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  • sections 498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 227 of the Code itself.10.
  • section 161 Cr. P.C
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citation codes
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  • sections 498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 227 of the Code itself.10.
  • section 161 Cr. P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Debi Prasad Sengupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revisional application challenges an order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge (2nd Court, Howrah) rejecting the petitioners' application for discharge in Sessions Trial No. XXII(7) of 2000. The opinion identifies the petitioners as accused under sections 498A, 304B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioners had sought discharge on the basis of a statement said to have been recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. by Dr. Tapan Sarkar (attending physician at S.S.K.M. Hospital), in which the victim reportedly stated that she caught fire while preparing tea and that her husband tried to rescue her. The post-mortem surgeon (Dr. D.K. Basu) expressed an opinion that the deceased might have been assaulted before sustaining burn injuries and that death was due to shock of burn effect associated with assault (antemortem in nature). Subsequently, the investigating agency obtained an opinion from Dr. Apurba Nandy (Professor and Head, Dept. of Forensic, State Medical College) describing the injuries as mechanical and suggesting the autopsy surgeon might have confused local patchy burn reactions for bruises.

The trial Judge initially rejected the discharge application by an order dated 19.2.2001. The petitioners challenged that order by way of a revisional application (C.R.R. No. 479 of 2001), which this Court disposed of on 2.3.2001, directing the trial Judge to take the relevant facts into consideration at the time of framing charge and granting liberty to the petitioners to agitate the points then. The trial court again rejected the prayer for discharge (the opinion refers to an order dated 15.5.2001 at the outset and later refers to an order dated 15.5.2002) and fixed a date for framing charge, which led to the present revisional application. The petitioners contend the trial Judge mechanically rejected their discharge application without properly considering the materials on record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court, at the stage of framing charge/discharge under sections 227/228 (and analogous procedure), is required to apply its judicial mind to ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds for presuming commission of the offence by the accused.
  2. Whether the learned trial Judge erred in rejecting the petitioners' application for discharge without duly considering the materials on record and without complying with this Court's earlier direction to consider those facts at the framing stage.
  3. Whether a trial court is required to record reasons when it decides to frame charges against accused persons.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The learned trial Judge failed to comply with this Court's earlier direction and mechanically rejected the discharge application without applying judicial mind to the materials on record.
  • At the stage of framing charge the court must judicially consider whether there are sufficient grounds for presuming the commission of the offence; petitioners relied on several Supreme Court decisions (including Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, State of M.P. v. Mohonlal Soni, Niranjan Singh, Satish Mehra) to support that proposition.
  • The petitioners argued that the dying statement (as recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C.) and the post-mortem opinion are contradictory, and that these contradictions and expert opinions should have been properly evaluated before framing charges or refusing discharge.

Respondent / Public Prosecutor's Arguments

  • The learned trial Judge acted in compliance with this Court's earlier direction and applied his judicial mind when rejecting the discharge application.
  • The trial court is not required to record reasons when it frames a charge; reliance was placed on Smt. Om Wati v. State Through Delhi Administration and Kanti Bhadra Saha v. State of West Bengal for the proposition that there is no legal requirement to specify reasons when charges are framed.
  • The Public Prosecutor resisted the revisional application and maintained that the impugned order was proper and required no interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545 At the stage of framing charge the court must apply its judicial mind to consider whether there are grounds for presuming commission of the offence; the court should not blindly adopt prosecution's decision. Relied upon by petitioners to argue the trial Judge should have applied judicial mind. The Court noted and considered the judgment while assessing the dispute about the framing/discharge stage.
State of M.P. v. Mohonlal Soni, 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110 The court at the stage of framing charge has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; not required to appreciate evidence for conviction. Relied upon by petitioners; the Court examined the principle and took it into account in evaluating whether prima facie materials existed to proceed.
Niranjan Singh Karan Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, AIR 1990 SC 1962 At sections 227-228 stage the court must evaluate materials on record taken at their face value to see if they disclose ingredients of the offence and may, for limited purpose, sift evidence. Relied upon by petitioners; the Court acknowledged this guiding principle in assessing whether the matter should proceed to trial.
Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration, 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104 Object of section 227 is to enable the court to decide if it is necessary to conduct the trial; Sessions Judge may consider materials produced by accused at that early stage and may truncate proceedings if there is no prospect of conviction. Relied upon by petitioners to contend that the trial Judge could and should examine materials; the Court considered the judgment while determining whether discharge was appropriate at this stage.
Smt. Om Wati v. State Through Delhi Administration, 2001 Cri. L.J 1723 Section 227 requires recording reasons when an accused is discharged; however, no reasons are required to be recorded when charges are framed against accused persons. Relied upon by the Public Prosecutor to argue there is no legal requirement to record reasons when framing charges. The Court recorded the existence of this authority in the submissions and had regard to it.
Kanti Bhadra Saha v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1 SCC 722 (2000 Cri. L.J 746) When the trial court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement to pass an order specifying reasons for framing the charge. Relied upon by the Public Prosecutor and referred to by the Court in the course of hearing the dispute over whether reasons must be recorded when framing charges.
State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari, 2000 Cri. L.J 944 At framing stage the court must prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground; it should not appreciate and weigh evidence as if at trial—if prima facie case exists, charge should be framed; charge can be quashed only if even accepting prosecution evidence in full conviction is impossible. Relied upon by the Public Prosecutor; the Court considered the principle while deciding whether prima facie material existed to proceed with the trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the competing contentions and the authorities cited by both sides. The following points encapsulate the Court's reasoning as expressed in the opinion:

  1. The Court identified a clear contradiction between the dying statement (as recorded by the attending physician under section 161 Cr.P.C.) and the post-mortem surgeon's opinion. The dying statement reportedly indicated the victim said she had caught fire while preparing tea and the husband tried to rescue her, whereas the post-mortem opined the deceased might have been assaulted before the burn injuries and that death was due to shock of burn effect associated with an antemortem assault.
  2. The Court emphasized that the mental fitness and physical capacity of the victim to make a dying declaration is a primary consideration in determining admissibility and reliability of such a statement. That fitness is to be assessed from the nature of the injuries, the general condition of the patient and by consulting medical opinion. In the present matter, the victim had sustained 100% burn injuries, and whether she was in a position to make any statement was a fact-sensitive question that the trial court must decide after considering surrounding circumstances and, if necessary, after recording evidence.
  3. The Court observed that the opinion of Dr. Apurba Nandy was an opinion obtained by the investigating agency. At the stage of framing charge, an accused cannot be discharged solely by relying upon an opinion produced by the investigating agency when other materials on record point in a contrary direction.
  4. The Court stated that these factual and evidentiary determinations (for example, whether the victim could make a dying declaration despite 100% burns) are matters that can only properly be adjudicated by the trial court after recording evidence. The Court therefore resisted a conclusion that discharge was mandated at the charge-framing stage on the basis of the challenged materials alone.
  5. Having perused the statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., the post-mortem report and the opinion of Dr. Nandy, the Court concluded that prima facie materials exist which are sufficient to proceed further in the matter. The Court found that the learned trial Judge had before him all relevant materials and had considered them before passing the impugned order.
  6. Consequently, the Court held that the impugned order of the learned trial Judge was passed in full compliance with the earlier direction of this Court and that there was no sufficient ground for interference by way of revision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional application is dismissed; the impugned order of the trial Judge rejecting the petitioners' application for discharge is upheld.

Direct consequences and orders given by the Court:

  • The present revisional application fails and is dismissed.
  • The interim order earlier granted by this Court in the revisional proceedings stands vacated.
  • The learned trial Judge is directed to proceed with the trial and to conclude the same with utmost expedition.
  • In relation to C.R.A.N. No. 914 of 2001, the application for vacating the interim stay filed by the State of West Bengal is disposed of and the interim stay earlier granted by this Court is vacated.

Implications regarding broader precedent: The Court applied established Supreme Court principles concerning the scope of judicial scrutiny at the charge-framing stage and the need to consider prima facie materials; the opinion does not purport to lay down new law. The immediate effect is the continuation of prosecution and a direction for expedition of trial; no new legal principle was announced in this order.

Disposition (as stated in the opinion):

Revisional application dismissed.
Interim order vacated.

    Nirmal Kanti Banerjee & Ors. v. State Of West Bengal

    Debi Prasad Sengupta, J.:— Present revisional application is directed against an order dated 15.5.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Howrah in Sessions Trial No. XXII(7) of 2000 thereby rejecting the petitioners' application for discharge from the aforesaid case.

    2. Present petitioners are made accused in the aforesaid Sessions Trial to meet a charge under sections 498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Petitioners filed an application before the learned trial Judge praying for discharge from the said case. The contention of the petitioners before the learned trial Judge was that one Dr. Tapan Sarkar, attending physician of S.S.K.M Hospital in his statement recorded by police under section 161 Cr. P.C stated that the victim made a dying statement before him that while she (the victim) was preparing tea she caught fire and her husband tried to rescue her. But after the postmortem was held, the P.M doctor was of the opinion that the deceased might have been assaulted before burn injury and death, in his opinion, was due to shock of burn effect associated with assault which was antemortem in nature. Thereafter an opinion was sought for from Dr. Apurba Nandy, Professor and Head of the Dept. of Forensic and State Medical College. The injuries were described by Dr. Nandy as mechanical injuries and he further opined that the autopsy surgeon Dr. D.K Basu might have confused some local patchy reaction of burn injuries as bruises.

    3. The said application for discharge filed by the petitioners was rejected by the learned trial Judge by his order dated 19.2.2001 Challenging such order a revisional application was preferred by the petitioners before this court being C.R.R No. 479 of 2001, which was finally disposed of by this court on 2.3.2001 As the date for framing of charge was fixed on 5.3.2001 before the learned trial Judge, the revisional application was disposed of directing the learned trial Judge to take all these facts into consideration at the time of framing of charge. Liberty was also granted to the petitioners to agitate all such points before the learned trial Judge at the time of framing of charge.

    4. After the aforesaid order was passed by this court, the matter was again taken up by the learned trial Judge afresh. The learned trial Judge after hearing the respective parties again rejected the prayer for discharge made by the petitioners by his order dated 15.5.2002 and fixed date for framing of charge. Challenging such order the petitioners have again preferred this revisional application.

    5. It is the contention of the petitioners learned Advocate that the earlier direction of this court has not been complied with by the learned trial Judge, who mechanically rejected the prayer for discharge made by the petitioners without considering the materials on record.

    6. Relying upon a number of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court it is submitted by the petitioners' learned Advocate that at the stage of framing of charge a duty is cast upon the court to apply his judicial mind for ascertaining whether there are sufficient grounds for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. Mr. Bose, learned Advocate of the petitioner relies upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1972 SC 545 (Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra) in the said judgement it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:—

    “The argument that the court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply of its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the personal liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution.”

    7. Next judgement relied upon by Mr. Bose is reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110 (State of M.P v. Mohonlal Soni), wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:—

    “The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”

    8. In the case reported in AIR 1990 SC 1962 (Niranjan Singh Karan Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja), which is relied upon by Mr. Bose, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:—

    “From the above discussion, it seems well settled that at the sections 227-228 stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.”

    9. In the next judgement relied upon by Mr. Bose, reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104 (Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:—

    “The object of providing such an opportunity as is envisaged in section 227 of the Code is to enable the court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case ends there it gains a lot of time of the court and saves much human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in section 227 of the Code.”

    “But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of workload. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of section 227 of the Code itself.”

    10. Relying upon the aforesaid judgements it is submitted by Mr. Bose, Earned Advocate that the impugned order was passed by the learned trial Judge without applying his judicial mind and without considering the materials placed before him. It is further submitted by Mr. Bose that in passing the impugned order the learned trial Judge did not at all comply with the earlier direction of this court.

    11. Mr. Safiullah learned Public Prosecutor in opposing the present application submits that the learned trial Judge passed the order in full compliance with the earlier direction of this court and on proper application of judicial mind. It is further submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the learned trial Judge is not required to record any reason when the decides to frame a charge against the accused. Learned P.P in support of his contention relies on a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2001 Cri. L.J 1723 (Smt. Om Wati v. State Through Delhi Administration). In paragraph 7 of the said judgement it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:

    “Section 227” of the Code provides that if upon consideration of record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused for which he is required to record his reasons for so doing. No reasons are required to be recorded when the charges are framed against the accused persons. This Court in Kanti Bhadra Saha v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1 SCC 722 : 2000 AIR SCW 52 : AIR 2000 SC 522 : 2000 Cri. L.J 746, held that there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge.”

    12. Next judgement relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor is reported in 2000 Cri. L.J 746 (Kanti Bhadra Saha v. State of West Bengal). This judgement has been referred to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the case of Smt. Om Wati referred to above. In this judgement it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if the trial court decides to frame a charge, there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so.

    13. In the next judgement relied upon by learned Public Prosecutor, reported in 2000 Cri. L.J 944 (State of M.P v. S.B Johari), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:—

    “In our view, it is apparent that the entire approach of the High Court is illegal and erroneous. From the reasons recorded by the High Court, it appears that instead of considering the prima facie case, the High Court has appreciated and weighed the materials on record for coming to the conclusion that charge against the respondents could not have been framed. It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”

    14. I have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. I have perused the judgements referred to above. There is no doubt that there is a contradiction in between the dying statement of the victim before the attending doctor and the opinion of the postmortem doctor, who opined that the victim might be assaulted before burn injury and the death was due to shock of burn effect associated with assault which was antemortem in nature. In such a situation so many things are to be taken into consideration by the trial court. The mental fitness and physical capacity to make a statement at the time of making the dying declaration is the primary consideration in admission of a dying declaration. This may be ascertained from the nature of injury and general condition of the patient besides opinion of the doctor. In the present case the victim sustained 100% burn injury and in such a condition whether she was in a position to make any statement before any doctor, can only be decided by the trial court after considering all the surrounding circumstances. These things can only be decided by the trial court after recording evidence. The opinion of Dr. Apruba Nandy is nothing but an opinion obtained by the investigating agency. At the stage of consideration of charge an accused, against whom there are other materials on record, can not be discharged simply relying upon an opinion given by Dr. Apurba Nandy.

    15. I have gone through the statements recorded by the police under section 161 Cr. P.C, the post mortem report as also the opinion of Dr. Nandy and in my considered view prima facie materials are there which are sufficient for the purpose of proceeding further in this matter. All the materials were placed before the learned trial Judge, who after considering all such materials passed the impugned order. In my view the said order was passed in full compliance with the earlier direction of this court and I do not find any reason to interfere with the same.

    16. The present revisional application accordingly fails and the same is dismissed.

    17. The interim order earlier granted by this court stands vacated. The learned trial Judge is directed to proceed with the trial and to conclude the same with utmost expedition.

    C.R.A.N No. 914 of 2001

    18. In view of the judgement delivered by this court today in C.R.R No. 1204 of 2001, the application for vacating the interim stay filed by the State of W.B bing CRAN No. 914 of 2001 is also disposed of. The interim stay earlier granted by this court stands vacated.

    Revisional application dismissed.
    Interim order vacated.
    B.D

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    Nirmal Kanti Banerjee & Ors. v. State Of West Bengal
    (Jun 17, 2002)