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citation codes
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  • provisions of S. 21 of the Benal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 read with S. 106
  • S. 14 of tile Limitation Act,
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act.4.
  • S. 14 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • S. 5, Limitation Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of S. 21 of the Benal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 read with S. 106
  • S. 14 of tile Limitation Act,
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act.4.
  • S. 14 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • S. 5, Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Two Applications for Condonation of Delay (A.M. Bhattacharjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two applications sought admission of two First Miscellaneous Appeals that were filed beyond the period of limitation. The applicants sought relief either by excluding, under S. 14 of the Limitation Act, the period taken in prosecuting similar appeals in the District Judge's Court, or by extending the period of limitation for sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.

The appeals were initially filed in the Court of the District Judge (a wrong forum for these appeals, which in view of the valuation should have been filed in the High Court under S.21 of the Benal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 read with S.106 of the Civil P.C.). Respondents had lodged caveat in the District Court and the District Judge had admitted the appeals after hearing the parties. Thereafter respondents moved the High Court in revision; appellants withdrew the appeals from the District Court and filed them in the High Court. The parties agreed that if the period spent prosecuting the appeals in the District Court were excluded or condoned, the appeals before the High Court would be within time.

The central procedural question for the Court's determination was whether there was sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the appeals in the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period spent prosecuting appeals in another court (the District Judge's Court) can be excluded under S. 14 of the Limitation Act when computing limitation for appeals, or whether the principles of S. 14 can be invoked by way of S. 5 to extend time for appeals.
  2. Whether the appellants have shown "sufficient cause" under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing appeals in the High Court caused by having filed in the wrong court on the advice of their lawyers (and by the District Court's admission of those appeals).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156 Authority for the view that prosecution of another civil proceeding in circumstances contemplated by S.14 may constitute sufficient cause for extension of limitation for an appeal under S.5. Cited as a supporting authority for applying S.14 principles (though S.14 does not literally apply to appeals) via S.5 in appeals.
Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, AIR 1918 PC 135 Supports the view that principles underlying S.14 should be applied in considering S.5 for appeals. Relied upon as part of the line of Privy Council decisions endorsing use of S.14 principles in S.5 applications for appeals.
Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur v. Raj Rajeshwari Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 Privy Council decision used to show that although S.14 does not apply to appeals on its face, its principles may be applied when considering S.5. Relied on to support the proposition that a lawyer's mistake can furnish sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
Purna Chandra v. Mabub Baksh, AIR 1923 Cal 291 Decision in which principles under S.14 appear to have been applied in condoning delay in filing appeals. Cited as an instance where S.14 principles were applied by the Division Bench in condoning delay in appeals.
Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 Observes that invocation of S.14 principles while considering S.5 would often solve hardship caused by the non-application of S.14 to appeals in terms. Quoted to justify using S.14 principles by way of S.5 and to endorse a liberal approach to "sufficient cause."
Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 (as quoted in Ram Lal) Observation that the words "sufficient cause" receive a liberal construction to advance justice when no negligence or lack of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Used to support a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" in condonation applications.
Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400 Statement that once a party engages a lawyer, the party may properly expect the lawyer to look after his interests; the party should not suffer for the lawyer's default. Quoted for the proposition that a party who has done everything expected (engaged counsel, briefed and paid fees) should not be penalised for the advocate's default.
Goswami Krishna Murarilal v. Dhan Prakash, (1981) 4 SCC 574 Reiterates the principle that a party should not suffer because of the advocate's negligence. Cited as part of Supreme Court authority supporting the view that advocate's default can be a ground for condonation.
Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records, AIR 1984 SC 41 Quotes prior observations that a party should not be made to suffer for counsel's default; supports non-imposition of fault on the litigant. Quoted to reinforce the principle that the litigant should not be disadvantaged by the lawyer's conduct.
State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 Held that if a party acted on wrong advice given by his legal adviser, he cannot be guilty of negligence so as to disentitle him to plead "sufficient cause" under S.5. Relied upon to support the conclusion that wrong legal advice can be a good ground for condoning delay.
Punjabi University v. A.S. Ganesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 Holds that a mistake by a lawyer is good ground for condoning the delay in filing an appeal. Quoted as controlling authority that mistakes of a lawyer can constitute sufficient cause for condonation.
Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 Supreme Court decision urging a liberal approach to condonation of delay; suggests recasting the enquiry from "why condone?" to "why not condone?" and advocates a commonsense application of the rule that "every day's delay must be explained." Referred to as a recent Supreme Court message promoting liberal treatment of non-deliberate delay; the Court notes the decision and indicates it will consider its message on a suitable occasion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a logical sequence:

  1. Legal framework: The Court acknowledged that S.14 of the Limitation Act, in terms, applies to suits and applications and not appeals. However, it noted authoritative decisions (Privy Council and subsequent cases) that the principles underlying S.14 may be invoked when considering an application under S.5 to extend limitation for appeals.
  2. Law Commission viewpoint: The Court noted the Law Commission's recommendation (89th Report) that S.14 be extended expressly to appeals, but observed that until legislative change occurs, appeals must proceed by way of S.5.
  3. Facts applied to law: The Court found that the appellants had engaged lawyers who advised filing in the District Court; the appeals were filed in that wrong court; respondents lodged caveat and the District Judge admitted the appeals after hearing — the appeals remained on that Court's file for a period. The appeals were later withdrawn and re-filed in the High Court.
  4. Relevance of counsel's mistake: Relying on the line of authorities (including Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions), the Court accepted that mistake or wrong advice of a lawyer can constitute "sufficient cause" under S.5 for condoning delay. The Court emphasized the practical reality that parties are often compelled to engage counsel and should not be made to suffer for counsel's blunders when they have otherwise acted bona fide.
  5. Treatment of recent guidance: The Court acknowledged the recent Supreme Court decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji advocating a liberal, commonsense approach to condonation applications and indicated willingness to embrace its message; the Court observed that it would consider the decision's message on a more suitable occasion so it percolates down.
  6. Conclusion from application of principles: Given that the delay arose out of the wrong institution of appeals on lawyers' advice and because the District Court had itself admitted the appeals, the Court concluded that the appellants had shown sufficient cause under S.5 to condone the delay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the two applications for condonation of delay. In the Court's words: APPLICATIONS ALLOWED / APPEALS TO BE ADMITTED.

Specific directions and immediate consequences:

  • The appeals are to be admitted (if otherwise in form) and placed for hearing under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • One other Judge (Ajit Kumar Nayak, J.) agreed with the result, and the order concludes with "Applications allowed."

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authorities to confirm that mistakes or wrong advice of legal advisers may amount to "sufficient cause" for condoning delay under S.5. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle or change statutory text; rather it applied established precedent and endorsed a liberal approach as promoted by the Supreme Court in Katiji. The opinion therefore produced a direct effect in admitting the two appeals but did not announce a new legal precedent beyond applying and reaffirming cited authorities.

Order: Applications allowed. Appeals to be admitted and placed for hearing under O.41, R.11 CPC. No order as to costs.

    Somnath Banerjee And Others v. Vivek Salvi And Others

    A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:— These are two applications praying that the two concerned First Miscellaneous Appeals filed beyond the period of limitation be admitted either by excluding, under S. 14 of tile Limitation Act, the period taken in prosecuting similar appeals in the court of the District Judge or by extending the period of limitation for sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Act.

    2. S. 14 of the Limitation Act no doubt provides for exclusion of the period taken in prosecuting with diligence and good faith another civil proceeding against the same parties in respect of the same matter in another Court which is unable to entertain the same for want of jurisdiction or other causes of a like nature. In terms, however, S. 14 ex facie applies in computing the period of limitation for suits and applications only and not to appeals. But the Privy Council decision in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156 appears to be a sufficient authority for the view that even in the case of an appeal, prosecution of another civil proceeding in the circumstances contemplated in S. 14 may constitute sufficient cause for extension of the period of limitation for the appeal under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In fact, this Privy Council decision in Brij Indar Singh (supra) as well as the two later decisions of the Board in Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, AIR 1918 PC 135 and in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur v. Raj Rajeshwari Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 purport to lay down that although S. 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to appeals ex proprio vigore, the principles underlying the section should be applied also in considering an application under S. 5 of the Act in respect of appeals. In the Division Bench decision of this Court in Purna Chandra v. Mabub Baksh, AIR 1923 Cal 291 (1), the principles under S. 14 appear to have been applied in condoning the delay in filing appeals. It is true that even though S. 14 in terms does not apply to appeals, yet, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 at p. 365 invocation of its principles while considering an application under S. 5 would very often solve the hardship that would have otherwise resulted because of non-application of S. 14 to appeals in terms. But even then, we have every reason to respectfully agree with the view of the Law Commission of India in its 89th Report on the Limitation Act, 1963, submitted in 1983 (para 14, 12, page 35) to the effect that “a right should be given to an appellant to exclude the time taken in proceeding bona fide in a Court without jurisdiction, rather than leaving the matter to the discretion of the court under S. 5 to be exercised for ‘sufficient cause”, because “while interpreting the expression ‘sufficient cause’, the Courts may take conflicting views which appear to be worth avoiding on such matters”. The Law Commission has in fact recommended the extension of S. 14 to appeals by express phraseology and has suggested (para 14, 23, page 38) insertion of a new sub-sec. (2A) applying the section to appeals in express terms. But until that is done (and sooner the better and better late than never), in appeals, we would have to go by the S. 5 way. Now to the facts.

    3. The two appeals were initially filed in the Court of the District Judge. But even though those were appeals from orders, the suit in which the orders were passed having been valued at more than Rs. 25,000/-, the appeals were required to be filed in the High Court under the provisions of S. 21 of the Benal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 read with S. 106 of the Civil P.C It appears from the certified copy of the relevant order-sheet that the respondents also lodged Caveat in the District Court and the appeals were admitted by the District Judge in the presence of and after hearing the parties. The respondents subsequently moved this Court in revision against such admission and those appeals were then withdrawn by the appellants from the District Court and have thereafter been filed in this Court. It is not disputed that if the delay caused by the time taken in prosecuting those appeals in the District Court is condoned or excluded then the present appeals in this Court would be within time. The only question for our determination, therefore, is whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay and extend the time under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.

    4. In Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields, AIR 1962 SC 361 (supra) the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 to the effect that “the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant”. Now though our procedural laws, in theory, permit a party to conduct his case in person without a lawyer, the labyrinth of our laws, both procedural and substantive, and the enigmatic features prevailing under our present adversary legal system leave him almost with no option but to engage a Counsel to prosecute his case. In such a case, to quote from the Supreme Court decision in Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400 at p. 1401, “the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things” as “after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest”. If a party has done that, then, as the Supreme Court has proceeded to have observed further in the form of a question, “what is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of default of his advocate”. This has again been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Goswami Krishna Murarilal v. Dhan Prakash, (1981) 4 SCC 574 and these observations have again been quoted with approval in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records, AIR 1984 SC 41 at p. 42. It should be noted that in Rafiq v. Munshilal (supra), the Supreme Court, after raising the question as to whether a party should suffer for the inaction, negligence or other fault of the advocate, has answered by declaring that “the answer is obviously in the negative”.

    5. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that the appellants engaged lawyers to prefer appeals against the impugned order and these appeals were filed in a wrong Court in accordance with the advice of their lawyers. It is also on record that the respondents themselves also lodged caveat in that wrong Court and that the said Court also had no hesitation to admit those appeals after hearing the lawyers for both the parties and also to keep the appeals on its file for all these days. If these appeals could get entry in this wrong Court only because of the obviously wrong and/or negligent advice of the lawyers and also inaction and negligence on the part of the Court, then it is difficult to understand as to why the appellants shall not be regarded to have made out sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay resulting from such wrong institution. As already stated, our laws and forensic procedure compel a party to engage a lawyer in proceedings in Courts and, therefore, the Courts must see that the parties do not suffer because their lawyers have blundered.

    6. Even if it cannot be always put into a straight-jacket formula of universal application, it has been repeatedly held by both our pre-independence and post-independence apex Courts that mistake or mistaken advice of lawyer may be a good ground for condoning the delay resulting from such mistake or mistaken advice. Relying on the Privy Council decision in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur v. Raj Rajeshwari Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Howrah Muncipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 at p. 757 that “if a party had acted in a particular manner on a wrong advice given by his legal adviser, he cannot be guilty of negligence so as to disentitle the party to plead sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act”. And relying on those observations, and also the aforesaid Privy Council decision, it has again been held by the Supreme Court in Punjabi University v. A.S Ganesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 at Pp. 1974-1975 that “a mistake by a lawyer is good ground for condoning the delay in filing the appeal”.

    7. What we have stated hereinbefore is sufficient to dispose of these two applications for condonation and to justify our granting the same. But we think that we must take note of a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, where the Supreme Court has regretted that, though it has been making liberal approach in matters relating to condonation of delay”, “its message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy”. The message, as formulated therein (at 1354) appears to be that since an appellant does not stand to gain, but runs a serious risk, by lodging an appeal late and since refusal to condone delay might result in a meritorious appeal being shut out at the threshold, while condonation would at its highest result in a hearing of the appeal on merits with due notice to the parties, and since substantial justice after hearing on merits should, whenever possible, be preferred to technical consideration scuttling such hearing, non-deliberate delay would deserve a liberal approach. As to the rule that “every day's delay must be explained”, the Supreme Court has, while disapproving a pedantic or mechanical approach, recommended a rational, commonsense and pragmatic application thereof and has endeavoured to demonstrate the futility of a strict adherence to that rule by posing the question “why not every hour's delay, even second's delay?” We would have, however, thought, and this we say with great respect, that even a strict adherence to the rule would have never required explanation of delay of every hour, minute or second as under our Law of Limitation the smallest units for the computation of periods are days and never seconds or minutes or hours, and we are unable to visualise a case where limitation would have to be counted or condonation to be refused on the basis of such fractions of a day. Be that as it may, we would have thought that while considering the question of extension of time for condonation of delay under S. 5, Limitation Act, the relevant question is ‘whether there is sufficient cause to extend or condone?’, but as a result of this message we may have now to recast the question as ‘whether there is sufficient cause not to extend or condone?’ In other words, the question may not be ‘why to condone’ but may be ‘why not to condone’.

    8. As already indicated, for the reasons stated by us hereinbefore even without the aid of this latest Supreme Court decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, (AIR 1987 SC 1353) (supra), we would grant these two applications and, therefore, we propose to consider this decision and ascertain its message on a more suitable occasion so that the same may percolate to us, the courts below and hence this may not be pursued here any further.

    9. We, therefore, allow these two applications for condonation of delay in preferring these two appeals and direct that the appeals may be admitted, if otherwise in form and be placed for hearing under O. 41, R. 11 of the Civil P.C We would, however, make no order as to costs.

    Ajit Kumar Nayak, J.:— 10. I agree.

    Applications allowed.

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    Somnath Banerjee And Others v. Vivek Salvi And Others
    (Sep 18, 1987)