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citation codes
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  • provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963
  • provisions of Section 31 of the new Limitation Act
  • Order 21, Rule, 17 of the CPC. Sub-rule (1) of rule 17
  • Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 190.17.
  • provision of Order 21. Rule 17 of the CPC,
  • Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • rules 11 to 14 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908),
  • Rule 11(2)(j)(ii) read with rule 13,
  • Order 21, Rule 22 of the CPC,
  • Order 21, Rule 2 of the CPC,
  • provision of sub-rule (1),
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 17.7.
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 17,
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 17
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule
  • Order 21. Rule 17
  • Order 21, Rule 22,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963
  • provisions of Section 31 of the new Limitation Act
  • Order 21, Rule, 17 of the CPC. Sub-rule (1) of rule 17
  • Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 190.17.
  • provision of Order 21. Rule 17 of the CPC,
  • Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • rules 11 to 14 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908),
  • Rule 11(2)(j)(ii) read with rule 13,
  • Order 21, Rule 22 of the CPC,
  • Order 21, Rule 2 of the CPC,
  • provision of sub-rule (1),
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 17.7.
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 17,
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 17
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule
  • Order 21. Rule 17
  • Order 21, Rule 22,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decree-holder's challenge to an order of the executing Court which upheld the judgment-debtors' objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

Relevant events (as stated in the opinion):

  • A decree was passed on 8-2-1952 in Rent Suit No. 1 of 1951.
  • An execution proceeding (Execution Case No. 26 of 1954) was initiated and dismissed for default on 28-7-1955.
  • The decree-holder filed a second execution petition, Execution Case No. 23 of 1958, on 18-7-1958; notice under Order 21, Rule 22 CPC was served on the judgment-debtors.
  • On 11-2-1960 the decree-holder applied to amend the execution petition by deleting the property originally mentioned and substituting another property; that amendment petition was allowed on 4-3-1960.
  • Following the amendment, on 11-3-1960 an order for attachment of the substituted property was made.
  • On 21-8-1961 the judgment-debtors filed an objection under section 47 CPC contending (i) the original execution petition (18-7-1958) was not in accordance with law because the property originally listed did not belong to them, and (ii) the amendment petition of 11-2-1960 was in substance a fresh execution petition barred by limitation (beyond three years from the final order in Execution Case No. 26 of 1954 dated 28-7-1955).
  • The executing Court allowed this objection (registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 27 of 1961) on 7-1-1963 and recalled its earlier order of 4-3-1960 allowing the amendment.
  • The decree-holder appealed to the lower appellate Court, which dismissed the appeal on 30-4-1964. The decree-holder then preferred the present second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amendment petition filed on 11-2-1960 was an amendment falling within Order 21, Rule 17 CPC (thereby deemed to have been presented on 18-7-1958), or whether it constituted a fresh application for execution barred by limitation under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908.
  2. Whether the judgment-debtors' objection under section 47 CPC was barred by laches because they did not object earlier when notice under Order 21, Rule 22 CPC was served.
  3. Whether alleged part payments (claimed for 30-9-1958 and 17-1-1961) could extend the period of limitation and whether the lower appellate Court erred in rejecting additional evidence to prove such payments.
  4. Whether the provisions of the new Limitation Act (Limitation Act, 1963), specifically Article 136, applied to extend the limitation period in favour of the decree-holder while the appeal was pending.

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holder (Appellant) — Main Contentions

  • The amendment allowed on 4-3-1960 should "date back" to the original presentation date (18-7-1958) under sub-rule (2) of Order 21, Rule 17 CPC, because the amendment remedied defects in the original application.
  • The judgment-debtors, having received notice under Order 21, Rule 22 CPC and not objecting earlier, were guilty of laches and could not raise the objection later (reliance on Lal v. Raj Kishore Narain Singh).
  • The lower appellate Court wrongly refused permission to lead additional evidence to prove part payments on 30-9-1958 and 17-1-1961 which, if accepted, would have extended the period of limitation.
  • The Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 136), which came into force while the appeal was pending, had altered the limitation regime and should have been taken into account (reducing the bar that arose under the old Act).

Judgment-debtors (Respondents) — Main Contentions

  • The execution petition originally filed on 18-7-1958 was not in accordance with law because the property described did not belong to the judgment-debtors; hence the decree-holder's petition of that date could not validly commence execution proceedings.
  • The amendment petition of 11-2-1960 substituted an entirely different property and therefore amounted to a fresh execution petition, which was filed beyond the three-year period specified by Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908, and was barred by limitation.
  • They raised their section 47 objection after the substituted property was attached; they could not reasonably have raised it earlier because the execution originally was not directed against any property of theirs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gajanand bha v. Dayanand Thakur, AIR 1943 Pat 127 Order 21, Rule 17 interpreted as confined to formal amendments; substitution of a completely different property is not covered. The Court relied on this Bench decision to hold that the amendment seeking substitution of an entirely different property could not be treated as a remedial amendment under Rule 17 and therefore did not date back to the original petition.
Jaganath Das v. Chamu Raghunath Khuntia, ILR 8 Pat 462 : AIR 1929 Pat 407 Authority supporting the view that substitution of a new property constitutes a fresh application. Relied upon as one of the earlier decisions endorsing the principle that substantial substitution = fresh execution petition.
Ram Ran Bijay Prasad Singh v. Kesho Pd. Singh, 21 Pat LT 407 : AIR 1941 Pat 635 Another early authority supporting the "fresh application" principle when substitution is substantial. Placed alongside Jaganath Das to support the conclusion that a substantial substitution is a fresh application for execution.
Mahidar v. Ralyani Prasad, AIR 1945 Pat 71 Subsequent case following the Bench view limiting Rule 17 to formal amendments. Cited to show consistent follow-up of the controlling Bench decisions on Rule 17's scope.
Haridas Ghosh v. Jogeridra Nath Sahden, 1964 BLJR 359 : AIR 1964 Pat 4801 Illustrative of later decisions following the same principle restricting Rule 17 to formal corrections. Referred to as a subsequent case in which the Bench principle was followed.
Lal Inderjit Nath Sahido v. Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahido, AIR 1942 Pat 84 Test for whether a subsequent application is a continuation or a fresh application: whether the first application has been substantially abandoned or the subsequent application marks a substantial departure. The Court adopted this "substantial departure" test and applied it to conclude that the 11-2-1960 petition was a fresh application.
Maharaja Bahadur Singh v. A.H. Forbes, AIR 1929 PC 209 Privy Council authority referred to for the test of whether a subsequent application is a fresh or continued application. Used in the discussion of the test (substantial abandonment/departure) which the Court applied to the facts.
Deonarain (Deo Narain) v. Khatoon, AIR 1949 Pat 401 Distinguished on facts: held that addition (not substitution) of a new property may be permissible as an amendment provided the decree has not become barred by limitation. The Court distinguished this decision because it concerned addition of properties (not substitution) and therefore did not conflict with the principal line of authority relied upon by the Court.
Dolagobinda Sahu v. Chakradhar Mohapatra, AIR 1955 Orissa 94 Orissa decision where fresh properties were added to the execution petition (addition, not substitution). Relied on by appellant but distinguished by the Court because that case involved additions rather than substitution and did not address the dating-back issue.
Lal v. Raj Kishore Narain Singh, AIR 1933 Pat 658 Principle that a judgment-debtor who receives notice under Order 21, Rule 22 and does not appear may be precluded by laches from later objecting—subject to exceptions where sufficient cause prevented earlier objection. The Court applied the distinction from this case to reject the laches argument because the judgment-debtors had no occasion to object until the decree-holder amended the petition to include their property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by sequentially addressing the factual and legal contentions strictly on the basis of the material before it.

  1. Finding on the original execution petition: The Court accepted the decree-holder's own case that the property described in the original execution petition of 18-7-1958 did not belong to the judgment-debtors and therefore that petition was not "in accordance with law" within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court reiterated the principle that an application for execution must be directed against property belonging to, or in which there is an interest of, the judgment-debtor.
  2. Characterisation of the 11-2-1960 amendment: Although the amendment petition remedied the defect (by inserting property that did belong to the judgment-debtors) and thus could be regarded as an execution petition "in accordance with law," it was filed more than three years after the final order in the earlier execution (Execution Case No. 26 of 1954). Thus, unless that amendment could be treated as dating back to 18-7-1958 under Order 21, Rule 17 CPC, it would be barred by limitation.
  3. Interpretation of Order 21, Rule 17 CPC: The Court construed Rule 17 narrowly — as intended to permit only formal amendments necessary to complete an application (e.g., missing identifying details under Rule 11 or description details under Rule 13). The Court held that substituting an entirely different, fully described property for the one originally mentioned is not a "formal" amendment contemplated by Rule 17.
  4. Reliance on precedent and the "substantial departure" test: The Court relied on prior Bench authority (notably Gajanand bha v. Dayanand Thakur and earlier cases) and the test articulated in the authorities (including the Privy Council decision referred to and Lal Inderjit Nath) — namely, whether the subsequent application involves a substantial departure from the original application or whether the original application has been substantially abandoned. Applying that test, the Court found the 11-2-1960 amendment amounted to a substantial departure and therefore constituted a fresh execution petition.
  5. Consequences for limitation: Because the amendment petition was a fresh application filed beyond the three-year period specified by Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908 (counted from the date of the final order in the earlier execution), it was barred by limitation and could not be saved by treating it as dating back to 18-7-1958 under Rule 17.
  6. Laches argument: The Court rejected the decree-holder's contention that the judgment-debtors were precluded by laches from objecting, holding that the judgment-debtors had no occasion to object when the original (invalid) execution petition was first served because it did not affect any property of theirs. Their objection arose only after the decree-holder amended the petition to include their property.
  7. Additional evidence of part payments: The Court approved the lower appellate Court's rejection of the decree-holder's application to lead additional evidence of alleged part payments because those payments were not certified in Court as required by Order 21, Rule 2 CPC (sub-rule (3)) and therefore could not be recognized by the executing Court; moreover, the alleged payments, even if accepted, lay beyond the relevant three-year period and could not extend limitation.
  8. Effect of the Limitation Act, 1963: The Court held that the new Limitation Act (which came into force on 1-1-1964) could not assist the appellant because Section 31 of that Act preserves bars of limitation which had already expired before its commencement or affects suits/applications pending at commencement; the execution petition was already barred before that date.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal fails on all grounds. In the words of the Court, the amendment petition filed on 11-2-1960 constituted a fresh execution petition that was barred by limitation under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908, and the executing Court's order upholding the judgment-debtors' objection was correct. The lower appellate Court's dismissal of the decree-holder's appeal was affirmed.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree-holder cannot proceed on the basis of the 11-2-1960 amendment because it is a fresh execution petition barred by limitation; the executing Court's allowance of the judgment-debtors' section 47 objection stands. The decree-holder's appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • Broader precedential effect: The Court applied established authorities limiting Order 21, Rule 17 CPC to formal amendments and confirmed the "substantial departure" test for distinguishing a continuation from a fresh execution application. The opinion follows existing Bench decisions rather than purporting to overrule them (the Court distinguished decisions on additions of properties where appropriate).

No additional factual findings, arguments, or precedential holdings beyond those expressly set out in the provided opinion have been added to this summary.

    Kumar Taranand Sinha v. Thakur Chandra Bhusan Pd. Singh And Others

    1. This is a decree-holder's appeal against the order of the executing Court upholding the objection of the judg-ment-debtors under section 47 of the CPC.

    2. The decree under execution was passed on 8-2-1952 in Rent Suit No. 1 of 1951. The decree was put in execution in Execution Case No. 26 of 1954, which was dismissed for default on 28-7-1955. A second execution case, namely. Execution Case No. 23 of 1958 was filed by the decree-holder on 18-7-1958, and the notice required under Order 21, Rule 22 of the CPC, was duly served upon the judgment-dobtors. On 11-2-1960, however, the decree-holder filed an application to the executing court for amendment of the execution petition by deleting the property originally mentioned therein and substituting another property and to start the execution proceeding afresh. This petition was allowed on 4-3-1960, and on 11-3-1960, an order was passed for attachment of the substituted property on 21-8-1961, the judgment-debtors filed an application under section 47 of the CPC, objecting to the executability of the decree mainly on two grounds; (i) the execution petition as originally filed on 18-7-1958 was not in accordance with law since admittedly the property originally mentioned therein did not belong to the judgment-deb-tors; and (ii) the petition for amendment of the list of property filed on 11-2-1960 must be deemed to be a fresh application for execution, but the same was barred by limitation, having been presented more than three years after the date of the final order which was passed in Execution Case No. 26 of 1954 on 28-7-1955. This objection of the judgment-debtors, which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 27 of 1961, was allowed by the executing Court on 7-1-1963. The executing Court passed a further order recalling its order dated 4-3-1960. Whereby it had allowed the petition for amendment of the execution petition dated 11-2-1960. The decree-holder thereupon took an appeal to the lower appellate Court, but it was dismissed on 30-4-1964. Being thus aggrieved, the decree-holder has preferred this second appeal.

    3. On the question that the execution case as originally levied on 18-7-1958 was not in accordance with law, there can be no legitimate room for any controversy. Upon the decree-holder's own case, the property included in the original execution petition did not belong to the judgment-debtors, and it was for this reason that the decree-holder had filed his petition on 11-2-1960 for deleting that property and inserting another property therein. It is well settled that in order that an application for execution of a decree may be in accordance with law within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908, it must not only be made to the proper court, but it must also be directed against some property belonging to the judgment-debtor or in which the judgment-debtor has some interest, so that the executing Court may be in a position to take steps for executing the decree. The executing Court cannot be in a position to take any such step where the property nought to be proceeded against does not belong to the judgment-debtor or in which the judgment-debtor has no interest whatsoever.

    4. It is man hest that it had become necessary for the decree-holder to ask for amendment of his original execution petition on the ground that the property as originally mentioned in his execution petition neither belonged to the judgment-debtors nor they had any interest therein. According to the decree-holder, the mistake had occurred due to the mistake of the scribe who had included in the original execution petition certain property belonging to the co-sharers of the judgment-debtors. Whatever might have been the reason for the mistake, there can be no doubt that the execution petition as originally presented on 18-7-1958, was upon the decree-holder's own case, not in accordance with law.

    5. The mistake was sought to be remedied by the petition for amendment which the decree-holder had filed on 11-2-1960. That amendment petition in the eve of law was tantamount to an execution petition made in accordance with law, since, the property sought to be inserted in the original execution petition admittedly belong to the judgment-debtor or in which the judgment-debtors have interest. The difficulty with which the decree-holder, however is faced with is that his petition dated 11-2-1960 was made more than three years after the date of the final order in the first execution case namely. Execution Case No. 26 of 1954. The execution petition filed on 18-7-1958 not being a petition for execution of the decree in accordance with law within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908 the petition filed on 11-2-1960, treated as a petition for execution of the decree made in accordance with law must fail on the ground of limitation, because this petition was filed more than four years after the date of the final order in Execution Case No. 26 of 1954.

    6. The contention of the decree-holder, however, is that once the petition dated 11-2-1960 had been allowed, as it was allowed on 4-3-1960, it must date back to 18-7-1958, when Execution Case No. 23 of 1958 was filed this contention of the decree-holder can only succeed if it is held that the amendment of the execution petition, which was ordered to be made on 4-3-1960, was an amendment contemplated by Order 21, Rule, 17 of the CPC. sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 enables the executing Court to allow the defects in the execution petition to be remedied where the Court finds that the requirements of rules 11 to 14 of Order 21 of the Code, so far as they may be applicable to the case, have not been complied with. And sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 provides that where the application for execution of the decree is amended under the provision of sub-rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented. The question, therefore, arises whether the amendment which was ordered to be made on 4-3-1960 was for remedying the defects in the original petition as permitted by sub-rule (1) of Rule 17.

    7. The contention of the learned counsel for the decree-holder is that the amendment was within the scope of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17, inasmuch as, it related to the requirements of Rule 11(2)(j)(ii) read with rule 13, which provide for the execution of the decree by the attachment and sale or by the sale without attachment of any property of the judgment-debtor. In my opinion, it is impossible to accede to the contention of the learned counsel that the amendment ordered to be made on 4-3-1960 fell within the ambit of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17. In my opinion, Order 21. Rule 17 is intended to deal with only formal amendments, without which the application for execution or attachment will not be regarded as complete. It cannot cover a case like the present where the decree-holder asks the Court to delete from his application a property which is fully described and to substitute in its place an entirely different property with a totally different description

    The view that I take is borne out by a Bench decision of this Court in Gajanand bha v. Dayanand Thakur, AIR 1943 Pat 127. That was a case where the property described in the application for amendment was totally different from the description given in the original application and the decree-holder wanted, in effect, to substitute a new property for the property mentioned in the original execution application. Speaking for the Court. Fazl Ali, J. (as he then was) made the following observation:

    The view which has been generally taken as to the meaning of O. 21, R. 17 is that it is intended to deal with only formal amendments but for which the application for execution or attachment will not be regarded as complete for example, under R. 11 the judgment-debtor is required to state such details as the number of the suit, names of the parties, the date of the decree, etc., in his application and if upon scrutiny of his application it appears that any of these details is missing in the application, the Court may give an opportunity to the decree-holder to remedy the defect. Similarly, what O. 21, R. 13 contemplates is that the property which is sought to be attached should be described in such a way in the application for attachment as to show that the property is identifiable. If, therefore, there are found wanting in the description such details as are necessary for the proper identification of the property, the Court has full power to allow the decree-holder to remove the defect by supplying such details. Rule 17, however, was never intended in my opinion to enable the decree-holder to ask the court to delete from his application a property which is fully described and to substitute in place thereof another property with is totally different description. In my opinion, therefore the present case cannot be said to be covered by O. 21. R. 17.”

    8. His Lordship further discussed the question as to whether in a case where an entirely new property is sought to be substituted in the execution petition, the petition for amendment of the original petition can be regarded as a continuation of that application, and laid down the law in the following words;

    “On this point numerous cases wert cited by both parties, but as far as I can see the preponderance of legal opinion is in favour of the view that where the decree-holder wishes by means of a subsequent application merely to correct any mis-description of the property mentioned in his application for execution, his application may be regarded as a continuation of that application, but where he tries to substitute a new property which is quite different from the property against which he wished to proceed in the first instance, his application must be regarded as a fresh application for execution.”

    9. In support of his view, his Lordship relied upon two earlier decisions of this Court; one in Jaganath Das v. Chamu Raghunath Khuntia*, ILR 8 Pat 462 : (AIR 1929 Pat 407) and the other in Ram Ran Bijay Prasad Singh v. Kesho Pd. Singh, 21 Pat LT 407 : (AIR 1941 Pat 635). This Bench decision has been consistently followed in subsequent cases in this Court, see for example Mahidar v. Ralyani Prasad*, AIR 1945 Pat 71 and Haridas Ghosh v. Jogeridra Nath Sahden, 1964 BLJR 359 : (AIR 1964 Pat 4801)

    10. In an earlier Bench decision in Lal Inderjit Nath Sahido v. Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahido, AIR 1942 Pat 84, the original execution application was presented for executing the decree as a rent decree, but sub-sequently the decree-holder applied for sale of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in the same property on the footing that the decree was a money decree. The question which arose for consideration in this Court was whether the subsequent application was in continuation of the original application. Fazl Ali, J., referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Maharaja Bahadur Singh v. A.H Forbes, AIR 1929 PC 209 and to AIR 1941 Pat 635, and observed as follows:—

    “The test which seems to have been laid down in both these cases for determining whether a certain application should be deemed in law to be a fresh application for execution or not is to find out whether the first application has been substantially abandoned and whether the effect of the subsequent application marks such substantial departure from the original application as to make it impossible to hold that it was a continuation thereof. According to these decisions in either case the subsequent application must be regarded as a fresh application for execution.”

    11. Applying this test to the facts of the present case. I must hold that the petition for amendment filed on 11-2-1960 was a fresh application for execution, making as it did, a substantial departure from the original execution petition filed on 18-7-1958 and as such it was not a continuation thereof.

    12. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the view expressed by Fazl Ali, J in these two decisions requires reconsideration by a larger Bench because it is somewhat inconsistent with the decision of Ramaswami, J. sitting with Agarwala, C.J in Deonarain v. Khatoon*, AIR 1949 Pat 401. But the material facts of Deo Narain Singh's case, AIR 1949 Pat 401 were different. In that case, the decree-holder had applied for addition of a new property in the execution petition. Ramaswami, J. Pointed out that it was open to the decree-holder co. amend his original execution petition by addition of a new property provided that the decree had not become barred by limitation, and that it was not tantamount to substituting an altogether new property for the property against which the decree-holder wished to proceed in the first instance. It is therefore, clear that a case where some more properties are sought to be added in the execution petition stands on a different footing from a case like the present where an entirely new property is sought to be substituted for the property mentioned in the execution petition in the first instance. I am therefore, not satisfied that the view of Ramaswami, J. in Deo Narain Singh's case, AIR 1949 Pat 401 is in any way inconsistent with the view of Fazl Ali. J. in the two earlier decisions referred to above.

    13. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon a Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in Dolagobinda Sahu v. Chakradhar Mohapatra, AIR 1955 Orissa 94. That was also a case where the execution petition was sought to be amended by addition of fresh properties to the list of properties appended to the original execution petition that was not a case like the present where the property appended to the original execution petition was deleted and an ??? new property was substituted therein. Besides, the question of dating back which has been raised in the instant case did not fall for consideration in the Orissa case Learned counsel, however, also relied upon the Orissa case in support of the contention that the Court has power, apart from the provision of Order 21. Rule 17 of the CPC, to amend an execution petition provided the decree is alive and has not become barred under Section 48 of the Code. But that is of no avail to the appellant because if the amendment does not fall within the ambit of Order 21, Rule 17, then even if it might be allowed, presumably under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code, it would not date back to the original execution petition and the decree holder cannot get over the bar of limitation under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 190?

    14. Upon a consideration of the various authorities referred to above, I am definitely of the opinion that the amendment petition of the 11th February, 1960 was a fresh petition for execution of the decree which had been filed beyond the period of three years mentioned in Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908 and as such it was barred by limitation, and the bar of limitation cannot be saved because the amendment petition did not date back to the original execution petition filed on 18-7-1958.

    15. Learned counsel for the decree holder then contended that the present objection of the judgment-debtor was not maintainable since it was not raised earlier when the notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the CPC, was served upon them prior to 11-2-1960. When the decree-holder had applied for amendment of the execution petition. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon Lal v. Raj Kishore Narain Singh, AIR 1933 Pat 658, where it was held that it notwithstanding the service of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, the judgment-debtor does not appear and object to the execution, he cannot escape the consequence of his laches. It will, however, be noticed that in the same decision it was further held that there may be circumstances in which the Court may find that though the judgment-debtor wanted to take an objection, he was prevented by sufficient cause from taking it earlier, and in that case he will not be debarred from taking the objection at a subsequent stage. In the present case, the judgment-debtors could have no reason to object to the execution as originally applied for because at that stage the execution was not directed against any property belonging to them or in which they had any interest. The occasion for their objection arose only after the decree-holder applied for the amendment of the execution petition by inserting therein the property of the judgment-debtors for the first time. The judgment-debtors were, therefore, entitled to raise the present objection after their property was attached under the order of the executing Court. The contention of the learned counsel must, therefore, be overruled.

    16. Learned counsel then contended that the executing Court was in error in recalling by the present order the order which it had passed on 4-3-1960 allowing the amendment petition. But this contention is of no avail to the appellant because even if the amendment order were allowed to stand, the amendment petition as a fresh execution petition cannot escape the bar of limitation under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 190.

    17. On behalf of the appellant an application appears to have been made in the lower appellate Court for permission to lead additional evidence in order to prove that the judgment-debtors had made part payment towards the decretal dues on 30-9-1958 and 17-1-1961. The purpose of the decree-holder evidently was that the alleged payments would have the effect of extending the period of limitation for execution of the decree. But the lower appellate Court rejected the petition for additional evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the rejection of the petition for additional evidence was unjustified. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Upon the decree-holder's own case, the alleged payments were not certified in Court as required under Order 21, Rule 2 of the CPC, and, therefore, under sub-rule (3) of the said rule, the payments, if any, could not be recognised by the Court executing the decree. Therefore, the petition for additional evidence was futile. I am not satisfied that it was unjustifiably rejected by the lower appellate Court which has pointed out that the alleged payments being beyond three years from the date of the final order in the first execution case, could not serve to extend the period of limitation.

    18. Lastly, it was contended that the lower appellate Court ought to have taken into consideration the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 which had come into force while the appeal in the lower appellate Court was pending. That Article has done away with the three-year rule of limitation which was prescribed under Article 182 of the old Act and provides for only one period of twelve years from the date of the decree as the limitation period for an application for execution of a decree.

    19. But this contention of the learned counsel ignores the provisions of Section 31 of the new Limitation Act which provides in clear terms that nothing in this Act shall, (a) enable any suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred or made, for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), expired before the commencement of this Act, or (b) affect any suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made before, and pending at, such commencement. The new Act came into force on the 1st January, 1964, but the present execution petition was barred by limitation long before that date. The new Limitation Act would not, therefore, come to the aid of the appellant in this case.

    20. All the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant have failed. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.

    LGC/D.V.C

    21. Appeal dismissed.

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    Kumar Taranand Sinha v. Thakur Chandra Bhusan Pd. Singh And Others
    (May 3, 1967)