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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act read with section 10(4)
  • section 10(2) because of the provisions of sub-section (4) of section
  • provisions of the Cess Act or the Education Cess Act
  • Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930.
  • provisions of sub-section (4) of section
  • Bengal Cess Act, being Act IX of 1880.
  • section 10(4) of the Income-tax Act.
  • provisions of the Cess Act, 1880,
  • sub-section (4) of section 10.7.
  • Income-tax Act, section 10
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act read with section 10(4)
  • section 10(2) because of the provisions of sub-section (4) of section
  • provisions of the Cess Act or the Education Cess Act
  • Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930.
  • provisions of sub-section (4) of section
  • Bengal Cess Act, being Act IX of 1880.
  • section 10(4) of the Income-tax Act.
  • provisions of the Cess Act, 1880,
  • sub-section (4) of section 10.7.
  • Income-tax Act, section 10
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Sinha, J. (with Datta, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The four consolidated applications concern assessments for the years 1950‑51, 1951‑52, 1952‑53 and 1953‑54 made against the assessee, Samla Collieries Ltd., a company which, on its own statement of facts, carried on coal‑mining operations: it took mines on lease, raised coal from those collieries and sold the coal. For the years in question the assessee incurred liabilities described as (1) road and P.W.D. cess (levied under the Bengal Cess Act, Act IX of 1880), (2) an education cess (levied under the Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930), and (3) payments to royalty‑holders under royalty agreements. The Appellate Tribunal allowed deductions for amounts paid to royalty‑holders but excluded the road/P.W.D. cess and the education cess from allowable deductions under section 10(4) of the Income‑tax Act. The consolidated applications raise the common legal question whether the amounts paid as those cesses were allowable deductions under section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) read with section 10(4) of the Income‑tax Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount paid by the assessee company as cess for roads and public works (under the Bengal Cess Act) and as primary education cess (under the Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930) was allowable as a deduction under section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income‑tax Act read with section 10(4) of that Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (Mr. Mitter)

  • The assessee contended for a distinction between the profit gained by the process of extracting coal from a mine and the profit of the business of mining; the extraction profit, according to the argument, is different from the business profit and should not, on that basis, attract a cess exclusion under section 10(4).
  • Reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision in Civil Appeals Nos. 587 and 588 of 1961 (Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. State of Bihar) and related cases (an unreported judgment dated 24 September 1962 by Ayyangar J.) to support the asserted distinction or to show relevant principles about when mining operations give rise to assessable profits for purposes of cesses.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Pal)

  • Even if the matter did not fall within the first part of section 10(4), the cess was nevertheless excluded by the latter part of section 10(4) because the cesses were assessed at a proportion or otherwise on the basis of the profits or gains enjoyed by the assessee company from its mining operations.
  • Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Manindra Chandra Nandy v. Secretary of State for India (later taken to the Privy Council) concerning whether cess is levied on the property or the income therefrom; that decision held the cess could be charged not only from the occupier but also from the owner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. State of Bihar (Civil Appeals Nos. 587 & 588 of 1961); reported [1963] 48 I.T.R. S.C. 123; also reference to an unreported judgment delivered by Ayyangar J. (24 Sept 1962) The principle that profit can arise out of mining operations even where the ore is not sold but used in manufacture — i.e., mining operations can contribute to the overall profit of a business and that profit is includible in the profit of the end product. The court distinguished the Tata facts from the present case (there the mining was incidental to manufacturing and ore was used in manufacture rather than sold). The court nevertheless relied on the Tata line to reject the assessee's suggested distinction between extraction profit and business profit, observing Tata stands for the proposition that profit arises from mining operations.
Manindra Chandra Nandy v. Secretary of State for India (Division Bench of this Court; later on appeal to the Privy Council) Whether the cess is levied on the property or on the income therefrom; the cited holding was that the cess could be charged from the owner as well as the occupier (i.e., the cess is not restricted to the occupier alone). The court noted the decision but stated it was unnecessary to decide in the present case the particular question whether the cess follows the land or the profit arising therefrom. The decision was mentioned in support of the general proposition that cess may be charged on owner or occupier, but the court did not base its primary conclusion on this precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reading together the statutory provisions under which the cesses were levied and the relevant provisions of the Income‑tax Act. The analytical steps (as set out in the opinion) are:

  1. Identify the statutory basis for the charges: the road and public works cesses are levied under the Bengal Cess Act (Act IX of 1880), specifically sections 5 and 6; the primary education cess is levied under section 29 of the Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930 and is tied to assessments under the Cess Act; and the Income‑tax Act contains rules for allowable deductions under section 10(2) and the exclusion provision in section 10(4).
  2. Note the Appellate Tribunal's practical finding: payments to royalty‑holders were allowable, but the cesses (road/P.W.D. and education cess) were excluded by section 10(4) of the Income‑tax Act.
  3. Analyze section 10 of the Income‑tax Act: clause (ix) of subsection (2) allows sums paid as land revenue, local rates or municipal taxes in respect of premises used for the business; clause (xv) is a residuary revenue‑nature allowance; but subsection (4) expressly excludes from allowance any sum paid on account of any cess, rate or tax "levied on the profits or gains of any business" or assessed at a proportion or on the basis of such profits or gains.
  4. Apply the statutory text to the facts: the company carried on mining as a business and raised and sold coal. The court concluded the profits enjoyed by that business fall within the ambit of the Cess Act and the Education Cess Act, and that the cesses in question were either levied on profits or assessed by reference to profits/net annual value as contemplated in section 10(4).
  5. Address the assessee's attempted distinction: Mr. Mitter's contention that extraction profit is different from business profit was rejected. The court found no sound basis for separating the profit from raising coal from the profits of the mining business when, on the company's own case, the coal was raised and sold (i.e., no intermediate manufacturing use existed here).
  6. Consider the precedents relied upon: the Tata Iron & Steel decision was examined and distinguished on its facts (there mining supplied raw material to manufacture and mining was incidental to manufacturing rather than direct sale). The court observed that the Tata line actually supports the proposition that profit arises out of mining operations rather than negates it. The Manindra Chandra Nandy decision was noted on the point that cess may be charged on owners as well as occupiers, but the court held it unnecessary to decide the land v. income question in this case.
  7. Conclude that the cesses were excluded from deduction by the clear terms of section 10(4): because the cesses were levied on, or assessed by reference to, profits or gains from the mining business, they fall within the exclusion and therefore are not deductible under section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the framed question in the negative — the amounts paid by the assessee company as cess for roads, public works and education were not allowable as deductions under section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income‑tax Act read with section 10(4).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the assessee's claim for deduction of the road/P.W.D. cess and the primary education cess is rejected; the Appellate Tribunal's exclusion of those cesses was affirmed. The respondent was awarded costs and the judgment was certified for two counsel.
  • Broader precedent: the opinion reasons from statutory text and applies existing case law by distinguishing factual situations; the court did not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying the clear language of section 10(4) to cesses assessed on profits or by reference to profits. The opinion does not state that it is creating any new rule of law beyond its application to the facts before the court.

Decision: The Appellate Tribunal's conclusion that the road/P.W.D. cess and primary education cess are excluded from deduction by section 10(4) was upheld. Datta, J. concurred.

    Samla Collieries Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.

    Sinha, J.:— These four applications have been consolidated for the sake of convenience inasmuch as a common question of law has arisen in these applications.

    2. The facts are as follows: The assessee in this case is the Samla Collieries Ltd. In its own statement of facts, being annexure “A”, set out at page 65 of the paper-books, it has been stated that the company carried on the business of coal mining and as such had taken several coal mines on lease from owners of land to whom royalties were being paid. It is further stated that the several collieries were being worked by the company and the coal raised therefrom was sold. In other words, this is a simple case of a company working a mine, raising and selling the coal. The assessment years are 1950-51, 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1953-54. For these years, the assessee incurred liabilities for payment of three classes of expenses (1) road and P.W.D cess, (2) education cess and (3) payments made on account of royalty-holders as per royalty agreements.

    3. We need not deal with the views of the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but may straightaway mention that the Appellate Tribunal held that so far as the amount paid on account of royalty-holders was concerned, that was allowable for deduction, but the amounts paid as cess were excluded because of section 10(4) of the Income-tax Act. The point arises as follows: The road and P.W.D cess are paid under the Bengal Cess Act, being Act IX of 1880. The relevant sections are sections 5 and 6, which run as follows:

    “5. From and after the commencement of this Act in any district or part of a district, all immovable property situate therein except as otherwise in section 2 provided, shall be liable to the payment of a road cess and a public works cess.”

    “6. The road cess and the public works cess shall be assessed on the annual value of lands and ‘until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament’ on the annual net profits from mines, quarries, tramways, railways, and other immovable property, ascertained respectively as in this Act prescribed and the rates at which such cesses respectively shall be levied for each year shall be determined for such year in the manner in this Act prescribed: Provided that the rate at which each such cess shall be levied for any one year shall not exceed the rate of one-half anna on each rupee of such annual value and annual net profits respectively.”

    4. The education cess is levied under the Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930. The relevant section is section 29, which runs as follows:

    “29. (1) In any district or part of a district in which the provisions of this chapter are in force, all immovable property on which the road and public works cesses are assessed according to the provisions of the Cess Act, 1880, shall be liable to the payment of a primary education cess.

    (2) The primary education cess shall be levied at the rate of three and a half pice on each rupee of annual net profits from mines and quarries and at the rate of five pice on each rupee of annual value of land and of annual net profits from tramways, railways and other immovable property as determined under the Cess Act, 1880.”

    5. Coming now to the Income-tax Act, section 10 deals with the headings under which tax is payable and the allowances that are to be made for computing the income on the various headings. Section 10(1) provides that tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head “profits and gains of business, profession or vocation” in respect of the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him. Sub-section (2) lays down the method of computation of such profits or gains. Various allowances are to be made, of which we are concerned in this case with two, namely, section 10(2)(ix) and section 10(2)(xv). Under clause (ix) of subsection (2) allowance is given for any sum paid on account of land revenue, local rates or municipal taxes in respect of such part of the premises as is used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation. Clause (xv) of sub-section (2) is the residuary clause which deals with allowances which are of a revenue nature and not of the nature of capital expenditure. We now come to sub-section (4) of section 10. It reads as follows:

    “10. (4) Nothing in clause (ix) or clause (xv) of sub-section (2) shall be deemed to authorise the allowance of any sum paid on account of any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation or assessed at a proportion of or otherwise on the basis of any such profits or gains…”

    6. Reading these provisions together, it has been held that the amounts paid as cess for road and P.W.D as also the education cess are excluded-by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10. It is conceded that the matter does not come under clause (ix) of sub-section (2). It would come under clause (xv) unless it is excluded by the proviso. The proviso seems to be without complication and excludes allowances of any sum paid on account of any cess levied on the profits or gains of any business. I have already mentioned that the assessee in this case carries on a mining business which consists of raising coal from the mines and selling the same. I do not see how it can be argued that the profit which is gained by raising the coal and selling the same does not come within the provisions of the Cess Act or the Education Cess Act or is not within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 10.

    7. Mr. Mitter appearing on behalf of the assessee has argued that there is a subtle distinction between the profit that is gained by the process of extracting coal from a mine, which, according to him, is different from the profits of the business which the mining company might carry on. I am unable to understand the distinction. He has referred us to a decision of the Supreme Court, being Civil Appeals Nos. 587 and 588 of 1961 in Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. State of Bihar Since reported in [1963] 48 I.T.R S.C 123. and certain other allied cases, which were apparently heard together. In the unreported judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by Ayyangar J. on the 24th of September, 1962, the learned judge was dealing with a particular set of circumstances that arose in those cases. It so happened that the Tata Iron & Steel Company, as well as the other companies mentioned in the judgment, namely, the Indian Iron & Steel Company and the Indian Copper Corporation Ltd., carried on mining operation by raising ore from mines. But the operation of mining was only incidental to their main business, namely, the manufacture of iron and steel or copper. It was argued there that in such an operation, the Cess Act would not be applicable, because no profit was gained by the mere operation of mining. This contention was overruled. The learned judge held that although the assessee companies did not operate the mines and raise the ore for direct sale thereof, and although the goods brought up from the mines were not sold but used in manufacture, it could not be said that there was no profit arising out of the business of mining. That profit was included in the profit that was enjoyed by sale of what has been termed as the “end product”. It is apparent, therefore, that the facts of these cases are quite dissimilar to the present one. In the present case the assessee company, upon their own showing, carried on the business of raising coal from mines and having raised the coal, they carried out no operation of manufacture of any product but simply sold the coal. In my opinion, there is no reason why the complications that arose in the other cases should be introduced herein. It may be that, where a mining company does not sell the coal raised but uses it in some other operation, the question may arise as to the computation of profit which can be said to have arisen out of the mining operation. But the Supreme Court decision is no authority for saying that no profit arose out of the mining operation. On the contrary, it is authority for the proposition that such profit did arise. Naturally, the computation of the profit will depend on the facts of each case. Mr. Mitter's argument was, in brief, that we should make a distinction between the profit made by raising the coal and the profit made in the business of mining. In our opinion, there is no ground or basis for making this distinction in the facts and circumstances of this case. That being so, it seems to be clear that the profits enjoyed by the assessee as a result of the mining business was liable for the payment of cess under both the Acts mentioned above.

    8. Mr. Pal has also pointed out that, even if the matter does not come within the first part of sub-section (4), it certainly comes under the latter part, because the cess is certainly assessed at a proportion or otherwise on the basis of the profits or gains enjoyed by the assessee company as a result of the mining operations. Mr. Pal cited two cases, one being of a Division Bench of this court in Manindra Chandra Nandy v. Secretary of State for India, which subsequently went on appeal to the Privy Council. There, the point raised was as to whether the cess is levied on the property or the income therefrom. In that particular case, the Maharaja of Cossimbazar had leased out certain properties and was getting a royalty. He claimed that he was not himself carrying on the mining operations and, therefore, was not liable for payment of cess. This was negatived. It was held that the cess was not merely to be charged from the occupier but also from the owner. In my opinion, it is not necessary to deal in this case with the particular question that arose in the case above mentioned, namely, as to whether the cess follows the land or the profit arising therefrom. It is quite clear to me that the cess under both the Acts has to be paid because the assessee company carried on mining operations and enjoyed profit. Such payments, however, are not allowable under section 10(2) because of the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10. If it was a kind of cess that is contemplated under clause (ix) of sub-section (2) then it would have been allowed. But since it is a cess payable on the profits or gains of any business or calculated at a proportion on the basis thereof, it is excluded by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10. The Appellate Tribunal, therefore, came to the right conclusion. The question that has been asked is as follows:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount paid by the assessee company as cess for roads, public works and education, was allowable as deduction under section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act read with section 10(4) of the said Act?”

    9. The answer is in the negative. In other words, it is not allowable as a deduction. The respondent is entitled to costs. Certified for two counsel.

    Datta, J.:— I agree.

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    Comments

    Samla Collieries Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.
    (Nov 23, 1962)