Chothmal Chhagamal does not affect the appellant, particularly when the said alleged statement is not corroborated by any books of account of the said firm.”

    12. This ground has been expressly dealt with by the Commissioner in this order. The Commissioner referred to the fact that the assessee did not choose to produce books of account and other papers in order to rebut the allegations made in the Inspector's report. The Commissioner also pointed out that the assessee did not care to adduce any oral or documentary evidence in order to rebut the allegations made in the Inspector's report.

    13. The Commissioner, therefore, rejected the argument of the assessee and held that there was no reason, to disbelieve the report of the inspector and the assessment made by the Sales Tax officer on the basis of the Inspector's report could not be interfered with. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that under the statutory scheme of the Sales Tax Act both the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue are Tribunals of fact and that it was open to the assessee to argue before either of the Tribunals that he had been prejudiced on account of non-disclosure of the Inspector's report. I think that this argument is sound.

    14. If the Tribunals were satisfied that this grievance had any substance, they might have taken additional evidence produced by the assessee or might have made an order of remand for taking additional evidence. In my opinion there is no question of violation of any principle of natural justice in this case.

    15. There is no violation of the principle of “audi alteram partem” in this case, because at the appellate stage the assessee had an opportunity of showing cause against the Inspector's report and of producing documentary and oral evidence in order to rebut the allegations made in the report.

    16. This view is borne out by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheopujan Choudhury v. State of Bihar, Misc. Judi. Case No. 171 of 1954, D/- 29-2-1956 — reported in 1956 Pat LR 120 : (S) (AIR 1356 Pat 212) (A). It was pointed out in that case by the Division Bench that the principle of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of any fixed formula, but must be applied in the context of the circumstances of each particular case. In the course of the judgment the Division Bench states:

    “But as a matter of law it is not correct to state that the party adversely affected should be heard at each and every stage of the administrative process. There is no such general requirement in the principle of ‘audi alteram partem’ on the contrary, the principle is satisfied if the party adversely affected is given sufficient opportunity to know the case he has to meet and to answer that case at some stage and not at all the stages of the 1 administrative proceeding.

    17. As I have said, the question as to whether a fair Opportunity has been given to the party adversely affected defends very much on the particular facts of each case. I think that the concept of “natural justice” cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of any fixed formula. It is not a mechanical instrument applicable to all situations. As observed by Frankfurter J. in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. J. Howard McGrath (1950) 341 US 123 at p. 164 (B):

    “Whether the ex parte procedure to which the petitioners were subjected duly observed ‘the rudiments of fair play’, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rly. Co. v. Polt, (1913) 232 US 165 at p. 168 : 58 Law Ed. 554 at p. 555 (C), cannot therefore, be tested by mere generalities or sentiments abstractly appealing. The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected., the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt, complained of and good accomplished — these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.”

    18. It is, therefore, clear that on the question whether a fair opportunity has been given, no general test can be formulated which would be applicable to all conditions. There is, however, authority for the view that the principle would be satisfied if the statute provides for an appeal to higher authority, as appeal to the Commissioner of Excise in the present case (See the judgment of Lord Coleridge C.J in Vestry of St. James and St. John, Clerkenwell v. Feary, (1890) 24 QBD 703 (D), or for making any formal representation to the authority before the order becomes finally operative (see Attorney General v. Hooper, 1893-3 Ch 483 (E).

    19. A similar view has been taken in American Administrative Law where the conception of procedural clue process takes the place of conception of ‘natural justice’. For example, in Opp. Cotton Mills v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, (1940) 312 US 126(F) it was held by Stone J. that ‘the demands of due process) do not require a hearing at the initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective’.

    20. Similarly, in Bourjois v. Clyde R. Chapman, (1936) 301 US 183 (G) it was held by Brandeis J. that due process was not denied by the statute which authorised the Health Department to refuse the issuance of certificate of registration for cosmetic preparations, which in its judgment contain injurious or poisonous substances, and which did not provide for a hearing of the application for certificate of registration by the said Department but which provided for an appeal to the Court from the refusal of the Department to issue the certificate.”

    21. In the present case the assessee had opportunity to argue on the questions raised by the Inspector's report at the appellate stage before the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division and also at the revisional stage before the Board of Revenue.

    22. The assessee did take advantage of the opportunity at both these stages of the administrative process and, therefore, cannot be heard to complain that because at the initial stage of assessment by the Sales Tax Officer he was not shown the Inspector's report there has been violation of any principle of natural justice. I think that the argument of Mr. Baldeo Sahay on this point cannot be accepted as correct.

    23. It is necessary to deal with the decision of the Supreme Court, Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, West Bengal, 1955 SCR 941 : (S) (AIR 1955 SC 65) (H), which was cited by Mr. Baldeva Sahay on behalf of the assessee in the course of his argument. I do not consider that the ratio decidendi of this case has any relevance to the decision of the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court the Income-tax Officer made an estimate of gross profit on sales at 40 per cent, by pure guess. The relevant part of the assessment order was in these terms:

    “From the point of view of profits, 1943 was a very good year, if not the best, for all cotton mills. Expenses on cotton and fuel show that production was undoubtedly higher whereas it is found that the gross profit disclosed by this company is low. I conclude that full amount of sales has not been accounted for. It is expected that actually the rate of gross profits should have been higher this year. In view of the higher costs of establishment, I take it that the rate of about 40%, i.e near about the rate disclosed in 1942 accounts, should have been maintained. I add back Rs. 35 lakhs for unaccounted sales”.

    24. On appeal, the order of assessment was upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessee then appealed to the Tribunal who reduced the gross profit to 35% on the application of a different basis. The Tribunal stated in the course of its order:

    “At the end of the hearing of this appeal on 25-11-1949, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal requested the departmental representative to produce for the examination of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal the gross profit rates shown or assessed in the cases of other similar cotton mills. The departmental representative wanted ¾ days' time to collect information on this point. On this the appellant also wanted to be allowed to produce information regarding the gross profit rates shown or assessed by other similar cotton mills, and he was also allowed to produce information on the point.

    25. On or about the 29th November the counsel for the appellant requested that he should be allowed time till Saturday the 3rd of December to file the above information and time for this purpose was allowed to him. On the 3rd December Mr. Banerjee the appellant's counsel saw the Accountant Member in his chamber and wanted to produce mitten arguments and a trunk full of books and papers in support of his case.

    26. Mr. Banerjee was told that the arguments in the case had finished on the 25th and he was allowed time only to supply to the Court the gross profit rates shown or assessed in the cases of other similar cotton mills. He was told that it was not fair to the other side to take notice of any additional evidence or record at that stage and his trunk of books and papers was returned to him”.

    27. In the context of these facts the Supreme Court held that the order of assessment was legally invalid because the Tribunal had made the assessment upon information supplied by the departmental representative without giving any opportunity to the assessee to rebut the information so supplied. There is another important fact to notice.

    28. In the Supreme Court case the assessee offered to produce rebutting evidence before the Income-tax Tribunal and indeed his Advocate, Mr. Banerji, produced before the Accountant Member in his Chamber “a trunk-load of account books” in order to substantiate the assessee's case, but the Accountant Member refused to look at the documents on the ground that “the arguments had finished and it was not fair to the other side to take notice of any additional evidence or record at that stage”. The trunk-load of books and papers were returned to the assessee.

    29. In the circumstances it was held by the Supreme Court that there was a violation of the principle of natural justice and the evidence tendered by the assessee was improperly rejected by the Income-tax Tribunal and the assessment made could not be upheld as legal. It is obvious that the material facts of the present case are different and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in, 1955 SCR 941 : (S) (AIR 1955 SC 65) (H), has no application to the present case.

    30. For these reasons I hold that in the circumstances of this case the assessment of sales tax upon the assessee for both the periods, namely, for the period from 1-7-1947 to 31-3-1948, and 1-4-1948, to 31-3-1949, is legally valid. Accordingly the question referred to by the Board of Revenue and as reframed by me must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee.

    31. There will be consolidated fee of Rs. 250/- for both these cases.

    32. Raj Kishore Prasad, J.:— I agree.

    V.S.B

    33. Answer against assessee.

    Sales Tax Act

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Hardutt Mull Jute Mills v. State Of Bihar
    (Jul 6, 1956)