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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a parcel of land that the plaintiff alleges was ancestral property of the family of Kalu Rana (defendant No. 1). The plaintiff purchased the disputed land from Kalu by registered sale deed Ext. 2 dated 9-4-1943 for Rs. 1,200. Defendant No. 4 purchased two-thirds of the suit land from defendants 2 and 8 by registered sale deed Ext. A dated 29-8-1943 for Rs. 880.

The plaintiff's substantive claim was that the land was ancestral joint-family property and that Kalu, acting as Karta of the family, alienated the property by Ext. 2 for legal necessity and to discharge antecedent debts; therefore the sale bound the family. The plaintiff also challenged the subsequent sale (Ext. A) by defendants 2 and (variously described in the record as) 3 or 8, contending that those transferees had no subsisting interest and thus their sale was invalid. The suit sought recovery of possession.

At trial the court found the land to be joint family property but concluded that by the date of Kalu's sale the joint status had been disrupted and that Kalu had not effected the sale as Karta for legal necessity and antecedent debts; the trial court therefore dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court reversed on all points, holding that the land was ancestral, the sale (Ext. 2) was for consideration and supported by legal necessity and antecedent debts, and that the sale was binding and valid; it accordingly decreed the suit. The legal representatives of defendant No. 4 filed this Second Appeal challenging the reversing decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. 2 was a sale executed by Kalu Rana as Karta of the joint family and whether it was supported by consideration, legal necessity and antecedent debts such that it bound other family members.
  2. Whether the recital in Ext. 2 describing the property as Kalu's self-acquisition precluded a finding that the property was joint family (ancestral) property.
  3. Whether the appeal in the lower appellate Court abated for want of substitution of a legal representative (specifically, whether Gangadhar had a daughter Satya and whether non-substitution caused abatement).
  4. Whether the condition in A.H.O. No. 4 of 1950 — that costs incurred in prior litigation be deposited and assessed by the Registrar of the High Court before filing a fresh suit — was fulfilled (the issue being whether costs were properly assessed by the Registrar as required).
  5. Whether defendants 2 and 3 (or their legal representatives) should be directed to pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4 (a point arising from a direction noted in the lower appellate court's reasoning but omitted from its final decree).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Mohanty)

  • Ext. 2 contains only a recital that the property was the self-acquisition of Kalu and has no recital that he sold the property as Karta of the family; therefore the lower appellate court should have held that Kalu did not transfer the property as Karta and the sale under Ext. 2 is not binding on defendants 2 and 3.
  • The lower appellate court's finding that Ext. 2 was supported by consideration and legal necessity is contrary to law and not based on a consideration of all relevant materials.
  • The appeal in the lower appellate Court abated because Satya, daughter of Gangadhar, was not substituted on the deaths of Kalu (23-10-1960) and Pata (14-11-1961).
  • Under A.H.O. No. 4 of 1950, a prior suit was allowed to be withdrawn only on condition that the plaintiff deposit costs in Court to be assessed by the Registrar and incorporated in the High Court decree; although costs were deposited, they were assessed and the decree signed by the Deputy Registrar rather than the Registrar, so the condition precedent was not complied with and the present suit is not maintainable.

Plaintiff's Case (as presented in the record)

  • The land was ancestral/joint family property of Kalu's family.
  • Kalu, as Karta, sold the property by Ext. 2 for legal necessity and to discharge antecedent debts, and that sale is binding on the family members.
  • The subsequent sale (Ext. A) by defendants 2 and (variously recorded as) 3 or 8 was not valid because those transferees had no subsisting interest.
  • The plaintiff sought recovery of possession and enforced the earlier sale in the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1964 SC 1385 — Balmukand v. Kamla Wati Principle that the intention of parties must be gathered from all the circumstances; courts of fact may look beyond recitals in a deed to determine true nature of property (self-acquisition vs. joint family property). The court relied on this line of authority to reject the contention that a recital of self-acquisition in Ext. 2 precluded a fact-finding that the property was joint family ancestral property; the court accepted that the lower appellate court could examine all evidence and find the property to be joint family property despite the deed recital.
AIR 1967 SC 574 — Radhakrishnadas v. Kaluram Same principle as above: the parties' intention must be determined from all relevant circumstances; recitals alone are not conclusive. The court treated this decision similarly — as supporting the proposition that the lower appellate court could properly find the property to be joint family property on the evidence despite the deed recital.
AIR 1967 SC 49 — Dolai Maliko v. Krishna Chandra Patnaik Where an appellant dies and heirs apply to be brought on record as legal representatives, unless there is fraud, collusion, or special circumstances preventing a fair trial, heirs who apply may be allowed to represent the entire estate including heirs not brought on record. The court applied this principle to hold that, even if a daughter (Satya) had not been specifically substituted, the appeal did not abate; the heir brought on record (Lingaraj, defendant No. 2(a)) was treated as representing the estate and interests of other heirs, so non-substitution did not vitiate the proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the contested points with focused factual and legal analysis:

  1. On the question whether Ext. 2 was supported by consideration and legal necessity (an antecedent debt), the court treated this as a pure finding of fact made by the lower appellate court. After reviewing the lower appellate court's judgment, the court concluded that relevant materials had been considered and that the finding was not open to challenge in a Second Appeal. Accordingly, the appellant's contention on this ground was rejected.
  2. Concerning the deed recital that the property was Kalu's self-acquisition, the court held that courts of fact may examine the entire evidence and conclude that a property is joint family property despite a contrary recital in a sale deed. The court relied on the cited precedents establishing that the parties' intention must be gathered from all circumstances. Thus, the appellate finding that the property was ancestral and that Kalu acted as Karta in effecting the sale was not contrary to law.
  3. On abatement and substitution (whether Gangadhar had a daughter Satya and whether lack of substitution caused abatement): the court summarized the procedural history (deaths of Kalu and Pata; petitions to substitute heirs; omissions and objections not taken at stages). The trial court had not made a determination that Satya did not exist; rather, the trial court treated Lingaraj as representing Satya. The court observed two questions but concluded that it was not necessary to inquire further into the existence of Satya because (a) the dispute was effectively between transferees (the plaintiff and the legal representatives of defendant No. 4) and whatever interest Gangadhar and Banchhanidhi had was transferred to original defendant No. 4, leaving the legal representatives of defendants 2 and 3 with no subsisting interest that could affect the plaintiff's entitlement to 1/3 interest; and (b) even assuming abatement, the principle in Dolai Maliko allows an heir brought on record to represent the entire estate unless exceptional circumstances exist. The court further considered and rejected the argument that the Hindu Succession Act altered this principle in a way relevant to abatement.
  4. On the maintainability of the suit vis-à-vis the A.H.O. No. 4 of 1950 condition (costs to be assessed by the Registrar): the court quoted the A.H.O. order requiring that costs be deposited and assessed by the Registrar and incorporated in the High Court decree. The record showed the decree had been prepared and signed by the Deputy Registrar and that costs were deposited. The court held there was no material to show that the costs were not assessed by the Registrar, and noted that under the High Court rules the decree is to be signed by the Deputy Registrar. No objection had been timely taken that the assessment by the Registrar had not occurred, and there was no dispute that the costs had been deposited before instituting the fresh suit. On these bases the court concluded the condition precedent had been fulfilled and the suit was maintainable.
  5. On the monetary direction relating to Rs. 880: the court observed that the lower appellate court, in its reasoning (para 17), gave a direction that defendants 2(a) and 3 should pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4, but that this direction had not been incorporated in the final decree. The court corrected this omission by ordering that defendants 2(a) and 3 do pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the order.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Subject to the specific monetary direction ordering defendants 2(a) and 3 to pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the order, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

Consequences and practical effects:

  • The lower appellate court's factual findings that Ext. 2 was a sale supported by consideration, legal necessity and antecedent debts and that Kalu acted as Karta were upheld; those findings were treated as factual determinations not open to challenge in the Second Appeal.
  • The court held that the recital of self-acquisition in Ext. 2 did not preclude a finding of joint family (ancestral) property when the evidence as a whole supported that conclusion.
  • The court found no abatement of the appeal in the circumstances; alternatively, it held that an heir who has been brought on record (Lingaraj, defendant No. 2(a)) represents the estate and interests of other heirs (including Satya) unless exceptional circumstances exist.
  • On the A.H.O. condition about assessment of costs by the Registrar, the court concluded the prerequisite had been complied with in substance and that the suit was maintainable.
  • Defendants 2(a) and 3 are ordered to pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4 with 6% interest from the date of the order. The court directed that, except for this payment direction, the parties bear their own costs throughout.
  • The opinion applies existing precedent and does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond the applications of those precedents to the facts of the case.

Order pronounced and recorded accordingly.

    Binod Naik And Another v. Chandrasekhar Padhi And Others

    1. Kalu Rana (defendant No. 1) had two sons Gangadhar (defendant No. 2) and Banchhanidhi (defendant No. 8) and a daughter Chandra who was impleaded as respondent No. 1(b) in the lower appellate Court. His wife Pata was also impleaded as respondent No. 1(a) in the lower appellate Court. The plaintiff purchased the disputed land from defendant No. 1 by a registered sale deed Ext. 2 on 9-4-43 for Rs. 1200. Defendant No. 4 purchased ⅔rds of lie suit land from defendants 2 and 8 by a registered sale deed Ext. A on 29-8-1943 for Rs. 880. The plaintiff's case is that the disputed land was the ancestral property of the family of Kalu and the sale was for legal necessity and antecedent debts made by Kalu as the Karta of the family. The subsequent sale Ext. A by defendants 2 and 3 is not valid as they had no further subsisting interest. The suit is also for recovery of possession. The learned trial Court held that the suit land was the joint family property, but by the date of sale by Kalu there was disruption of joint status and that Kalu did not sell the property as the Karta for legal necessity and antecedent debts. He dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court reversed the trial Court's holding on all points. He held that the suit land constituted ancestral property of the family and Kalu sold the same for legal necessity and antecedent debts, and the sale was binding and valid. He accordingly decreed the suit Against the reversing decree this Second Appeal has been filed by the legal representatives of defendant No. 4.

    2. Mr. Mohanty raised the following contentions:—

    (1) In Ext. 2 mere was a recital that the property was the self-acquisition of Kalu and there was no recital that he sold the same as the Karta of the family. On the aforesaid facts the lower appellate Court should have held that Kalu did not transfer the property as the Karta of the family and as such the sale under Ext. 2 was not binding on defendants 2 and 3.

    (2) The finding of the lower appellate Court that Ext. 2 was for consideration and legal necessity is contrary to law and is not based on consideration of all the relevant materials on record.

    (3) The appeal in the lower appellate Court abated as Satya, daughter of Gangadhar, was not substituted on the death of Kalu on 23-10-60 and on the death of Pata on 14-11-61.

    (4) In A.H.O No. 4 of 1950 of this Court the previous suit filed by the plaintiff was allowed to be withdrawn only on condition that the plaintiff would deposit in Court the costs incurred by the defendants in all the stages of that litigation and that such costs should be assessed by the Registrar and fixed, and the decree of the High Court would be drawn up incorporating the conditions indicated therein. Though the costs were deposited the costs were not assessed by the Registrar but by the Deputy Registrar of the High Court and as such the condition imposed in the order of the High Court dated 19-2-53 was not complied with and the present suit is not maintainable.

    3. All these contentions require careful examination.

    4. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that Ext. 2 was for consideration and supported by legal necessity and antecedent debts is a pure finding of fact and is not assailable in Second Appeal. After having carefully gone through the judgment of the lower appellate Court I am satisfied that the relevant materials have been taken into consideration. This contention must accordingly be rejected.

    5. The second contention is that on the face of the recital in Ext. 2 that the property was the self-acquisition of Kalu, the Courts below acted contrary to law in arriving at a conclusion that it was joint family property. This contention has equally no force. It is open to the Courts of facts to examine the entire evidence on record and come to a conclusion whether it is joint family property despite recital to the contrary in the sale deed. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Mohanty on AIR 1964 SC 1385, Balmukand v. Kamla Wati and AIR 1967 SC 574, Radhakrishnadas v. Kaluram. These very decisions lay down that the intention of the parties must be gathered on the basis of all the circumstances. On the finding that the property was joint family property and the father alienated the property for consideration and for legal necessity and antecedent debts, the conclusion that he transferred the same as the Karta of the family is not contrary to law. This contention is accordingly rejected.

    6. The third contention is based on a case of abatement arising in the lower appellate Court. The facts leading to the abatement may be stated in brief. Kalu died on 23-10-60. The plaintiff filed an application to make his widow Pata and daughter Chandra as parties respondents. Banchhanidhi and Lingaraj were already on record as heirs. Pata died on 14-11-61. The plaintiff filed a petition stating that the heirs of Banchhanidhi and Chandra are already on record. He, however, omitted to mention the name of Lingaraj though he is a legal representative. But the mistake has no significant value as Lingaraj is already on record. The defendants did not raise any objection at any of the two stages that Lingaraj had a sister named Satya. Substitution was allowed without objection and the first appeal was allowed. In second Appeal an application was first filed that Gangadhar hada daughter Kora. Objection was filed by the plaintiff that Kora was the wife of Gangadhar and had predeceased him in 1956. Thereafter the appellant filed another application that Lingaraj had a sister Satya. To this no counter was filed by the plaintiff. Mr. Panda relied on the earlier counter filed in this case on 15-1-66 that Gangadhar died leaving no daughter.

    7. Two questions arise for consideration—

    (i) Whether Gangadhar has a daughter Satya, and (ii) Even assuming that Gangadhar has a daughter Satya, whether the appeal would be taken to have abated in the lower appellate Court due to non-substitution of Satya as legal representative of Kalu or Pata.

    8. So far as the first question is concerned, Mr. Panda contended that in the trial Court the substitution of Satya was in question when Gangadhar died on 28-3-1958 and therein the trial was allowed to proceed without substituting Satya. Mr. Mohanty on the other hand contended that there was no finding by the trial Court that Gangadhar had no daughter as Satya. It appears from the order dated 19-2-59 that Satya was not allowed to be substituted on the following observation:—

    “As minor D. 2(a) is already represented from beginning and no objection was taken that any L.R is there and when practically no relief is sought against D. 2 or his L. Rs. the counter is overruled to this extent that any other L.R is there for D. 2. Implead D. 2(a),”

    9. Mr. Mohanty is, therefore, correct in saying that there was no determination in the suit that Gangadhar had no daughter as Satya. All that was decided was that Lingaraj defendant No. 2(a) represented Satya. Existence of Satya was therefore, assumed. In Second Appeal there has been no enquiry as to the existence of Satya.

    10. It is not necessary to make an enquiry as to whether Gangadhar had a daughter Satya on two grounds. The fight is between the two transferees, the plaintiff and the legal representatives of defendant No. 4. Whatever interest Gangadhar and Banchhanidhi had was transferred to original defendant No. 4. In either case the legal representatives of defendants 2 and 3 have no subsisting interest. The plaintiff is bound to succeed in respect or ⅓rd interest of Kalu. The other ⅔rds interest would go to defendant No. 4 if the plaintiffs suit fails. On this ground there is no question of abatement.

    11. Even assuming there is abatement in the facts and circumstances of this case, defendant No. 2(a) would be taken as representing the interest of Satya. The matter is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 49, Dolai Maliko v. Krishna Chandra Patnaik. On identical facts this Court held that the appeal in the lower appellate Court abated. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and observed thus:

    “Even in a case where on the death of one of the appellants, his heirs apply for bringing themselves on record as his legal representatives, unless there is fraud or collusion or there are other circumstances which indicate that there has not been a fair or real trial or that against the absent heir there was a special case which was not and could not be tried in the proceeding, there is no reason why the heirs who have applied for being brought on record could not be allowed to represent the entire estate including the heirs not brought on record”.

    12. The identical principle applies to this case. Mr. Mohanty however contends that the aforesaid principle requires re-examination after the passing of the Hindu Succession Act whereunder a daughter is an heir in her own independent right, title and interest. On the question of abatement a daughter being an independent heir as the son makes no difference. The entire group of persons representing an estate can be represented through one of the heirs provided the other conditions mentioned in the aforesaid decision subsist. I am therefore of opinion that the appeal did not abate in the lower appellate Court and defendant No. 2(a) Lingaraj represented his interest and that of Satya.

    13. The next question for consideration is whether the suit is maintainable as the costs of all the courts in the previous litigation were not assessed by the Registrar of the High Court. The order in A.H.O No. 4 of 1950 runs thus:

    “In the fresh suit that may be filed, the 4th defendant's equity, if any, to recover back his money from defendants 2 and 3 or from the plaintiff, as the case may be, may be worked out so as not to drive him to bring a fresh suit to recover his money which may be open to the bar of limitation. Subject to this the leave asked for is granted and on condition that before filing a fresh suit the plaintiff will deposit into Court the costs incurred by the defendants in all the stages of the present litigation uptodate. Such costs will be assessed by the Registrar and fixed and the decree of this Court will be drawn up incorporating the conditions above indicated and specifying the amount to be paid as costs.”

    14. In accordance with this order the decree was prepared in the High Court and costs were assessed. The decree is signed by the Deputy Registrar. It is accordingly contended by Mr. Mohanty that the costs have not been assessed by the Registrar and the condition precedent has not been fulfilled. There is no substance in this contention. Under the rules of the High Court the decree is to be signed by the Deputy Registrar. Costs were assessed. The decree was notified. No objection was taken that the costs were not assessed by the Registrar or that the real costs were not assessed. There is no material on the record also to show that costs were not assessed by the Registrar. There is no dispute that the entire costs have been deposited before the institution of the suit. I am satisfied that the condition precedent was fulfilled and the suit is maintainable.

    15. The last contention of Mr. Mohanty is that defendants 2 and 3 should be directed to pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4. The learned lower appellate court gave that direction in Para 17 of his judgment. As in the final order passed in the judgment he did not incorporate this direction, the decree does not contain it. It is hereby ordered that defendants 2(a) and 3 do pay Rs. 880 to defendant No. 4. This amount will carry interest from today onwards at 6 per cent per annum. Subject to the aforesaid observation regarding payment of Rs. 880 by defendants 2(a) and 3 to defendant No. 4 the appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances parties to bear their own costs throughout.

    LGC/D.V.C

    16. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Binod Naik And Another v. Chandrasekhar Padhi And Others
    (Sep 10, 1968)