Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 5 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 115 by the Amendment Act of 1976,
  • Regulation) Act, 1975 (is short, Ceiling Act)
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code
  • clauses of Section 115(1)
  • Section 115 of the Code.
  • Amendment Act of 1976
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 5 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 115 by the Amendment Act of 1976,
  • Regulation) Act, 1975 (is short, Ceiling Act)
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code
  • clauses of Section 115(1)
  • Section 115 of the Code.
  • Amendment Act of 1976
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Opposite parties instituted T.S. No. 677 of 1986 for specific performance against one Moti Bewa. After Moti Bewa's death the petitioner was substituted as defendant (she was stated to be the adopted mother of the petitioner). The petitioner filed a written statement but did not take any steps after 12-3-1991. He was subsequently set ex parte; the suit was heard in his absence on 4-4-1991 and 5-4-1991, and an ex parte decree was pronounced on 1-5-1991.

After the decree, plaintiffs deposited the balance consideration and moved to obtain a sale deed through the Court. The petitioner refused to accept notice regarding the draft sale deed. The Civil Judge held service sufficient on 11-12-1993 and fixed 11-5-1994 for filing the sale deed. On that date the petitioner appeared and sought a stay; on 12-5-1994 he filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code (to set aside the ex parte decree) together with a Section 5 Limitation Act petition for condonation of delay (registered as Misc. Case No. 272 of 1994). The petitioner attributed his non-appearance earlier to laches of his counsel.

The learned Civil Judge dismissed the application after analysing the factual situation and noting the petitioner's participation in several proceedings; the plea blaming counsel was rejected. The Second Additional District Judge affirmed that factual position, finding the petitioner's plea not tenable. The correctness of these orders is the subject of the present revision application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the orders of the Civil Judge, First Court, Cuttack and the Second Additional District Judge, Cuttack dismissing the petition under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code (to set aside the ex parte decree) and refusing condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were correct.
  2. Whether the High Court should exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code to interfere with those orders of the subordinate courts.
  3. Whether a liberal approach to condonation of delay (as reflected in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and authorities) required acceptance of the petitioner's application despite the findings recorded by the courts below.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The decree was obtained by fraud on the Court; material suppression had occurred because a proceeding under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1975 was pending and Section 42 of that Act barred adjudication in favour of the opposite parties.
  • A liberal approach should be adopted in condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act; ordinarily courts should prefer restoration/condonation so causes are decided on merits rather than on technicalities.
  • The petitioner's non-appearance was due to laches of his counsel and therefore the ex parte decree should be set aside.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The petitioner had not come to the Court with clean hands — he was actively participating in a large number of cases across forums and in matters before this Court.
  • The petitioner had already filed an application under Section 47 of the Code challenging the executability of the decree as being procured by fraud; in view of these circumstances the present application for setting aside the decree (and condonation) deserved dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katijl, AIR 1987 SC 1353 Supports a liberal attitude in condoning delay; Section 5 Limitation Act enables courts to do substantial justice and the phrase "sufficient cause" is wide and elastic. Invoked to explain the general principle favouring condonation of delay and to frame the starting point of analysis when considering the petitioner's claim for condonation.
D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2324 States that revisional jurisdiction cannot be used to correct errors of fact or errors of law that do not relate to jurisdiction; "illegally and with material irregularity" concerns manner of decision-making, not the decision itself. Relied upon to explain limits of High Court revisional power and to justify non-interference with subordinate courts' factual findings in the present matter.
Sher Singh (dead) through L.Rs v. Joint Director of Consolidation, AIR 1978 SC 1841 Same principle as D.L.F. — High Court's revisional jurisdiction does not extend to reexamination of facts or to correcting errors of fact/law unrelated to jurisdiction. Used with D.L.F. to support the proposition that the High Court should not re-assess evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the subordinate courts.
Manick Chandra Nandy v. Dehdas Nandy, AIR 1986 SC 4467 Highlights the difference between first appeal (where facts and law can be reexamined) and revisional jurisdiction (which is confined by Section 115). Applied to emphasise that revisional jurisdiction is limited and that the High Court is generally not to re-appraise evidence or substitute factual findings of subordinate courts.
Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokgairi and Co., AIR 1988 SC 1445 Used to illustrate limits of revisional jurisdiction vis-à-vis appellate jurisdiction; supports principle that High Court should not interfere with subordinate courts' factual conclusions. Relied on to reinforce the conclusion that concurrent factual findings by lower courts are ordinarily conclusive and not open to revisional interference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging the well-established principle — endorsed by the apex Court and embodied in Section 5 of the Limitation Act — that a liberal approach to condoning delay is desirable so as to enable determination of matters on their merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is wide and elastic and the underlying object is to allow courts to do substantial justice.

However, the Court explained that such liberality is not unqualified. When assessing an application for condonation of delay, the Court must examine whether the delay was occasioned deliberately, or was due to culpable negligence or mala fides. These are factual inquiries for the trial / subordinate court to decide.

The Court analysed the findings of the lower courts: both courts recorded that the petitioner had been actively participating in many proceedings, including before this Court, and that the plea blaming counsel for non-appearance was not acceptable. Those findings were based on the facts and the conduct of the petitioner. The Court observed that the petitioner’s factual position was found to be distorted by the courts below.

The Court then turned to the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code (as amended by the 1976 Amendment Act). It emphasized that revisional power is constrained: the High Court can call for records only where the subordinate court exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or acted illegally or with material irregularity. The proviso further restricts interference so that the High Court shall not vary or reverse an order unless (a) the order, if made in favour of the applicant, would have finally disposed of the suit/proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury.

Relying on cited precedents, the Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction does not permit reappraisal of evidence or substitution of the subordinate courts' factual findings. The phrases "illegally and with material irregularity" refer to the manner in which a decision was reached and not to mere errors of fact or law; therefore such errors are not ordinarily ground for revision.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court concluded that the concurrent findings of the subordinate courts — namely, that there was no sufficient cause to condone the delay — were factual findings recorded after consideration of the petitioner's conduct and were not based on non-existent material or baseless assumptions. As such, there was no scope for interference under revisional jurisdiction.

The Court also noted that an objection under Section 47 of the Code had been filed and stated that that objection would have to be decided on its own merits (separately).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Revision dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The orders of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, First Court, Cuttack and the Second Additional District Judge, Cuttack, refusing to set aside the ex parte decree and refusing condonation of delay are upheld by this Court.
  • The revision filed by the petitioner fails and is dismissed. The Court ordered no costs.
  • The objection filed under Section 47 of the Code will be decided on its own merits and separately.

Broader implications:

  • The opinion applies established limits on revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 (post-1976 amendment): the High Court will not normally interfere with concurrent factual findings of subordinate courts unless the strict conditions in the proviso are satisfied.
  • No new legal precedent was announced by this opinion; the decision enforces existing principles that condonation is generally liberal but must yield to factual determinations about deliberate delay, culpable negligence or mala fides recorded by subordinate courts.

Revision dismissed.

    Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another

    1. In this application correctness of orders passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, First Court, Cuttack and learned Second Addl. District Judge, Cuttack, while dealing with acceptability of petition filed by petitioner under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the ‘Code’) for setting aside ex parte decree passed against him in T.S No. 677 of 1986, is questioned.

    2. Background facts undisputed essentially, are as follows:

    Opposite Parties herein brought T.S No. 677 of 1986 against one Moti Bewa for specific performance of contract. Consequent upon the death of Moti, petitioner was substituted as defendant in her place as she was stated to be adopted mother of the petitioner. He traversed pleadings of the plaintiffs by filing written statement; but did not take any steps after 12-3-1991. He was set ex parte, suit was heard on 5-4-1991 and 4-4-1991 in his absence, and judgment decreeing the suit ex parte was pronounced on 1-5-1991. After sealing and signing of the decree, plaintiffs deposited the balance consideration amount and took steps to get the requires sale deed executed through Court. Petitioner refused to receive the notice relating to draft sale deed, and learned Civil Judge in his order dated 11-12-1993 held service of notice on him to be sufficient, and fixed 11-5-1994 as the date for filing sale deed on stamp paper. On the said date, petitioner appeared and filed a petition for stay of further proceeding, and on 12-5-1994 he filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code along with a petition under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1953 (in short, ‘Limitation Act’) for condoning delay. The application for setting aside the ex parte decree was registered as Misc. Case No. 272 of 1994. It was stated that on account of laches of his counsel there was non-appearance. Learned Civil Judge on analysis of facts situation and taking note of petitioner's participation is several proceedings on different dates, came to hold that plea of petitioner, throwing blames on his counsel was not acceptable. The application was accordingly dismissed. Appeal before learned Second Addl. District Judge not with the same fate. Both learned Civil Judge and learned Second Addl. District Judge held that factual position was distorted and the plea taken by petitioner regarding absence was not tenable.

    3. In support of the revision application, Mr. P.K Routrary, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that decree obtained was the outcome of fraud practised on Court, and there was suppression of fact that a proceeding under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1975 (is short, ‘Ceiling Act’) was pending and in view of the bar prescribed under Section 42 of the said Act, there could not have been any adjudication, much less in favour of the opposite parties. It is further submitted that a liberal attitude is warranted while dealing with an applications for condonation of delay. A party does not stand to gain by abating from a proceeding and therefore, normal apporach of the Court should be to accept prayer for restoration and/or to condone delay rather than reject it. Mr. S.K Panda, learned counsel for opposite parties on the other hand submitted that petitioner has not come to this Court with clean hands. In large number of cases before various forums he was actively participating. In fact he was participating in several cases which were before this Court. It is further submitted that an application under Section 47 of the Code has been filed questioning executability of decree on the ground that it is an outcome of fraud. Therefore, the application under consideration deserves dismissal.

    4. It cannot be gainsaid that while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, liberal attitude is warranted. This position was succinctly stated by the apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katijl, AIR 1987 SC 1353. Legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The object is to enable Courts to do substantial justice by deciding cases on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” used in the provision is wide enough and is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by seeking relief late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

    5. Keeping in view the aforesaid well established norms, it has to be seen whether delay was occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. These are matters which have to be considered by the Court dealing with an application for condonation. Factual aspects are to be considered by the Court to come to a conclusion whether there was any deliberateness involved in presenting the application belatedly. In the case at hand, Courts below have found conduct of petitioner to be not above board. After taking note of vigour with which petitioner was participating in various proceedings in various Courts plea of petitioner was turned down. Blame was thrown on the shoulders of the counsel. By merely throwing blame on the counsel, a case of restoration would not be in all cases made out. Circumstances and facts must support the stand taken. Power of revision given under Section 115 of the Code can be exercised within parameter of restriction imposed by section itself. There has been substantial change in the provision by Amendment Act of 1976. It gives power to High Court to call for records of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to it and on which no appeal lies. The power can be exercised if such subordinate Court appears (a) to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The proviso added by Amendment Act of 1976 lays down a further requirement to the effect that High Court shall not vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or of the proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. It is not within scope of High Court's power to enter into merits of evidence. High Court is not to usually interfere if result of irregularity of lower Court has been to promote justice. Only where impugned order is perverse in the sense that it is in gross violation of rule of law or procedure and not otherwise, there is scope for interference.

    6. The position if firmly established that while exercising revisional jurisdiction, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. The words “illegally and with material irregularity”, as used in clause (c) also do not cover either errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at, but merely to the manner in which it is reached. See D.L.F Housing and Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2324 and Sher Singh (dead) through L.Rs v. Joint Director of Consolidation, AIR 1978 SC 1841). High Court is not entitled to reexamine or re-assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings of fact for those of the subordinate Court. Findings of facts generally are treated as conclusive and not open to revision.

    7. The nature, quality and extent of appellate jurisdiction being exercised in first appeal and revisional jurisdiction are very different. The limits of revisional jurisdiction are prescribed and its boundaries defined by Section 115 of the Code. Under that provision revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the High Court in a case in which no appeal lies to it from the decision of a subordinate Court if it appears to it that the subordinate Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to questions of jurisdiction. While in first appeal the Court is free to decide all questions of fact and law which arise in the case, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re-assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the subordinate Court. (See Manick Chandra Nandy v. Dehdas Nandy, AIR 1986 SC 4467 and Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokgairi and Co., AIR 1988 SC 1445).

    8. After the amendment of Section 115 by the Amendment Act of 1976, the position is manifest that only such orders can be reversed which if allowed to stand would occasion the failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made or if a favourable order, instead of the impugned order that had been passed by the Court below, in favour of the party applying for revision against the impugned order would have finally disposed of the suit or the proceeding in question. Even if the order falls under any of the clauses of Section 115(1) the High Court will have no jurisdiction to vary or reverse the order, unless the conditions stipulated in the proviso exist.

    9. In the case at hand concurrent findings have been recorded by the Courts below that there was no sufficient cause to condone delay in making application to set aside the ex parte decree. The findings have been recorded with reference to facts and not on the basis of non-existent material and/or baseless assumptions. There is no scope for interference in such a case.

    10. Judged in the aforesaid background, I do not find this case to be one where revisional power is to be exercised. It is stated that as objection has been filed in terms of Section 47 of the Code. The same shall be decided on its own merits.

    The revision fails and is dismissed. No costs.

    Revision dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another
    (May 15, 1995)