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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The New India Assurance Co., Ltd. (the petitioner) obtained a writ on 14 June 1951 from the High Court prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad from proceeding with Reference No. 12 of 1951 concerning the dismissal of Nagendranath Bhattacharya on 27 April 1949. The reference to the Tribunal was originally made under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (notification dated 3 May 1951). After the High Court issued rule, the Government of India cancelled that order of reference and, on 9 July 1951, issued a fresh notification referring the dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner instituted the present proceedings in the High Court under Article 226 seeking certiorari to quash the Tribunal proceedings on the ground that the Government of India had no jurisdiction to make the reference.

Cause was shown against the rule by the Advocate-General for the Government Industrial Tribunal and by Mr. B.C. Ghosh for the dismissed employee and the Bihar Provincial Insurance Employees' Association. The High Court considered statutory provisions, parties' affidavits and precedents and ultimately made the rule absolute, quashing the reference and proceedings before the Tribunal. A concurrence by Sarjoo Prosad, J. agreed on the facts that no industrial dispute existed and that the proceedings should be quashed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dispute between the Company (employer) and the dismissed workman Nagendranath Bhattacharya constituted an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  2. Whether, assuming the matter was not an industrial dispute as defined, the Government of India had jurisdiction under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal (i.e., whether the reference made by notifications dated 3 May 1951 and 9 July 1951 was intra vires).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (New India Assurance Co., Ltd.)

  • Submitted by Mr. Baldeva Sahay: contended there was no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act because the matter involved only an individual dispute between the Company and a single workman (Nagendranath Bhattacharya) concerning his dismissal.
  • Argued that “industrial dispute” requires a dispute between an employer and a body of workmen acting in a collective sense and that an individual dismissal alone does not satisfy section 2(k).
  • Pointed to affidavits (paragraph 4 of petitioner's affidavit) asserting that the Association did not raise any dispute at the time of dismissal, did not make any demand on behalf of Bhattacharya, and that the petitioner company was unaware that the Association had taken up his cause.

Respondents' Arguments (Advocate-General; Nagendranath Bhattacharya; Bihar Provincial Insurance Employees' Association)

  • Mr. B.C. Ghosh relied on section 13 of the General Clauses Act to argue that the singular/plural rule permits construing "employee" so as to include a solitary workman; thus a dispute involving one workman could be an "industrial dispute".
  • The Advocate-General argued from the terms of the Government notification that there should be a presumption that the facts stated in the notification (i.e., that an industrial dispute existed between the Company and the Association on 9 July 1951) were correct; he further relied on authorities suggesting workers might properly invoke governmental machinery without formal demand on management.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal Held that a dismissed workman cannot, by making a demand for reinstatement alone, create an industrial dispute; an industrial dispute may arise if a workers' union or a substantial body of workmen espouse his cause. Used to support the Court's view that section 2(k) requires something more than an individual dispute — the dispute must involve a collective body of workmen.
Manager, U.C. Bank v. Labour Commissioner Chief Justice expressed the view that section 2(k) requires a dispute between a body of employees in the collective sense and the management; a solitary employee's dispute alone does not constitute an industrial dispute under that section. Cited to reinforce the interpretation that "industrial dispute" contemplates a collective dispute rather than a purely individual grievance.
J. Chowdhury v. M.C. Banerjee Adopted the view distinguishing individual disputes from industrial disputes (as requiring collective character). Referred to as supporting authority for the collective-nature requirement of an industrial dispute.
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Industrial Tribunal Adopted the view that an industrial dispute implies a collective dimension rather than merely an individual dispute. Used as further supporting authority for the Court's construction of section 2(k).
Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability v. Victorian Coal Miners' Association (Australian) Defines an industrial dispute as one where a considerable number of employees make common cause in demanding changes in conditions of employment — emphasises collective action and economic character. Quoted to illustrate the economic and collective conception of an "industrial dispute" and to explain the Court's interpretive approach.
George Hudson, Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union Distinguished individual disputes from industrial disputes; emphasised the broader class-based and enduring character of industrial disputes. Adopted to clarify the conceptual distinction between individual grievances and industrial disputes and to support the Court's reasoning on the nature of an industrial dispute.
Members of the Sasamusa Workers' Union v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1952 Patna 56) Held that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of the Act if there is no material showing that notice of strike or demands were served on or made known to the management or that reasonable opportunity was given to the management to comply. Applied as a governing principle: because there was no evidence that the Association had made demands on the petitioner or that the petitioner was aware of any such demands, the Court held there was no industrial dispute in the present case.
Standard Coal Company, Ltd. v. S.P. Varma Observed that workers may, in some circumstances, appropriately invoke governmental machinery without formal demand on management; however, in that case there was material showing the management was aware of the demands via correspondence. Considered and distinguished on its facts: Court noted that Standard Coal was fact-specific (management there was aware) and that those facts were absent in the present matter.
A.I.R. 1952 Patna 56 (referenced separately in the opinion) The opinion notes that the decision must be confined to its own facts. Referred to by the concurring judge (Sarjoo Prosad, J.) as requiring limitation to its facts; used to support the conclusion that the present decision rests on the specific absence of facts showing Association's prior involvement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in two linked strands: statutory construction of "industrial dispute" under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and factual application of that construction to the evidence before the Court.

1) Statutory construction and contextual analysis:

  • The Court rejected a literal application of the General Clauses Act rule (section 13) that singular includes plural, observing that such a rule is inapplicable where repugnant to the subject or context. Instead, the Court examined section 2(k) within the setting and purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • Reference was made to other provisions of the Act to illuminate the intended scope of "industrial dispute": section 10(2) (references on application of parties where applicants represent majority), section 10(3) (power to prohibit strikes or lock-outs on reference), section 18 (binding effect of settlements on all parties and persons employed), and section 36 (representation rights of workmen and employers in proceedings).
  • From these provisions the Court inferred that the Act contemplates disputes which have developed a collective character — i.e., where majority or a substantial portion of workmen are involved and where there is a risk of collective action such as strikes. The Court emphasised the "collective" or "body of men" aspect as essential to the conception of an industrial dispute.
  • The Court further relied on authoritative statements from other jurisdictions (Australian cases) and domestic precedents to characterise an industrial dispute as economic and collective in nature rather than a mere individual grievance.

2) Application to facts:

  • The Court examined affidavits and factual material and found no evidence that the Bihar Provincial Insurance Employees' Association had at any time taken up the dismissed employee's cause with the petitioner or had made any demand for reinstatement which the petitioner had been given an opportunity to consider.
  • The petitioner's affidavit (paragraph 4) stated that the Association did not raise any dispute at the time of dismissal and did not make any demand on the petitioner's behalf. The Association's affidavit contained no specific denial of those facts.
  • The Advocate-General's reliance on a presumption of correctness of the Government notification was noted; the Court observed that the presumption is rebuttable by proper evidence and found no evidentiary support showing the Association had acted on behalf of the dismissed workman prior to the reference.
  • The Court distinguished the Standard Coal Company case on its facts: in that case the management was aware of the workers' demands through correspondence; in the present case there was no evidence that the petitioner was aware of any demand by the Association.
  • On the combined statutory and factual analysis, the Court concluded that the conciliation proceedings initiated under section 12 and the references under section 10(1) were without jurisdiction (ultra vires) because no industrial dispute as defined by section 2(k) existed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Rule made absolute; the reference made by the Government of India (notification dated 9 July 1951) and the proceedings consequent thereon before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad are quashed.

Direct consequences:

  • The conciliation proceedings under section 12 and the references under section 10(1) relating to the dismissal of Nagendranath Bhattacharya are held to be beyond jurisdiction and are quashed.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion confines its conclusion to the statutory interpretation and the facts proved: it applies existing principles (as discussed and cited) to hold that an individual dismissal, without material showing collective action or awareness by the management, does not constitute an "industrial dispute" under section 2(k). The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying and following prior authorities; accordingly, no new broad precedent was announced beyond the factual determination and the statutory construction applied to these facts.

S.H
Rule made absolute.

    N.I Assurance Co. v. C.G.I Tribunal

    Ramaswami, J.:— In this case the petitioner, namely. The New India Assurance Co., Ltd., had obtained a writ from this High Court on 14th June, 1951, prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad from proceeding with Reference no. 12 of 1951 for adjudication of the dispute between the petitioner and Nagendra Nath Bhattacharya who had been dismissed from the Company's service on 27th April, 1949. The reference was made to the Tribunal under-section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act no. XIV of 1947) by the notification, dated 3rd of May, 1951. After the High Court had issued the rule the Government of India cancelled the order of reference by the notification, dated the 9th July, 1951. On the same date the Government of India passed another order to the following effect:—

    “Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen between the New India Assurance Co., Ltd., Calcutta and the Bihar Provincial Insurance Employees' Association, Patna, in the matter of the termination of services of Sri Nagendranath Bhattacharya a workman at the Patna Branch of the New India Assurance Company.

    And, whereas the Central Government considers it desirable to refer the dispute for adjudication: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Act XIV of 1947), the Central Government hereby refers the said dispute for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad constituted under section 7 of the Act”.

    Thereafter the petitioner instituted the present proceeding in the High Court for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for calling up the record of the proceedings pending before the Tribunal and for quashing the same on the ground that there was no jurisdiction on the part of the Government of India to make the reference.

    Cause was shown against the rule by the Advocate-General on behalf of the Government Industrial Tribunal and by Mr. B.C Ghosh on behalf of the dismissed employee Nagendranath Bhattacharya and on behalf of the Bihar Provincial Insurance Employees' Association.

    In support of the rule Mr. Baldeva Sahav argued in the first place that there is no ‘industrial dispute’ within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently the Government of India had no jurisdiction to make a reference under section 10(1) and proceedings pending before the Tribunal at Dhanbad were illegal and ought to be quashed. The argument of the learned counsel is that in order to constitute an ‘industrial dispute’ there must be a dispute or difference between the employer and a body of workmen in the collective sense and that the dispute must be connected with the employment or terms of the employment or with conditions of labour of any person. It was submitted by the learned counsel that dispute between a single workman and the management of the Company was merely an individual dispute concerned with the terms of the employment or the terms of dismissal of a solitary workman, that it was not in its nature or quality an ‘industrial dispute’ contemplated by the Act. The question is a matter of construction and depends upon the language of clause 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Clause 2(k) defines an ‘industrial dispute’ to mean

    ‘any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.’

    On behalf of the respondents Mr. B.C Ghosh, referred to the General Clauses Act and contended that under section 13 of that Act “words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa” unless there was anything repugnant in the subject or context. It was argued by Mr. B.C Ghosh that the word ‘employee’ in section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act must be construed so as to include a dispute between the management and a solitary workman whose terms of employment had been affected. In my opinion the argument of Mr. B.C Ghosh is not correct. Section 13 of the General Clauses Act no doubt enacts a general rule of construction that words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa, but the rule is subject to the proviso that there shall be nothing repugnant to such a construction in the subject or context of the Act which is to be construed. In the present case the proper approach is to examine section 2(k) in the setting and the context and other important provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 10(2) of the Act provides for a reference to a Court or a Tribunal on the application of the parties to an industrial dispute if the appropriate Government is satisfied “that the persons applying represent the majority of each party”. Section 10(3) is also important in this connection. Section 10(3) states that

    “where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board or Tribunal under this section, the appropriate Government may by order, prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference.”

    Sections 10(2) and 10(3) therefore contemplate a state of affairs where the action of the management in connection with a single workman has developed into a general dispute involving the whole of the workmen or the majority of the workmen in the particular establishment and there is an apprehension or threat of strike. Section 18 of the Act is also important. This section states that—

    “a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings……….; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.”

    Section 36 also throws light on the proper construction of the expression ‘industrial dispute’. This section states that—

    “a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by—(a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union by an officer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in, the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.”

    Section 36(2) similarly provides that—

    “an employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by—(a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of associations of employers…………; (c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged………”.

    In the context of these important provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act it is clear that the ‘ndustrial dispute’ referred to and defined in section 2(k) must be construed to mean not a dispute between an individual workman and the management but a dispute which though it may originate in an action with regard to an individual workman has developed into a dispute in which the majority of the workmen in the establishment are interested. This view is supported by the decision in Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal in which it was held that a dismissed workman cannot, by making a demand for reinstatement, create an industrial dispute, but if a workers' union or a substantial body of workmen; who continue in employment espouse his cause then an industrial dispute may arise. The point was actually decided by Mack, J. but the Chief Justice did not express his final opinion on this point, in a subsequent case, however, Manager, U.C Bank v. Labour Commissioner the Chief Justice definitely expressed the view that if section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act was to apply there must be a dispute between a body of employees in the collective sense and the management and that a dispute between a solitary employee and the management would not by itself constitute an industrial dispute falling within the scope of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. At page 144 the learned Chief Justice said: “In my opinion, this is not the result. The two Acts, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act and the Madras Act are not in pari materia. Though in one sense, section 41(2) of the Madras Act concerns a dispute between an employee and an employer, an individual dispute falling under it would not by itself be an industrial dispute fallings within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act. It may be that the dismissal of even one workman can become the subject of an industrial dispute, but then it is no longer an individual dispute between the dismissed workman and the employer only; it becomes a dispute between the workmen on the one hand and the employment on the other. Such a dispute, it may be called a collective dispute, certainly cannot be the subject-matter of an appeal under section 41 of the Madras Act. Such dispute would have to be referred to a Tribunal or other authority under section 10, Industrial Disputes Act either by the Government suo motu or at the instance of one or both of the parties. In the Kandan Textile, Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras, it was held by Bench of this Court that something more than an individual dispute between a worker and the employer is required to make the dispute an industrial dispute, ult was pointed out in that case that a dispute which in its origin might be an individual dispute may at a later stage develop into a collective dispute which could be properly called an industrial dispute. We have not been referred, to any authority which holds to the contrary”. The same view has been adopted in J. Chowdhury v. M.C Banerjee and Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Industrial Tribunal.

    There is another matter to be considered in this connection. The Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) is legislation with reference to item no. 22 in the Concurrent List, namely, ‘Trade Unions; Industrial and labour disputes’. The expression ‘industrial dispute’ cannot be construed in a grammatical sense so as to mean any dispute relating to an industrial establishment. The conception of industrial dispute is a conception in the realm of economics. It connotes a dispute between capital and labour organised in a collective sense. The object of an industrial dispute in this sense is to obtain new industrial conditions for the body of employees and not merely to ventilate the grievance of any specific individual employee at a particular moment in an industrial establishment. An industrial dispute, therefore, involves two elements, viz., (1) the dispute must relate to industrial matters; and (2) at least on one side of the dispute the disputants must be a body of men acting in collective manner and not individual. In the Australian case Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability v. Victorian Coal Miners' Association Griffith, C.J said that “an industrial dispute exists where a considerable number of employees engaged in some branch of industry make common cause in, demanding from or refusing to their employers (whether one or more) some change in the conditions of employment which is denied to them or asked of them”. In a later case George Hudson, Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union Isaacs, J. referred pointedly to the difference between an individual dispute and an industrial dispute. At page 441 the learned Judge states: “The very nature of an ‘industrial dispute,’ as distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrial conditions, not merely for the specific individuals then working from the specific individuals then employing them, and not for the moment only, but for the class of employees from the class of employers limited by the ambit of disturbance or dislocation of public services which has arisen or which might arise if the demand were not acceded to and observed for a period really indefinite. The concept looks entirely beyond the individuals who are actually fighting the battle. It is a battle by the claimants not for themselves alone and not as against the respondents alone, but by the claimants so far as they represent their class, against the respondents so far as they represent their class”.

    In the present case, therefore, I am of opinion that the dispute between the petitioner and the dismissed employee Nagendranath Bhattacharya does not fail within the ambit of the expression ‘industrial dispute’ as defined in section 2(k) of the Act and that the conciliation proceedings initiated under section 12 were without jurisdiction. It follows that the reference made by the Government under section 10(1) of the Act by the notifications, dated the 3rd May 1951 and the 9th July 1951 must be held to be beyond jurisdiction and ultra vires.

    It was nevertheless argued on behalf of the respondents that the cause of the dismissed employee was taken up by the Insurance “Employees” Association and there was an ‘industrial dispute’ within the meaning of the Act on the date when the Government of India issued the notification, dated the 9th July 1951. On this point the learned Advocate-General referred to the terms of the notification and argued that there was a presumption that the facts stated in the notification are correct and that there was a dispute between the Association and the petitioner on the date the notification was issued. The presumption upon which the Advocate-General relies is not an absolute presumption but it may be rebutted by proper evidence adduced by the, parties interested. In the present case it was submitted by Mr. Baldeva Sahay on behalf of the petitioner that there was nothing, to show that at any time the Association had approached the petitioner for the reinstatement of Mr. Bhattacharya. It was contended by the learned counsel that the Association made no demand from the petitioner and no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to comply with any such demand. It was stated that the petitioner was not aware that the Association had taken up the cause of the dismissed employee or that it made any reference to the Government of India in the matter. Learned counsel referred to paragraph 4 of his affidavit which states that—

    “the Association did not raise any dispute at the time of the dismissal of the aforesaid Sri Nagendranath and did not make any demand on his behalf, which could possibly have been refused.”

    In the affidavit field on behalf of the Employees' Association there is no specific denial of the facts stated in paragraph 4(b) of the petitioner's affidavit. In this state of facts it is impossible to hold that there was any dispute between the Association and the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Government of India to make a reference under-section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The case is governed, in my opinion, by the principle laid down by this Court in Members of the Sasamusa Workers' Union v. State of Bihar in which it was, held that there was no ‘industrial dispute’ within the meaning of the Act if there was no material to show that the notice of strike by the Workers' Union was in fact served upon the management or that reasonable opportunity was given to the management to comply with the demands made on behalf of the Workers' Union, or that the management was otherwise aware of those demands. On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed by the learned Advocate-General on Standard Coal Company, Ltd. v. S.P Varma in which it was observed that there may be instances where workers may consider it wholly useless to make a demand for redress on the management and prefer to move the appropriate machinery set up by Government for the redress of their grievances. But nevertheless, it will be an industrial dispute if it comes within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act”. This observation must be, however, read in the context of the special facts admitted or proved in that case. It would appear that certain demands were made by the workmen through their trade union direct to the Regional Labour Commissioner and not direct to the management of the colliery. But there was material in that case to indicate that the Regional Labour Commissioner had correspondence with the management of the colliery who was aware of the demands made by the workers. Upon these facts it was held by the Bench that it was wholly useless for the workers to make a formal demand for redress on the management and it was open to them to move the appropriate machinery set up by Government for the redress of their grievances. In the present case the material facts are wholly different. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest or to indicate that the petitioner was aware that the Association had taken up the cause of the dismissed employee or that it was insisting on his reinstatement. In my opinion upon the facts proved in this case it must be held that there was no industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act and that the reference made by the Government of India under section 10(1) is without jurisdiction.

    For these reasons I would make the rule absolute and direct that the reference made by the Government of India by the notification, dated the 9th July 1951 and the proceedings, consequent on the reference, pending before the Tribunal at Dhanbad should be quashed. There will be no order as to costs.

    Sarjoo Prosad, J.:— On the facts disclosed in the affidavits of the respective parties I cannot but hold that there is no existence of any industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act so as to warrant a reference to the Tribunal. There is nothing in their affidavits to show that the Provincial Insurance Employees' Association which came into being on 18th March, 1950, long after the dismissal of the workman Sri Nagendra Nath Bhattacharya on the 27th April, 1949, at any stage interested itself on behalf of the dismissed employee before the petitioner Company or took up his cause before it. There is apparently some conflict between a Division Bench judgment of this Court [Standard Coal Company, Limited v. S.P Varma] and another Bench decision of this Court [Members of the Sasamusa Workers' Union v. State of Bihar] to which my learned Brother was himself a party. It is not necessary, however, to attempt to resolve that conflict if any, because the decision in A.I.R 1952 Patna 56, as pointed out by my learned Brother, has to be confined to its own facts. I, therefore, agree that the rule should be made absolute and the proceedings pending before the Tribunal should be quashed.

    S.H
    Rule made absolute.

    Industrial Disputes Act.
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    Comments

    N.I Assurance Co. v. C.G.I Tribunal
    (Jan 14, 1953)