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citation codes
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  • Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure/151 of the said Code,
  • provisions of s. 95 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.3.
  • s. 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.8.
  • s. 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.
  • Order 39, rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • s. 91(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act,
  • Societies Act because, the Rent Act
  • Co-operative Societies Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure/151 of the said Code,
  • provisions of s. 95 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.3.
  • s. 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.8.
  • s. 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.
  • Order 39, rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • s. 91(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act,
  • Societies Act because, the Rent Act
  • Co-operative Societies Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Revisional application challenged Order No. 6 dated 14 September 1993 of the District Judge, Alipore, in Misc. Appeal No. 405 of 1993. The petitioner originally instituted Title Suit No. 43 of 1993 in the court of the Assistant District Judge, Alipore seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions restraining the defendant from obstructing the plaintiff's possession of a flat and seeking restoration of electricity supply. An ad interim injunction initially granted by the Trial Court was vacated on an application under Order 39, rule 4 CPC made by Defendants Nos. 1–4. The plaintiff/petitioner then filed a petition under Section 151 CPC for a mandatory order to restore electric supply and preferred Misc. Appeal No. 405 of 1993 in which an Order for maintenance of status quo was issued on 25 August 1993. On 26 August 1993 the petitioner applied under Section 151 CPC to modify the status-quo order to direct reconnection of electricity. The impugned order rejected that application, inter alia, on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. The Revisional Court was therefore asked to determine the jurisdictional question between the Civil Court and the statutory tribunal under the Co-operative Societies Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil suit (Title Suit No. 43 of 1993) was barred by Section 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court.
  2. Whether, pending such jurisdictional determination, the civil court could or should grant relief in the form of a mandatory injunction directing restoration/reconnection of electricity supply to the disputed flat.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff

  • The plaintiff claimed a right of tenancy in the disputed flat arising from privity with the allottee (defendant No. 5) and sought permanent and mandatory injunctions including restoration of electricity.
  • It was argued that the real occupant of the flat was the plaintiff (occupation was permitted earlier to an employee purportedly related to the allottee) and several documents were annexed to support the contention that the plaintiff was the true occupant.
  • The plaintiff sought modification of the status-quo order to direct restoration/reconnection of electricity under Section 151 CPC.

Respondents / Defendants

  • The respondents relied on the Society's Rules and Bye-laws which, they contended, prohibit handing over possession of flats to a body corporate; on that basis respondents 1–4 proposed forfeiture of respondent No.5's membership rights.
  • Defendants Nos. 1–4 obtained vacation of the trial court's interim injunction by an application under Order 39, rule 4 CPC and urged that the suit was barred by Section 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act—i.e., the matter fell within the statutory forum's exclusive jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ratnakar Gajanan Godambe v. Ratna Prabha Co-operative Society, AIR 1991 SC 1378 Remand to High Court for fresh consideration (including fresh evidence) as regards extent of protection available to occupant (forum and grounds of eviction), due to lack of clarity in legal position. The Revisional Court noted this decision as one of the two recent Supreme Court decisions that acknowledged uncertainty and remanded for fuller consideration; it relied on the approach of remanding for enquiry into forum and eviction grounds.
Marine Times Public Pvt. Ltd. v. Shriram Transport and Finance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 626 Before referring a dispute under s.91(1) of Co-operative Societies Act, parties must belong to categories specified in that provision; relief against a society may be ancillary and society's approval may be needed only after successful claim against a member. The Court included this decision among authorities showing limits of statutory forum—i.e., that reference under the Act depends on the character of parties and relief claimed; used as part of the analytic matrix on forum competence.
Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., AIR 1990 SC 1563 Where an occupant has acquired the status of tenant by privity of contract with an allottee, the society cannot evict him via s.91(1) of Co-operative Societies Act because such eviction would deprive him of protection under the Rent Act; jurisdiction must be determined from plaint averments. The Court treated Sanwarmal as laying down the key criteria: tenant-status protection under Rent Act overrides eviction via Co-operative Societies Act, and jurisdictional enquiry must be based on plaint averments. The revisional bench relied heavily on these principles and held the District Judge failed to apply them.
Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867 Principles for granting interlocutory mandatory injunctions: (i) stronger prima facie case; (ii) resultant injury cannot be compensated in money; (iii) balance of convenience; (iv) exercise of judicial discretion on sound equitable principles. The Court cited these factors when considering the propriety of granting temporary restoration of supply and observed that interlocutory mandatory relief is exceptional; it relied on these guiding factors in directing temporary restoration of electricity.
AVR & Co. v. Fair Field Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 81 When there is no claim of tenancy and no substantiating agreement, Rent Act protection may not be available. The Court noted that some earlier Supreme Court decisions (including AVR & Co.) were distinguishable on facts where tenancy protection was not claimed; used to contrast with Sanwarmal.
Anjan Chowdhury v. Anandaneer Co-operative Housing Society, 1990 (1) CLJ 345 (Special Bench) Local Special Bench decision on related issues (noted as having been given without considering later Supreme Court rulings). The Court observed this Special Bench decision deserved reconsideration because it did not take into account subsequent Supreme Court authorities (notably Sanwarmal and Ratnakar).
Phanibhusan Dey v. Sudhamoy Roy, 1987 (2) CHN 49 Prayer for injunction regarding supply of electricity rejected on the ground supply may be discontinued if the other side succeeds, though non-supply might cause irreparable injury. The Court referred to this decision when considering the balance between possible irreparable injury caused by non-supply of electricity and the possibility of discontinuance if the plaintiff ultimately fails; relied on it to justify temporary restoration subject to future orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused analysis of the authorities cited by the parties and identified the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, particularly in Sanwarmal Kejriwal and Ratnakar Gajanan Godambe. The reasoning proceeded as follows:

  1. The Court identified the central legal criterion from Sanwarmal Kejriwal: where an occupant has acquired tenant status by privity of contract with an allottee, the occupant enjoys protection under the Rent Act and cannot be evicted via proceedings under the Co-operative Societies Act; the Rent Act is to be preferred as the special enactment.
  2. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction must be determined by the averments in the plaint or claim application, not by the defence taken by the adversary (as articulated in Sanwarmal).
  3. The Court noted that earlier decisions (including AVR & Co.) were distinguishable on facts where tenancy was not claimed or proved, and therefore those decisions could not control a case where tenancy was averred.
  4. On review of the impugned order, the Court concluded that the District Judge had not adverted to the specific criteria and procedure laid down by the Supreme Court (Sanwarmal and Ratnakar). Consequently, the District Judge had refused to exercise a jurisdiction vested in the civil court by law.
  5. Given this failure, the Revisional Court found it necessary to set aside the impugned order and to remand the matter for reconsideration in the light of the Supreme Court guidelines; it recognized that further factual determination (including evidence as to tenant status and the proper forum) might be required.
  6. While observing that mandatory interlocutory injunctions are exceptional and require the Dorab criteria to be satisfied, the Court considered the practical circumstance that electricity is an essential requirement and that the disconnection had occurred at the initiative of the allottee (not the Society). Balancing interests and considering the need for reconsideration on jurisdictional grounds, the Court directed temporary restoration of electricity to avoid immediate injustice, subject to future orders.
  7. The Court also refused to stay its order restoring electricity despite the respondents' application for a stay, citing the essential nature of supply and the established Supreme Court authorities already noted.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Revisional application is allowed to the extent indicated: the impugned order (Order No. 6 dated 14.9.1993) is set aside, and the electricity supply to the disputed flat is directed to be restored forthwith on a strictly temporary basis.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The District Judge's order rejecting the application under Section 151 CPC on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act is set aside as a refusal to exercise the civil court's jurisdiction in accordance with Supreme Court guidelines.
  • The matter is to be reconsidered by the learned District Judge (he is given liberty to take up and dispose of the Misc. Appeal and/or the applications together or in any mode he deems fit), applying the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court (notably Sanwarmal and Ratnakar) and taking evidence if necessary regarding forum and grounds of eviction.
  • Electricity is to be restored to the disputed flat immediately, but such restoration is expressly temporary and subject to further directions (including discontinuance) that the appropriate court may pass upon final disposal of the pending applications.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The Court refused the respondents' prayer for stay of this order; xerox copies of the order were to be supplied to counsel on usual undertakings to obtain certified copies urgently.

The opinion relies on existing Supreme Court authorities to set out the applicable legal framework and instructs the trial/appeal court to reconsider the matter in light of those authorities. The Court's decision here is primarily corrective and procedural — it sets aside the impugned order and orders temporary relief pending proper consideration — rather than purporting to lay down a new legal rule beyond applying the cited precedents.

    In Re v. Jenson And Nicholson (India) Ltd.

    Samir Kumar Mookherjee, J.:—The present Revisional application, which is directed against Order No. 6 dated 14th of September, 1993, passed by the learned District Judge, Alipore in Misc. Appeal No. 405 of 1993, rises an important question about the scope and applicability of s. 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. The question, on more than one occasion, had fallen for consideration by the Apex Court of the country. But, notwithstanding a number of decisions rendered by the said Court on such occasions, in one of the recent decisions of that Court, it had judicially acknowledged that there was “lack of clarity in legal position”. The resultant effect has been that counsel, oil behalf of the contesting parties, have made full utilisation of their forensic dexterity and ingenuity to make emphatic submissions in justification of the respective contentions of their clients.

    2. The relevant facts culminating with the above order may be succinctly stated as follows:—

    The Revisional petitioner filed a Title Suit (Title Suit No. 43 of 1993) in the court of the learned Assistant District Judge, Alipore, inter alia, for permanent and mandatory injunctions seeking to restrain the defendant from obstructing or interfering with the plaintiff/petitioner's possession in the suit flat with all amenities and essential services and to remove any obstruction to such enjoyment of the flat. An ad interim order of injunction initially granted by the Trial Court stood vacated on the basis of an application under Order 39, rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, preferred by the Defendants Nos. 1 to 4, along with the prayer of the plaintiff/petitioner under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for mandatory order directing the restoration of electric supply. The plaintiff/petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 405 of 1993 and in the said appeal, made an application for injunction under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure/151 of the said Code, on which, by Order No. 3 dated 25th of August, 1993, an Order for maintenance of status quo had been issued. On 26th of August, 1993, the petitioner/appellant, preferred an application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for modification of the said order of status quo by directing the opposite parties to restore or reconnect electricity in the said flat. The impugned order rejected the said application for restoration or reconnection of electricity, inter alia, with a finding that the suit was barred by the provisions of s. 95 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.

    3. In the background of the aforesaid facts, we have been called upon to answer the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court vis-a-vis the statutory Tribunal created by the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.

    4. On behalf of the contesting parties, a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, of this Court and other High Courts have been cited to substantiate the respective standpoints of the contesting parties. The said decisions, excepting two, which we have been able to lay our hand on, on proper reading and analysis, appear to pronounce and formulate the following principles:—

    (a) AIR 1991 SC 1378 (Ratnakar Gajanan Godambe v. Ratna Prabha Co-operative Society): The two judges remanded the case to the High Court for consideration afresh, if necessary, by taking fresh evidence as regards the extent of protection that would be available to him, both as regards the forum and the grounds upon which he could be evicted, after adverting to the principles and factors laid down in the case of Sanwarmal Kejriwal (AIR 1990 SC 1563) which could not be done due to lack of clarity of the legal position.

    (b) Marine Times Public Pvt. Ltd. v. Shriram Transport and Finance Co. Ltd. (AIR 1991 SC 626). Before a dispute would be referred under s. 91(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act, it was equally essential that the parties to the dispute must belong to one of the categories specified in Clause a(cc) of sub-s. (1). The main claim of the plaintiff, in a suit for specific performance, was against a member and not against the society. Society's approval would be needed only after the plaintiff succeeded in his claim against the member and as such, the relief against the society was of ancillary nature.

    (c) Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1563. Once the status of tenant was acquired, the society could not evict him by taking recourse to s. 91(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act, as the tenant was entitled to the benefits of Rent Act. The mere fact that occupation of the said tenant was in violation of the bye-laws would not make any difference; if the society could evict a protected tenant on the plea of absence of privity with him, it would render the protection of the Rent Act redundant, Proceeding under s. 91 by the Society was held not maintainable. The Five decisions referred to by A.P Sen and B.C Ray, JJ. reported in AIR 1989 SC 81 were held to be distinguishable on facts because in all those cases the licences stood terminated on the relevant date. The Court further laid down that even if the Co-operative Societies Act was a later Act, on the maxim “Generalia Speciali bus non-derogant”, the plaintiff would be protected and could not be evicted except by taking recourse to Rent Act. The Court further held that the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined on the averments in the plaint or claim application and not on the defence taken by the adversary party.

    (d) Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867 (paragraph 14), Grant of interlocutory mandatory injunction must be bassed on the following:—

    (i) A stronger prima facie case then in normal circumstances,

    (ii) The resultant injury cannot be compensated in money.

    (iii) Balance of convenience;

    (iv) Exercise of judicial discretion on sound equitable principle.

    (e) AVR & Co. v. Fair Field Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 81: There was no claim of tenancy. No substantiating agreement was filed before the Court. Hence, the protection under Rent Act was found not to be available

    (f) Anjan Chowdhury v. Anandaneer Co-operative Housing Society, 1990 (1) CLJ 345 (SB): The decision was delivered without considering the latest Supreme Court view at that point of time in the case of Sanwarmal Kejriwal, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1563 and as such deserves to be reconsidered because of the inconsistency with the said Supreme Court decision.

    (g) Phanibhusan Dey v. Sudhamoy Roy, 1987 (2) CHN 49: Prayer for injunction regarding supply of electricity rejected on the ground that such supply may be directed to be discontinued in the event of success of the other side, but non-supply might result in irreparable injury.

    5. In the instant case, from the materials on record as relied on and referred to by the parties, forming parts of the pleadings before this Court, it appears that the plaintiff was claiming a right of tenancy under defendant No. 5 an allottee of the disputed flat, the allotment having been made upon full payment of the purchase price to respondents 1 to 4. It further appears that the Rules and Bye-laws of the Society, which have been strongly relied upon and referred to on behalf of the respondents, prohibit handing over of possession of such flats in the co-operative housing to any body corporate and on that basis, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 had been proposing to forfeit the membership right of the respondent No. 5.

    6. It is an admitted position also that from before the said flat was in occupation of one Mr. Probal Chatterjee, who was also an employee of the plaintiff, but such occupation was permitted by the Society on a representation that Mr. Chatterjee was a relation of the allottee of the flat. On behalf of the plaintiff, however, it has been argued that the real occupant of the flat was the plaintiff itself was well known to the respondents and in support of such a stand, several documents have been annexed for forming parts of the records of the case.

    7. As stated above, the learned District Judge dismissed the application, preferred on behalf of the plaintiff under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, with a finding that the civil suit, as instituted by the plaintiff, was not maintainable because of application under s. 95(1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.

    8. We have been invited to adjudicate the propriety of the said reasoning of the learned District Judge.

    9. We have given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions of the parties in view of the importance of the point involved as also to the different authorities cited on their behalf.

    10. From the analysis of the cases cited, it appears that certain criteria were laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., AIR 1990 SC 1563 to the effect that once the status of a tenant was found to have been acquired by an occupant of a flat on the strength of a privity of contract with the allottee of the flat under the co-operative society, the society was not entitled to evict him without a proceeding in Civil Court; allowing the Society to take recourse to the statutory forum created by the law of co-operation would be to deprive the said person of the benefit of the Rent Act, Even the alleged violation of the Bye-law or Rules of the Society, according to the Supreme Court in that decision, did not make any difference as a protected tenant could not be evicted in a proceeding under the co-operative Societies Act because, the Rent Act was a special type of legislation and must, therefore, be allowed predominance over and preference to the Co-operative Societies Act. The said decision further laid down that the jurisdiction of the Court was to be determined on the averments in the plaint or claim application and not on the defence taken by the adversary party. The said decision was approved and followed in remanding the case to the High Court for consideration afresh, if necessary, by taking evidence both as regards forum and the grounds upon which he could be evicted another decision of two Judges of the Supreme Court, in the Case of Ratnakar Gajanan Godambe v. Ratna Prabha Co-operative Society (AIR 1991 SC 1378).

    11. In the earlier case, the provious five decisions of the Supreme Court, including that in the case of AVR & Co. v. Fair Co-operative Rousing Society Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 81 : (1988) 4 SCC 408 by a Bench consisting of their Lordships A.P Sen and B.C Ray, JJ., were held to be distinguishable on their respective facts.

    12. It is pertinent to note that this juncture that the decision of the Special Bench of this Court in the case of Anjan Chowdhury v. Anandaneer Co-operative Housing Society, AIR 1990 (1) CLJ 345 (SB) : 94 CWN 515 deserves to be reviewed as in the said judgment, none of the two cases of the Supreme Court, referred to above, had been taken into consideration justifiably because the decision of the Supreme Court were pronounced subsequent to the Special Bench decision of this Court.

    13. In the impugned order also, the two decisions of the Supreme Court and the principles laid down therein, broadening the scope for consideration by a Court of law and indicating the factors, which though not exhaustive, must be taken into consideration by such Court, had also not been taken note of with the result that the learned District Judge cannot be said to have adverted to the said criteria as were required to be determined by the Supreme Court nor can he be said to have followed the procedure which the Supreme Court laid down in the said two decisions.

    14. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the impugned order as this clearly is an instance of refusal to exercise a jurisdiction vested in the court by law.

    15. The Revisional application, therefore, must be allowed setting aside the impugned order. As regards the prayer for mandatory injunction, no doubt, it is well settled that such a prayer cannot be granted in a general way, but can be granted during the pendency of the suit only very exceptional cases.

    16. In the instant case, admittedly, the Society on its own had no occasion to disconnect the supply, but for the initiative taken by the allottee. It is also incontrovertible that electricity is an essential requirement and since we have not been able to sustain the order of the learned District Judge, we cannot presume that the application made on behalf of the plaintiff will be dismissed by the learned District Judge or by the trial Court. We have already indicated that depending on the determination of the question of jurisdiction in the light of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, there should be reconsideration of the entire matter. In that state-of-affairs, it will also we think, not be just and proper to directly throw the plaintiff out of possession by permitting the discontinuance of supply to continue. It is already judicially recognised (vide the cases of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Serab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867 and Phanibhusan Dey v. Subhamoi Roy, 1987 (2) CHN 49) that in case the plaintiff or the applicant becomes unsuccessful the restored supply may again be discontinued or may be allowed to be enjoyed by the legally entitled occupant of the property.

    17. We, accordingly, direct that the electricity be restored to the disputed flat by the respondents forthwith, but such restoration will be absolutely temporary in nature and will abide by the further directions including one for discontinuance that may be passed by the appropriate Court on disposal of the pending applications.

    18. We further give liberty to the learned District Judge to take up and dispose of for consideration either the Misc. appeal or the applications or all of them together whichever mode and manner may commend to him.

    19. The Revisional application is therefore, allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.

    20. A prayer has been made on behalf of the opposite parties for stay of operation of this order, but, considering the restoration of essential supply is involved and also the existence of the decisions of the Apex Court of the country as noted above, we refuse the certificate and the prayer for stay.

    Let xerox copies of this order be delivered to the learned advocates for the parties on their usual undertakings to apply for and obtain urgent centified copies.

    Nikhil Nath Bhattacharjee, J.:—I agree.

    Application allowed.
    S.C

    Co-operative Societies Act

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    Comments

    In Re v. Jenson And Nicholson (India) Ltd.
    (Oct 14, 1993)