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  • question.13. Order 38, Rule 11 of the CPC
  • property.14. Order 21, Rule 57 of the CPC
  • provisions of Rule 57 of Order 21
  • Order 21, Rule 59 of the CPC,
  • 21, Rule 58
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • question.13. Order 38, Rule 11 of the CPC
  • property.14. Order 21, Rule 57 of the CPC
  • provisions of Rule 57 of Order 21
  • Order 21, Rule 59 of the CPC,
  • 21, Rule 58
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners in this revision application are the decree-holders in a money decree dated 8-3-1957 for Rs. 3235-3-3 pies obtained against judgment-debtors Janmejoy Swain and Pata Dei. During the pendency of the suit there was an attachment before judgment over the properties that are the subject of the present proceedings. Execution Case No. 50 of 1967 was instituted by the decree-holders because the decree remained unsatisfied. It was accepted for the purposes of the revision that Execution Case No. 50 of 1967 was within limitation and that there had been intervening execution steps in aid.

In the execution proceedings the opposite parties (and another) applied under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for release of specific items of property, alleging that they had purchased those properties by registered sale deeds (Exts. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 9) executed between 10-5-1962 and 23-5-1962. It was not disputed that one of the decree-holders, on behalf of all, had given consent on those sale deeds.

The learned Subordinate Judge, acting as the executing court, concluded that because one of the decree-holders had written and signed endorsements on the sale deeds, the decree-holders had waived their rights under the attachment; consequently the court directed release of the properties covered by those sale deeds while rejecting another claimant's application for want of proved consent. Aggrieved by that order, the decree-holders filed this revision petition seeking vacation of the release order and dismissal of the claims by the purchasers.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, given an attachment before judgment, Order 38 Rule 11 CPC applies so that there could be no valid sale of the attached property until the Court lifted the attachment.
  2. Whether the decree-holders had waived their rights under the attachment (i.e., whether waiver was established by the endorsements and conduct), and whether the properties could be released when the sale consideration had not been shown to have been paid to the decree-holders or deposited in Court.
  3. Whether, in view of Order 21 Rule 59 CPC, the purchasers/claimants were entitled to maintain their applications in the executing Court when they had neither interest nor possession at the date of the attachment or decree.
  4. Whether, applying Order 21 Rule 57 CPC, an attachment before judgment lapses (ceases) by reason of intervening execution applications being dismissed, so that by the time of the 1962 sales there was no subsisting attachment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Decree-holders') Arguments (as represented by Mr. Mohapatra)

  • The attachment was made before judgment and, therefore, Order 38 Rule 11 CPC prevents any sale of the attached property until the Court lifts the attachment.
  • Waiver on the part of the decree-holders had not been established; the endorsements on the sale deeds do not amount to waiver. Further, there is no reliable material to show that the sale consideration was paid to the decree-holders or deposited in Court, so the property should not have been released.
  • Under Order 21 Rule 59 CPC the claimants were not entitled to maintain claims in the executing Court because they did not have interest or possession at the date of the attachment or decree.

Opposite Parties' Arguments (as represented by Mr. Patra)

  • Relying on Order 21 Rule 57 CPC and the fact that there had been intervening execution cases (which, it was said, must be taken to have been dismissed or otherwise disposed), the attachment before judgment had lapsed by the time of the sales in 1962; therefore the sales were not subject to attachment.
  • There was evidence on the record to justify a finding that the consideration money under the sale deeds had been paid to the decree-holders; the learned Subordinate Judge failed to record such a finding (this was advanced to support the release of property).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shivlal v. Taniram, AIR 1928 Bom 444 Principle that waiver must be properly proved; waiver is an intentional act requiring clear evidence of an intention to waive. The Court relied on this authority to underscore that the endorsements on the sale deeds did not, without clearer proof, establish an intentional waiver by the decree-holders; therefore waiver was not held to be established.
Subbayya v. Subba Reddy, AIR 1927 Mad 648 Rule that attachment cannot be partially raised by parties outside Court; the Court itself must raise an attachment, normally by order on application. The Court cited this to support the proposition that informal or private consent cannot be treated as terminating an attachment; this supported the conclusion that there was no effective waiver by consent outside court.
Mukhram Pandey v. Arjun Missir, AIR 1934 Pat 511 Order 21 Rule 58 read with Rule 59 confines right of claim to those who had interest in and possession of the property on the day when the attachment was effected. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the purchasers (claimants) who purchased in 1962 and were not in possession or interested at the date of attachment or decree could not maintain claims under Order 21 Rule 58/59.
Durga Dei v. Sadananda, AIR 1952 Orissa 182 Expressed view that Rule 57 of Order 21 has no application to cases where an order for attachment before judgment has been obtained; such attachment subsists for subsequent execution applications. The Court considered this earlier decision of the Orissa High Court as authoritative and followed its conclusion that attachment before judgment continues to subsist and is not nullified by dismissal of an intervening execution application under R.57.
Meyyappa Chettiyar v. Chidambaram Chettiyar, ILR 47 Mad 483 / AIR 1924 Mad 494 (Full Bench) Represents the Madras Full Bench view (referred to by other judges) on the operation of Order 21 Rule 57 vis-à-vis attachment before judgment (this view differs from Calcutta/Patna/Orissa views). The Court noted this Full Bench decision as part of the conflicting authorities but expressly preferred the contrary view taken by the Calcutta, Patna and Orissa courts; it declined to follow the Madras Full Bench view.
(Ganesh Chandra v. Banwarilal) (1912) 16 Cal LJ 86 Calcutta High Court view that Order 21 Rule 57 does not apply to attachments before judgment and that such attachments subsist for successive execution applications. The Court cited this as supporting authority for holding that an attachment before judgment continues to operate until the decree is satisfied or set aside; the Court accepted this view.
Dattatraya v. Rambhabhai, AIR 1962 Bom 236 Held that where there is an attachment before judgment, Order 21 Rule 57 does not operate and the attachment continues; conveyances made after such attachment are hit by section 64 and are void against the purchaser in execution. The Court relied on this decision as a recent authority consonant with its conclusion that the 1962 sales were subject to a subsisting attachment and therefore invalid against the decree-holder.
Bhagwan Das v. Santokh Singh, AIR 1968 Punj & Haryana 461 Held that attachment before judgment cannot be treated as an attachment in execution on a date when the decree did not exist; supports the proposition that such attachment subsists until satisfaction or discharge of the decree. The Court cited this decision as further judicial support for its view that Order 21 Rule 57 does not nullify a prior attachment before judgment and that the attachment continued at the time of the sales.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner addressing the disputed contentions in sequence and restricting itself to the materials and authorities on record.

  1. Preliminary stance: The Court accepted for purposes of revision that there was an attachment before judgment and that Execution Case No. 50 of 1967 was within limitation; objections as to limitation were treated as not raised below and therefore barred.
  2. Waiver issue (Order examined first): The Court examined whether the endorsements and conduct of one of the decree-holders established a waiver of attachment rights. The Court found there was no dependable evidence that sale consideration had been paid to the decree-holders or deposited in Court. Citing authorities emphasizing that waiver must be clearly and intentionally proved (Shivlal v. Taniram) and that attachments cannot be partially raised by private consent (Subbayya v. Subba Reddy), the Court concluded waiver was not established and the decree-holders were not estopped from challenging the purchasers' claims.
  3. Maintainability under Order 21 Rule 59 CPC: The Court quoted Rule 59 requiring that a claimant must show interest or possession at the date of the decree or attachment. It noted that the attachment preceded the decree (decree dated 8-3-1957) and that the sales occurred in 1962. The claimants were neither in possession at the date of attachment nor had interest at the date of the decree; relying on Mukhram Pandey v. Arjun Missir, the Court held that the claimants could not sustain proceedings under Order 21 Rule 58/59 and the executing court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain those claims.
  4. Interaction between Order 38 Rule 11 and Order 21 Rule 57: The Court examined whether Rule 57 (which provides that upon dismissal of an execution case attachments in that case cease unless the Court otherwise directs) operated to nullify an attachment before judgment. After surveying the authorities and noting conflicting views (Madras Full Bench versus Calcutta/Patna/Orissa decisions), the Court followed the line of decisions (including its own previous decision in Durga Dei v. Sadananda, and later decisions such as Dattatraya v. Rambhabhai and Bhagwan Das v. Santokh Singh) holding that Order 21 Rule 57 does not apply to an attachment that was made before judgment. The Court reasoned that an attachment before judgment is an order passed in the suit and continues to subsist for subsequent execution applications until the decree is satisfied or set aside; dismissal of an intervening execution application under Rule 57 does not, by itself, nullify such an earlier attachment.
  5. Application to facts: Applying these legal conclusions to the present case, the Court held that a subsisting attachment existed at the time of the 1962 sales; the purchasers/claimants could not maintain their applications; and the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to release the attached properties. Consequently, the release order was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Revision allowed; the impugned order releasing the properties is vacated.

Direct consequences:

  • The claims made by the opposite parties (the purchasers) in the executing Court are dismissed.
  • The decree-holders (petitioners) are entitled to the costs of the proceeding in the Court below.
  • The hearing fee in this Court was assessed at Rs. 100 (one hundred).

The opinion grounds its decision in existing authorities and the statutory text; it does not purport to establish or announce a novel legal principle beyond the application of prior decisions and the cited rules of the CPC.

    Ramachandra Gochhikar And Others v. Ramachandra Biswal And Others Opposite Parties.

    1. The decree-holders in a money suit are the petitioners in this revision application. They obtained the decree in question for a total amount of Rupees 3235-3-3 pies on 8-3-57 against judgment-debtors Janmejoy Swain and Pata Dei. During the pendency of the suit there was an attachment before judgment against the properties which are involved in the present proceedings. Execution Case No. 50 of 1967 was filed by the decree-holders, as the decree had remained unsatisfied. As there is no objection that Execution Case No. 50 of 1967 was barred by limitation it must be taken as an accepted position that there had been other execution cases Intervening as steps in aid. Mr. Patra for the opposite parties wanted to raise objection on that score mainly on the ground that the decree-holders have not placed materials to prove other steps in aid. For the purposes of the present revision application. I have ruled out such contention on the ground that objection on such score was not taken in the Court below and, therefore, such objection must be taken as barred by constructive res judicata. This revision petition will therefore? proceed on the basis that there was an attachment before judgment and that Execution Case No. 50 of 1967 was within limitation and maintainable.

    2. In this execution case the opposite parties and another applied under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC for release of certain specific items of properties on the allegation that these properties had been purchased by them under different sale deeds (Exts. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 9) between the period 10-5-1962 and 23-5-1962. It is not disputed by the decree-holders that on these registered sale deeds one of the decree-holders on behalf of all gave consent for the sale.

    3. The learned Subordinate Judge as the executing Court went into the matter and came to hold that as one of the decree-holders himself had written the endorsements and had signed them, it must be taken that they had waived their right under attachment and these properties which have now been sold to third parties cannot be proceeded against in the execution case and, therefore, while rejecting the claim of one person who is not a party to this revision application on the ground that consent of the decree-holders had not been proved in that case he directed release of the properties described in schedules Ka, Kha, Ga, Gha and Cha in the execution petition which are covered by the sale deeds Exts. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 9 respectively relating to the opposite parties in this Court.

    4. Aggrieved by the said order of release the decree-holders are now the petitioners. Three questions have been raised by Mr. Mohapatra in the revision application. They are:—

    (1) The attachment having been made before judgment the relevant provision to apply is O. 38. R. 11 of the CPC. As attachment subsisted, there could be no sale until the Court lifted the attachment.

    (2) Waiver on the part of the decree-holders has not been established and on the materials on record the learned Sub-ordinate Judge was not justified to hold that there was waiver. In any event the consideration money under these sale-deeds having not either been paid to the decree-holders or deposited in Court for satisfaction of the execution case the learned Subordinate Judge should not have released the property.

    (3) Keeping in view the language of O. 21, R. 59 of the CPC it must be held that these claimants were not entitled to maintain the claims in the executing Court.

    5. Mr. Patra, for the opposite parties, raises a contention that in view of the language of O. 21, R. 57 of the CPC and on the basis that there must have been Intervening execution cases which should also be taken to have been dismissed under some contingency or other, applying O. 21, R. 57(2) of the CPC, it must be held that attachment, even if made before judgment, had lapsed by the time of the sales in 1962. The submission of Mr. Patra, therefore, would raise a fourth question for examination. Each of these questions requires careful examination as they have substantial bearing on the points in issue.

    6. Let me first dispose of the question No. 2 as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Subordinate Judge should have held that there was waiver. There has been admittedly no finding by the learned Subordinate Judge in the miscellaneous proceeding that the consideration money has been either paid to the decree-holders or deposited in Court. In the normal course of events no, decree-holder would allow release of property already under attachment particularly when it constitutes a substantial portion of the property available to be executed against without securing his own interest. Mr. Patra contended that there was evidence on record to justify a finding that the consideration money under the sale deeds had really been paid to the decree-holders and the learned Subordinate Judge failed to record a finding on such evidence. Though normally it is not a function of this Court sitting in revision to look into the evidence, I wanted to satisfy myself that there was some substance in the contention of Mr. Patra particularly with a view to find out whether if the other contentions of Mr. Mohapatra for the petitioners failed it would make out a case for remand. On a perusal of the evidence I am also satisfied that the evidence is_ absolutely undependable and on the basis of such evidence a finding is difficult to be recorded that the decree-holders had been paid the consideration money under the sale deeds.

    7. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have taken the view that the conduct of the decree-holders amounted to waiver. To support the contention of Mr. Mohapatra that waiver has not been established and the endorsements on the sale deeds cannot be taken to be waiver he sought to rely on AIR 1928 Bom 444 (Shivlal v. Taniram) where a Division Bench of that Court, on examination of a case almost on all fours on this aspect of the point held.

    “Waiver must be properly proved; the ordinary principle is that waiver is an intentional act; and a clear act showing such, an intention to waive must be Shown.”

    8. Ultimately they held that there was no waiver and attachment must be taken to have continued. Another aspect of the matter pertinent to this point is available in AIR 1927 Mad 648 (Subbayya v. Subba Reddy) where Odgers, J. held.

    “There cannot be a partial raising of an attachment of property by consent of parties outside Court, Court must raise an attachment unless it becomes inoperative by payment of decree debt and there must be an application therefor and an order of Court.”

    9. I think this is a sound rule which should be allowed so that confusion may not arise in judicial proceedings. In the absence of any material of this type in the present case it is difficult to hold that there was either consent leading to waiver or, that there is material to hold that the decree-holders are estopped from challenging the claim of the transferees-claimants. On the aforesaid analysis, I must dispose of this question against the claimants and hold that waiver has not been established.

    10. Coming to the question as to whether under the provisions of O. 21, R. 59 of the CPC the claimants can maintain their application, it is proper to quote the rule to start with. Order 21, Rule 59 of the CPC, as applicable to the State of Orissa in view of the Patna amendment, is as follows:—

    “The claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that at the date of the decree or of the attachment, as the case may be, he had some interest in, or was possessed of, the property in question.”

    11. As has been indicated above, the attachment was sometime prior to the decree and the decree itself is dated 8-3-1957. Admittedly, the sales in favour of the claimants are sometime in 1962. As such the claimants were neither in possession at the time of attachment nor had they anything to do with the property even at the time of the decree. In the circumstances, it is difficult to hold that at the instance of such persons a proceeding under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC could be sustained. Reference may, in this connection, lie made to the decision in AIR 1934 Pat 511 (Mukhram Pandey v. Arjun Missir) where a Division Bench of the Patna High Court, while disposing of this aspect of the matter, stated thus:—

    “Order 21, Rule 58 read with R. 59 gives right of claim only to those who had interest in and possession of the property under attachment on the day when the attachment was effected. Rule 58 is no doubt general, but R. 59 makes it clear that the investigation is to be confined to possession on the date of the attachment.” This being the legal position, at the instance of the claimants the present enquiry in the Court below was not maintainable. The learned Subordinate Judge in seisin of the execution case had no jurisdiction to go into the claims as the proceeding itself was not sustainable in law. This disposes of one of the contentions of Mr. Mohapatra.

    12. What remains for discussion is the first question as indicated above, that is, attachment having been made before judgment under the relevant rule of O. 38 of the CPC whether R. 11 of that order is to be enforced or the attachment before judgment lapsed in view of a subsequent execution taken by the decree-holders and its disposal in terms of O. 21, R. 57 of the CPC. The question raised by Mr. Mohapatra and the submission made by Mr. Patra for the parties as indicated earlier will now be examined as a common question.

    13. Order 38, Rule 11 of the CPC reads thus:—

    “Where property is under attachment by virtue of the provisions of this order and a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff, it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution of such decree to apply for a reattachment, of the property.”

    14. Order 21, Rule 57 of the CPC makes the following provision:—

    “Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date.

    Upon every order dismissing an execution case in which there is an attachment, the attachment shall cease unless the Court otherwise directs.”

    15. This aspect of the matter seems to be concluded by a series of judicial pronouncements. It is true that there is no consensus, but a view binding on me seems to have been clearly expressed in AIR 1952 Orissa 182 (Durga Dei v. Sadananda). Ray, C.J, on a difference between Jagannathadas and Panigrahi, JJ. (as both, of them then were) examined this aspect of the matter, Mr. Justice Panigrahi, in his judgment, referred to the Madras view as represented in ILR 47 Mad 483 : (AIR 1924 Mad 494 FB) (Meyyappa Chettiyar v. Chidambaram Chettiyar) and a view of the Calcutta High Court in (1912) 16 Cal LJ 86 (Ganesh Chandra v. Banwarilal) and stated.

    “The provisions of Rule 57 of Order 21 had no application to a case in which an order for attachment before judgment had been obtained and that the attachment subsists not only for the first application but also for subsequent applications.”

    16. Ray, C.J re-examined this aspect of the matter in his judgment and quoted sumptuously from various authorities placed before him and ultimately held:

    “If I am asked to give my opinion with regard to the operation of O. 21. R. 57, I will agree with the view taken in the Calcutta High Court as well as that of the Patna High Court, rather than with the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court. The simple reason is that on the dismissal of the execution case all orders passed by the executing Court in course of that execution proceeding are ‘nullified’ while the attachment before judgment is an order passed in the suit. Secondly, it has been said in the Calcutta High Court, in the cases already referred to, that the attachment before judgment enures for all successive execution applications for the first or the second or the third only. Its period of life continues until the decree is either set aside or satisfied and discharged. It becomes an attachment in execution when vou execute the decree on the basis thereof, or in other words, to use the words of Sir George Rankin, C.J which I have just now quoted, when you want to make that the basis of the sale that you are going to hold for the purpose of execution and realisation of the decree.”

    17. The portion of the judgment of Chief Justice Rankin, reference to which has been made by Ray, C.J, reads thus:—

    “Applications for execution were to be definitely dismissed if they were not adjourned to a future date. The object of the last sentence in Rule 57 is to settle the question as to whether when the application is dismissed, any attachment, made under that application, should fall to the ground or should subsist, and the legislature has provided that it is to fall to the ground. In these circumstances, it seems reasonably clear to me that it is no part of the intention of this rule to say that an attachment before judgment, which existed before any application could be made in execution, and which prima facie would continue to have effect if no application for execution had been made, should fall to the ground merely because a subsequent application for execution has come to nothing.”

    18. Normally I should have left the matter here in view of the decision of this Court disposing of the above case. But since Mr. Patra tried to question the propriety of the decision of this Court I have followed up the series of decisions relevant on the point up-to-date and I find that judicial opinion seems to be supporting the view taken by this Court. Reference may be made to AIR 1962 Bom 236 (Dattatraya v. Rambhabhai) where a Division Bench of that Court in a case almost similar to the facts of the present case came to hold:

    “It must be held that in the case of an attachment, before judgment O. 21, R. 57 does not operate and the attachment still continues. If this is so, the conveyances in favour of defendants Nos. 6 and 7 and defendant No. 8 are clearly hit by Section 64 and they are inoperative and void against the purchaser.”

    19. A similar view has also been taken in a very recent decision of the Punjab High Court in AIR 1968 Punj and Haryana 461 (Bhagwan Das v. Santokh Singh). His Lordship the Chief Justice, while speaking for the Division Bench stated thus:—

    “It is true that where attachment before judgment has been made, no fresh attachment may be made of the same property after the passing of the decree and the same attachment may become an attachment for the purposes of the execution of the decree immediately on the date of the application to execute it. But by no stretch of any reasoning can attachment of the property be treated as an attachment in execution of a decree on a date on which the decree is not in existence.” On this state of authorities I am satisfied that the contention of Mr. Mohapatra is correct, namely, that O. 21, R. 57 of the CPC has no application and the attachment before judgment made under O. 38 of the CPC survives and is available to the decree-holder at all stages within the period of limitation until the decree obtained by him is satisfied or discharged. Applying this legal position to the present case, it must, therefore, be held that there was subsisting attachment on the date when the sales in favour of the opposite parties took place and, therefore, the sales were subject to attachment.

    20. On the aforesaid analysis, it must be held that the claimants were not entitled to maintain the claims in the execution proceeding, there was valid attachment subsisting by the time when the purchases were made, the decree-holder had not waived his right under the attachment and as such the miscellaneous proceeding in the Court below was not maintainable. It must necessarily follow that the learned Subordinate Judge has exercised the iurisdiction which was not vested in him in law and went wrong in directing release of the properties in question. This revision application is allowed, the impugned order is vacated and the claims made by the opposite parties stand dismissed. The petitioners would be entitled to costs of the proceeding. Hearing fee in this Court is assessed at Rs. 100 (one hundred).

    21. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Ramachandra Gochhikar And Others v. Ramachandra Biswal And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Nov 11, 1969)