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Judgment Summary: Narayan, J. (with Imam, C.J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals and a Civil Revision were heard together as they raised common questions of law and fact. The Civil Revision challenged the decision of the Small Cause Court Judge, Arrah, in Small Cause Court Suit No. 9/9 of 1951. The plaintiff in that suit, Sheoshankar Pandey, sued Padumdeo Narayan Singh relying on a handnote dated 22-6-1950 alleged to have been executed by the defendant in the plaintiff's favour for a cash advance of Rs. 400.

Two other Money Suits were instituted by the same plaintiff against Padumdeo's brothers, Awadhbihari Singh and Balbhadra Singh, based on handnotes allegedly executed on the same date (22-6-1950), claiming three handnotes of Rs. 400 each from each defendant (three by Awadhbihari, three by Balbhadra and one by Padumdeo).

The defendants denied any cash advance or execution of handnotes in favour of the plaintiff. They alleged that the three brothers had purchased property from Ramasis Singh under a sale-deed dated 14-6-1950 (registered 21-6-1950) for Rs. 14,000, that Rs. 10,500 was payable in cash but only Rs. 7,700 was paid, and that seven handnotes of Rs. 400 each were executed in favour of Ramasis to meet the unpaid consideration (three by Awadhbihari, three by Balbhadra, one by Padumdeo).

It was further alleged by the defendants that the handnotes, when passed to Ramasis, had bodies not filled in; later the body appeared to name the plaintiff as beneficiary.

Procedurally, the Small Cause Court Judge rejected the defendants' defence and decreed the Small Cause Court suit in favour of the plaintiff. In the two Money Suits, the learned Munsif accepted the defendants' defence, found no transaction between plaintiff and defendants, and dismissed the suits. On appeal the 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Arrah agreed that the notes had been executed in lieu of unpaid consideration but held that the plaintiff, being the holder of the instruments, was entitled to a decree. The defendants then preferred appeals and Padumdeo filed the Civil Revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the holder of a promissory note (or handnote) alone is entitled to maintain a suit for recovery thereon, even if the holder is not the true owner (i.e., whether a true owner who is not the holder can sue).
  2. Whether a blank or inchoate but stamped and signed paper (a handnote executed with only the signature/execution part) can be completed by the holder under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and thereby converted into a negotiable instrument payable to a specified person.
  3. Whether the findings in the separate Money Suits (that the handnotes were executed in lieu of unpaid consideration) operate as res judicata against the Small Cause Court suit under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  4. Whether the handnotes should be regarded as collateral security rather than primary instruments for unpaid consideration.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position (Sheoshankar Pandey)

  • Claimed that on 22-6-1950 the defendants executed handnotes in his favour for cash advances (each Rs. 400) and sued for recovery on those notes.
  • Relied on his status as the person named/appearing as payee (holder) to maintain suits on the handnotes.

Defendants' / Appellants' Arguments

  • Denied any cash advance or direct transaction with the plaintiff; asserted the handnotes were executed in favour of Ramasis Singh as part-payment of purchase consideration for property.
  • Alleged that the body of the handnotes had not been filled when delivered (i.e., they were blank/inchoate when passed to Ramasis), and were later filled to name the plaintiff.
  • Counsel (Mr. Kailash Rai) argued that the trial finding was that only the execution portion had been written on 22-6-1950 (i.e., the instruments were incomplete when passed), and further contended that earlier appellate findings should operate as res judicata against the Small Cause Court proceeding under Section 11 CPC.
  • Also faintly raised the contention that the handnotes should be treated as collateral security.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harkishore Barua v. Gura Mia Chaudhuri, AIR 1931 Cal 387 Held that a true owner who was not the holder could not maintain a suit on a promissory note even though the holder was his benamidar. Referred to as authoritative support for the proposition that only the holder can sue on a promissory note; cited with approval.
Sarjoo Prasad v. Smt. Rampayari Debi, AIR 1950 Pat 493 Bench of this Court referred approvingly to the Calcutta decision (Harkishore Barua). Used to show this High Court had approved the rule that a non-holder true owner cannot sue.
Hridaysingh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1940 Pat 377 Bench decision: a holder of a blank but stamped and duly signed paper described as a handnote can convert it into a negotiable instrument payable to any specified person. Applied to hold that Section 20 allows completion of inchoate instruments by the person to whom the stamped and signed paper is delivered; supports plaintiff's entitlement if he is the holder.
Cruchely v. Clarance, (1813) 2 M & S. 90 English authority: signing a bill in blank is an undertaking answerable when filled up; supports liability of drawer for filling blanks. Quoted (Lord Ellenborough C.J.) to support the principle that signing in blank subjects the signatory to liability when the instrument is completed and used by a bona fide holder.
M.N.P.L. Firm v. Kirwan Cyan, 17 Ind Cas 915 Authority that a payee can fill in a blank inchoate instrument and sue after filling it or endorsing it. Quoted for the proposition that completion by the payee may give him enforceable rights as holder.
Hari Kant Jha v. Nathu Choudhury, AIR 1941 Pat 504 Fazl Ali J. held Section 20 gives general authority to a person receiving a stamped and signed paper to convert it into a negotiable instrument payable to any specified person. Followed Hridaysingh and applied to confirm that a person receiving a blank inchoate instrument may complete it in favour of any person.
Bachamdeo Singh v. Kari Singh, AIR 1936 Pat 498 Holds that if a handnote mentions one kind of consideration but another kind is actually found, the suit is not liable to be dismissed for that reason alone. Cited to support the point that a mismatch in stated versus actual consideration does not necessarily defeat a suit on the note.
Mrs. Gertrude Oates v. Mrs. Millicent D'Silva, AIR 1933 Pat 78 Authority on constructive res judicata (as cited by counsel). Cited by counsel for the defendants but the Court found it irrelevant to the facts and refused to treat it as applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by observing that the central legal proposition governing the case is settled by statute and authorities: under the Negotiable Instruments Act the "holder" of a promissory note is the person entitled in his own name to possession and to receive the amount due (Section 8), the maker is bound to pay according to the apparent tenor (Section 32), and payment must generally be made to the holder to discharge liability (Section 78) subject to Section 82(c). From these provisions the Court concluded that ordinarily only the holder can maintain a suit on a promissory note.

The Court then addressed the contention that the instruments were incomplete when passed to Ramasis (or to the plaintiff/benamidar). It applied Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and a line of binding decisions (Hridaysingh; Hari Kant Jha) to conclude that a stamped, signed but inchoate (blank) instrument may be completed by the person to whom it is delivered and thereby converted into a negotiable instrument payable to a specified person. The Court quoted English authorities (Cruchely v. Clarance) and Indian authorities (M.N.P.L. Firm) to reaffirm that signing in blank exposes the maker to liability once completed by a bona fide holder.

On the facts, the Court examined the trial and appellate findings. While lower courts differed (Small Cause Court Judge found a loan to the plaintiff; Munsif found notes were executed in lieu of unpaid consideration), the Subordinate Judge accepted that the handnotes had been executed in lieu of the unpaid consideration but nevertheless held that the plaintiff, as holder of the instruments, was entitled to maintain suits. The Court found no clear and definite finding by the trial judge that the documents were incomplete when passed to the beneficiary; moreover, even if incomplete, Section 20 permitted completion by the holder.

The Court also considered and rejected the res judicata argument under Section 11 CPC: because the handnote in the Small Cause Court suit was different from the notes in the Money Suits, the litigations were not between the same parties nor under the same title; accordingly, constructive res judicata did not apply and the cited authority (Mrs. Gertrude Oates v. Millicent D'Silva) was irrelevant.

Finally, the Court rejected the submission that the handnotes were merely collateral security, holding instead that they were given for the unpaid consideration and, irrespective of the payee named, could be enforced by the holder as a negotiable instrument.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals and the Civil Revision are DISMISSED (appeals and revision dismissed). The Court held that the appeals and revision were without merit and that the legal rule entitling the holder to sue on the promissory note applies; Section 20 and related authorities permit completion of inchoate instruments by the holder, and res judicata did not bar the Small Cause Court proceedings.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • Appeals and Civil Revision dismissed with costs.
  • Hearing fee in the Civil Revision fixed at Rs. 48/-.

Implications for broader law: The Court relied on established statutory provisions and precedents; it did not purport to lay down a new principle of law but applied existing provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act (notably Ss. 8, 20, 32, 78, 82(c)) and settled case law to the facts. The decision confirms (a) that the holder of a promissory note can maintain suit even if not the true beneficial owner and (b) that completion of blank/inchoate instruments by the holder is authorized under Section 20. No novel precedent was created beyond applying existing authority to the facts.

Final result recorded in the opinion: Imam, C.J. agreed. "Appeals and revision dismissed." (V.S.B initials appear in the judgment record.)

    Awadhbihari Singh And Others v. Sheoshankar Pandey .

    Narayan, J.:— The appeals and the Civil Revision have been heard together, because they raise common questions of law and fact. The Civil Revision is directed against the decision of the Small Cause Court Judge, Arrah, made in Small Cause Court Suit No. 9/9 of 1951. The plaintiff Sheoshankar Pandey had sued the defendant Padumdeo Narayan Singh on the basis of a handnote elated 22-6-1950 alleged to have been executed by the defendant in his favour on a cash advance of Rs. 400/-.

    2. The suits giving rise to the Second Appeals had also been instituted by the same Sheoshankar Pandey against Awadhbihari Singh and Balbhadra Singh, the brothers of Padumdeo Narayan Singh (the defendant in Small Cause Court suit No. 9/9 of 1951) on the basis of handnotes executed on the same date on which Padumdeo had executed the handnote which was the basis of the claim against him. In these two suits also the plaintiff had alleged that on 22-6-1950 the handnotes were executed in his favour by the defendants after cash advances made by him. In each of these two suits the claim was based on three handnotes, each of Rs. 400, executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff.

    3. The defence substantially was that there had been no cash advance by the plaintiff to any of the defendants and no handnote had been executed in his favour. According to the allegation of the defendants, the three brothers, Awadhbihari, Balbhadra and Padumdeo who are the members of a joint Hindu family, had purchased certain properties from one Ramasis Singh under a sale-deed dated 14-6-1950 for Rs. 14,000/-.

    4. This sale-deed was registered on 21-6-1950, and out of the consideration Rs. 10,500 was to be paid in cash and Rs. 3,500 had to be left in deposit with, the vendees for payment of certain prior encumbrances. The vendees were, however, not able to pay the entire amount of Rs. 10,500 and after having paid Rs. 7,700 they executed 7 hand-notes of Rs. 400 each in favour of Ramasis. Three of the handnotes are by Awadhbihari, three by Balbhadra and one by Padumdeo.

    5. It was further alleged by the defendants that when they made over these handnotes to Ramasis the body of the handnotes had not been filled up, though it now appears that the body of the handnotes has been written out describing the plaintiff therein as the beneficiary.

    6. The learned Small Cause Court Judge rejected his defence entirely and holding that there had been a cash advance by the plaintiff he decreed the Small Cause Court suit in full.

    7. In the Money Suits the learned Munsif accepted the defence and came to the finding that there had been no transaction between the plaintiff and the defendants and that the handnotes had been executed in favour of Ramasis for the unpaid consideration money.

    8. The learned Munsif was of opinion that even on the basis of the provisions contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree in these two suits. In the result he dismissed the suits, and the plaintiff had to file appeals before the District Judge of Shahabad. The appeals were heard by the 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Arrah, who while agreeing with the learned Munsif in his finding that the handnotes had really been executed by the defendants in lieu of the unpaid consideration money held that the plaintiff being the holder of the instruments was entitled to a decree.

    9. The defendants of the two Money Suits have, therefore, preferred these appeals, and the defendant of the Small Cause Court suit has filed this application in Civil Revision.

    10. In my opinion, the appeals as well as the Civil Revision are absolutely without any merit, the question of law arising in this case and canvassed in the Courts below having been finally determined by authoritative decisions of this Court and other Courts. It is now a very well settled proposition of law that it is the holder of the promissory note who alone is entitled to maintain a suit on the note for the recovery of the money due thereon and that a true owner who is not a holder cannot maintain a suit on a promissory note even though the holder is his benamidar.

    11. This is the conclusion which follows after a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act and, especially, Ss. 8, 32 and 78.

    12. According to S. 8, the “holder” of a promissory note means any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto. Section 32 lays down that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the maker of a promissory note and the accepter before maturity of a bill of exchange are bound to pay the amount there-of at maturity according to the apparent tenor of the note or acceptance respectively.

    13. Section 78 is in stringent terms and says that subject to the provision of S. 82, cl. (c), payment of the amount due on a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque must in order to discharge the maker or acceptor, be made to the holder of the instrument. Section 82(c) says that the maker, acceptor or indorser respectively of a negotiable instrument is discharged from liability thereon to all parties thereto, if the instrument is payable to bearer, or has been indorsed in blank, and such maker, acceptor or indorser makes payment in due course of the amount due thereon.

    14. In view of what is contained in S. 78 it is manifest that it is the holder of the promissory note who alone will be entitled to maintain a suit on the note, and we have, therefore, now a catena of authorities which lay down this proposition.

    15. The point was considered by the Calcutta High Court in — ‘Harkishore Barua v. Gura Mia Chaudhuri, AIR 1931 Cal 387 (A), and in that case it was held that a true owner who was not the holder could not maintain a suit on a promissory note even though the holder was admittedly his benamidar, and was made a party to the suit. This ruling was referred to widi approval by a Bench of this Court in a recent decision, — ‘Sarjoo Prasad v. Smt. Rampayari Debi’, AIR 1950 Pat 493 (B).

    16. With the greatest respect for the arguments advanced before us by Mr. Kailash Rai, the counsel for the appellants and the petitioner, I should like to point out that these handnotes which are certainly negotiable instruments were never actually negotiated. The handnotes were executed in favour of the plaintiff or if only the execution portion was written by the executants and the body was written later on, even then under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it was open to the holder of the instrument to complete the document by writing the body of it.

    17. The decision of this court in — ‘Hridaysingh v. Kailash Singh’, AIR 1940 Pat 377 (C) is a Bench decision which lays down after a consideration of the previous authorities on the subject that the holder of a blank but stamped and duly signed, paper described as a handnote by the drawer in his own handwriting can convert it into a negotiable instrument payable to any specified person and not necessarily to himself.

    18. In this case their Lordships cited certain very important observations made in English cases, and because of the submissions made before us by the learned counsel for the appellants I should like to mention in this judgment also the following quotations:

    “Lord Ellenborough C.J in — ‘Cruchely v. Clarance’, (1813) 2 M & S. 90 (D) disposed of this defence in the following words:

    19. As the defendant has chosen to send the bill into the world in this form, the world ought not to be deceived by his acts. The defendant by leaving the blank undertook to be answerable for it when filled up in the shape of a bill.”

    20. Bayley J. said:

    “The signing the bill in blank without the name of the payee was an authority to a bona fide holder to insert the tame. Twomey J. in — ‘M.N.P.L Firm v. Kirwan Cyan’, 17 Ind Cas 915 (E) also held that

    a payee can fill in a blank inchoate instrument and sue on it himself alter filling if or endorsing it to some one.”

    21. This Bench decision was followed by Fazl Ali J. (as he then was) in — ‘Hari Kant Jha v. Nathu Choudhury’, AIR 1941 Pat 504 (F), and his Lordship held that Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, gives a general authority to a person to whom a stamped and signed paper is delivered to convert it into a negotiable instrument payable to any specified person and that accordingly it is open to a person receiving a blank inchoate instrument to complete it in favour of any person besides himself.

    22. These decisions are binding upon us, and even if it has been found as a fact that the documents had not been completed when they were made over to Ramasis or the plaintiff, the claim as based on these notes cannot be dismissed. As a matter of fact, I am not at all able to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the finding of fact in this case is that the documents were incomplete and that only the execution portion of the instruments had been written out on the date which the handnotes bear.

    23. The conclusion at which the learned Subordinate Judge has arrived is expressed by him in these terms:

    “In agreement with the learned Munsif I hold that no loan was advanced by the plaintiff to the defendants and that the handnotes were really executed by the defendants in lieu of the unpaid consideration money for the sale deed executed by Ramasis in favour of the defendants which was registered on 21-6-50.”

    24. Mr. Rai submitted that on this question the learned Subordinate Judge has accepted the finding of the trial Court and that the finding of the trial Court was that only the execution portion of the document had been written on 22-6-1950. But even in the judgment of the trial Judge I find the following observation:

    “On a consideration of the entire evidence and the circumstances discussed above I hold that there had been no dealing between the plaintiff and defendants but there had been transaction between the defendants and Ramasis as stated by the defendants and the defendants executed the handnotes to Ramasis for the unpaid consideration money.”

    25. It is true that he has discussed Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but on reading his judgment I am not able to say that in fact his definite finding was to the effect that the handnotes were incomplete when they were passed to the beneficiary or the benamidar. In any view of the case, therefore, the decision of the Courts below does not call for any interference on our part. This Court has also taken the view that if a handnote mentions one kind of consideration but it is found that there is a consideration of a different nature, the suit is not liable to be dismissed for this reason alone. See — ‘Bachamdeo Singh v. Kari Singh’, AIR 1936 Pat 498 (G).

    26. In fact, if the position in law is that on a proper construction of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act it is the holder of the note who alone can maintain the claim on the basis of the note, even though he is not the real beneficiary, the present plaintiff who is, according to the findings of fact, a benamidar for the real owner will be entitled to maintain the suit.

    27. There are two other points which were faintly raised by Mr. Rai, but I do not think that they deserve any serious consideration. The learned Small Cause Court Judge decreed the claim of Sheoshankar Pandey against Padumdeo Narain Singh on 29-3-1952, and before that the appellate Court had decided the suits filed by Sheoshankar against Awadhbihari and Balbhadra. The learned counsel submitted that the findings of fact which have been arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge, that is the findings to the effect that the handnotes were really executed by the defendants for unpaid consideration money, should have been taken by the learned Small Cause Court Judge as binding upon him.

    28. I do not think it can be urged with any show of reason that Section 11 of the CPC will apply in this, case and that the bar of res judicata prevented the Small Cause Court Judge from going into the question of fact again. The claim as made in the two Money Suits was on handnotes different from the one on which the claim was made in this small cause court suit, and it cannot, therefore, be said that the two litigations were between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claimed; nor can it be said that they were litigating under the same title.

    29. In a case like this there cannot also be constructive res judicata, and the decision in — ‘Mrs. Gertrude Oates v. Mrs. Millicent D'Silva*’, AIR 1933 Pat 78 (H) cited by the learned counsel has got no relevance whatsoever. The other submission of Mr. Rai was that the handnotes should be taken to be a collateral security. There is no reason for holding that the handnotes were collateral security. They were given for the unpaid consideration money, and instead of being executed in favour of Ramasis they were executed in favour of the plaintiff. In the result, therefore, I would dismiss the appeal as well as the Civil Revision with costs. Hearing fee in the Civil Revision Rs. 48/-.

    Imam, C.J:— I agree.

    V.S.B

    30. Appeals and revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Awadhbihari Singh And Others v. Sheoshankar Pandey .
    (Aug 27, 1954)