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  • Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
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  • Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Reference under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court. The Tribunal referred a question whether certain payments, received by a director (Mr. P.K. Das) who was a nominee of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd., formed part of the total payment made by the principal company (Empire of India Life Assurance Company Ltd.) on the termination of the Chief Agency, and whether those payments were income receipts in the hands of the director (and other nominees) or were capital receipts.

The Reference relates to assessment years 1950–1951 and 1951–1952. D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. had held the Chief Agency for the Assurance Company in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam. In 1948 the Assurance Company terminated the Chief Agency, effective 1 January 1948. Negotiations culminated in terms evidenced by a letter dated 26 June 1948 (and apparently by a formal agreement subsequently), under which the Assurance Company agreed to make certain payments called "compensation" to persons nominated by the Chief Agents.

Under the arrangement some nominated persons (including Mr. P.K. Das) were to receive monthly payments (in Mr. Das's case Rs. 1,000 per month for seven years); some shareholders were to receive nothing; and one nominee (Mrs. A.C. Sen) who was not a company shareholder was to receive Rs. 1,000 per month for life. The agreement also contained restrictive covenants (no carrying on of life assurance business or working for another life office during the payment period) and a cooperation clause. The Tribunal held that the payments to D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. were capital receipts and also held that the payments received by the nominees were capital receipts; the Commissioner of Income-tax was dissatisfied and sought the Court's opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sums paid by the principal company on the termination of the Chief Agency, which formed part of the total payment made to D.M. Das and Sons Ltd., were income receipts or capital receipts in the hands of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd.?
  2. Whether the payments actually received by certain nominees of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. (including the individual assessee, Mr. P.K. Das) — in the form of monthly payments or life payment to a stranger-nominee — were income receipts or capital receipts in the hands of those nominees?
  3. If the payment to the Chief Agents was capital, did the mode of distribution (to nominees, as monthly payments, and in some cases to strangers) alter the character of the receipt in the hands of the individual recipients?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Cement Mines Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, (1956) 29 ITR 629; AIR 1956 Cal 480 Articulation of the practical test—"the look of the thing"—and the question whether the taxpayer was realising an asset (capital receipt) or merely using an asset to obtain income (income receipt). The Court invoked this principle as guidance: it assessed whether D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. was realising an asset (the source of income) and concluded that the termination destroyed the profit-making apparatus (source), so the receipt in the company's hands was capital in nature.
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fleming & Co. (Machinery) Ltd., (1952) 33 Tax Cas 57 (A) Illustrates that where loss of an agency is an ordinary trading risk of a company that trades in such agencies, compensation for such loss can be a trading (income) receipt. The Court considered this authority when noting the Tribunal's reference to it, but distinguished it: D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. did not carry on a business of obtaining and exploiting multiple Chief Agencies, and therefore compensation here was not an ordinary trading receipt but a capital receipt for loss of the source of income.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in two principal strands corresponding to (A) the character of the receipt in the hands of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd., and (B) the character of the receipt in the hands of the individual nominees (including the assessee).

(A) Receipts in the hands of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd.

  • The Court accepted the Tribunal's finding that, judged by the practical test ("look of the thing" from National Cement Mines), the payments received by D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. were capital receipts. The company did not carry on a business of obtaining multiple Chief Agencies; instead the Chief Agency for the Assurance Company was the principal or sole business and its termination destroyed the profit-making apparatus (the source of income).
  • The Court applied the well-settled distinction between loss of income and loss of the source of income: where the loss is of the source itself, compensation is a capital receipt. On the found facts, the loss was of the source, so capital in character.
  • The restrictive covenant in the agreement (that the company and directors refrain from life assurance business during the payment period) was treated as a covenant the price of which is classically capital; that further supported the capital character of the receipt in the company's hands.
  • The cooperation clause was found by the Tribunal to amount only to co-operation in observing the agreement, not co-operation in carrying on the Assurance Company's business, and thus of no significance to convert the nature of the receipt.
  • The Court considered but accepted the Tribunal's factual finding that the parties treated the rights to future commission as extinguished (i.e., not a matter affecting the valuation of the compensation). Although the surrender of future commissions could, in another factual setting, require allocation and possibly yield an income element, on the Tribunal's finding that right was treated as non-existent, the company receipt remained capital.

(B) Receipts in the hands of the nominees (including Mr. P.K. Das)

  • The Court disagreed with the Tribunal's second proposition that the fact the payments were made to nominees and spread over years did not matter. The Court held that it does make a difference: the payments to nominees bore characteristics inconsistent with being installments of a pre-determined capital sum.
  • Three principal considerations led the Court to characterize the nominees' receipts as income:
    1. The mode of distribution and identity of recipients: payments were to nominees (including at least one stranger), and the benefits were not apportioned according to shareholdings. This made the arrangement look like the Chief Agents using their compensation to provide annuities/incomes to chosen persons rather than direct distribution of a capital sum as shareholders.
    2. The absence of an ascertained aggregate capital sum: there was no fixed total compensation apportioned to each recipient. Payments depended on contingencies (e.g., Mrs. A.C. Sen's monthly payment depended on her life span; payments to others depended on survival for the seven-year term). Thus monthly payments were not merely installments of an ascertained capital sum but variable payments akin to income.
    3. The recipients were not receiving payments as consideration for their own direct contractual surrender of rights to the Assurance Company. The restrictive covenant binding nominees did not transform the receipts into capital, because the nominees were not parties contracting with the Assurance Company; the covenant was imposed by the Chief Agents and directors in the agreement between themselves and the Assurance Company. There was no factual or legal basis to attribute a determinable capital allocation to the covenant in favor of any nominee.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded that, while the compensation was capital in the hands of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd., the actual receipts by the nominees (the only receipts before the Reference) were income receipts in their hands.

Holding and Implications

The Court's core ruling: The payments received by the nominees of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. (including the assessee, Mr. P.K. Das) were income receipts and not capital receipts in the hands of those recipients.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The Tribunal's conclusion that the receipts in the hands of D.M. Das and Sons Ltd. were capital was accepted by the Court; however, the Court disagreed with the Tribunal's extension of that character to the nominees' receipts and held that the nominees' receipts were income.
  • The Reference was answered in the affirmative (i.e., in favor of treating the nominees'/assessee's receipts as income receipts), and there will be no order as to costs because the taxpayer did not appear or resist the Reference.
  • The opinion distinguishes the facts from precedent where compensation for loss of an agency was held to be trading income (Fleming), thereby limiting that authority's application to cases where the taxpayer carries on a business of acquiring and exploiting such agencies; here that was not the case.
  • No broader legal innovation or new general principle is asserted beyond the application and clarification of established tests (the "look of the thing" test and established distinctions between loss of income and loss of source); the decision's effect is primarily to resolve the character of the specific payments at issue on these facts.

Additional procedural/administrative notes from the opinion:

  • Mr. P.K. Das (the assessee before the Court) did not appear in the Reference and was not represented; a clause in the agreement provided that if any income-tax were levied on payments under the agreement, the Assurance Company would bear it.
  • Justice Guha concurred with the judgment (notation in the opinion: "Guha, J.:— I agree.").

This summary is confined strictly to the facts, findings and reasoning presented in the provided opinion. No information has been inferred or added beyond the text of the judgment supplied.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. P.K. Das

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Chakravartti, C.J:— This is a Reference under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, by which the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred to this Court a short question of a familiar shape. The question asks whether certain payments received by a director of a company of Chief Agents, which was a part of the total payment made by the principal company on the termination of the Chief Agency, were income receipts in the hands of the director or were capital receipts. The tribunal have held that the sums were capital receipts. The Commissioner of Income-tax, being dissatisfied, has brought up the question before us for an expression of the Court's opinion.

    2. The Reference relates to two assessment years, namely, 1950-1951 and 1951-1952. It has arisen out of the following facts.

    3. The assessee is, or perhaps was, a director of a company, going by the name of D.M Das and Sons Ltd. I say ‘was’, because it is not clear whether after the termination of the Chief Agency, the company which had this particular agency as its main, if not the only business, has at all continued to exist. The present assessment of the assessee is an assessment in his capacity of an individual. It appears that D.M Das and Sons Ltd., held the Chief Agency of the Empire of India Life Assurance Company Limited for Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam. As such Chief Agents, the company procured considerable business for the principal company and built up for it a fine business reputation in the area covered by the Chief Agency. Nevertheless in 1948, the Life Assurance Company decided to terminate the Chief Agency and take up the business directly into his own hands. Certain negotiations as regards the terms on which the Agency was to be terminated followed and it appears that ultimately a set of proposals was made by the Chief Agents. Those proposals were accepted by the Assurance Company with certain modifications and the terms, as so modified, are evidenced by a letter which the Assurance Company wrote to the Chief Agents on the 26th of June 1948. The seventh term, as set out in that letter, states that a formal agreement, giving effect to the arrangement agreed to between the parties, would be drawn up Subsequently with the approval of the company's solicitors and it may be presumed that an agreement was in fact drawn up. In those circumstances, it would have been proper if the formal agreement had been produced in the case as evidence of the terms on which the Chief Agency was terminated. But since both parties proceeded on the footing that the terms, as set out in the letter of the 26th of June 1948, were the terms upon which the termination took place, I shall overlook what appears to me to have been a slight irregularity.

    4. The effective terms were six in number, although there were in some of them what I may call sub-terms. It was agreed that the termination of the Agency would have effect as from the 1st of January 1948. On and from that date, the Chief Agents would not be entitled to and would not be paid any commission or renewal commission on business secured by them during the period of their Chief Agency. The amounts of commission or renewal commission which had already accrued due for the period ending on the 31st of March 1947, but which had not been paid or accounted for, would be adjusted and paid to the Chief Agents, but as regards the period after that date the bills for commission submitted by the sub-agents would be settled by the Assurance Company directly. As a corollary to that term, it was further agreed that all expenditure incurred by the Chief Agents on account of establishment and other usual charges would be payable by the company from the 1st of January 1948, till the actual date of the handing over of the Chief Agents' business. The handing over would be in the form that the entire organisation of the Chief Agents would be taken over by the Assurance Company as from the 1st of January 1948.

    5. As a consideration for the termination of the Chief Agency, the Assurance Company agreed to pay to certain persons nominated by the Chief Agents certain amounts which were collectively called ‘compensation’. There were seven share-holders of the company of Chief Agents, namely, Mr. Amiya Kumar Sen, Mr. Anil Kumar Sen, Mr. P.K Das, Mrs. Maya Bose, Mr. Dilip Bose, Mr. A.B Gupta and Mr. Anupam Sen, but of them, Mr. Amiya Kumar Sen, Mr. Dilip Bose and Mr. Anupam Sen were not to receive any payment at all. For Mr. Anil Kumar Sen, Mr. A.B Gupta, Mrs. Maya Bose and Mr. P.K Das, who is the assessee before us, payments at certain rates per month, to be made for a period of seven years, were provided for. A further provision was made for payment of Rs. 1,000 per month to one Mrs. A.C Sen, who was the mother of Mr. Amiya Kumar Sen, to be made for the period of her life. Mrs. Maya Bose, it may be stated here, was the mother of Mr. Dilip Bose who was himself a director, but for whom no provision was made by the agreement.

    6. It appears, and the tribunal has so found, that even the share-holders who were to get monthly payments under the terms of the agreement were to receive benefits which were not in proportion to their share-holdings.

    7. A further covenant provided that neither the company, nor any of the recipients of the compensation would carry on life assurance business or work for any other Life Office during the period of the payment of the compensation, but, on the other hand, the company and its directors, more particularly Mr. Amiya Kumar Sen, would extend their full co-operatidn to the Assurance Company.

    8. The question before us concerns the nature of the payment which one of the directors of the company of Chief Agents, who held twenty-three shares in the company, was to receive from the Assurance Company under the terms on the agreement. The amount receivable by him was Rs. 1,000 per month for a period of seven years.

    9. The assessee, Mr. P.K Das, did not enter appearance in the Reference and has not been represented before us at the hearing. Probably, the reason is to be found in cl. 3(b) of the agreement which states that if any income-tax is levied on any of the payments provided for in the agreement, the same will be borne by the Assurance Company.

    10. In the letter of the 26th of June 1948, to which I referred a moment ago, the terms of S. the agreement are referred to as ‘the terms of relinquishment of your appointment as Chief Agents’. If the compensation was compensation for a voluntary relinquishment of the Chief Agency, the principles applicable in judging its true character would obviously be different. It was, however, agreed before us, and so it appears to have been agreed before the tribunal, that there was no voluntary relinquishment by, the Chief Agents of their office, but the appointment was terminated by the principal Company. The description ‘terms of relinquishment of your appointment as Chief Agents’ does not, therefore, appear to be correct. On the other hand, the appellate order of the tribunal states that the agreement was that the Assurance Company would pay the Chief Agents ‘compensation for the loss of the Chief Agency’. Not only is that statement made in the course of the preliminary narration of the facts, but it also appears that while giving their reasons for the view they are going to take, the tribunal make it a point that the payments were ‘described as compensation for loss of agency’. Wherefrom the tribunal imported that description is not clear, unless it was from the case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fleming & Co. (Machinery) Ltd., (1952) 33 Tax Cas 57 (A), to which they have referred and in Which it occurs. If, on the other hand, they took the description from the formal deed of agreement referred to in the last of the clauses set out in the letter of the 26th of June 1948, it is all the more regrettable that the formal deed was not referred to or included in the paper book. It is true that nothing decisive turns on the words employed by either the payer or the recipient of a certain sum in describing the payment made, but they are some evidence as regards how the parties themselves regarded the payment and thus some evidence of their intention. So far as the description quoted by the tribunal is concerned, we do not find any materials before us to Show that the parties themselves had used it and, therefore, we shall leave it out of account.

    11. The decision of the tribunal falls into two parts. They have held that the payments provided for in the agreement, regarded as payments made to D.M Das and Sons Limited, could not possibly be anything but capital receipts. Proceeding a step further, they have held that it made no difference that the payments were made to the nominees of the Chief Agents, nor did it make any difference that the payments were made and taken in the form of monthly payments, spread over a number of years. According to the tribunal, the receipts by the nominees of the Chief Agents were equally capital receipts.

    12. As regards the first of their findings, I am prepared to accept the view taken by the tribunal. The question whether a particular receipt is an income or a capital receipt is always a vexed, question and no test of a hard and fast character can be laid down. It is fashionable to say that each case must be decided on its own facts, but to suggest that form of approach is not by any means to solve the difficulty. Broadly stated, a principle which I think may safely be acted on is the principle which I ventured to state in the case of National Cement Mines Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, (1956) 29 ITR 629 : (AIR 1956 Cal 480) (B). You have to consider the look of the thing and having taken notice of the look, you have to ask yourself this question: Was the assessee realising an asset or was he merely using an asset as a means of obtaining an income or even if he was realising an asset, was he doing it in such a form that the payments arranged by him lost their character of capital receipts and become income?

    13. I am prepared to hold that, judged by that test the payment, as received by D.M Das and Sons Limited from the Assurance Company, can be said to have been a capital receipt. It has not been found, nor is it the case of anybody, that D.M Das and Sons Limited was carrying on the business of obtaining Chief Agencies from different companies and exploiting such Chief Agencies for profit. If such had been to nature of the trading adventure of D.M Das and Sons Limited, it might have been said, as was said in the case of (1952) 33 Tax Cas 57 (A), that loss of one of the Chief Agencies was an ordinary trading risk of the company and compensation received for such loss would be a trading receipt. The finding in the present case, on the other hand, is that the Chief Agency of the Assurance Company was the principal, if not the only, business of D.M Pas and Sons Limited. This Chief Agency, therefore, was it's profit-making apparatus and the termination of the Chief Agency meant that the whole structure of that apparatus was destroyed with no means left for making any profits in the future. I do not think that it is necessary to enlarge on the distinction between the loss of an income and the loss of the source from which income is received. It is well-settled that when the loss is a loss of the source itself, the compensation received for that loss is a capital and not an income receipt. On the facts of the present case, it must, in my view, be held that the loss which D.M Das and Sons Limited suffered was a loss of the source of its income.

    14. Coming now to the specific terms of the agreement, one of them is that neither the company, nor the directors would carry on any life assurance business or work for any other Life Office during the period of the payment of the compensation, either directly or indirectly. That, it is clear, is a restrictive covenant and it is equally well-settled that the price received for submitting to a restrictive covenant in regard to one's business or profession is a capital receipt. Another term is that the company and its directors, more particularly one of them, would extend their full co-operation to the Assurance Company, but it has been found by the tribunal on admission made before them that the co-operation contemplated was only co-operation in observing the terms of the agreement and not co-operation with the Assurance Company in carrying on its assurance business. That being so, this particular term is of no consequence.

    15. Some difficulty, in my view, is created by a further term which provides that on and from the date when the termination of the Chief Agency would take effect, the Chief Agents would not be entitled to, nor be paid, any commission or renewal commission on business secured by them during the period of their Chief Agency. The tribunal did take notice of this term and observed that if the payments, agreed to by the Assurance Company, had been in part in commutation of the right of the Chief Agents to receive the renewal commissions — I should think that it would have been more correct to say ‘payments agreed to by the Chief Agents to be received in commutation of their rights’ — it might have been necessary to allocate a reasonable proportion of them to that right and to consider whether, at least, the portion reasonably attributable to that right would not be an income receipt. The tribunal, however, thought that the matter was disposed of by clause 2(a) of the agreement which provided that on and from the 1st of January 1948, the Chief Agents would not be ‘entitled to or paid any commission or renewal commission’ and they added that there was nothing to cast any doubt on the good faith of that clause. I confess I find some difficulty in appreciating what the tribunal could have really meant. If the clause relied on by them provides, as it undoubtedly does, that on and from the date on which the Chief Agency would stand terminated, the Chief Agents would no longer be entitled to and would no longer be paid any commission or renewal commission, I cannot see that such meaning of the clause excludes the argument that a part of the receipts was the price for the surrender of the recurring right to receive commission or renewal commission and, therefore, an income receipt. Probably, what the tribunal meant was that the Chief Agents elected to bargain with the Assurance Company on the basis that they would not merely forbear from demanding commission or renewal commission after the appointed date, but they would treat their right to receive such commission as extinguished or as having never existed, so that no commission or renewal commission would be claimable. In any event, the finding is that in determining the amount of the compensation, the right to receive commission or renewal commission in the future was not in the minds of the parties at all and that the right was treated as non-existent, being mentioned only for pointing out that it was so. If this term be left out of account, as on the finding of the tribunal, I think it may be, the payment to the Chief Agents, as provided for by the agreement can, in my view, be properly regarded as a capital receipt in their hands.

    16. I, however, find myself unable to accede to the second proposition of the tribunal. In my view, the fact that the payment with which we are here concerned is not a payment received by D.M Das and Sons Limited as such, but a payment received by a nominee of the company, although a director, does make a difference and a further difference is made by the form in which the payments were arranged to be paid and received. One of the tests applied in deciding whether a particular instalment payment is capital or income is, although it is not a decisive test, to see whether the instalment has any relation to any ascertained capital sum. If the payment is only an instalment of a capital sum, it is obviously not an income receipt in the hands of the recipient, but an instalment of a debt and therefore a capital receipt. In the present case the assessee, it might be useful to remind ourselves, is not D.M Das and Sons Limited, but Mr. P.K Das. The payments in which he was to participate under the agreement were, it is true, payments agreed to by and between D.M Das and Sons Limited and the Assurance Company, but those payments were to be made not to the company of the Chief Agents as such, but to its nominees and such nominees included at least one stranger. Mrs. A.C Sen, although the mother of Mr. Amiya Kumar Sen, one of the directors, was a stranger to the company. Even where the nominees were share-holders of the company of the Chief Agents, the provision made for them was not in proportion to their share-holdings. The look of the thing, therefore, is that the Chief Agents were, by the agreement, buying annuities and providing for an income for certain persons of their choice and doing so with the compensation that they were themselves entitled to receive.

    17. Looked at from another point of view, the receipts by the several nominees would appear to bear the same character. There was no fixed sum agreed to and determined as the compensation payable. On the other hand, the sum payable was left very much at large. The payment provided for Mrs. A.C Sen was a payment for her life and naturally its quantum would depend upon the number of months she might live and, therefore, according as her life was long or short, the amount payable to her would be large or small. The payments provided for the other recipients were also months payments for the specified period of Seven years and, in their case too, the amount payable to each would be greater or smaller according as he or she lived the full period of seven years or died earlier. It can, therefore, by no means, be said that the monthly payments receivable by the several nominees of; the company of Chief Agents were merely instalments of a determined amount, agreed to as the total compensation payable.

    18. A third circumstance which stamps these receipts with the character of income is that they are obviously not being paid to the several recipients for the reason or at least the sole reason that they are members of the company of Chief Agents. As I have already pointed out, at least one recipient was a stranger. The real character of the arrangement, therefore, is not that the several recipients are receiving portions of the compensation paid by the Assurance Company to the Chief Agents as such compensation and as share-holders of the company of Chief Agents, but that the company of Chief Agents is using its right to receive compensation from the principal company or, to go a step further, using the compensation received which is an asset in its hands, for providing an income for the several nominees who are not receiving the same directly from the Assurance Company in exchange for some rights of their own, but receiving it from the Chief Agents in the form of an annuity provided by the Chief Agents for them. I cannot see that, on the facts of the case, the receipts by the several nominees can be said to bear any other character. This is not even a case when a person is receiving a capital sum in a form which makes it income in his hands, but it is a case where a person, receiving a capital sum, is using it to provide incomes for third parties, one of whom is the assessee before us.

    19. There is one obligation cast on the nominees which must, however, be referred to. As has been seen, they too are required to refrain from carrying on any life assurance business or working for any other Life Office directly or indirectly during the period of the payment of the compensation. It might be argued that, at least to a certain extent, they are getting the monthly payments as a price for their submission to this restrictive covenant and, therefore, at least a portion of the payments which may be found reasonably attributable to this restriction should be treated as a capital receipt. I do not think that the argument is sound, because the agreement is not an agreement between the Assurance Company and the nominees of the Chief Agents. It is not as if the nominees themselves are contracting with the Assurance Company and surrendering certain rights for a compensation. The term I have referred to is only a term imposed by the immediate parties to the agreement on the nominees of one of them and, whether in law or fairly regarded on the facts, I do not think it can be said that any part of the payments provided for the nominees was determined on the basis of the restraint sought to be imposed. It is important to recall again in this connection that the persons who are promising to the Assurance Company are the company of the Chief Agents and the directors. The promise is not by the nominees, although some of them are share-holders and certainly there is no promise by the nominee who is a stranger.

    20. In all the facts of the case and from the look of the thing, it appears to me that the receipts of the nominees of the company of Chief Agents which are the only receipts, with which we are concerned in this Reference, were in their hands income and not capital receipts.

    21. The question referred by the tribunal must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative.

    22. Since there has been no appearance on behalf of the tax payer and he has not resisted the Reference, there will be no order as to costs.

    23. Guha, J.:— I agree.

    V.B.B

    24. Reference answered in the affirmative.

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. P.K. Das
    (Jul 26, 1957)