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  • s. 7(1(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • s. 7(1(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petition challenges the order dated April 2, 1986, passed by the Second Special Judge, Calcutta, which set aside a prior order dated November 29, 1985. The earlier order had stopped further investigation under section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and discharged the accused persons in G.R Case No. 535 of 1985. The petitioner no. 1 was arrested on March 2, 1985, for an offence under section 7(1(a)(ii)) of the Essential Commodities Act, relating to alleged violations of the West Bengal Declaration of Stock & Prices of Essential Commodities Order 1977 and the West Bengal Imported Vegetable Oil (Prohibition of Unauthorised Sales) Order 1984.

On September 2, 1985, the Investigating Officer applied under section 167(5) CrPC to extend the investigation period beyond six months from the arrest. The learned Judge fixed November 29, 1985, for hearing. On that date, the Judge rejected the extension request, dropped the case, and discharged the accused. Subsequently, on December 10, 1985, the Investigating Officer unsuccessfully sought to recall the discharge order. On January 7, 1986, the State filed an application to recall and set aside the discharge order, which the learned Judge allowed on April 2, 1986, permitting investigation to continue within a month. The present revision petition was filed challenging this April 2, 1986 order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Special Judge had the power to set aside or review his final order dated November 29, 1985, which discharged the accused and stopped further investigation under section 167(5) CrPC.
  2. Whether an order rejecting extension of investigation time and discharging accused is a final order that cannot be recalled or reviewed by the same Judge.
  3. Whether the provisions of section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bar the learned Judge from reviewing or recalling his final judicial orders.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The learned Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to set aside his final order dated November 29, 1985, which discharged the accused.
  • If the State had grievances against the discharge order, it should have preferred a revision petition in an appropriate court rather than seek review before the same Judge.
  • The April 2, 1986 order reviewing and setting aside the discharge order was illegal and liable to be set aside.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sm. Sooraj Devi v. Peare Lal, 1981 Cr LJ 296 Orders for clarification that alter a final order are barred under section 362 CrPC, as such orders are not clerical or arithmetical errors. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the learned Judge could not review or clarify his final order discharging the accused under section 362 CrPC.
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2432 No provision in the Criminal Procedure Code empowers a Judge to recall or review his own judicial order. The Court cited this to reinforce that the learned Special Judge had no power to review or recall the final discharge order.
A.S Gouranga v. S.N Thakur, 1986 Cr. LJ 1074 Even when a complaint is dismissed or accused acquitted, the Judge has no inherent power to review or restore the case. The Court applied this precedent to confirm that the discharge order was final and not subject to review by the same Judge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the November 29, 1985 order and concluded it was a final order because it rejected the Investigating Officer’s prayer to extend investigation time beyond six months, dropped the case, and discharged the accused. The Court noted that the learned Special Judge erred in treating this order as non-final and thus reviewable. The Court referred to binding precedents establishing that a Judge has no power under the Criminal Procedure Code, particularly section 362, to recall or review a final judicial order. The Court rejected the contention that the learned Judge could set aside the discharge order by a subsequent order, emphasizing that the appropriate remedy for the State would have been to file a revision petition in a higher court rather than seeking review before the same Judge. Hence, the impugned order dated April 2, 1986, was held to be illegal and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated April 2, 1986, is set aside.

The direct effect of this decision is that the discharge order dated November 29, 1985, stands restored and the Investigating Officer is barred from continuing investigation under the set aside order. No new precedent is established beyond reaffirming the settled principle that a Judge cannot review or recall his final order under the Criminal Procedure Code.

    Babulal Agarwal & Ors. v. The State

    1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated April 2, 1986 passed by the Second Special Judge, Calcutta by which the learned Special Judge set aside the previous order dated 29th November, 1986 stopping further investigation under s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and discharging thereby the accused persons in G.R Case No. 535 of 1985 Facts are briefly as follows:

    2. On March 2, 1985 the petitioner no. 1 had been arrested for having committed an offenee punishable under s. 7(1(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act for alleged violation of paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Declaration of Stock & Prices of Essential Commodities Order 1977 and also the provisions of the West Bengal Imported Vegetable Oil (Prohibition of Unauthorised Sales) Order 1984. On September 2, 1985 the Investigating Officer filed an application under s. 167(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for extending the time for investigation beyond the statutory period of six months from the date of the arrest of the petitioner. The learned Judge fixed November 29, 1985 for hearing of the said application.

    3. By the order dated November 29, 1985, the learned Judge rejected the prayer of the Investigating Police Officer for extending the time to complete the investigation and dropped the case and discharged the accused petitioners from bail bonds. On December 10, 1985, K. Patra, Sub Inspector being the Investigating Officer filed an application for recalling the order dated November 29, 1985 discharging the petitioners from the said case and the learned Judge dismissed such application. On January 7, 1986 the State of West Bengal through the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the learned Judge praying for recalling and setting aside the order of discharge passed by the learned Judge on November 29, 1985. The learned Judge by April 2, 1986 order, set aside the earlier order discharging the accused and the Investigating Officer was permitted to investigate the case within a month Being aggrieved the present Revision has been filed.

    4. It is contended by Mr. Roy learned Advocate for the petitioners that the learned Special Judge has no power to set aside his order dated 29th November, 1985 because the order which was passed was a final order and if the State had any grievance against such order, the State could have preferred an application in revision in the appropriate court against such order but the Special Judge had no power to review his order and when by the order dated April 2, 1986 the order dated 29th November, 1985 was reviewed and/or set aside and the discharge order was vacated and the Investigating Officer was directed to complete investigation within a month the impugned order being illegal is liable to be set aside.

    5. I have perused the certified copy of the impugned order dated 24, 1986 I have also perused the decisions which were cited before the learned Special Judge. The decision reported in 1981 Cr LJ 296 Sm. Sooraj Devi v. Peare Lal referred to by the learned Judge clearly indicates quite otherwise. In that decision, it was held that when the High Court directed the restoration of possession to the respondents, any subsequent order for clarification of that order by declaration that it was not binding on the applicant and did not effect his/her position cannot be passed under s. 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code because such an order for clarification of the earlier order does not come within the purview of the clerical or arithmetical error and such an order is clearly barred under s. 362 of the Code Moreover, Mr. Roy, learned Advocate, has referred to two Supreme Court decisions namely, Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh. AIR 1977 SC 2432 and A.S Gouranga v. S.N Thakur 1986 Cr. LJ 1074. In the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 2432 case, it has been held that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code empowering the learned Judge to recall or review the judicial order passed by him. In 1986 Cr. LJ 1074, it has been held that even when a complaint case is dismissed for default and the accused is acquitted, the judge has no inherent power to review his order of dismissal and restore the case.

    6. I find from the order of the learned Special Judge that he took a view, that the order dated 29th November, 1985 was not a final order. I am of the view that the learned Special Judge was completely in error in thinking the said order not to be a final order. By that order, he did not allow the prayer of the Investigating Officer time to investigate the case beyond the period of six months and dropped the case and discharged the accused. So far as the present petitioners are concerned, the impugning order was nothing but a final one. In the decision reported in 1986 Cr L.J 1074, Supreme Court has also clearly laid down that so far as the accused is concerned, the dismissal of a complaint for non-appearance of a complainant or discharge or acquittal on the same ground is a final order. In this particular case, when the learned Special Judge did not allow the prayer of the Investigating Officer to investigate the case beyond the period of six months and discharged the accused after drooping the case, the order passed by him could not but be a final order. Such an order cannot be subsequently recalled by the learned Judge because the learned Judge has got no power to review a final order in view of the bar imposed under s. 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    7. In these circumstances, the impugned order cannot be sustained and must be set aside. In the result, the revision petition be allowed and the order dated 2.4.86 be set aside.

    Application allowed.

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    Comments

    Babulal Agarwal & Ors. v. The State
    (Jan 7, 1987)