Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950.
  • section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950,
  • SECTION 2 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • rule 21 of Order XI of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950
  • section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • 43, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order XLIII, rule 1(f)
  • rule 16 of Order VI
  • rule 21 of Order XI
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950.
  • section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950,
  • SECTION 2 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • rule 21 of Order XI of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950
  • section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • 43, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order XLIII, rule 1(f)
  • rule 16 of Order VI
  • rule 21 of Order XI
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Bachawat, J.; concurrence by Guha Ray, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (landlord) instituted a suit for ejectment against the opposite party (tenant) in the Court of the 4th Subordinate Judge, Alipore. On 24 August 1955 the Subordinate Judge struck out the tenant's defence on the ground that he had not deposited arrears of rent, by an order made under the provisions of section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950.

Before the suit proceeded further and before any decree for ejectment was passed, the tenant preferred an appeal against that order to the learned District Judge of 24-Parganas. The landlord contended that this appeal was incompetent and not maintainable; the District Judge held that the appeal was maintainable by his order dated 19 November 1955 and fixed the appeal for hearing on 7 January 1956.

The landlord filed the present application in revision before this Court challenging the District Judge's order dated 19 November 1955. The principal question raised was whether the appeal against an order made under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, is maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies from an order made under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 (i.e., whether the appeal before the District Judge was maintainable).
  2. Whether an order striking out the defence under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 amounts to a "decree" within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore is appealable as a decree.
  3. Whether this Court has the power to interfere in revision with the District Judge's order dated 19 November 1955 under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Landlord) — Arguments

  • The appeal before the learned District Judge was incompetent and not maintainable because the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 does not provide for an appeal against an order under section 14(4).
  • The order striking out the defence under section 14(4) does not amount to a decree determining the rights of the parties on the matters in controversy in the suit, and therefore the order is not appealable as a decree.

Opposite Party (Tenant) — Arguments

  • The opposite party contended before this Court that no case had been decided by the learned District Judge and therefore no revisional application was maintainable against the District Judge's order dated 19 November 1955.
  • The opposite party contended that the order striking out the defence under section 14(4) conclusively negatives the defendant's right to defend the suit and therefore amounts to a decree (i.e., is appealable).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sunil Baran Roy Chowdhury v. Purna Chandra Chandra (1) (59 C.W.N 974) Appeared to assume that an appeal lies from an order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. The learned District Judge relied upon observations in this case to hold the appeal competent. The High Court (Bachawat, J.) disagreed with those observations insofar as they assume such an appeal lies, noting the earlier judgment gave no reason for holding that such an appeal exists.
Kamini Debi v. Promotha Nath Mukherjee (2) (19 C.W.N 755) Authority for the proposition that a decision merely holding that the plaintiff's suit is maintainable is not a preliminary decree and is not an adjudication on "matters in controversy" in the suit. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that an order negating the right to defend is not a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) CPC and therefore not appealable as a decree.
Meher Singh v. Keshardeo Chamaria (3) (59 C.W.N 1148) Contains the observation by P. N. Mookerjee, J., that an order striking out the defence under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 is not appealable and disagrees with the Sunil Baran Roy Chowdhury decision on that point. The Court expressly agreed with the conclusions of P. N. Mookerjee, J., and cited this as supporting the view that such an order is not appealable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court (Bachawat, J.) began by addressing the jurisdictional question whether it could entertain the revision application. It held that this Court has the power to interfere in revision with orders passed at any stage of a suit for the purpose of preventing failure of justice, even where another remedy is available to the injured party, and found that the District Judge's proceeding would be an inquiry in a matter in which he had no jurisdiction and would lead to unnecessary expense and waste of time if left to stand. The Court therefore concluded the District Judge's order dated 19 November 1955 amounted to a case decided and was amenable to revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The central legal analysis concerned whether an appeal lies from an order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. The Court emphasized the principle that a right of appeal is conferred only by statute: where no statutory right of appeal exists, there can be no appeal. The Rent Control Act of 1950 does not provide for any appeal from an order under section 14(4), and the order is not appealable under Order XLIII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court then considered whether the impugned order could be treated as a "decree" (which might make it appealable). It cited the statutory definition of "decree" in subsection (2) of section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code — a decree is a formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy in the suit. The Court rejected the contention that an order striking out defence under section 14(4) conclusively determines the plaintiff's right to eject: such an order places the tenant in the position as if he had not defended, but the plaintiff must still prove his right to eject at the hearing and the Court must be satisfied before passing a decree for ejectment.

The Court further rejected the argument that denial of the right to defend amounts to a right "with regard to any of the matters in controversy in the suit" and therefore a decree. Relying on Kamini Debi v. Promotha Nath Mukherjee, the Court agreed that an order merely deciding that the suit is maintainable or negating the right to defend is not an adjudication on the substantive matters in controversy and thus is not a decree.

The Court noted that some decisions (specifically Sunil Baran Roy Chowdhury) appeared to assume such orders were appealable but that those decisions gave no statutory or reasoning basis for that assumption. It also relied on Meher Singh v. Keshardeo Chamaria, where P. N. Mookerjee, J. had held an order striking out the defence under section 14(4) is not appealable; the Court expressed agreement with that conclusion.

Guha Ray, J., in concurrence, added that an appeal is a creature of statute and that the order under section 14(4) is neither an appealable order under the Code of Civil Procedure nor a decree under section 2(2) of the Code. He compared the situation to a preliminary issue on jurisdiction: deciding that a party may not contest an issue does not finally determine the substantive rights, which remain to be decided on the main hearing. Accordingly, the order under section 14(4) is not a decree and is not appealable.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court set aside the order of the learned District Judge dated 19 November 1955, adjudged and declared that the appeal before him was not maintainable and directed that the appeal should be dismissed on that ground.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The District Judge's order holding the appeal maintainable is set aside.
  • The District Judge is directed to dismiss the appeal as not maintainable.
  • There will be no order as to costs in this Court.
  • The records are to be sent down as early as possible.

Broader legal implication as stated in the opinion:

  • The Court held that an order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, striking out the defence against ejectment, is not appealable because no statute confers a right of appeal and such an order does not qualify as a "decree" under section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.

    Ashalata Mitra v. A.D Viz Opposite Party.

    Bachawat, J.:— This application in vision is directed against an order of the learned District Judge of 24-Parganas, dated the 19th November, 1955, holding that the appeal was maintainable and fixing the 7th January, 1956, for the hearing of the appeal.

    1. The petitioner landlord instituted against the opposite party tenant a suit for ejectment in the Court of the 4th Subordinate Judge, Alipore. By an order, dated the 24th August, 1955, the learned Subordinate Judge passed an order striking out the defence of the tenant opposite party on the ground that he had not deposited the arrears of rent. This order was passed under the provisions of section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. Before the suit was further proceeded with and a decree was passed, the tenant opposite party preferred an appeal against this order to the learned District Judge. In that appeal, it was contended on behalf of the landlord petitioner that the appeal was incompetent and was not maintainable. The preliminary issue as to whether the appeal was maintainable was tried by the learned District Judge and was decided by his order, dated the 19th November, 1955.

    2. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended before us that the appeal before the learned District Judge was incompetent and that therefore the order complained of should be set aside. The learned Advocate for the opposite party contends that no case has been decided by the learned District Judge and as such no revisional application is maintainable against the order, dated the 19th November, 1955. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. This Court has the power to interfere in revision with orders passed at any stage of a suit, for the purpose of preventing failure of justice even if there is another remedy open to the injured party. If the decision of the learned District Judge is allowed to stand, the learned District Judge would be holding an enquiry in a matter in which he has no jurisdiction vested in him by law and it will lead to unnecessary expenses and waste of time. In my opinion, the order dated the 19th November, 1955, amounts to a case decided and we have the power to interfere with the order under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    3. The learned District Judge held that the appeal was competent, relying upon the observations in Sunil Baran Roy Chowdhury v. Purna Chandra, Chandra (1) (59 C.W.N 974). In that case, in an appeal from a decree for ejectment it was contended that the learned Judge had acted wrongly in passing the order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. The Division Bench observed that no appeal having been preferred against that order, that order became final and could, no longer, be questioned. It was apparently assumed in that judgment that an appeal lay against an order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. The observations in that judgment undoubtedly support the contention that an appeal lies from an order under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950. It is to be noticed, however that the judgment gives no reason for holding that such appeal lies.

    4. A right of appeal can be conferred only by statute. Where no right of appeal has been conferred by statute, there can be no appeal. The West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950, does not provide for any appeal from such order. It is also beyond doubt that the order is not appealable under order 43, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order, therefore can be appealable only if it is a decree. It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the opposite party that the order in question is a decree. By sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, “decree” means “the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final”. It is contended on behalf of the opposite party that the order striking out the defence under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, conclusively determines the right of the plaintiff to eject the defendant from the premises. This contention is entirely without substance. When an order is made under section 14(4), striking out the defence against ejectment, the tenant is placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment. The order does not yet determine that the plaintiff is entitled to ejectment. On the date fixed for hearing of the suit, the plaintiff must adduce evidence to establish that he is entitled to a decree for ejectment and where such evidence is adduced and the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has the right to eject the defendant, the Court can only then pass a decree for ejectment.

    5. It is next urged on behalf of the opposite party that the order striking out the defence under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 conclusively negatives the right of the defendant to defend the suit and therefore the order amounts to a decree. I am again unable to accept this contention. Undoubtedly, the right of defence is a valuable substantive right. In my opinion, however, such right is not a right with regard to any of the matters in controversy in the suit. In Kamini Debi v. Promotha Nath Mukherjee (2) (19 C.W.N 755). Mookerjee and Beachcroft, JJ., held that a decision merely holding that the plaintiff's suit is maintainable is not a preliminary decree and that such a decision was not an adjudication on “matters in controversy” in the suit. I respectfully agree with that decision. In my opinion, the question whether the defendant ought to be entitled to defend the suit is not a right with regard to a matter in controversy in the suit and as such an order negativing the right of such defence does not amount to a decree.

    6. In Meher Singh… v. Keshardeo Chamaria…Opposite Patty.. (3) (59 C.W.N 1148), P.N Mookerjee J., had occasion to point out that an order striking out the defence against ejectment under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, is not appealable and he was not inclined to agree with the decision in Sunil Baran Roy Choudhury v. Purna Chandra Chandra (1) (59 C.W.N 974), on this point. I respectfully agree with the conclusions of P.N Mookerjee, J., on this point.

    7. In my opinion, an order under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, striking out the defence against ejectment, is not appealable. With respect, I am unable to agree with the observations in Sunil Baran Roy Chowdhury v. Purna Chandra Chandra (1) (59 C.W.N 974), in so far as it holds or assumes that such appeal lies. I am strengthened in my conclusions in view of the fact that my learned brother, who was himself a party to the decision in Sunil Baran Roy Choudhury's case (1) is of the opinion that such order is not appealable.

    8. We pass the following order:

    We set aside the order of the learned District Judge, dated the 19th November, 1955. We adjudge and declare that the appeal before him is not maintainable and should be dismissed on that ground. We direct the learned District Judge to dismiss the appeal accordingly.

    9. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. Let the records be sent down as early as possible.

    Guha Ray, J.:— I agree with the view taken by my Lord that an order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, is not appealable and that the view taken by the learned Court below that the appeal before it from such an order was maintainable is not sustainable. But as I was a party to the decision in the case of Sunil Baran Roy Choudhury v. Purna Chandra Chandra (1) (59 C.W.N 974), it is necessary that, I should add a few words of my own. It appears to have been assumed in that case that such an order was appealable but there is no reference to any provision of law under which it was appealable. On a closer examination, however, it now appears that such an order cannot be appealable either as an order or as a decree because there is no provision under which such an order is appealable and because an order striking out the defence is not really a decree within the meaning of the word in section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal is entirely a creature of the statute, so that if the order striking out the defence is appealable, it must be under some provision or other of a statute. The West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, does not make the order appealable. There are in the Civil Procedure Code two provisions under which a defence can be struck out. The first is rule 16 of Order VI and the record is rule 21 of Order XI of the Civil Procedure Code. The second is appealable under Order XLIII, rule 1(f) but clearly an order under section 14 (4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, does not amount to an order under rule 21 of Order XI because that is an order striking out a defence on the ground of non-compliance of the order for discovery. The order under rule 16 of Order VI has not been made appealable at all under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. If, therefore an order under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, is nothing more than an order, it is clearly not appealable.

    10. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite party that the order really amounts to a decree because it negatives the defendant's right to defend the suit. Although the right to defend a suit may be a very valuable right, it is not certainly a right in regard to any of the matters in controversy in the suit and by the order striking out the defence, there is really no final decision of any of the matters in controversy and these matters have still to be decided by the Court even after the defence has been struck out.

    11. The nearest analogy to such a case is when in a suit the question of jurisdiction is taken up as a preliminary issue and decided. If the Court decides that it has jurisdiction, that itself does not dispose of the rights of the parties and the Court has still to decide the rights of the parties after it has decided the question of jurisdiction. The order, therefore, to my mind, striking out the defence under section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, cannot amount to a decree and as pointed out by my Lord, there is authority for the proposition that it does not. In these circumstances, it has got to be said that the view taken in Sunil Baran Roy Choudhury v. Purna Chandra Chandra, (1) (69 C.W.N 974), that the order striking out the defence under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, is appealable, does not stand close scrutiny.

    A.K.D.G

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ashalata Mitra v. A.D Viz Opposite Party.
    (Jan 5, 1956)