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  • Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948
  • provisions of Act I of 1894
  • Section 3 of the 1948 Act,
  • Section 3 of 1948 Act
  • Rule 3(d),
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  • Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948
  • provisions of Act I of 1894
  • Section 3 of the 1948 Act,
  • Section 3 of 1948 Act
  • Rule 3(d),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitioner, a co-owner of a plot of land (R.S. Dag No. 462; Khatian No. 226; Mouza Mondalghanti; P.S. Rajarhat; District 24 Parganas (North)), challenged the State's requisition and subsequent acquisition of that plot. The petitioner had acquired the land jointly with others by a registered Deed of Conveyance. In an earlier partition suit this Court had appointed joint Receivers (respondents Nos. 4 and 5) who, by an order dated 27 March 1991, took possession of the plot along with other suit properties. The petitioner alleges the State requisitioned and acquired the land without serving notice or hearing the petitioner and without any public purpose, and that the State and a private company (Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited) thereby interfered with the Court's possession through the joint Receivers.

Bengal Peerless was later added as a party respondent. An interim order had earlier stayed the operation of the acquisition order; the Court did not vacate that interim order but proceeded to hear the writ petition finally after affidavits were completed. Counsel for the parties made oral submissions and filed written notes of argument.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite the passage of time (i.e., whether delay/limitation bars the challenge to requisition and acquisition completed between 1991 and 1997).
  2. Whether the requisition and subsequent acquisition under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (the 1948 Act) were in accordance with law — specifically, whether mandatory notice requirements (Section 3 and related rules) were complied with.
  3. Whether the property was in custodia legis (held by the Court through joint Receivers) at the relevant time and, if so, whether leave of the Court was required before requisitioning or taking possession.
  4. Whether requisition and acquisition under the 1948 Act can be used for permanent purposes without resort to Act I of 1894, and whether such use can be challenged as mala fide or not serving a public purpose.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (presented by Mr. P.K. Roy)

  • The requisition and acquisition under the 1948 Act were illegal, mala fide and a fraud on the statute because the 1948 Act was intended for temporary purposes, whereas the object here was permanent and perennial.
  • The State deliberately avoided invoking the 1894 Act to deprive petitioner of an opportunity of hearing and legitimate compensation prior to possession.
  • There was no public purpose for acquiring the plot.
  • No notice was served on the petitioner (a recorded co-owner) despite name mutation in records; purported notices were directed to an erstwhile recorded owner to keep away true owners.
  • The property was in the possession and custody of joint Receivers appointed by the Court; no leave of the Court was obtained before requisition/acquisition or possession was taken, and the action amounted to interference with Court's possession and was contumacious.
  • The petitioner reserved the right to take further legal action in consequence of the alleged contumacious acts.

Added Respondent — Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited (presented by Mr. Indrajit Sen)

  • The State requisitioned the land under Section 3 of the 1948 Act and later acquired it under Section 4; the 1948 Act empowers requisition even if the purpose is permanent and Government can acquire land under the 1948 Act without resort to Act I of 1894.
  • The 1948 Act is constitutionally valid and applicable; acquisition was for urgent housing needs for middle- and lower-income groups to be completed expeditiously.
  • Service of notice under Section 3(2) is prescribed by Rule 3; the disjunctive "or" in Rule 3 permits any one of the prescribed methods. Notice was served by affixation on a conspicuous part of the land and at the Collector's office in terms of Rule 3(d), and such service is complete.
  • Possession by joint Receivers was not known to his client because there was no visible indication (no boundary wall or structure) at the time; the joint Receivers raised a boundary wall only later in 1999 pursuant to the Court's order. Because the Receiver had not taken physical possession such leave of Court was not necessary.
  • The joint Receivers did not object after gazette publication of the acquisition (25 September 1996), and on limitation he argued the petition filed on 9 October 1998 was belated since the acquisition process began in 1991 and award published in 1997.

State Respondent (presented by Mr. Banerjee)

  • Notice was served upon the recorded owner(s) ascertained from Land Reforms records; where a recorded owner refused to accept the notice it was affixed in a conspicuous place and at the Collector's office as per law.
  • The joint Receivers were not in physical possession; hence, no service upon them was required.
  • One co-owner who later sought compensation had his name addressed for receiving compensation because he approached the Land Acquisition Collector and claimed interest.
  • Generally adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Indrajit Sen for the added respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1997 SC 2745 (referenced at p.2758) Authority relied upon to support that the Government may requisition and acquire land under the 1948 Act even if the purpose is permanent and without resort to Act I of 1894. Quoted by counsel for the added respondent to justify use of the 1948 Act for housing purposes; the Court noted the reliance but examined applicability to the facts (see paragraphs 15–16).
1996 (5) SCC 386 : AIR 1996 SC 2586 Authority relied upon to show the 1948 Act is constitutionally valid and that acquisition is sustainable so long as a public purpose exists. Relied upon by the added respondent to support the contention that the 1948 Act is constitutionally valid; the Court recorded this reliance in considering arguments on public purpose (para 4–5).
AIR 1997 SC 2995 Support for the proposition that service by affixation in terms of Rule 3(d) constitutes valid service of notice under Section 3(2). Relied upon by the added respondent to contend that notice affixed on land and at the Collector's office satisfied statutory service; the Court considered this contention while evaluating whether notice was in fact served (para 6, 18–19).
AIR 1997 SC 173 Authority for the proposition that leave of the Court is not necessary where the Receiver has not taken physical possession; also cited regarding interference with court possession being a nullity. Relied on by respondents to argue no leave was required; the Court accepted the general proposition but examined whether the facts demonstrated that the joint Receivers had in fact taken possession and therefore whether the authority applied (paras 15–17).
AIR 1958 SC 725 Cited by the Court (via counsel for the petitioner) as authority supporting the proposition that acts tending to dispossess or interfere with Court's possession (custodia legis) are nullities. The Court cited this decision as supportive authority for the conclusion that disturbing the Receiver's possession without leave is invalid (para 16).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed maintainability. Although the acquisition process began in 1991 and the award was published in 1997, the Court held that when a writ petition challenges non-compliance with a mandatory statutory requirement (here, service under Section 3 of the 1948 Act), delay does not defeat maintainability. The Court read Section 3 as imposing a mandatory duty to serve the owner or, where occupied by a third party, the occupant, and concluded lawful requisition is a sine qua non of valid acquisition under Section 4; hence, the petition was maintainable (para 11–12).

The Court framed two substantial questions: (1) whether the property was in custodia legis in the legal sense (i.e., whether joint Receivers had taken possession), and (2) if not, whether statutory notices of requisition and acquisition had been served (para 13–14).

On custody/possession, the Court accepted respondents' general proposition (derived from a Supreme Court decision) that leave of the Court is unnecessary only if the Receiver has not taken physical possession (para 15–16). The Court ordered and considered the joint Receivers' affidavit and contemporaneous documents and found that the joint Receivers took possession on or about 29 March 1991; this fact was evidenced by contemporaneous letters of complaint to police, subsequent correspondence, an order of the Court by Justice Sen, and an Inspector General of Police order providing protection. The Court treated the ad interim order restoring possession to the Receivers (and the Court's direction to raise boundary fencing) as corroborative of prior possession (para 16–17).

The Court rejected the respondents' plea of ignorance of the Receivers' possession as incorrect; it observed that respondents' own written notes stated that notice was served on the Receiver by affixation (contradicting the plea of ignorance). The Court reiterated settled law that any act tending to dispossess the Court's Receiver without leave is a nullity and may amount to contempt (para 16).

Regarding service of notice under Sections 3 and 5, the Court found the State had addressed notices to an erstwhile recorded owner (Abu Bakkar Mondal) and had not attempted to serve any notice on the present co-owners despite their names being mutated in the records of rights well before the proceedings. The Court characterized the State's assertion that notices were served on the recorded owner as "wholly untrue and unbelievable" and concluded no notice was attempted to be issued to the petitioner (a recorded owner) (para 18–19).

On these combined bases — (a) that the possession taken by respondents from the joint Receivers was illegal because it interfered with the Court's possession, and (b) that mandatory notice requirements were not complied with — the Court concluded that the requisition and acquisition proceedings were illegal (paras 17–20).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the entire requisition and acquisition proceedings in respect of the plot of land in question on two principal grounds: (i) the respondents' taking of possession unlawfully interfered with the Court's possession through the joint Receivers (custodia legis), and (ii) mandatory statutory notice requirements under the 1948 Act were not complied with.

Direct Consequences and Practical Implications:

  • The requisition and acquisition were declared invalid and set aside.
  • The respondents are at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law (i.e., by complying with statutory requirements).
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The operation of this judgment and order was stayed for a period of three weeks after the Christmas vacation (as ordered in the judgment).

The opinion does not state that it establishes any new binding precedent beyond the application of existing authorities; the Court's decision addresses the direct effect on the parties and permits the respondents to re-initiate proceedings lawfully.

Order: Let certified copies of the judgment be provided to the parties' counsel if applied for. Order accordingly.

    Gopeswar Prasad Agarwal v. State Of West Bengal And Others

    1. The writ petitioner herein claiming one of the co-owners of a plot of land bearing R.S Dag No. 462 under Khatian No. 226, Mouza Mondalghanti, P.S Rajarhat, District-24 Parganas (North) has challenged the requisition and subsequent acquisition of the aforesaid plot of land. The petitioner has acquired this land along with other co-owners by and under a registered Deed of Conveyance.

    2. It is the case of the petitioner that the State respondent has illegally and wrongfully and without serving any notice or giving any hearing to the petitioner has requisitioned and lateron acquired the aforesaid plot of land. In a partition suit joint Receivers being the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 herein have been appointed by this Hon'ble Court in its ordinary original Civil Jurisdiction. In the aforesaid partition suit the said joint Receivers by an order dated 27th March, 1991 have taken possession along with other suit properties of the said plot of land. The joint Receivers were appointed and they took possession of the property in question before this impugned order of requisition was passed followed by acquisition. There was no public purpose for requisition and acquisition of the aforesaid plot of land. The possession taken by the State Government as well as the private respondent, viz., the added respondent is wholly illegal and tantamounts to interference with possession of the Court through the joint Receivers. In substance this requisition and acquisition are deliberate act of contempt.

    3. Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said Company) was not a party to this writ petition. Subsequently it was added as party respondent by an order of this Court. The aforesaid company being affected by interim order staying operation of acquisition order has made an application for vacating interim order. I, however, did not vacate the interim order instead decided to hear the writ petition out finally. Affidavits have been made complete.

    4. Mr. P.K Roy, learned senior Counsel, in support of the writ petition, submits that there was no facts and circumstances and/or situation which warranted for applying 1948 Act (since repealed). The aforesaid Act was brought about to meet temporary purposes but in this case the object is for permanent and perennial purposes. So, the acquisition proceedings under the aforesaid Act is wholly mala fide and in fact this exercise is fraud upon the statute. The State respondent deliberately did not resort to 1894 Act in order to deprive the petitioner of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard and also from paying legitimate compensation before possession is taken. Moreover, there is no element of public purpose for acquiring the aforesaid plot of land. In any event assuming this requisition followed by acquisition under the 1948 Act is valid but the procedure thereof has not been followed in terms of the provision of the 1948 Act. No notice was given to the petitioner who is admittedly co-owner. The name of the petitioner has been mutated in the records of rights. It appears purported notice under Section 3 of 1948 Act was attempted to be served upon the erstwhile recorded owner. It was so done deliberately to keep away the petitioner and other co-owners with full knowledge of their right as owners in the land. Their knowledge about petitioner's ownership would appear from the fact that notice for receiving compensation has been given to one of such co-owners. So, admittedly no notice was served upon any of the recorded owners. Thus the entire requisition proceedings as well as the acquisition proceedings stand vitiated. Moreover, this property along with other properties were and still are under possession and custody of the joint Receivers appointed by this Hon'ble Court. No leave was obtained from the Court for initiating proceedings aiming at to dispossess the joint receivers. In fact pursuant to this impugned requisition and acquisition proceedings the joint Receivers were physically dispossessed and this Court was pleased to direct restoration of possession of the joint Receivers who are still in possession. This venture on part of the State Government along with the aforesaid ‘Company’ is illegal, wrongful and further contumacious act and action. For this, Mr. Roy argues, his client reserves right to take action in accordance with law.

    5. Mr. Indrajit Sen, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited, submits that in exercise of power under Section 3 of the 1948 Act, the State Government had requisitioned initially this plot of land, thereafter under Section 4 of the aforesaid Act the land was subsequently acquired. It is submitted by Mr. Sen that Statute empowers Government to requisition even if it is permanent in nature and the State Government without resorting to the provisions of Act I of 1894 can acquire the land under 1948 Act. In this connection he relies on a decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 2745 at page 2758. This plot of land was sought to be requisitioned and acquired for immediate and emergent need of the acute housing accommodation problem faced by middle income and lower income group of people and this necessity has been felt bitterly and in extremity by the State Government and as such in order to complete expeditiously housing project the aforesaid Act, 1948 has been made applicable. He also argues that it is no longer res integra that the said Act is constitutionally valid. It is submitted that so long public purpose exists, acquisition cannot be termed to be being mala fide and the acquisition is sustainable. In this connection he relies on a decision reported in 1996 (5) SCC 386 : (AIR 1996 SC 2586).

    6. On the question of service of notice, Mr. Sen argues that under Section 3(2) of the said Act notice of requisition is to be served upon the owner or occupier of the land under requisition in the prescribed manner, i.e, as prescribed under Rule 3. The word ‘or’ employed in the said Rule is disjunctive and any one of the methods as prescribed can be resorted to for service of such notice either upon the owner or occupier. When the notice under Section 3(1) was served upon the owner or the occupier of the land, viz., the Receiver by affixation on the conspicuous part of the land and at the Collector's office in terms of Rule 3(d), service of notice is complete, in this connection he relies on a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 2995 (2998).

    7. The notification under Section 4 regarding acquisition was published in the official gazette on 25th September, 1996. This publication tantamounts to notice being served upon all concerned.

    8. The possession of the joint Receivers was not within the knowledge of his client as there was no visual indication either by boundary wall or by any structure where from possession of the joint Receivers could be discerned. Since the joint Receiver was not in physical possession of any portion of the land requisition followed by acquisition is not at all invalid under the law. Admittedly the joint Receivers raised boundary wall much later, in 1999 pursuant to the Court's order. Furthermore, notice of acquisition was published and gazetted on 25th September, 1996. In spite of such notice the joint Receivers did not come forward to raise any objection and/or to intimate the State Government, as such no leave of the Court was necessary. In this connection he relies on a decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 173 at page 180.

    9. The writ petition is also not maintainable, he argues, as the requisition followed by acquisition proceeding of the land was started in the year 1991 and completed in the year 1997 when the award for compensation had been published on 10th March, 1997. On 9th October, 1998 the petitioner has come forward to challenge the validity of requisition and acquisition.

    10. Mr. Banerjee, learned Counsel, appearing for the State, submits that the notice was served upon the recorded owners ascertained from records that were made available from the Land Reforms department. He also argues that joint Receivers were not in physical possession. Therefore, question of service of notice upon them does not arise. The recorded owner refused to accept the notice, it was affixed at a conspicuous part of the land in question and also at the office of Collector as per law. So far the notice given to one of the co-owners of the land in question for receiving compensation is concerned it was issued because subsequently one of the co-owners approached the Land Acquisition Collector and demanded compensation money as he had interest in the land. Those apart as a whole he adopts the argument of Mr. Indrajit Sen.

    11. After submissions, made by the learned lawyers, they filed written notes of argument. It appears from the written notes of argument filed by the petitioner this requisition followed by acquisition have been challenged on the question of non-service of notice and the possession of the property being taken without leave of the Court, as it was custodia legis.

    12. As the question of maintainability has been taken by the contesting respondents it has to be decided first before any other point is embarked upon for decision. It is contended that since in the year 1991 the impugned requisition and acquisition proceeding was commenced and it was complete in the year 1997 by publication of award. The writ petition being moved on 9th October, 1998 cannot be maintained as it was a belated action. It is an admitted position that this acquisition proceeding is a follow up action of the requisition of the land. In the writ petition question of non-service of notice of requisition has been alleged. Upon plain reading of Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 it appears to me that service of order upon owner and in case of the land being in occupation of third party upon the occupant, is mandatory. Unless the aforesaid mandatory requirement is fulfilled possession of the land being taken, is an illegal and unauthorised Act. Section 4 of the aforesaid Act provides for acquisition of the land since being requisition. So, lawful and valid requisition of land is a sine qua non of valid acquisition of the land under the aforesaid Act. As the root of acquisition is being challenged on the ground of non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of the law it cannot be said that the writ petition is not maintainable or it is a belated action. Moreover, the property is a custodia legis admittedly now the recorded owner has come forward to challenge the same so ordinarily the writ petitioner could not come: I am of the view when any question of non-compliance of mandatory provision of the law is raised in a writ petition question of delay in this case does not arise. As such the writ petition is perfectly maintainable.

    13. Next question is to be examined as to whether the requisition followed by acquisition is done in accordance with law or not.

    14. In order to find out answer to the aforesaid question two substantial questions need to be examined. One whether the property in question is custodia legis in legal sense or not; another if not then notice of requisition and acquisition were served or not.

    15. To find out first question, I am to examine whether the joint Receivers had taken possession of the said land in question or not. If so, whether any requisition followed by acquisition is valid, of a particular portion of the land being held by the joint Receivers. I accept the submission of Mr. Sen that no leave of the Court is necessary for taking possession of the property provided physical possession whereof has not been taken by the Receiver.

    16. This submission is made on the strength of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 173. Nobody is disputing the aforesaid proposition but question is whether the aforesaid decision is applicable on the facts and circumstances of this case or not.

    17. I directed the joint Receivers to file affidavit. From the affidavit it appears to me that joint Receivers took possession of the said land in question on or about 29th March, 1991. Factum of taking such possession has been recorded in their service of contemporaneous letters of complaint to the S.P concerned and Officer-in-Charge of the local police station. The said letters are annexed to their affidavit. Nobody has challenged the aforesaid documents being manufactured or forged. The joint Receivers have also recorded the factum of possession in subsequent correspondence and communication. It appears in terms of the order passed by Justice Sen (as his Lordships then was) that the joint Receivers indeed took possession of the said land. In fact an order of Inspector General of Police (Headquarters) has been annexed whereby police picket was provided to protect possession of the joint Receivers. Significantly it is alleged a notice addressing to joint Receivers was affixed at the Collector's office. The aforesaid act and action of joint Receivers are nothing short of actual physical possession. The possession of the joint Receivers was subsequently disturbed and interfered with by Mr. Sen's client with aid and assistance of the State respondent and that is why an ad interim order was passed by this Court restoring possession of the joint Receivers and directing them to raise boundary wall and/or fencing to consolidate such possession. It is, however, contended by Mr. Sen passing of the said order suggest that the joint Receivers were not in possession. This contention hardly needs serious consideration as the joint Receivers by an affidavit supported by contemporaneous documents stated that possession of land in question was taken by them long before this requisition and acquisition proceeding. Rather aforesaid interim order restoring possession unmistakably substantiate the factum of prior possession of the joint Receivers. Mr. Roy is perfectly right in saying that possession of the Court cannot be disturbed by any person without permission of the Court. I am of the view, and come to the findings that joint Receivers were in possession before the order of requisition was passed followed by acquisition. Subsequent activity of taking physical possession of the land tantamounts to wrongful, illegal, contumacious dispossession of the joint Receivers. It is needless to mention admittedly no leave was obtained from the Court to disturb the possession of the Receivers. Such fact is not disputed by any of the respondents including the applicant for vacating interim order. Their plea is that they did not have any knowledge about the possession of the joint Receivers. Such a plea is wholly incorrect as it appears from written notes of argument of added respondent at page 3 notice under Section 3 was served upon Receiver by affixation. In any event plea of ignorance may be a good defence in contempt proceedings but it is settled law any act or action by any person taken without leave of the Court tending to dispossess the Receiver and interfere with the court's possession is a nullity. I find support of this view from the decisions cited by Mr. Roy reported in AIR 1958 SC 725 in its paragraph 7 and AIR 1997 SC 173.

    18. So, I hold that possession of the said property taken by the State respondents together with the aforesaid applicant added respondent from the Receivers is illegal, if not contumacious act as it tantamounts to interference with the Court's possession, as such the same is invalid.

    19. Next question remains as to service of notice under Sections 3 and 5 of the said Act. Admittedly the notices were adressed to the erstwhile recorded owner, Abu Bakkar Mondal and no attempt was made to serve any notice to any of the present co-owners. Curiously the notice for receiving compensation was addressed to one of the co-owners not to the erstwhile recorded owners. In the affidavit-in-reply a certified copy of the up to date records of right is annexed and it appears therefrom that long before initiation of the requisition followed by acquisition proceedings the petitioner's and other co-owner's names were mutated and/or recorded in the records of rights. Therefore, the plea taken by the State respondent about the service of notice upon the erstwhile recorded owner is wholly untrue and unbelievable and this nothing but a careless act and further aiming at to hide the notice from the true and lawful owners and/or occupiers. No notice was shown to me addressing the writ petitioner and/or the recorded subsequent owners. Therefore, any affixation of notice as alleged by the respondent is wholly untrue. I hold that no notice was attempted to be issued before requisition and acquisition in favour of the petitioner who is a recorded owner. The story of affixation on the conspicuous part of the property as contended by the State respondents is unacceptable and unbelievable inasmuch as in the affidavit-in-opposition by the joint Receivers it has been alleged that land in question is completely barren and vacant and there was no structure.

    20. Therefore, I hold that without serving any notice of order of requisition under the law possession was taken and the acquisition followed. Therefore, the entire proceedings of requisition and acquisition are thus illegal on that account too and the same is set aside.

    21. The respondents, however, would be at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

    22. There will be no order as to costs.

    23. The operation of the judgment and order as already passed shall remain stayed for a period of three weeks after the Christmas vacation.

    24. Let xerox certified of the Judgment and order be made available to the learned lawyers for the parties, if applied for.

    Order accordingly.

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    Gopeswar Prasad Agarwal v. State Of West Bengal And Others
    (Dec 14, 1999)