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  • S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.4.
  • S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948,
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citation codes
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  • S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.4.
  • S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter was listed for final orders and, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, was taken up for trial disposal. Both sides were heard in detail. The appeal challenges the order of the learned Single Judge in M.A. No. 438 of 1990. The specific question before the Single Judge — and now before this court on appeal — was whether "over-time allowance" paid to employees is included in the statutory definition of "wages" contained in S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, for the purpose of calculating the employer's contribution under that Act.

The learned Single Judge had observed a split of opinion among High Courts: Calcutta, Karnataka and Rajasthan High Courts had held that overtime allowance is not included within "wages," whereas Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Kerala and Delhi High Courts had taken the contrary view. The Single Judge accepted the former view (that overtime is not "wages"). That decision is the subject of this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether "over-time allowance" constitutes "wages" within the meaning of S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, for the purpose of the employer's contribution.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court's decision (in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation) declaring overtime to be "wages" should be applied retrospectively to the present case, or should be given only prospective operation as contended by the respondent relying on Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N. 48], which the court records as having clearly held that overtime wages are "wages" within the meaning of S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The appellant therefore urged application of that Supreme Court decision to this case.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the law declared by the Supreme Court in Indian Drugs should be given prospective operation only, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [1994 (2) L.L.N. 9]. The respondent contended that, because the events in the case pre-dated the Indian Drugs decision, Indian Drugs should not be applied to the present case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N. 48] Held that over-time wages are "wages" within the meaning of S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The court treated this Supreme Court decision as decisive and binding under Article 141, applied it to the present appeal, and concluded that the view adopted by the Single Judge (that overtime is not wages) is unsustainable.
Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [1994 (2) L.L.N. 9] Contains authority where their Lordships specifically declared that the ratio of that decision would apply prospectively (i.e., prospective operation was expressly declared in that case). The respondent relied on this decision to argue that Indian Drugs should have only prospective operation; this court rejected that contention, stating that Indian Drugs did not itself declare prospective operation and that the High Court lacked power to treat a Supreme Court decision as prospective.
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [1967 (2) S.C.R 762] Discussed as establishing that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court to declare a decision prospective and, historically, such declarations have been made in constitutional contexts. The court cited Golak Nath for the principle that declaring prospective operation is within the Supreme Court's competence; the court noted that it cannot itself make a Supreme Court decision prospective and that such power is not available to the High Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner based strictly on the authorities and positions reflected in the record:

  1. The primary substantive question (whether overtime allowance is part of "wages" under S. 2(22) of the ESI Act) has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, which held that overtime wages are "wages" for the purposes of S. 2(22). That decision resolves the split of opinion among High Courts noted by the Single Judge.
  2. Because the Supreme Court had decided the matter in Indian Drugs, the court considered whether that decision should be applied in the present case. The respondent urged that Indian Drugs should be given only prospective effect, relying on Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar (where prospective application had been declared in that particular case).
  3. The court examined that submission and concluded that Indian Drugs did not itself declare that its ratio would operate prospectively. The court reiterated the settled principle that when the Supreme Court declares a law, it declares what the law always was; it does not become law only from the date of that declaration.
  4. The court referred to Golak Nath to note that the authority to declare a decision prospective lies with the Supreme Court (and historically has been exercised in constitutional contexts), and observed that the High Court lacks the power to make a Supreme Court decision prospective in operation.
  5. Given that Indian Drugs is a binding declaration of law by the Supreme Court, the High Court was bound to apply it pursuant to Article 141 of the Constitution. Because the matter on appeal remained pending before this court when Indian Drugs was decided, the court was obliged to apply the Supreme Court's ruling to the appeal at hand.
  6. On that basis, the court concluded that the Single Judge's contrary view must be set aside and the appeal allowed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal allowed; the order of the learned Single Judge in M.A. No. 438 of 1990 is set aside.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The decision of the learned Single Judge (which had held that overtime allowance was not part of "wages") is set aside.
  • The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.

Broader legal implication as reflected in the opinion:

  • The court applied the Supreme Court's declaration in Indian Drugs that over-time wages are "wages" within S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The court emphasized that it was bound to apply that Supreme Court decision under Article 141 and that it could not itself give that decision only prospective effect.

Note: The opinion does not purport to create new precedent; it applies and enforces the Supreme Court's prior ruling (Indian Drugs) and resolves the appeal in accordance with that binding authority.

Appeal allowed.

    Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. P.B Gupta

    1. This matter was listed for orders and on consent of the learned counsel for the parties, it was taken up for trial disposal. Both sides were heard in detail.

    2. What is challenged in this appeal is the order of the learned Single Judge in M.A No. 438 of 1990. The question that arose for consideration before the learned Single Judge was whether “over-time allowance” paid to the employees would be included in the definition of “wages” in S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, for the purpose of the employer's contribution on the same. The learned Single Judge noticed that there was a sharp cleavage of opinion on the question, the High Courts of Calcutta, Karnataka and Rajasthan having taken the view that the said payment would not be included in the definition and the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Kerala and Delhi having taken a contrary view. The learned Single Judge accepted the view taken by the High Courts of Calcutta, Karnataka and Rajasthan and held that “overtime allowance” would not be Included in the definition of “wages.” The view taken by the learned Single Judge is challenged in this appeal.

    3. It has become unnecessary to consider the argument advanced, in view of the fact that this question has been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 48], wherein the Supreme Court clearly held that the view taken by the High Courts of Calcutta and Karnataka is unsustainable and the view taken by Bombay. Delhi and Andhra Pradesh High Courts was the correct view and held that over-time wages are “wages” within the meaning of S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.

    4. Though the question raised before us thus stands concluded, learned counsel for the respondent, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [1994 (2) L.L.N 9], argued that the law declared by the Supreme Court in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical, Ltd. case [1997 (1) L.L.N 48] (vide supra), should only be given prospective operation and cannot be applied to the case on hand since the decision was taken prior to the declaration of law by the Supreme Court.

    In Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical, Ltd. case (vide supra), the Supreme Court has not declared that the law would have only prospective operation unlike in the case of Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad (vide supra) wherein their Lordships specifically declared that the ratio that decision would apply prospectively and only from the date of that decision. The law declared in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical, Ltd. case (vide supra) is applicable to the present case and we are bound to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

    5. It is the settled principle that when a law is declared by the Supreme Court, it is the law as it always was and it does not become law only from the date it was so declared. It is also clear from the decision in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [1967 (2) S.C.R 762], that it is only within the competence of the Supreme Court to declare the law declared by it to be prospective and that too only on constitutional questions. But the Supreme Court applied the same principle to other statutory interpretations. This can also be seen from Para. 37 of the decision in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad case [1994 (2) L.L.N 9], (vide supra). We are conscious that we have no power to treat a decision of the Supreme Court only to be prospective in operation. We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondent that the decision in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Ltd. case (vide supra) should not be applied to the case on hand. As far as we know, the High Court does not have the power to declare that any decision would operate only prospectively. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent relying upon Para. 44 of the judgment in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Hyderabad case (vide supra) that the law declared in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Ltd. case (vide supra) cannot be applied to the present case, cannot be accepted/since this Court is bound to apply the law declared as law of the land by the Supreme Court, as and when the appeal is taken up for hearing.

    6. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the argument that we should not accept that decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. According to us, as the matter was still pending before us and law has been declared by the Supreme Court which is binding on this Court in view of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India.

    We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the learned Single Judge in M.A No. 438 of 1990. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. P.B Gupta
    (Jan 17, 2002)